THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF HASTINGS RASHDALL

by

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PREFACE.

The first part of this thesis presents in the form of a continuous argument the substance of all the philosophical (including the ethical) and theological writings of the late Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924), who was successively Fellow and Tutor in Moral Philosophy at New College, Oxford, Canon of Hereford, and Dean of Carlisle. The second part offers critical reflections upon some of the most important themes; it does not purport to be an exhaustive commentary.

My sincere thanks are due to my advisers, Doctors John Baillie and H.R. Mackintosh of New College, Edinburgh, and to Doctors H.D.A. Major (Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford) and F.L. Cross (Librarian of Pusey House, Oxford), the co-editors of Rashdall's posthumously published essays and sermons. Dr. Cross very kindly read and criticized my entire manuscript.

D. E. R.

Abbreviations.

The following abbreviations have been used in the foot-notes with reference to Rashdall's own books, which are here listed chronologically:[1]

DD --- Doctrine and Development. (1898)
CE --- Christus in Ecclesia. (1904)
GE --- The Theory of Good and Evil. (1907)
(Volume numbers are represented by large Roman numerals; this work is in two volumes, but it is divided into three "Books". Where the Book, instead of the Volume, is referred to, this has been indicated).

PR --- Philosophy and Religion. (1909)
ICE--- Is Conscience an Emotion? (1914)
CC --- Conscience and Christ. (1916)

Atonement --- The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology. (1919)

JHD--- Jesus, Human and Divine. (1922)
PP --- Principles and Precepts. (1927)
ID --- Ideas and Ideals. (1928)
GM --- God and Man. (1930)

The titles of three symposia to which Rashdall contributed have likewise been abbreviated thus:

CV --- Contentio Veritatis. ("The Ultimate Basis of Theism"). (1902).
PI --- Personal Idealism. ("Personality, Human and Divine"). (1902).
FW --- The Faith and the War. ("The Problem of Evil"). (1915).

The titles of periodicals have sometimes been abbreviated, but in such a way as to be unmistakable.

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1. See the Bibliography for full data.

Single inverted commas, throughout, indicate direct quotation; double commas indicate that the expression is a quotation within the book quoted, or a quotation within a quotation, or that it has some special significance. Where two or more succeding quotations are from the same page in the work followed, that page is indicated with reference to the last quotation. In order to avoid confusion, it has sometimes been necessary to capitalize the possessive pronoun when referring to the Deity or to Christ, hence this has been done throughout. Cross-references to pages in this thesis have been uniformly indicated by the symbol #.

Virtually all persons of high academic rank in the United States are "Professors". I have applied the title incorrectly to several British scholars mentioned in the following pages, but this was not pointed out to me until it was too late to make the necessary corrections.

INTRODUCTION

Hastings Rashdall will be remembered primarily for the versatility which enabled him to produce three such works as The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, The Theory of Good and Evil, and The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology. Against the background of a widely diversified learning, he consciously emulated Aquinas in his desire to compass the whole area of knowledge within a consistent theological system.[1] Doubtless he was aware of how far short he fell of this ideal; the magnitude of his enterprise inevitably laid his writings open to defects, although he was more successful in avoiding superficiality than are most thinkers who have the temerity to undertake huge tasks of research in a number of different fields. Scholars have frequently questioned his originality within their respective spheres, but they have hastily coupled this with admiration for his ability otherwise. The Biblical scholar, for example, is not favourably impressed by him as an exegete, and suggests that his strength lay, say, in metaphysics. The philosopher esteems him more as a courageous theologian than as a philosopher. The theologian is convinced that here was a really great historian whose mind proved to be a bit too unyielding when he turned to constructive theology. This, of course, is the price of versatility, and his critics are

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1. 'Thomas Aquinas did a great work for his time by putting Christianity into a shape in which it satisfied, on the whole, the intellect of his day - by combining the truth about God which the world had learned from Christ with all the truth about man and the Universe which it had learned from other sources... But knowledge and thought go on growing, and the work which St. Thomas did for his age wants doing again for ours; for knowledge increases and thought advances, and Theology, if it is to be a living science, must advance too'. (GM., p. 198).

justified in emphasizing those shortcomings which their training has prepared them to discern most readily. Nevertheless a review of Rashdall's writings should be challenging precisely because he attempted with at least a boldness which few English thinkers of his generation can rival, to bind ethics, metaphysics and theology into one consistent system. This fact in itself seems to furnish sufficient excuse for a survey which is designed to present the essence of his thought in a single, coherent argument.

At the same time the variety and scope of the problems he discusses, the wealth of historical detail which he brings to bear upon them, the pains with which he scrutinizes opposing points of view, and the concreteness with which he habitually relates theoretical issues to practical affairs, often by means of humourous illustrations, - all these considerations set definite limits to what a monograph of this kind can accomplish. Historical and exegetical material has been dealt with in an extremely summary manner; so far as criticism of his scholarship is concerned, I have not mentioned even all the most dubious points. Controversial matter has also been reduced to a minimum, though anyone familiar with Rashdall's career will know that it would be misleading to separate his thought from replies to opponents. As Dr. W. R. Matthews has put it:

> 'Dr. Rashdall is one of those who never build so well as when they have a sword in one hand and a trowel in the other; he is never so vivacious as when he is slaying either a high churchman or a denier of the objectivity of moral judgments'.[1]

Of Rashdall's influence as a preacher the following pages can give but little hint, because practical applications and discussion of detailed theological questions have had to give way before issues

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1. Hibbert Journal. Vol. XIII, p. 926.

of principle; his purely historical writings, and virtually all of his articles on social, economic and educational problems, have been passed over for the same reason. The bibliography, in which I have sought to include everything he has published, indicates where these neglected items can be found. In the chapter on metaphysics,[1] and in one portion of the chapter on doctrine,[2] I have felt justified in giving a rather full outline of his opinions, in an effort to compensate in some small way for deficiencies which Rashdall's death prevented him from supplying as he intended. All else, including much that could have been discussed with great profit, has been sacrificed in an attempt to show the relationship in which each main aspect of his thought stands to the others. So large a proportion of his work is contained in isolated articles, lectures and small books, that if the expository section of this thesis succeeds in leaving a clear impression of the singleness of purpose which he brought to his variegated intellectual activities, it will be of more value than the critical reflections offered in the latter half.

The task of setting forth Rashdall's religious philosophy in a unified, orderly statement is facilitated by the fact that his writings, from the earliest to the latest, manifest a remarkable consistency. Apparently he did not begin contributing to philosophical journals until he had thought out the rudimentary outlines of a working philosophy; for it is possible in the case of every important aspect of his thought to point to some essay or sermon written prior to 1900 which contains the basic principles of his later books. Perhaps this will be taken as indicating either that he was too stubborn to change his point of view, or that his thought crystallized into an unyielding system. He was nearly

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1. Chapter III
2. Chapter IV, 2. - concerning the Incarnation.

thirty years of age, however, before his first philosophical articles began to appear; and in the succeeding ten years, while he was engaged primarily in his work on the medieval universities, he unhurriedly developed his own speculative outlook. Hence one of the reasons why he did not change the first principles of his philosophy as his thought progressed, was that he had not expressed them prematurely. What took place, then, in the period between 1900 and his death, when all his philosophical and theological books (except for the first volume of sermons) were written, was the gradual elaboration and deepening of a single world-view, as his mind confronted fresh problems and fortified itself with an increasingly wide study of the history of Christian thought.

Still another consideration helps to explain the consistency of his work as a whole. He habitually reached theoretical conclusions as the result of reflection upon practical issues, and he had no interest in building up an architectonic system for its own sake. Therefore his philosophy bears to a striking degree the impress of his own temperament, and his temperament can hardly be characterized except as one of rugged common sense. Perhaps he appealed too frequently to "the plain, self-evident facts" in seeking to substantiate really questionable points in his own position; certainly he had no hesitation in waving aside dialectical brilliance whenever he felt that it led ultimately to nonsense. In any case, familiarity with his characteristic reactions and methods frequently makes it possible for one to conjecture in advance how he will treat a new problem and what his conclusions will be. One can even reconstruct what in all probability would be the essence of his attitude toward the Oxford Group Movement or toward Barthianism, if he were alive today.

This desire to make every aspect of his thinking cohere found expression in an unwavering confidence in reason; yet he always looked upon the functioning of reason as integral to the unified consciousness of the self. Hence on the one hand he broke away from absolute idealism because of its hypostatization of abstract thought. But on the other hand he was an avowed opponent of the voluntaristic tendencies which came into philosophical prominence during his life-time; for example, he was convinced that pragmatism ignores the distinction between objective truth and falsity. His rationalism continually involved him in disputes with conservative churchmen when he turned to theology; because he regarded the moral consciousness as included within the sphere of reason, and then built his theology largely upon that foundation, he left little room for the mystical, the mysterious and the miraculous in religion. He did, indeed, recognize that reason has its limits, but he felt that those limits mark the boundary of what the human mind can know at all; once reason had been pressed to the utmost, he regarded it as illegitimate to look for illumination from some region beyond. If some aspects of reality are literally supra-rational, he contended, we cannot even be aware of them, let alone understand them; hence it is better to assume an attitude of reverent agnosticism in such matters than to introduce contradictory or unintelligible elements into theology. This intellectual disposition in itself would have been sufficient to make his career in the Church a stormy one; but other personal characteristics intensified the inevitable conflicts. In the first place, he did not permit his very real desire for conciliation so to soften his statements as to blur their meaning.

Rather than foster harmony through silence or vague language, he preferred to serve the cause of truth within the Church by actively attacking doctrines or beliefs which he regarded as unsound. Popular approval seemed to him a poor substitute for intellectual integrity. Dean Inge has written of him:

> 'My friend Rashdall...was impelled by his combative disposition always to sieze a poker by the hot end, and in consequence had a reputation for heresy which he certainly did not deserve'.[1]

What must have given even greater pain to conservative opponents than his aggressive liberalism was the fact that Rashdall was convinced of his own fundamental orthodoxy. He recognized that he was at odds with the general opinion of the Church on questions involving miracles, especially with regard to the Virgin Birth and the physical Resurrection; but he did not look upon these as essential. With regard to doctrines like the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the Atonement, however, he was ready to defend his orthodoxy with an acuteness and a wealth of historical learning which must have made him troublesome as an opponent. Moreover, when he felt sufficiently justified, he did not limit his remarks to an apologetic for his own position; he boldly charged notoriously conservative theologians with holding views which were really heretical.

Unmitigating confidence in reason is not an unmixed blessing in a theologian; and if many err on the side of being too ready to evade difficulties by relegating them to a realm of divine mystery, Rashdall perhaps erred in the opposite manner; he followed out the logical implications of his thought so rigorously that he sometimes reached conclusions too clear-cut to be true. Some of his own

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1. Cf. Vale, p. 54. Rashdall himself one said of Bernard Bosanquet that the latter had 'exceeded the limits of courtesy that were customary between scholars' (Oxford Magazine. Vol. XLII. p. 276).

friends felt this to be especially the case with his solution to the problem of evil; Dean Inge once said with regard to his conception of a limited Deity: "I have no use for godlets".[1] Again, the consistency of Rashdall's own mind often led him astray when he studied exegetical and historical questions; to Biblical writers, to the framers of the creeds, or to great theologians of the past, he tended to attribute a uniformity in the use of terms and a logical coherence which in many instances they did not possess. Moreover, in his studies of historical theology he usually had some polemical purpose uppermost in his mind, and this inevitably biased his researches in favour of whatever would support his own thesis; as a result, what he meant to be an impartial survey of a writer's thought at times turned into special pleading.

All these considerations fall within the perspective of a wider purpose which will lie continually in the background of this thesis, and concerning which a word must now be said. Rashdall's religious philosophy repays study not only because of features already mentioned, but because the type of thinking which it represents is undergoing such widespread criticism to-day. Undeniably his conception of theology is the sort which Barth cannot abide. To be sure, Rashdall did not fall into all the heresies of liberalism which the Barthians have catalogued. His distrust of arguments based on immediate religious experience put him poles asunder from the subjectivism and the mysticism which Schleiermacher is usually blamed for insinuating into Christian theology. Again, acceptance of the evolutionary view of history did not lead Rashdall into the superficial optimism which, it is alleged, tainted European and American theology before the war; he conceived of salvation and the Kingdom - to take specific examples - as beginning in a terrestrial process which reaches fruition only in the future, in a

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1. Dr. Major recounted this to me; so far as I know it has not appeared in print.

supra-mundane order. Most noteworthy of all, he was not an indeterminist. But the alternatives which he adopted must seem to the Barthian equally bad. For if Rashdall reacted against subjectivism, he at the same time repudiated the distinction between natural and revealed theology. And if he reacted against a shallow optimism, he at the same time refused to acknowledge any radical separation between God and man, between the supernatural and the natural - any "infinite qualitative difference between the eternal and the temporal"[1] - such as Barthianism involves.

Naturally recent theological tendencies cannot be discussed in this thesis; but if a period of reaction is apt to swing too far in the opposite direction, overlooking the merits and exaggerating the defects of the previous period, then the study of a powerful representative of liberalism should help to suggest which elements in it may rightly be discarded and which should not be allowed to perish in the rising tide of the Theology of Crisis. I have already admitted that in a few respects Rashdall does not fit into the Barthian description of what constitutes a liberal; perhaps his writing may be taken as indicating that this description sometimes borders on mere caricature. Yet if a steadfast belief in the reasonableness of Christianity, and a firm conviction that theology should be built upon an ethical foundation, be the two most important features of liberalism,[2] Rashdall assuredly epitomizes them. In so far as Barthianism places man's reason, including conscience, within the sphere of the flesh, it strikes at the foundation upon which post-Kantian Protestant theology has largely rested. This fact should make our present enterprise all the more relevant to current problems; for every difficulty which Rashdall

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1. The expression is Kierkegaard's, but I cannot recall exactly where I have read it.
2. Cf. C.J. Shebbeare's remarks in The Atonement in History and in Life, p. 309.

encounters in defending the independent validity of moral judgments (on which he primarily bases his theology), in defending theism by other speculative arguments, and in employing this theistic system as an apologetic for Christian doctrine, attests to the danger of resting the validity of Christian revelation upon purely rational grounds. At the same time, wherever the strength of his own position becomes apparent, then we may take that as an admonition against lightly relinquishing whatever benefits a rational theology has to offer.

Admittedly we cannot generalize concerning such momentous questions on the basis of one man's thought. Yet there are certain advantages to be derived from the study of one representative of a movement, which would remain even if an understanding of liberalism were our primary concern. In one man's mind, if it be penetrating enough, the essence of a movement may be distilled away from extraneous elements. This gives rise to a danger if it blinds one to the fact that the movement is more diffuse than the man; but on the other hand, it may enable one to discern certain cardinal features which otherwise would not have been distinguishable admidst the confusing welter of a generation's thought. Rashdall took such pains to show the organic relationship between his own ideas and the traditional doctrines of Christianity, that in his case we find an especially good opportunity for forming some sort of a judgment concerning what place belongs to liberalism in the sweep of dogmatic history. Because he was awake to the various influences which were moulding European thought, especially prior to the war, we can study in him the perennial problem of the relationship between Christian theology and secular thought as it pertains to the development of liberalism. In this connexion his acquaintance with current philosophical disputes, as well as the close attention which he gave to

the findings of higher criticism and to specific theological tendencies like Ritschlianism and Catholic modernism, make his religious philosophy a meeting ground for most of the forces which fashioned Christian thought in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

A further word should be said here concerning the sources from which he drew; in so far as possible I have indicated, at the appropriate point in the exposition, those writers who influenced him most. In some instances, however, it has been necessary to do more than this. Because in many respects he reached his own conclusions primarily in response to or in reaction against the writings of others, it has been undesirable to abstract those conclusions entirely from the setting in which they developed. These references to other thinkers have been confined to that bare minimum which is indispensable to an understanding of Rashdall's own position. In order to avoid confusion, the ideas of others have been stated in the sense in which they influenced him; frequently his interpretation is by no means the only one possible, and in some instances it may seem to be positively unfair or misleading. Where this latter has been the case, I have sometimes sought to indicate the fact in so far as my own acquaintance with the writers concerned made that possible; but the main purpose throughout has been first to unfold Rashdall's thought as it stands, and then to criticize it in terms of itself. While supplementary reading has been employed in criticizing the various aspects of his system, all else has been made subordinate to a consideration of difficulties which are inherent to that system. Hence, to the extent that conscious effort enables one to do so, I have usually suppressed my own prejudices and predilections, with the intention of making such criticisms as are offered those which would occur most inevitably to anyone who studied his thought as a whole.

The thesis thus divides itself into two main sections; the first is expository and the second critical. In the former, while following the inner logic of Rashdall's own thought, I have nevertheless attempted to bring out the chief points of weakness in such a manner that the way is prepared for a critical examination of them in the latter half. Naturally this latter half is largely destructive in tone because those aspects of his thought which rest on a firm foundation need little further comment; this will not be taken, I trust, as indicating a lack of respect on my part for the work of a very earnest and able Christian theologian.

An admirable biography of Rashdall has been written by Percy E. Matheson of New College;[1] in it the various influences which entered into his intellectual life may be traced in detail. Because this volume is readily available I have refrained from mentioning many personal incidents and characteristics which throw much light on Rashdall's writings. It also contains a masterly comment, contributed by Dr. Webb, upon Rashdall as a philosopher and theologian.[2] Articles by Dr. Major[3] and Dr. Kirkby[4] in The Modern Churchman, the preface to God and Man,[5] and Prof. Joseph's brief tribute in The Oxford Magazine,[6] also provide illuminating insight into his character and work.

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1. Percy E. Matheson: The Life of Hastings Rashdall. Oxford 1928.
2. Ibid. Ch. XIII, by C.C.J. Webb.
3. Op. cit. Vol. XIII. pp. 634-42.
4. Ibid. Vol. XVII, pp. 481-88.
5. Op. cit. (Essays by Rashdall, edited by H.D.A. Major and F.L.Cross). Cf. pp. 7-12.
6. Op. cit. Vol. XLII, pp. 275 ff.

OUTLINE

Part Two - Critical Reflections.

PART ONE:

AN EXPOSITION OF RASHDALL'S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I - MORAL THEORY

The epithet once applied to John Dewey serves equally well to indicate the primary characteristic of Dean Rashdall's thinking: "He is incurably ethical". The fruits of Rashdall's reflection during the years when he taught moral philosophy at Oxford are contained in his longest philosophical book, The Theory of Good and Evil. Undoubtedly his two other chief works are more original in their respective fields. Nevertheless, his contribution to ethics was one of the most significant made by any Oxford writer between the time of Green and the controversy of the last few years.[1]

Because the moral consciousness is the focal point of Rashdall's thinking, his entire system must suffer greatly if his ethical theory is found to be defective in any fundamental respect. Future discussion will reveal the fact that his defence of theism rests primarily upon the objectivity of moral values, and that he regards the moral consciousness as affording the most important - if not the only - insight into the character of God. His reinterpretation of Christian doctrine is founded upon the belief that in morality human nature and the nature of God are the expression of a common principle; it is not unfair to say that he uniformly uses his conception of what constitutes moral truth as a criterion for discovering the eternal truth embedded in Christianity. Certainly he feels bound to reject whatever seems immoral in traditional formulations of a doctrine like the Atonement. Therefore no intelligible survey of his religious philosophy can be undertaken except by first scrutinizing his conception of the nature of morality.

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1. A profitable discussion could be devoted to a consideration of Rashdall's ethical position in the light of these later writings by Prichard, Ross, Carritt and Joseph in Oxford, by Moore, Broad and Osborne in Cambridge, by Muirhead in Birmingham, Stocks in Manchester, Laird in Aberdeen, and many others. This is a topic which will receive some attention in the critical section (# 249 ff.); but our theme does not permit a thorough treatment of purely ethical questions.

The predominant affinities of The Theory of Good and Evil are indicated by the fact that it is dedicated to the memory of T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick.[1] Rashdall was a pupil of Green, but he gradually found himself compelled to combat the followers of his master at Oxford, both in ethics and in metaphysics. A cursory glance reveals the pervasiveness of Sidgwick's influence upon him; the real starting point of almost every chapter in the first volume of Rashdall's work is the painstaking analysis which the question at issue received in The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick's influence also accounts for the striking parallel which at times exists between Rashdall's point of view and that of G.E. Moore. At first glance it might seem that the agreement between the two writers was due to direct borrowing on Rashdall's part, since Moore's Principia Ethica was published four years before The Theory of Good and Evil. An early article by Rashdall, however, entitled "The Principle of Authority in its Relation to Morals",[2] gives evidence that he had at that time thought out, in an imperfect form, the fundamental position which appeared sixteen years later in his book;[3] in fact many articles which were included almost unaltered as chapters in that work had appeared before the publication of Moore's treatise.

The manner in which these and other writers affect Rashdall's own thinking is revealed in the opening chapters of The Theory of Good

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1. Prof. Broad once remarked: 'Even a thoroughly second-rate thinker like T.H. Green, by diffusing a grateful and comforting aroma of ethical "uplift", has probably made far more undergraduates into prigs than Sidgwick will ever make into philosophers' (Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 144). Rashdall constitutes an exception to this pleasantry on both counts: for Green failed to make him a prig, and Sidgwick undeniably helped to make him a philosopher. This fact, of course, need not affect Prof. Broad's mordant fidelity to Cambridge.
2. Cf. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.(1891). Vol.I,pp.96-110.
3. Cf. GE.I,pp. viii.ff. for a list of such articles.

and Evil,[1] wherein he undertakes a survey of several contrasting types of ethical theory. His own position, which he calls "ideal utilitarianism", gradually emerges in the course of the argument; and though it is constructed largely by means of a process of selection and rejection, the conclusions reached by no means form an artificially welded or merely eclectic system. For the sake of clarity it will be best to state at the outset the positive conclusions at which he finally arrives; then we may proceed to examine the various considerations which lead Rashdall to assume such a position.

He accepts Sidgwick's contention that ethics must be teleological, - that it must determine the rightness of an action in terms of the extent to which that action will promote an intrinsically good end; the two writers differ sharply, however, concerning what constitutes this end. Both describe it as "universal well-being"; but for Rashdall this ideal, while it includes pleasure, incorporates other and more important elements such as virtue and cultural interests. Only an immediate judgment of value, he declares, can disclose that these various states of consciousness are good, and only comparative judgments of value can determine their relative positions in a conception of the summum bonum.

His defence of this position encounters several problems; (1) The hedonistic identification of value with pleasure must be refuted. (2) The teleological relationship between the right and the good, which provides Rashdall with his view of the moral criterion, must be defended against that form of intuitionism which holds that the rightness of an act is known irrespective of its consequences. (3) Kant's formalistic attempt to give meaning to the idea of duty without appealing

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1. Op. cit. Bk. I. Chs. II-VII.

to the concrete goods presented by experience, likewise conflicts with Rashdall's conception of the moral criterion; naturally he accepts, however, the Kantian thesis that virtue possesses intrinsic value. (4) The validity of judgements of value must be established against theories which seek to enslave them to feeling, emotion or satisfaction. (5) The possibility of comparing heterogeneous goods must be demonstrated if it is true that such a comparison alone can reveal wherein duty lies. Rashdall's treatment of these topics will now be examined in this order.[1]

1. Pleasure and Moral Goodness.

(i) - Psychological Hedonism.

The theory of psychological hedonism, whose foremost protagonist was Jeremy Bentham, elicits Rashdall's initial attention; for if its assertion can be substantiated that in fact only pleasure is ever desired, then theories like Sidgwick's which attempt to defend the rationality of hedonism, are rendered superfluous. Sidgwick may accord an independent meaning to the term"duty", while contending that it is

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1. The composite character of The Theory of Good and Evil - several of its chapters being articles which were separately published - no doubt accounts for certain defects in its arrangement. The first point supra corresponds to Book I, Chapters II and III, the second point to Chapter IV, the third to Chapter V. But surely the chapter entitled "Morality and Evolution"(Book III, Chapter IV) belongs with Book I, Chapter VI, in a discussion of the moral consciousness, rather than in the metaphysical section. These two chapters, together with a book entitled Is Conscience an Emotion?, and articles mentioned later, provide material for the treatment of the fourth point. Finally, the chapters on the hedonistic calculus, the commensurability of values, and the limits of casuistry (respectively Book II, Chapters I and II; Book III, Chapter V) have been joined here in a unified discussion of the fifth point. For all but the last point a little volume entitled Ethics (Published in 1913), which Rashdall wrote for "The People's Books"Series, furnishes a useful condensation of the argument in The Theory of Good and Evil. Three chapters in this latter work (Book I, Chapter VIII; Book,II Chapters III and IV) deal with specific moral problems; for this reason they have not been brought into the course of the succeeding argument.

always one's duty to promote the greatest possible pleasure. But Bentham's view, by resolving the idea of goodness into that of the pleasant, denies the former notion's sui generis character altogether; it likewise robs the idea of duty of all distinctive meaning, since if in fact only pleasure is ever desired, it is idle to ask whether anything else ought to be desired.[1]

Rashdall is concerned to disprove Bentham's view, not only because he regards it as destructive of genuine morality, but because he himself cannot follow ultra-rationalists in an unqualified deprecation of pleasure. Precisely because he is willing to acknowledge its legitimate place in the scale of values, he appreciates the importance of leaving no ambiguity as to his attitude toward any theory which seeks to make pleasure the sole value.

He begins by contending that whether the hedonist define the pleasure in question as present, future, or "the greatest on the whole", he cannot establish the thesis that men never desire anything else, - though a certain plausibility may be gained for the hedonistic argument by vacillating between these three possible interpretations. Certainly even very selfish people, as Rashdall points out, deliberately

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1. Professor Broad thinks that though psychological hedonism would render "duty" and "obligation" meaningless, it would not necessarily destroy the meaning of "right". 'It might be the case that the only end which I can desire is also the end which it is right or appropriate or fitting for me to desire'. (Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 182). If, however, "right" is definable in terms of conduciveness to the greatest possible good, and goodness is definable in terms of pleasure, then the judgment "right action is conducive to the greatest possible pleasure" would be tautologous. But it is possible to hold, as Sidgwick does, that right action is always conducive to the greatest possible good, without holding that the one concept is definable in terms of the other. This point will prove to be of considerable importance. (Cf. # 249 ff.).

elect to endure painful experiences in the present for the sake of some future end; but he is able in turn to dispose of the case for future pleasure by showing that, if the hedonistic psychology be valid, remoteness should not affect the intensity of desires for two equally great and equally certain pleasures, while in actual experience men invariably prefer the nearer. Similarly, the theory that the greatest pleasure on the whole is always the object of desire is at variance with the fact that the immediate proximity of some tempting object, like good food, frequently awakens a desire which proves too strong for what one knows to be conducive to his own maximum pleasure in the long run.

This patent inadequacy of the hedonistic psychology is traceable, Rashdall contends, to two fundamental defects. In the first place it attempts to reduce the human soul to an 'impartial calculating machine',[1] and thus it overlooks the presence of passion, the strength of which cannot be explained in terms of the proximity and intensity of the pleasure. In other words, a man under the influence of a passion like anger often chooses a lesser pleasure because he desires it more strongly; that is, he desires not pleasure qua pleasure, but a particular kind of pleasure which is selected, not because of its greater intensity or duration, but because it satisfies some supervening interest.[2]

Secondly, hedonism falls into the fallacy of hysteron-proteron. Rashdall willingly admits that some pleasure attends the satisfaction of any desire; but this fact, he believes, leads hedonists into the false assumption that the anticipation of this pleasure explains the genesis of the corresponding desire. Frequently the reverse situation,

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1. GE. I, p. 12.
2. Cf. Ibid. pp. 13 ff.

wherein the desire itself gives rise to the anticipation of pleasure at its fulfilment, is the only true explanation. The attractiveness of moral and intellectual pleasures, for example, is usually dependent in this manner upon a previously existing desire. Above all, benevolent impulses arise, not because the particular sort of pleasure they yield is more intense than others, but because the benevolent man in the first instance desires the good of others. The reverse case of the malevolent man is equally incompatible with hedonistic psychology, - and for the same reason. In a word, when hedonism denies the existence of any desire directed toward ends other than pleasure,- and these so-called "disinterested" desires may be bad, as well as good - it leaves out of account virtually all human interests 'except those of a purely sensual character'.[1] It is incapable of explaining not only altruism, but 'hate, anger, revenge, ambition.'[2]

Rashdall maintains further that the findings of anthropology run directly counter to hedonistic theory as applied to the life of primitive man by a writer like John Stuart Mill. Mill's assumption that altruism has evolved out of egoism cannot be reconciled with the data of subsequent research, which have disclosed the presence of disinterested impulses of a self-preserving and race-preserving character at very early stages of human evolution. In accordance with the principle that questions of present psychological fact should be distinguished from questions of genesis, however, Rashdall adds that even if the instinctive equipment of mankind (most clearly observable in the life of infants and savages) conformed to the hedonistic description of human nature, that fact would not serve to demonstrate the non-existence of genuine altruism among mature, civilized men.

Finally, he demonstrates that various attempts to harmonize hedonism with the dictates of conscience always end by implicitly abandoning the

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1. GE. I, p.15.
2. Ethics, p. 19.

hedonistic psychology. This is true of Mill's admission that the ethical quality of pleasures may constitute one of the determining factors in choosing between them. Pleasures vary only in intensity and duration; but Mill acknowledged that certain pleasures are preferred for qualitative instead of quantitative reasons. Similarly, the claim that the pleasure of obeying conscience is the greatest in intensity or duration is either patently false, or it refers to an extremely low moral standard. In any case, this form of pleasure presupposes a prior desire to perform one's duty; and this desire is quite distinct from desire for any sort of pleasure per se. When the hedonist seeks to deny this distinction he falls inevitably into a circular argument, explaining 'the pleasantness of an act...by its morality, and its morality...by its pleasantness'.[1]

Despite this outspoken rejection of hedonism, Rashdall attempts to keep his criticism within due proportions, and he is not blind to certain elements of truth contained in the theory. He recognizes not only that some pleasure attends the gratification of all desire, but also that it may strengthen or weaken a desire according to whether its magnitude does or does not fulfil expectations. Nor in his insistence upon the existence of disinterested desires does he seek to suggest that the desire for pleasure as such does not exist. Indeed, in a later chapter he earns the dis/approval of idealists like Muirhead[2] by so far deserting Green's teaching as to defend, with qualifications, the possibility of a hedonistic calculus. He does not even regard Sidgwick's remarks about the "paradox of hedonism" as being invariably true; with his gift for apt illustration, Rashdall points out that the pleasure of a vacation tour is not necessarily diminished because it is carefully planned for in advance.

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1. GE. I, p. 30.
2. Cf. Muirhead's review of GE: The International Journal of Ethics. Vol. XVIII, pp. 382 ff.

(ii) - Hedonistic Utilitarianism: Sidgwick.

After disposing of psychological hedonism, he still has to deal with that form of hedonism known as utilitarianism, which admits the existence of desires for objects other than pleasure, but maintains that pleasure alone is the 'rational object of desire'.[1] He attaches great importance to the fact that utilitarianism, although it asserts that ultimately pleasure alone is good, does distinguish between the two notions, so that such an assertion is intended to convey more than a mere tautology. The utilitarian thereby appeals to goodness as an objective and universal standard, just as truly as does the moral philosopher of a different school when he declares that virtue is good. It follows, if this assertion be true, that utilitarianism cannot be defended in an egoistic form. Ceteris paribus, equal pleasures in different individuals are equally worth promoting, if the promotion of pleasure is a rational end; but egoism cannot partake of that impartiality which must characterize universal judgments. It implies that it is right for each man to pursue his own good, and yet, because these goods conflict, it asserts a contradiction; for if one man's good is the rational end of action, that which conflicts with it cannot be. This refutation, in which Rashdall is following a well-known passage from Moore's Principia Ethica,[2] applies to all forms of egoism, however goodness be conceived.[3]

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1. GE. I, p. 44.
2. Cf. op. cit., pp. 99-103; and Rashdall's Ethics, p. 63n.
3. In an essay on "Egoism, Personal and National", which he contributed to a symposium entitled The International Crisis: The Theory of the State, Rashdall applies this refutation of egoism to the conduct of nations. Despite the fact that it was written during the war, and was directed against the theories of Nietzsche and Bernhardi, which Rashdall takes to be the motivating forces underlying Prussianism, the article is free from bitterness. It shows that a nationalistic self interest which refuses to subordinate itself to the wider good of humanity falls into the egoistic contradiction. The force of its main conclusion is somewhat weakened, however, when Rashdall suggests that the individual may almost always serve humanity best by being obedient to his country, even when its policies and laws are wrong. (cf. pp. 129 ff.) This, of course, subordinates the (contd. on next page).

Recognition of the fact that if pleasure be a rational end then the pleasure of the many is of more importance than that of the individual, leads to the"universal" form of utilitarianism advocated by Sidgwick.[1] In his chapter on this very able thinker, Rashdall's critical gifts are exhibited at their best:[2] he leaves a clear impression of his debt to Sidgwick, and at the same time he explains why he cannot follow him completely.

Rashdall holds that Sidgwick really writes as a rationalist when he declares that it is obligatory to prefer the pleasure of the many to that of the individual, and when he regards this "dictate of reason" as supported, not only by spontaneous benevolence, but by"a desire to do what is right and reasonable as such".[3] To introduce the notion of obligation, as Sidgwick does, is to admit that ' the difference between right and wrong is perceived...a priori';[4] for while experience may reveal what is pleasant, only an immediate moral judgment could reveal that it is right or obligatory to desire pleasure alone. Logically, such a position has substituted the notion of moral obligation for that of pleasure, as the ultimate ground for doing what is ascertained to be right.

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3. (Contd., from page 9)
individual conscience to the state just as does the view against which he is protesting. This difficulty arises from a desire to bring home the necessity for patriotism to the minds of his English readers; his assumption that England is fighting for the wider good of humanity, while Germany is fighting primarily for selfish purposes, saves him from logical inconsistency.

1. Strictly, the opposite of egoism is altruism. Egoism counsels sacrifice of others for self, altruism counsels sacrifice of self for others; while the "universal" theory counsels sacrifice of self or of others for the greatest good of the whole.
2. Sidgwick himself acknowledged the acuteness of Rashdall's comments upon The Methods of Ethics; see the sixth edition, p.xii. n.
3. GE. I, p. 51.
4. Ibid., p. 48.

The real point of divergence between the two writers arises over the nature of goodness, which Sidgwick identifies with pleasure (or happiness).[1] Because he takes a hedonistic view of the end towards which right conduct is directed, his system encounters a "dualism of the practical reason"; that is, he holds that while reason regards the greatest happiness of society as of more importance than one's own, it at the same time supports the individual's right to pursue his own happiness as an end. Hence he maintains that public good may always be regarded as the more reasonable end, but that it cannot be shown to be the sole reasonable end without the aid of an empirically unverifiable hypothesis to the effect that the world is rationally ordered. He is torn between the duty of promoting the welfare of others - which Sidgwick, as a hedonist, defines as serving their desire for happiness, - and the knowledge that it may not be conducive to his own good to do so.

Rashdall regards this dualism as the presentation of a false dilemma. He thinks that because of his hedonistic conception of good-ness, Sidgwick has been betrayed into unwarrantably assigning ' a different end to the individual and to the race'.[2] Sidgwick's position requires that one treat himself as morally rational, - as ready to serve the collective good from a sense of duty - while treating others as irrationally desiring their own pleasure only. If service of the general good is rational for the individual agent, it must be

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1. Sidgwick's treatment of the question as to whether "good" is definable is extremely complicated. Apparently he concludes that individual " good on the whole" involves reference not only to the state of affairs which the individual most desires to bring about for himself (assuming that he can foresee how the various alternatives, which he might initiate, will affect him, and how his desires and feelings will alter), but also to the ethical notion "ought". (Cf. The Methods of Ethics, p. 112, sixth edition.) It is important to note that while Sidgwick regards happiness as good, and alone as good, he does not hold that "good" can be analyzed or defined in terms of happiness. Rashdall accepts Moore's contention that Sidgwick held " good" to be indefinable. (Cf. GE. I, p. 135 n.)
2. GE. I, p. 55.

rational for each of those whom he serves. By refusing to admit that the promotion of public good is also the individual's good, Sidgwick undermines the chief impulse to moral action, and his trust in the bare desire to act rationally is insufficient to recuperate this loss so long as his antinomy between self-interest and desire for universal good remains unresolved. In Rashdall's estimation that difficulty can be surmounted only by abandoning hedonism and incorporating virtue into the conception of the social, as well as of the individual, end.

The gulf which Sidgwick sets between duty and interest, between virtuous conduct and a hedonistic conception of goodness, is one which, by his own admission, cannot be bridged except by postulating the existence of God and the fact of immortality. Rashdall proceeds to argue, however, that hedonism undermines the grounds on which these beliefs rest. If pleasure be the true end of human life, the problem of evil is well-nigh insoluble. Moreover, the individual sacrifices which duty prompts one to make in the name of reason, run directly counter to that attainment of pleasure which the universe is (ex hypothesi) rationally ordered to achieve as its true purpose. This criticism of Rashdall's, it must be confessed, neglects the fact that according to Sidgwick the voice of duty, though it does impose individual sacrifice, in the end serves the hedonistic conception of the general good; hence the incompatibility between what reason prescribes and what a hedonistically ordered universe would have as its purpose, is not as insurmountable as Rashdall's comments imply.[1] Nevertheless he is able to point out that Sidgwick's attempt to justify individual sacrifice in this life by holding out the hope of a recompense in the next, ends in a paradox: in such terms, the man who serves his true good least in this life will achieve it most completely hereafter. Moreover, once the antinomy between individual duty and

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1. Cf. GE. I, pp. 60 ff.

individual pleasure is rejected, once it is admitted that pursuit of duty is more rational than pursuit of pleasure, then indeed there is much force in Rashdall's contention that what reason prescribes can hardly be good merely as a means to the future attainment of what it rejects.

In putting forth virtue as an essential element in his conception of goodness, Rashdall is forced to meet Sidgwick's direct objections to that view. He holds that Sidgwick's refusal to regard character - or, for that matter, truth and beauty - as possessing intrinsic value, is ultimately founded upon the indefensible assumption that no aspect of consciousness except feeling can possess value; having made the assumption he writes as though 'to assign value to...ends irrespective of their pleasantness is to assign value to them as things outside consciousness altogether'.[1]

Sidgwick's view serves to bring out Rashdall's own by contrast; for the latter contends that just as virtuous character cannot be divorced from a rightly directed will, neither can it be divorced from the feelings and emotions which accompany volition. In claiming that such character possesses value, Rashdall thinks of that value as resident in consciousness. Moreover, he denies that the value thus ascribed to virtue can be explained as a preference for the particular sort of pleasure which accompanies virtuous action; for this sort of pleasure is not superior in duration and intensity to others which the pursuit of virtue makes it necessary to forego. In a word, Rashdall holds that value may be attached to aspects of consciousness other than pleasure, or irrespective of the pleasure which attends them, - while Sidgwick in effect denies this. It also follows that if value is resident in consciousness, ' acts can only be called right or wrong in so far as they represent some state of a conscious agent which has value in

1. GE. I, p. 67.

itself, or in so far as they lead to some conscious state in the agent himself or in another being'.[1]

At this point Rashdall's position is nearer to Kant's than is that of Sidgwick, since in seeking to bring virtue and happiness within the scope of a single harmonious conception of the good, it likewise[2] subordinates happiness, and assigns it intrinsic value 'only in so far as it is consistent with the predominence of Virtue'.[3] This position is at variance with Sidgwick's, not only because it assigns intrinsic value to virtue, but because it refuses to assign value to pleasures in terms of their intensity or duration.

Rashdall completes his conception of the summum bonum by giving intellectual and aesthetic interests their due place in his scale of values; and again that place is not determined solely by the magnitude of the pleasure they yield. The relationship between these three factors[4] will soon be discussed more extensively; here it is enough to say that virtue or the goodwill is of supreme value, while (in the abstract) intellectual and aesthetic activities are superior to pleasure as such. Within the realm of feeling itself, those pleasures which are associated with virtue are the highest, those associated with cultural interests are next in value, and those of a more purely sensual nature are last.

It must be admitted that a schematic artificiality[5] characterizes

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1. Ethics p. 29.
2. Rashdall is here referring to an aspect of Kant's thought which is incompatible with the doctrine that the good will alone is good. Cf. # 23.
3. GE. I, p. 71. Rashdall himself makes a distinction, of course, between pleasure and happiness; the latter involves wider and more enduring satisfactions, though it includes pleasure. He refuses to regard happiness as the sole ethical end because it is not invariably the good to which all others should be sacrificed. Although moral goodness in general conduces to happiness far more than it does to mere pleasure, devotion to the moral ideal may sometimes require a genuine sacrifice of happiness. Cf. GE. II pp. 57-60.
4. Virtue, cultural interests and pleasure.
5. Cf. # 269-71.

Rashdall's argument as he goes on to represent the constituents of this conception of the summum bonum as corresponding to 'Thought, Feeling and Volition ... each of which is unintelligible in entire abstraction or separation from the rest'. He contends that because of the essential indivisibility of consciousness, it is impossible to follow hedonism in according value to pleasure by itself; for rational creatures never experience feeling apart from a content which is 'dependent upon the other two aspects of consciousness.' 'There is a good state and a bad state of intellect, of feeling, and of will. The good consists in a certain state of all three of them'.[1] While in the abstract value may be assigned to feeling as regards its pleasantness, thought its truthfulness, and the will its moral goodness, - in reality the value of a given state of consciousness cannot be identified with any one factor in isolation from the others. This explains why Rashdall admits that pleasure forms an element in all good states of consciousness.

This dictum of the unity of consciousness is of paramount importance, not only here, but in Rashdall's metaphysical arguments, wherein it has a decisive effect upon the manner in which he formulates his conception of God; and it recurs again in his discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity. Perhaps it is necessary to add that in ascribing value to such seemingly heterogeneous ideas as pleasantness, truthfulness and moral goodness, he does not mean to imply that value itself is susceptible of analysis into component parts. With Professor Moore, he regards it as an indefinable notion which may enter into consciousness in all its aspects, but which cannot be identified with anything other than itself. Thus he writes:

> 'The ideal life or the good is an ultimate conception which does not admit of further definition, and the content of which we can only express by enumerating the various elements or aspects of it, and then explaining in what way they are to be combined'. 2

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1. GE. I, p.75.
2. GE. II, p. 60. Cf. # 25.

2. The Moral Criterion.

Rashdall's fundamentally practical temperament is nowhere exhibited more clearly than by the fact that he regards casuistry as the ultimate task of ethics. Hence he attaches great importance to questions relating to the nature of the moral criterion, and he is unduly sanguine concerning its effectiveness in guiding men to a knowledge of what particular actions are right and wrong. His own view, as we have just seen, adopts the utilitarian principle of estimating the rightness of acts in terms of the extent to which they promote good ends, while it rejects the hedonistic conception of what constitutes the good; this view must now be tested against the opposing claims of intuitionism.

He defines intuitionism as the theory that conscience pronounces actions 'right or wrong a priori without reference to their consequences'.[1] Many intuitionists make concessions to the necessity for consulting consequences in certain cases; but in his opinion they have never succeeded in disclosing the principle which explains when consequences should or should not be considered. The form of intuitionism which holds that the moral faculty constantly issues guidance concerning particular acts, he dismisses as one which reduces morality to mere caprice, and makes moral instruction impossible.

A more cogent defence of intuitionism holds that conscience is the source of general rules of conduct, in terms of which the morality of particular acts must be judged. In his consideration of this view he follows at many points the searching critique to which Sidgwick had already subjected it. It is fair to note that Rashdall regards one quite frequent objection to intuitionism as invalid. The variations in moral judgment between different ages, races and individuals, really do not injure the theory, although most intuitionists seek to minimize these differences. Intuitionism may consistently recognize

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1. GE. I, p. 80.

the fact that men differ in their capacity to apprehend moral truth, just as they differ in mathematical ability. Because moral ideas, like mathematical concepts, have undergone a gradual development, and because these ideas are not grasped in either case with uniform completeness, even by civilized adults, one is not thereby justified in doubting their objectivity; certainly it is gratuitous to believe in the truth of mathematics and then urge against morality considerations which, if valid, would undermine the former also. The intuitionist need not claim that his self-evident moral rules or judgments have been assented to by everyone. In defence of his own utilitarian position Rashdall urges, however, that the traditional moral rules of mankind are usually founded upon the social benefits which they safeguard, and for that (utilitarian) reason present themselves to conscience as binding. His chief objection to intuitionism is simply that action which is not directed towards some end is irrational. When confronted by special circumstances, intuitively attested rules always seem to admit of exceptions, which are sustained not by fresh intuitions, but by reason of a consideration of foreseen consequences. Or again, when intuitions seem to conflict with each other, - when, for example, benevolence seems to be incompatible with strict veracity - the superiority of the one principle over the other cannot be satisfactorily decided except by appealing to consequences. If intuition pronounces veracity to be invariably superior, it is too rigorous; if it asserts that veracity must be relinquished whenever it conflicts with benevolence, it is too lax. Another important objection turns upon the fact that consequences enter into and determine the moral quality of action in such a manner that it is meaningless to speak of the one apart from the other.

At first glance Rashdall's refutation of intuitionism may seem somewhat puzzling. Though he does indeed espouse the utilitarian

principle, - freed from its hedonistic associations - that 'it is irrational to judge of the morality of an action without tracing its bearing upon human Well-being as a whole'[1], he has nevertheless asserted earlier that moral judgements are a priori or immediate. Such judgements would appear to be precisely what one means by deliverances of intuition. However, whereas intuitionism hold that the moral judgement relates to the rightness of acts, Rashdall holds that it reveals the value of ends. And, as he proceeds to argue in a chapter which will be discussed in a moment, experience must furnish knowledge of what the end is, before one can judge it to be good or bad. This judgement remains a priori, however, because 'experience can tell us nothing (concerning) intrinsic...value'.[2]

He goes on to maintain that once moral judgement is seen to imply a calculation of consequences, ethical principles lose the inflexibility which intuitionism ascribes to them. When moral judgement takes the form "this end is good" instead of "this action is right", it will prove adaptable to the exigencies of special circumstances. For example, the judgment that veracity is good remains valid, even though speaking the truth may in certain cases be sacrificed because it leads to consequences which constitute a greater evil than those of telling a lie. Intuitionists have rightly contended that action cannot normally be delayed until one has calculated its effects in terms of universal well-being; but that is because in practice the consequences of excessive deliberation are often harmful. Usually it is possible to decide whether an action is right or wrong in terms of its obvious effects. Nevertheless, unless all the circumstances and possible consequences are known, wider knowledge may reveal that some previously undiscovered end is superior

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1. GE. I, p. 91.
2. Ethics p. 75.

to the one originally espoused as the best; more complete foresight concerning consequences may result in a redirection of duty.

As a result of these reflections, Rashdall conceives of an ethical system as progressively built up through the comparison and correlation of particular judgments of value. How heterogeneous goods are brought into an ordered system under the aegis of a gradually developing moral idea, how they are assigned their places of relative importance, how one's duty in particular cases is discovered amidst competing ends, - these are questions which must be reserved for discussion in the last portion of this chapter.

3. Duty: Kant.

In his little book entitled Rule and End in Morals, Prof. J.H. Muirhead writes:

...'the Kantian theory...finds in acting from a sense of obligation something in itself good with a goodness that depends on its rightness; ...theories...like Rashdall's and Moore's resolve rightness into conduciveness to a good which is not an action'.[1]

I cannot help but think that this statement seriously misrepresents Rashdall's position;[2] he makes a definite effort in his chapter on Kant to show that, although he cannot agree in making goodness entirely contingent upon rightness, he can accept from Kant the important truth that right action itself possesses the highest intrinsic value. Perhaps a direct quotation from the remarks by which Rashdall leads up to the subject will serve best to establish this point.

'By expressing moral judgment as a judgment of value...we emphasize the fact...that acts are the objects of moral judgments as well as consequences. Because no act can be good or bad without reference to consequences, it does not follow that its morality depends wholly upon those consequences...When once it is admitted that the end includes a certain ideal of human character,...we can no longer recognize an absolute distinction between means and ends... Most of the acts which do conduce to further ends have a value (positive or negative) of their own; and this value must be taken into account in estimating the rightness or wrongness of the acts'.[3]

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1. Op. cit., p. 16.
2. Muirhead is merely reproducing a similar grouping suggested by Prof. Prichard.
3. GE. I, pp. 96 f. Italics mine. Only illustrative data have been omitted.

He even goes on to argue that certain pleasures are intrinsically bad because of the character of the acts from which they are derived, and from which they cannot be separated except for purposes of abstraction.

In a brief reference to his conception of the summum bonum, we have seen already that he regards right action as the greatest of all goods, and therefore as one which takes precedence over both culture and happiness when a conflict arises.[1] In a long chapter on Kant, Rashdall seeks to defend this conception, together with what it implies concerning the nature of duty. Whether the language employed in this defence can be reconciled with his theory that the right is instrumental to the good, is another question; but in according supreme value to the good will, Rashdall definitely parts company with both Sidgwick and Moore.[2] In so doing he contends that the intrinsic value of right conduct is as self-evident as is the intrinsic value of any other form of goodness.[3]

In so far as the idea of a categorical imperative implies that reason immediately recognizes the rightness of an action, however, Rashdall does not assent to it without reservation. At this stage in his thinking[4] he recognizes an element of truth in the contention that moral obligation is an ultimate notion, not susceptible of analytical definition. For example, he is inclined to agree with Sidgwick that its validity cannot be proved to any sceptic, because, like the categories of causality or quantity, it can be substantiated only by an appeal to the fact that men do

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1. The exact sense in which this is the case is made clear infra; cf. # 223 f. and # 50.
2. The references to Moore in this part of the thesis reflect the opinions expressed in Principia Ethica; they do not take into account later modifications, notably those suggested in Philosophical Studies, Chs. VIII and X.
3. The exact sense in which Rashdall supports this contention will be examined in the critical section, # 253 f.
4. In the critical section I argue that he later adopts a position which is really incompatible with what he says in GE concerning "right" and moral obligation. Cf. # 249 ff.

actually pronounce judgments, which they regard as genuinely true or false, concerning the rightness of conduct. And, as he sees it, only a metaphysical argument can demonstrate that a denial of the validity of what reason pronounces in the sphere of morals leads logically to complete scepticism; the results even of this demonstration are purely negative. Yet, for reasons which will appear presently, he cannot admit that judgments concerning obligation or "right" are immediate in the same sense as are those concerning "good".

Nevertheless, he does agree unreservedly that recognition of one's duty may itself supply a motive to the will, although that motive may not always be strong enough to dominate other desires over which it has a superior claim. He holds that Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of the will really embodies this truth, despite the fact that because of his false identification of desire with pleasure he 'refused to speak of a desire to do one's duty'.[1]

The point at which Rashdall finds Kant's system to be radically unsatisfactory can be revealed without entering into the details of his criticisms. Rashdall is willing to assent to the proposition that the form of morality is a priori; but this is the case because moral judgment, as he conceives of it, refers to the value of ends. Accordingly, knowledge of value, which for him is identical with knowledge of what ought to be,[2] is accessible solely through immediate judgments, and can never be supplied from experience. What Rashdall objects to is Kant's assertion that the detailed content of morality can be furnished from the notion of duty alone, without reference to

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1. GE I, p. 106 n.
2. This is true of Rashdall's views in GE; but see my comments in the critical section, # 249 ff.

experience.[1] In an examination of the three maxims which Kant derived from the categorical imperative, Rashdall attempts to show that none of them can be applied until some information - which they themselves are powerless to supply - is obtained concerning 'what particular things are good'.[2]

The first maxim, relating to the universalization of personal conduct, rightly implies that duty is in principle the same for all rational creatures; but it is at best a negative test, which informs one as to whether an action, when universalized, conduces to the general good; it says nothing about what constitutes that good. Indeed, in applying the principle Kant tacitly appealed to consequences (resulting from conduct like promise-breaking) which only experience and observation of human nature could give one any ground for anticipating. Even if he had succeeded in avoiding all reference to empirical data, the freedom from internal contradiction which the maxim requires remains an insufficient test of conduct. With the sly raillery which often animates his writing, Rashdall points out that Kant's own practice of celibacy is self-contradictory, since if it were made a universal rule it would soon extinguish celibates along with the rest of the race. Rashdall concludes from these observations that for moral rules to be valid without exception, either they must be so stated as to indicate the particular circumstances to which they apply, or they must be made general and internal, relating to motives

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1. Professor Laird (in The Idea of Value, p. 282) has suggested that it is wrong to hold that the essence of Kant's ethic is a formal consistency with which his conception of reason as an end is really incompatible. Kant's ethics, he argues, referred from the outset to an end; his real concern was with the question as to whether the purpose which underlies every volition (a fact which Kant did not deny) is within the rational will, or external to it; for in the latter case the will is enslaved to animal inclinations, an empty idea of perfection or an arbitrary theology.
2. GE. I, p. 112.

and dispositions rather than to types of action.[1]

He is unconvinced, not only by this attempt on Kant's part to derive guidance for action from the bare notion of duty, but also by his view of the motives supporting morality. Kant's assumption that 'respect for the Moral Law'[2] alone can possess moral value, he condemns as the product of a false psychology. Kant fell into the error of regarding all desire as directed towards pleasure; therefore he looked upon desire as morally worthless, irrespective of the nature of its object. Rashdall, following Aristotle and Butler, maintains that motives other than that of respect for duty may support virtuous action; benevolent action is not rendered less valuable because it is founded upon love, and a person moved by such an impulse is not on the same moral level as a crude pleasure-seeker. Moreover, Kant's arguments at this point are incompatible with his admission that happiness, in so far as it does not conflict with virtue, may be a rational end of action.

Rashdall does not mean to imply that action springing solely from the sense of duty is necessarily indicative of a cold and defective moral life. Yet because he acknowledges other valuable ends, he maintains that virtue must take its due place within a supreme ideal which elicits devotion to each of 'the various kinds of good...in proportion to their relative value and importance'.[3]

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1. Kant's other two maxims prove inadequate for similar reasons. Treating humanity as a means is most wrong when the end thus served is bad, and yet, once again, the precept fails to provide any illumination concerning the nature of ends. The third formula, which enjoins treating all human beings as possessing equal intrinsic value - or, in Kant's language, as members of a kingdom of ends - may be accepted in principle; but, when divorced from all empirical data, it likewise remains silent as to what constitutes that good of humanity which deserves to be promoted equally in each member, Cf. GE. I, pp. 131-5.
2. Ibid., p. 118.
3. GE. I, pp. 125 f.

In other words the sense of duty, instead of expelling all other good impulses, should act in a regulative capacity. In so far as natural inclinations issue in good conduct they should be allowed full sway, and their moral value should be recognized. It is the function of the sense of duty to augment or inhibit these various impulses only in so far as is demanded by the due proportions of the universal ideal. Although according to this principle other goods must be considered, such consideration can never result in a sacrifice of moral value for the sake of lower goods; so long as the approval of lower goods is commensurate with their relative importance, the agent is at the same time fulfilling his duty.

Rashdall's conception of duty thus stands in contrast with Kant's in several respects. According to the former, right action is the most important, but not the sole good; it must be weighed along with the other goods which participate in the summum bonum before duty, in any given instance, can be determined. Since value is resident only in conscious states, the sense of duty - far from being apposed to all natural impulses - is 'at its highest...identical with the rational love of persons (including in due measure self-love), and the things which constitute their true good'. Finally, when Rashdall's conception of the sense of duty is taken in connexion with his theistic belief, it becomes identified with the love of God and 'the conscious direction of the will towards the end which He wills'.[1] Thus it loses the impersonal and abstract character which has made Kant's imperative repellent to so many moralists.

The immediately preceeding discussion raises the question as to whether Rashdall's own view of the relation between the right and the good is consistent. In order that the later task of criticizing his

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1. GE. I, p. 128.

system may be facilitated, the fundamental nature of his difficulties must be suggested here. Repeatedly, in the chapter just reviewed, he refers to the fact that to recognize the imperative demands of duty affords no guidance as to what good end it is one's duty to promote. Now this criticism can be valid only on the basis of the assumption that it is impossible to know that an act is virtuous unless one first knows that the end which it promotes is good. To be sure, he contends that virtue itself may be an end of action; that is, rightness of motive may confer intrinsic value upon the action; but this value - while it may be additional to the goodness of the action's consequences - cannot be known apart from it. It would even seem that the intrinsic goodness of an action cannot be known until after its consequences have already been seen to be good.

For this reason Rashdall maintains that the idea of "good" is logically prior to that of "right". He holds that 'the good is that which "ought to be', and yet he adds in a foot-note: 'Such a statement is in no way inconsistent with the doctrine...which I fully accept, that the word "good" is indefinable'. This is the case because he regards '"Good", "Ought" (when applied to ends), "Value", "the End"... as synonymous terms'. Thus it remains true that 'we can only bring out the real meaning of the idea (i.e. of "good") by the use of words which equally imply the notion'. Therefore Kant's difficulties may be summarily expressed by saying that he attempted 'to give meaning to, and...find a content for, (the) idea of "right" without appealing to the idea of "good"'.[1]

Now Rashdall's utilitarian view of the relationship between the right and the good may or may not be defensible; but irrespective of that question, can the theory that the sense of obligation is

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1. GE. I, p. 135, and foot-note.

contingent upon and logically posterior to immediate judgments of value be reconciled with the view that obligation or "right" (as well as goodness) is an ultimate and indefinable notion? To be sure, he has not unreservedly accepted from Kant and Sidgwick the contention that reason immediately recognizes the rightness of actions; for if he had done so, he would have been forced to admit that no ground, other than this fact of immediate recognition, can be given for holding that a given course of action is indeed right. And then he could not have said that Kant, in making the rightness of action the sole moral criterion, failed to provide any detailed information as to what constitutes right action; for in that case no information could be provided, no reason could be cited for performing it, other than the fact that the agent perceives its rightness.[1]

Five years after the publication of The Theory of Good and Evil a famous essay by Professor H. A. Prichard, entitled "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?", appeared in Mind.[2] A fundamental thesis of this article, and of several subsequent books by writers whom it has influenced, is that to seek the ground of moral obligation in the value of the action itself or in the value of its consequences, is to fall into the fallacy of giving a reason, other than the rightness of the act itself, for holding that what is regarded as obligatory is really so. Because this essay criticizes The Theory of Good and Evil directly, it may be taken as reasonably

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1. Professor Prichard would protest that, in so far as Kant stresses the value of the good will as a reason for an action's being obligatory, his theory is in fact incompatible with the doctrine that obligation is known immediately and unconditionally.
2. Op. cit. Vol. XXI, pp. 21-37. (Professor Prichard was for some years a co-editor with Rashdall of The Economic Review.)

certain that the difficulties it raises caused Rashdall to revise his position.[1] In any event, his little book entitled Ethics (published in 1913) acknowledges the sui generis character of "right". Nevertheless, he seeks to reconcile this with the theory that "right" is instrumentally related to "good":

'There arises the further question whether this idea (i.e. of "right") is intelligible by itself, or whether it does not involve the further notion of good. This will depend upon what answer we give to the question how we ascertain what particular actions are right - whether particular acts can be seen to be right apart altogether from their consequences, or whether the only acts which we can regard as right are acts which conduce to the good. To hold this last view does not at all involve giving up the distinctive or sui generis character of the idea of right or duty. For both notions really involve the fundamental conception of an "ought". If we accept this view, we shall say that the notion of good is the notion of something which ought to be or which possesses intrinsic value; the notion "right" will then imply a voluntary act which ought to be done as a means to this ultimate good, whatever that may be. The two terms will be correlative terms which mutually imply one another (just as the convex implies the concave, or as the term "father" is only intelligible if we know the meaning of "son")....'[2]

Then in a foot-note he adds the qualification, which received so much stress in the chapter on Kant just reviewed, that certain types of action, because they possess intrinsic value, may themselves 'be part of the good'.[3]

In the critical section we shall find that this revision of his opinion concerning "right" has very far-reaching implications, which Rashdall himself never elaborated.

4. Moral Judgment.

The prominence which he accords to the judgment of value makes him an avowed opponent of all theories which declare that ultimately morality is founded upon feeling or emotion. During his tour in the United States in 1913, he took the opportunity to supplement what he had said concerning this subject in The

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1. I have been unable to confirm this suggestion directly.
2. Ethics. pp. 13 f.
3. Ibid., p. 14 n.

Theory of Good and Evil;[1] for in the interim he had become more thoroughly acquainted with the writings of anthropologists and psychologists who defended the view which he deplored. He was especially anxious to meet the criticisms of Professor McDougall, as contained in the latter's An Introduction to Social Psychology. Hence he chose the theme Is Conscience an Emotion? for the West Memorial Lectures which he delivered at Stanford University.[2]

The discussion of value-theory as a specialized problem had begun to take on the dimensions of a major philosophical contro-:versy in England and America some years before Rashdall delivered these lectures; and at that time the problem of the value-judgment seemed central for many other writers, as it did for him. Later discussion, such as Professor Perry's General Theory of Value, has tended to show that to establish the "rationality" of the judgment of value does not settle the question as to the nature and constitu-:tion of value itself. Moreover, Professor Moore, in a review of The Theory of Good and Evil published in The Hibbert Journal[3] directly after the appearance of the work itself, had called attention to substantially this same point.

Rashdall's argument assumes at the outset that men possess a capacity for pronouncing genuine judgments concerning morality; his task is to show that this capacity belongs to the intellectual or rational part of human nature. All that the first part of his dis-:cussion purports to prove, then, is this: emotion and feeling are not sufficient to account for judgments of any sort whatever; therefore the pronouncement of ethical judgments must be assigned to "reason".

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1. Op. cit., Bk. I., Ch. VI.
2. Published in 1914. Some years later McDougall wrote a reply to this volume, which Rashdall in turn defended; both articles appeared in The Hibbert Journal, Vol. XIX. Cf. # 39 f.
3. Op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 451.

He writes as though the question at issue relates primarily to how moral knowledge is possible, - while really he wishes to defend the additional thesis that the object of cognition in moral judgment cannot be identified solely with feeling or emotion. This latter topic receives little attention until he turns to some rather unwise remarks of William James in The Will to Believe; fortunately this does demand a discussion of the nature of value itself; but this was not, even at the time, a fair sample of pragmatist doctrine, despite the fact that Professor Perry's theory is really a development of it, with many weaknesses removed.

Rashdall takes account of three possible views as to the source of moral approbation: (a) in feeling, emotion or satisfaction; (b) in the intellect; (c) in a sui generis capacity which falls under neither of the two preceding categories.[1] He dismisses the last alternative as unintelligible, maintaining that what a writer like Martineau[2], who ostensibly defends it, really means to emphasize is that moral judg-:ments are distinct from judgments of fact. However true this may be, Rashdall replies, it affords no justification for inventing a sui generis "faculty". This leaves only some form of the first theory in the field against rationalism.

(i) - The Moral Sense Theory.

He freely admits that the exaggerations of rationalists have often been responsible for the impetus given to views which profess to find the basis of moral approbation in feeling or emotion, instead of in the intellect. Frequently the fact has been overlooked that the

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1. In Ethics, p. 31, Rashdall misleadingly refers to these as theories of the origin of moral judgment.
2. Cf, his Types of Ethical Theory, especially Vol. II, pp. 468 and 743.

mere rationality of action - taken apart from the desire to do what is right, and the other spontaneous impulses which support virtuous conduct - is insufficient to account for its ever being performed. But he proceeds to show that because the moral judgment is presupposed by and gives rise to the feelings or emotions which accompany it, it does more than merely record their occurrence.

Historically the most influential philosophical theory to be formulated in reaction against a misguided rationalism has been that of the "Moral Sense" school. Rashdall's illuminating account of the various thinkers who contributed to the development of the theory can be indicated here only in outline. He suggests that in the writings of Locke, although the language of rationalism was still used, reason was degraded to the function of calculating pain and pleasure; in accordance with his theological utilitarianism Locke held that reason, perceiving the future results of conduct, approved of virtue primarily as a path of escape from Hell. The inadequacy of Locke's theory - arising especially from its failure to refute Hobbes - prompted writers like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to find the basis of morality in a particular kind of feeling rather than in the intellect. Nevertheless, these two writers retained Locke's doctrine that all knowledge has its origin in "experience", which for them virtually meant "sensation". To avoid the hedonism implied in including moral knowledge under such theory, they postulated a special sense, which gives rise to feelings of a specifically moral and <u>sui generis</u> character.

Rashdall points out that this moral sense theory is radically defective because it cannot account for the origin and operation of moral <u>ideas</u>. Feelings vary only in intensity and duration, and moral feelings cannot claim superiority in these respects; until a judgment is pronounced, which assigns value to these feelings, nothing has

entered consciousness which demands obedience. If morality is restricted to feelings, one can never claim validity for it; for feelings are neither true nor false. Furthermore, because feelings vary from one individual to another, the judgments which merely record their occurrence may contain contradictory assertions, and yet both may be true. He assents to the undeniable fact that ethical judg-:ments do contradict one another; but he points out that if the moral sense theory be correct, the judgments in question can never express real disagreement because they refer to different data; that is, they refer to the feelings of different individuals. The significant fact about disagreement concerning moral questions, however, is not that different individuals possess different feelings with regard to the same course of action, but that if one individual is right in approving the action, then anyone who maintains the opposite must be wrong. As has been maintained in the discussion of intuitionism, the fact that men may fall into error in pronouncing moral judgments no more undermines objectivity in this sphere of knowledge than in any other. If moral approbation were constituted entirely by feeling, judgments could err only concerning whether or not a given sentiment were actually felt by an individual with regard to a certain type of conduct; they could never err as to whether the action were right or its end intrinsically good, because the moral sense theory renders questions of objective truth (in such matters) meaningless[1].

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1. Rashdall goes on to show that Shaftesbury and Hutcheson intended their theory to vindicate ethics, and did not realize that ultimately it destroyed the meaning of ethical distinctions; the former wished 'to defend the disinterestedness of the moral motive' (ICE, p. II.); the latter even regarded the moral faculty as that by which human actions could come into accordance with the will of God (Cf. Ibid, p.14). Hume, however, saw that qua emotion, moral approbation cannot pro-:vide its own ground for claiming ethical superiority over other motives; he therefore made pleasure the sole basis for choosing between different emotions. Contemplation of certain qualities, whose social utility is apparent, he held to cause sympathetic pleasure in the spectator; he listed the benevolent affections, but

(Contd. on Page 32)

The reaction which led to the appearance of the moral sense theory was partially due to rationalism's claim that ethical truths are apprehended in the same way as mathematical truths - that is, as axioms which present themselves to the intellect as self-evident. At first sight Rashdall's acceptance of Sidgwick's axioms of prudence, benevolence and equity[1], may seem to partake of this extreme ration-:alism; but he points out that these three principles are really formal representations of quantitative relations. The first asserts that one should promote his own greater good rather than his lesser good, in so far as the good of others remains unaffected; the second, that a larger public good is preferable to a smaller; the third, that the good of one man should be regarded as of equal intrinsic value with the <u>like</u> good of every other. It is correct to say, therefore, that these principles resemble those of mathematics, because they embrace no empirical content whatever; but for that very reason they can solve no ethical problem by themselves. Their sole ethical feature is the fact that they refer to the good; and not until after its nature has been determined by judgments relating to concrete objects of experience, can they furnish guidance concerning its distribution. Hence although they are self-evident, intuitive truths, a utilitarian like Sidgwick could consistently espouse them because they possess no content until supplemented with judgments of value which relate to consequences. For the same reason, they do not constitute an independent or self-sufficient type of moral judgment.

(<u>Contd. from Page 31</u>)

also personal possessions, as exciting this approbation. Thus Hume joined love of virtue with admiration for the prosperous. Moreover, on his view virtue varies directly with the actual approbation which it elicits in the spectator; actions are not approved because they are moral; they are moral because approved. Hence virtue is not proportionate to actual social usefulness, since a man who is really a benefactor, but who is hated by society, is, in terms of Hume's theory, really a bad man. Therefore this theory undermines utilitarianism along with all other objective theories of ethics. Finally, it implies, like the moral sense theory, that'if an act excites approbation in some minds and disapprobation in others, it is right and wrong at the same time'(<u>Ibid</u>,p. 27).

1. Cf. GE. I. p. 147.

The plausibility of the moral sense theory, Rashdall contends, arose from the fact that the moral judgment resembles aesthetic appreciation more closely than it does mathematical knowledge; and the moral sense writers assumed that aesthetic appreciation is wholly subjective. Moreover, concrete ethical judgments - as dis-:tinguished from formal principles - cannot be 'expressed with the same precision as mathematical judgments'[1]. Finally, because in both aesthetic and ethical questions no reason, apart from the immediate perception of value, can be cited in support of a given judgment, the metonymical expression, "I feel it to be good or beautiful", is frequently used in ordinary speech. In reality, 'propositions cannot be felt'.[2]

Rashdall's detailed discussion of the complicated problem of aesthetic judgment cannot be treated here[3]. In general he holds that in the case of aesthetic, no less than ethical, judgment, one man's opinion may be "better" than another's, - and that such an assertion would be meaningless in both cases if the judgments were founded solely upon feeling. Once the objective character of both is asserted, it is advantageous to stress the analogy between them; for though they involve a priori factors, both can be delivered only with reference to concrete objects which are given in experience.

The most potent objection to the moral sense theory and its modern descendants really arises, however, from the nature of value itself. In the foregoing discussion we have seen that Rashdall regards states of consciousness alone as possessing value; value itself, he has held, is indefinable, but it does characterize every aspect of consciousness, and therefore it cannot be identified with any single aspect in isolation from the others. Hence feeling

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1. GE. I, p. 149.
2. GE. I, p. 148.
3. Cf. GE. I, pp. 177-183.

of mathematics in that non-rational creatures could not pronounce either; but they differ from those of mathematics because non-sentient or non-emotional creatures could, apparently, pronounce the latter, while they could not pronounce the former.

Nevertheless, judgment and emotion may vary independently; an act may be judged wrong, even though it awakens no repugnance in the one who judges. It is even possible to pronounce a moral judgment without exciting any emotion concerning it, although in practice emotional deficiency usually leads to a state of indifference in which the tendency is to form no judgments at all; on the other hand, excessive emotion concerning a judgment may distort one's insight into its truth or falsity. Again, the same type of moral judgment may be attended under different circumstances by different emotions within the same person. And finally, emotions themselves - as is also the case with pleasures - may be judged to possess positive or negative value over and above the value attached to their satisfaction; the degree of intrinsic value assigned to them is dependent upon the relative importance or excellence of the interest they support; thus emotions associated with virtue or benevolence are the highest.

So far as terminology is concerned, Rashdall recognizes that in popular usage it is natural to speak of "conscience" as including feelings and emotions which are deemed intrinsically valuable, or which support the performance of right action. As long as reason's unique capacity to furnish knowledge of moral value is remembered, this conception of conscience rightly takes account of the presence of feeling and emotion in every conscious state, and hence in the ground of every moral judgment.[1]

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1. Once moral judgments take the actual emotional constitution of humanity into account, Rashdall believes, many schemes of social reorganization, which might be defended consistently on purely rational grounds, will be seen to be inappropriate or injurious; he cites Plato's plan to collectivize the family as an example. Cf. #48 n. 2.

(ii) - The Emotionalist Theory:[1] McDougall and Westermarck.

What Rashdall has to say in criticism of the writings of Professors Westermarck and McDougall[2] is really but a special application of the general theory just outlined. The vital issue, which must be filtered out from a mass of ambiguities, is whether or not the idea of duty can be completely analyzed into emotional constituents. Rashdall holds that by giving an affirmative answer to this question his opponents fall into the fundamental error of the moral sense writers, despite the fact that as modern scientists they do not believe in the existence of a 'specific moral feeling'.[3] Professor McDougall, for example, although he is far too well informed to echo the naïve eighteenth century belief that primitive man was a deliberate utilitarian, does seek the foundations of morality in various instincts and their accompanying emotions.

Rashdall is willing to go a considerable distance with these writers in purely historical matters. He thinks them undoubtedly correct in holding that some modes of conduct came to be approved or disapproved because of emotional reactions which they inspired in primitive men; he even admits that, if at an early period of human history the notion of duty was wholly absent, then the mores of that period can be explained in terms of emotion. What he wishes to maintain is that once the notion of duty has appeared, reflective morality has begun, and conduct can no longer be accounted for entirely by an emotionalist theory. The date of this transformation raises a

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1. The term "Emotionalism" is Rashdall's own; Cf. ICE., p. 54.
2. Cf. Westermarck's Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, and McDougall's Social Psychology. Westermarck's Ethical Relativity, published in 1932, contains various replies to Rashdall.
3. ICE, p. 55.

purely historical question; and the answer does not affect the question of validity any more than the validity of mathematics is affected by the fact that at one stage savages may have been unable to count. Even on historical grounds, however, he is inclined to think that McDougall fails to emphasize sufficiently the alteration effected in human emotions by the growth of intelligence.[1]

If McDougall and Westermarck are inclined to doubt the validity of the notion of duty among civilized adults to-day, Rashdall can make no fresh reply. The distinction which he sets between moral judgments and judgments recording personal desire or feeling is one which can be verified, in the last analysis, solely through intro-:spection. He has urged, however, that the moral category is as inexpugnable as those of cause, substance or quantity. Refusal to acknowledge any fundamental category renders the world unintelli-:gible; it entails a repudiation of reason as such, and this, Rashdall reminds his opponents, leads to a scepticism which is fatal to their own sciences of anthropology and psychology. He is able to show, however, that they do not fall into this scepticism even with regard to morality; for both betray an implicit belief in the objectivity of moral judgments.[2]

Nevertheless, their historical studies of morality fail to recognize the full significance of the transition from a purely emotional to a rational foundation. The transition from a stage when no notion of duty is present, through periods of confused savage beliefs, to the emergence of distinct moral ideas, is no more

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1. Rashdall finds in Hobhouse's writings (especially Morals in Evolution) a more adequate recognition of this transformation. Cf. ICE, p. 66 n.
2. Westermarck refers to his own moral ideas as based on reflection, and as "higher" than those of the savage. Cf. ICE, pp. 121 ff. Similar presupposition of moral objectivity may be found in McDougall's Social Psychology, pp. 257 f. (6th Edition).

difficult to understand, than a similar transition in the case of any other intellectual category. Rashdall believes, however, that even at relatively primitive levels of culture, men are able to distinguish between the customary and the right;[1] for example, they are able to formulate a conception of justice which is regarded as valid for all persons who belong to their own tribal group; this requires a capacity to grasp conceptions which aim at impartiality in mediating between the conflicting claims of tribal members. It is the awakening claims of reason which account in large measure for moral progress; for through this awakening, inconsistencies inherent in merely customary systems are gradually refined away. If the emotionalist hypothesis were true, no justifiable reason could ever have arisen for demanding that conduct be consistent from one day to the next. Needless to say, Rashdall does not bring forward these considerations in order to disparage the important influence of desire and emotion upon conduct. He wishes merely to defend his belief that the idea of duty operates through reason in a regulative capacity, - selecting, subordinating and comparing within the welter of the emotional life, with a view to ordering it in conformity with an harmonious and inclusive ideal.[2]

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1. Cf. ICE, pp. 90 ff.

2. This view has many affinities with that presented in Professor Hobhouse's The Rational Good (Published in 1921).

A Note on the Controversy with McDougall, and on the Ethics of Herbert Spencer.

The dispute between Rashdall and McDougall can be followed in detail in the latter's comments in An Introduction to Social Psychology, and the reply to these in Is Conscience an Emotion?,[1] - and then again in the articles in The Hibbert Journal[2]. Rashdall is able to demonstrate that because McDougall persists in assigning a purely deductive function to reason, he does not at all appreciate the sig-:nificance of a priori notions as furnishing the only possible first premises for science as well as for morals; yet even this limited function which McDougall does recognize, - that of deducing 'new pro-:positions from propositions already accepted[3]- 'implies certain principles of inference which cannot themselves be deduced from anything else'[4]. Rashdall suggests, in reply to repeated demands from his opponent, that McDougall can no more "prove" the validity of the principles on which his own science of psychology is founded, than he can "prove" the validity of moral categories.

Several other equally elementary and in some cases absurd points of confusion are clarified by Rashdall; for example, McDougall takes the assertion that the idea of duty can give rise to an impulse, as identical with the proposition that the idea of duty 'is an impulse'[5]. One point deserves special attention, however, McDougall intimates that Rashdall has fallen into a circular argument because in The Theory of Good and Evil[6] he makes the objective validity of moral judgments the ground for asserting that they are the work of reason, while in Is Conscience an Emotion? he argues that because these judgments are the work of reason they must be regarded as objectively valid[7]. Rashdall replies that McDougall should familiarize himself with the notion of mutual implication. 'From my point of view', he writes, 'to say that a judgment is objectively true implies that we ascribe it to Reason; neither proposition is deducible from the other, but each implies the other. There is therefore no difference between the two modes of statement on this head'[8].

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1. Op. cit. pp. 127 ff.
2. Op. cit. Vol. XIX (1920-21). McDougall's article: pp. 279-95, Rashdall's: pp. 449-65.
3. An Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 378 ff.
4. Hibbert Journal. Vol. XIX, p. 453.
5. Ibid., p. 455.
6. Op. cit., I, p. 166.
7. Hibbert Journal. Vol. XIX, cf. p. 291.
8. Ibid., p. 462.

In fairness to McDougall it should be added that Rashdall recognizes both the originality and the soundness of his work as a psychologist. Moreover, Rashdall tends to disregard the measure of acknowledgement, however inadequate, which McDougall does accord to the intellect in the shaping of the moral life. It is not correct to leave the impression, if Rashdall's remarks do so, that McDougall espouses a purely emotional theory.[1]

In a long chapter in The Theory of Good and Evil (Book III, Chapter IV), Rashdall defends his view of the relationship between the development and the validity of moral ideas against the evolutionary ethics of Herbert Spencer; there he convincingly exposes the latter's philosophical incompetence. The chapter deals primarily with confusions inherent in Spencer's system; it throws light on Rashdall's own views only by adding testimony to the fact that nothing in his theory is incompatible with an evolutionary account of all rational capacities, including those exercised in moral judgment. Rashdall follows Professor Cook Wilson[2] in adding the rejoinder, however, that 'no accumulation of experiences, personal or ancestral, could ever generate the idea of "good" or "value" in a consciousness which did not possess it'[3], any more than it could generate the logical axiom of non-contradiction.

(iii) - The Satisfaction Theory: William James.

The pragmatism of William James[4] offers yet another theory which, from Rashdall's point of view, ultimately denies the validity of ethical distinctions. Although James acknowledges that men desire other things besides pleasure, Rashdall finds his attempt to define value as "the satisfaction of desire" quite as objection-:able as hedonism.

Because James realizes that all desires cannot be fulfilled at once, and that they often conflict with one another within society

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1. Cf. W.K. Wright's article: "Conscience as Reason and as Emotion"; Philosophical Review. Vol. XXV (1916), pp. 676-91.
2. Cf. his "Mr. Spencer's Theory of Axioms". An Inaugural Lecture.
3. GE. II, p. 372.
4. Cf. his The Will to Believe, especially pp. 201 ff.

and within the same individual, he seeks to furnish a regulative criterion for mediating between them; he suggests that the desire (or desires) whose realization destroys or obstructs the least possible number of other desires, should be satisfied. This, Rashdall argues, is tantamount to an abandonment of James' own definition of value; for the individual may not in fact desire to follow the course of action which he knows will lead to the most inclusive satisfaction, as strongly as he desires some very selfish end. To accede to James' criterion the agent must be impartial enough to sacrifice the stronger desire to the more inclusive end, and this impartiality is dependent not upon emotion, but upon the intellect. In short, James' criterion presupposes an a priori judgment: "More satisfaction is always better than less satisfaction"[1]. No doubt this self-evidently rational principle cannot be put into practice unless it is supported by 'the desire to be rational'[2]. But the desire presupposes the antecedent presence of the principle and the judgment upon which it is founded.

If the inclusiveness of one satisfaction can constitute a reason for regarding it as "better" than others, and for promoting it apart from consideration of personal preference, then value can no longer be defined merely in terms of desire. For the superior value of the wider satisfaction is not contingent upon whether one desires it; it 'presents itself to my rational nature as that which ought to be desired, whether in point of fact I do desire it or not'[3]. Moreover, this notion of obligation must arise in the individual

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1. ICE., pp. 162 f.
2. Ibid., p. 162.
3. Ibid., p. 165.

mind before the highest good can be so strongly desired that it takes precedence over competing and narrower ends in the direction of actual conduct. Thus James' own argument implies that value is an ideally apprehended notion, which commends itself to reason, and remains - independent of the vicissitudes of individual impulse - the norm of what ought to be desired.

Therefore Rashdall cannot understand how James can go on to assert that 'being desired stamps ... a thing ... as pro tanto good'[1]. In terms of James' own argument it has already been shown that the measure in which a thing is actually desired by an agent is no measure of its goodness. But, Rashdall adds, neither is the satisfaction of the desires of others a principle which alone can determine the goodness of conduct[2].

Nevertheless, his whole commentary on James really falls short of its purpose. It establishes that any given individual may fail to desire the highest good; it further proves that this highest good, defined in James' sense of the widest possible satisfaction, can be apprehended only through a judgment which is undistorted by personal desire; it thus demonstrates the fact that James' criterion for determining the value of each specific desire in its relation to the widest possible satisfaction, is a principle which

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1. ICE., p. 166.
2. Rashdall supports this latter statement with a rather dubious example; he attempts to show that when a "good" man tries to prevent a fellow creature from getting drunk, the source of his motive is an idea of duty, which can be explained neither in terms of his own or the drunkard's desires. Rashdall admits, of course, that this idea calls forth in the good man a desire to perform his duty which yields satisfaction when fulfilled. The example fails to prove Rashdall's case, however, since James might reply that the real objection to drunkenness is that it interferes with wider satisfactions either in the drunkard himself, or in other men whom his drunkenness adversely affects. Cf. ICE., pp. 167 ff.

can be recognized only by the intellect. But Rashdall falsely assumes that when he has demonstrated the rational character of judgments of value, he has likewise destroyed James' definition of value itself. To show, for example, that only the intellect can acknowledge the superiority of an end which is predominantly desired by society, does not disprove that the end is superior simply because it is thus predominantly desired. James might admit that the individual will not desire this ultimately best end until after he has acknowledged its excellence through a judgment; but this admission would not require him to change his definition of value[1].

Rashdall's real intention can be grasped only by carrying out a process of inference further than he has done in his own writings. His acceptance of Moore's dictum that the good is in-:definable,[2] supplies a key to the riddle. Clearly Rashdall does not mean to contend merely that value can be apprehended through judgments which "claim" objectivity. For if this were the case, he could offer no objection to the moral sense writers, McDougall, or James, so long as they acknowledged the self-evident fact that moral judgments involve <u>reasoning</u>. But Rashdall goes on to argue that because desires and satisfactions vary from one man to the next, James cannot provide an "objective standard" for moral approval: 'The identification of the good with the satisfactory reduces diversities of moral judgment to differences of taste quite as much as the theory of the "moral sense" school'[3]. To

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1. This is not to say that other aspects of Rashdall's theory may not be cogent enough to require such a change; it is merely to say that the argument which Rashdall here advances does not meet the case. Cf. <u>infra</u>.
2. Cf. ICE., pp. 143 ff. Cf. also # 25.
3. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 171.

put Rashdall's objection in its simplest terms: according to James, if one person desires X and judges that it is good, while another desires to avoid X and judges that it is bad, then X is both good and bad at the same time. Rashdall contends, on the contrary, that if one person judges correctly that X is good, then anyone who contradicts him judges falsely. Therefore merely to distinguish, as Rashdall does[1], between the experience that a thing is satisfying, and the judgment that this experience of a thing is satisfying, fails to bring out the point at issue. For James, to judge that X satisfies desire is identical with judging that X is good. Because of this identification each judgment "claims objectivity" in the sense that if it is true, anyone who denies it judges falsely; but likewise in each case, according to James, what the judgment predicates of X has its origin in the fact that someone does actually desire X. Rashdall wishes to contend that the two judgments are not identical, and that whereas the former indeed claims objectivity only in the sense that it purports to assert a truth about the actual state of someone's emotional or impulsive life, the latter claims objectivity in the sense that what is predicates of X - if the judgment is valid - is not dependent upon what any human being actually feels or desires. According to Rashdall, the statement "that which is desired is good" is not a mere tautology; for the introduction of the idea of value asserts something not contained in the idea of desire or satisfaction; it asserts, in short, that

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1. Cf. ICE., p. 173. He uses the terms "satisfactory" and "satisfactoriness".

what is desired ought to be[1]. In his opinion this notion of value is a priori; hence it cannot be reduced to any factors of subjective experience. Thus, although he holds that value resides in or qualifies states of consciousness, he escapes what he holds to be James' error of identifying value itself with a state of conscious-:ness, or an aspect of such states[2]. Rashdall would agree with Moore that judgments of value are synthetic, not analytic[3]. His exposition of this position is defective because he assumes that the "objectivity" of a judgment of value necessarily implies that value itself is "objective" in the sense of not being constituted by emotional or affective factors. Obviously this is not the case. Propositions which are true or false - and this is what Rashdall means by "objectivity" - can be pronounced concerning emotions or feelings.

This distinction is of the utmost importance, because Rashdall has already acknowledged the closeness of the relationship between moral judgment and satisfactoriness. The notion of duty, as has been observed, may give rise to a desire to perform it, and the fulfilment of the desire yields satisfaction; moreover, one of the grounds upon which a low form of satisfaction may be condemned is that it causes the non-satisfaction of the impulses which support morality. But, although realization of the "good" is thus satisfying, James is not justified in assuming that the latter is exhaustive of the former's meaning. This attempt to identify

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1. Cf. Ethics, p. 25.
2. In the critical section I show why this is Rashdall's position; cf. # 310 ff.
3. Cf. Principia Ethica, pp. 6 f. But Rashdall agrees for a very different reason. In his theory, judgments of value are synthetic because they relate empirical data ("states of consciousness") with an a priori notion (value). In Moore's theory they are synthetic because they relate one simple notion of an empirical quality (value), with other notions, simple or complex.

the "higher" goods with "higher" satisfactions Rashdall regards as a tacit acknowledgement of the validity of a notion wherein the intrinsic value of an end is not dependent upon whether or not it is in fact desired, or would prove satisfying, to anyone.

5. Casuistry.

Rashdall's assertion that it is possible to discriminate between various types of good as to their degree of value, in order that the greatest accessible quantity of good may be made the end of action, raises a special problem. It implies that each of these various goods is susceptible of being compared in quantitative terms. He seeks first of all to establish, against widespread objections, the possibility of a calculus of pleasure; for if comparison of different instances of this single type of good is impossible, the more complex notion of the commensurability of all values can hardly be defended.

The most radical criticism of the hedonistic calculus with which he has to reckon is that of Edward Caird[1], who asserts that pleasure cannot be experienced apart from an object desired on some other ground; this implies that pleasure *per se* cannot be desired at all. Rashdall answers this objection bluntly; it seems self-evident to him that if two objects are equally desirable on other grounds, the more pleasant one will be preferred. To deny this involves defending the (to his mind absurd) converse notion that, *ceteris paribus*, it is impossible to have an aversion to the more painful of two experiences for no other reason than that it is the more painful.

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1. Cf. his *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*. Vol. II, p. 229.

Once this objection is set aside, that of Mackenzie[1] must be considered; he criticizes the idea that pleasures can be summed, primarily on the ground that different pleasures cannot co-exist at the same moment. If this argument were valid, Rashdall maintains, it would also prove that a single pleasure cannot be desired; for the briefest pleasure must occupy a duration-span which is infinitely divisible. All pleasure must be experienced in a series, and all that the idea of a sum of pleasures involves is that this series should possess as great a magnitude as possible when both duration and intensity are taken into account. Obviously the intensity of one series may be so much greater than another that the former is preferable, even though of shorter duration; and vice versa. Where two pleasures are equal in either duration or intensity, their difference as regards the other factor will determine which is more pleasant on the whole.

Green[2] objected to the idea of a sum of pleasures, not because he found it unintelligible, but on the quite different ground that because capacity for pleasure has no definable limits it cannot provide a determinate conception of the highest good. Rashdall of course does not wish to defend the hedonistic ideal; but he believes that Green's refutation will be seen to be invalid when it is applied, as consistency demands, to all goods realizable in time. The greatest possible virtue, for example, is not untenable as an ideal; yet any ~~conceivable~~ attainment of virtue could always conceivably be exceeded.

The only point which Rashdall deems indispensable to his position, apart from the obvious fact that pleasure occupies duration,

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1. Cf. his Manual of Ethics, pp. 229 f. Fourth Edition.
2. Cf. his Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 401 f. Second Edition.

is that duration can be weighed against intensity. This can be denied only by maintaining that duration cannot increase the value of a pleasure at all[1], - or, conversely, that the duration of pain is a matter of indifference; and the same reasoning would have to be applicable to other goods, implying, for example, that a long period of virtue (its quality remaining constant) would not be better than a short one. On the special question as to whether the comparative magnitude of pleasures can be expressed numerically, Rashdall admits that in practice such estimates are not feasible; yet he asserts that both intensity and duration are roughly conceivable in terms of portions, and that there is nothing theoretically unintelligible about maintaining that if one minute of a pleasure seems as desirable as two minutes of another, then the former is twice as intense.

Finally, he holds that even pleasures which differ in quality may be compared; for it is possible to distinguish between the pleasantness of an experience, and the other valuable elements it contains. It is possible, for example, to prefer the contemplation of beauty to some alternative experience on the ground that, while the other experience would yield a greater quantity of pleasure of a cruder kind, the aesthetic experience is more valuable as a whole[2].

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1. Cf. Mackenzie: Social Philosophy, pp. 231 f.
2. For a detailed defence of the distinction between the value of the pleasure which an experience yields, and its value on other grounds, see GE. II, pp. 50-57. In pursuance of this distinction Rashdall devotes the balance of a chapter (GE. Book I, Ch. VII) to contrasting his own view concerning various specific virtues like humaneness, veracity, purity and humility, with that of hedonistic utilitarianism. This chapter also rests on the assumption that actions, and the feelings and emotions which accompany them, may possess positive or negative value over and above their value as means to some external good. When what he calls 'the actual constitution of human nature' (GE.I. p. 108) is thus taken into account, certain actions are condemned which might be defended on purely utilitarian grounds; for example, cruelty to animals, infanticide, and the extinction of social dependents.

Rashdall's sole purpose in discussing the hedonistic calculus is to show that varying amounts of one type of good (viz: pleasure) can be compared; having done this, he passes on to the more difficult question of whether all kinds of good can be compared with one another. He has asserted that "value" is applicable in the same sense to virtue, cultural interests and pleasure; he has also asserted that right conduct consists in the promotion of the greatest possible quantity of value. If either statement is to have any meaning, these three types of experience must be commensurable as regards their value. This does not imply, however, that a certain quantity of one good can be satisfactorily substituted for that of another, Since all elements are indispensable to the summum bonum, no amount of one can compensate for the total absence of the other; indeed, no single type of value (positive or negative) can exist alone, because each attaches to an aspect of consciousness which is inseparable from the others. What Rashdall wishes to demonstrate is that when an ideal state of all three aspects of consciousness is not feasible, - when, in fact, the enhancement of one good involves the diminution of another - it is possible to determine which should be preferred.

Assuming that the necessity for quantitative comparison can be escaped only by contending that it is always right to choose the highest type, no matter how small an amount of it is thereby made available, Rashdall appeals again to the fact that if virtue is regarded as the sole value, it cannot of itself furnish content for moral action. Of course, virtue could be treated as invariably preferable, without being regarded as the sole value; but to this he replies that such supremacy can be known only by comparing it

(i.e. the value of virtue) with lower forms of value. In individual conduct it is clear that virtue cannot come into competition with other goods, since it is always virtuous in the highest degree to promote the greatest quantity of value, whatever be its constituents[1]. But when one must choose between contributing to a very slight increase in the moral character of another, at the cost of great sacrifice of cultural enjoyment, or at the cost of great physical suffering, Rashdall holds that a greater amount of the lower goods may suffice to compensate for the qualitative superiority of the higher. When intellectual or aesthetic goods are weighed against pleasure and material comfort, it is still more apparent that the enjoyment of the latter - beyond the minimum limits of physical necessity - is often justifiable, even when it entails the loss of a small amount of these higher benefits.

A brief statement of the basic principles which Rashdall lays down in defence of the idea of commensurability cannot do justice to his argument, because that argument is greatly strengthened by an appeal to concrete examples in an attempt to demonstrate that men actually do indulge in a quantitative comparison of different goods. He admits, of course, that these comparisons can never be exact, and his own language remains vague when questions of principle arise. In the abstract he can speak only of "large" amounts of a lower good off-setting "small" amounts of a higher; but when the bribery of a Mandarin, involving slight deterioration in a character which is already none too pure, could save a score of Europeans from torture, Rashdall has no doubt about which course the moral consciousness affirms.

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1. Cf. # 24[illegible].

In the first instance his whole discussion of casuistry issues from a theoretical necessity; he has argued that the primary purpose of ethics is to determine what acts are right, and according to his position this involves a knowledge of what accessible end possesses the largest amount of value for society as a whole. The question remains as to what extent this goal of casuistry can be realized in practice.

He recognizes that moral philosophy is primarily speculative, and therefore sufficiently justifies itself if it contributes to knowledge; but he believes that speculative enquiries cannot be devoid of influence upon conduct so long as they are intimately connected with vital human interests. In the case of moral philosophy, while a defence of its practical usefulness is by no means necessary, it may be put forward as an additional reason for its importance. Moreover, because ethical enquiry does pertain to issues which have practical importance, it is undesirable to be indifferent to them; earnest devotion to the truth is not diminished because knowledge of it is sought, not only for its own sake, but also because of the value which it has for life and conduct.

The feasibility of casuistry is seriously limited by the fact that the ultimate data of ethics are immediate judgments; but Rashdall denies that this renders casuistry altogether impossible. He is willing to admit that training in moral philosophy does not necessarily lead one to judge more correctly than others concerning moral value, any more than the formal correctness of the logician's thought is guaranteed by training in his discipline; but in each case reflective study does increase the likelihood of

correct judgment. Bradley had contended, in his diatribe against casuistry, that ethical thought cannot be discursive at all; but if this were true, Rashdall replies, all ethical judgments would be isolated and incoherent, and reflection upon them could only increase the likelihood of their being erroneous[1]. He holds that Bradley has overlooked the fact that immediate judgments can be criticized and moulded into a consistent system, through modification and subordination of their contradictory elements; this is a process which reflective reasoning alone can perform; it yields general principles for the guidance of conduct, and moral progress is dependent upon it.

Another invalid objection to casuistry arises from the fact that it is popularly associated with the vices of the Jesuit system, which arose in a period when the Church was seeking to gain favour by making its demands upon conduct as light as possible. Casuistry can be carried on apart from 'an immoral system of Probabilism'[2], apart from confessionals and priestly authority, apart from the distinction between mortal and venial sins which stresses the external character of the act rather than its motive. In short the whole purpose of casuistry, as Rashdall conceives it, is to facilitate the discovery of how men may best serve the highest possible ends; the Jesuit system, in general, was constructed to point out the degree of immorality which can be practised without incurring the censure of the Church.

Nevertheless, very real limitations are set upon the extent to which moral philosophy can enhance right conduct. Because the moral

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1. Cf. GE. II, p. 424.
2. Ibid., p. xv.

judgment is in the first instance immediate, its adequacy is dependent more upon insight than upon intellectual acumen. For this reason the best moral teacher is primarily a man of exceptional moral character. Speculation cannot greatly affect the moral sensitiveness of the individual in a positive way; but, given a native insight, it can stimulate the exercise of this capacity with regard to problems that might otherwise be neglected; especially it may provide a safeguard against fanaticism. The fact remains, however, that moral philosophy can contribute to goodness only in the small measure to which goodness is dependent upon knowledge and reflection; it can rectify those mistakes in conduct which are due to prejudice or confused thinking rather than to ill-will.

One further limitation arises from the fact that knowledge of the best means to the ideal end requires specialized information. The moral philosopher may contribute to progress by criticizing traditional standards which govern the conduct of mankind; but in order to discern and promote the best course amidst concrete circumstances, specialized knowledge is necessary. It is the expert who, in a given field, like law, medicine or commerce, is best fitted to know the most suitable means for bringing about a specific reform; but experts seldom concern themselves with ethical questions. Clearly the task of relating and comparing these various complicated aspects of life is too vast for any one man or class of men to perform adequately. Thus the ideal of a casuistry universal in scope cannot be fully realized in practice because it involves universal knowledge.

CHAPTER II - CHRISTIAN ETHICS

1. Authority.

Rashdall's ethical position, which is now completely before us, can be reduced to comparatively simple terms. Conscience he defines as a rational capacity whereby the rightness of an action is judged (not irrespectively of its consequences, but rather) in terms of the extent to which it promotes a universal good; and the universal good he regards (not as synonymous with maximum pleasure, but rather) as an ideal which includes virtue, cultural interests and pleasure, each in proportion to its relative importance. Is this, then, the end of the matter? Because he contends that judgment on the part of the individual agent is the ultimate arbiter concerning moral questions, does his system culminate in an individualism which leaves no function for external authority? This question is most pressing, of course, when taken in connexion with the moral teaching of Christianity; for Rashdall's procedure seems diametrically opposed to the practice of deciding matters of conduct by appealing to scriptural teaching.

The same tour in the United States which produced the little volume entitled Is Conscience an Emotion? included an engagement at Oberlin College, where he delivered the Haskell Lectures. This latter series, for which he chose Christian ethics as his theme, was published three years later (in 1916) under the title Conscience and Christ. The primary purpose of this volume is to clarify the relationship between the authority of individual conscience and the authority (so far as it concerns moral questions) of Christ's life and teaching. Rashdall had long been troubled by the fact that the prima facie inconsistency involved in espousing the authority of both had received so little attention.[1]

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1. Rashdall's discussion of this problem is to be found in the opening chapter of Conscience and Christ. See also The Theory of Good and Evil, Book II, Chapter V, and his early article in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Vol. I, pp. 96-110. (1891).

As early as 1893, in a review of Newman Smyth's Christian Ethics,[1] he had raised such questions as these: To what extent does Christian moral teaching reveal truths which the practical reason, operating independently, could not discover? How far are reason and revelation harmonious in the sphere of morality? What are the grounds and limits of the moral authority ascribable to Christ, the Bible and the Church; and in what relation do these authorities stand to individual conscience and the state? To these questions Conscience and Christ furnishes a partial answer, and on the basis of this book we shall now proceed to consider most of them; the relationship between reason and revelation, however, must be reserved for another chapter.[2]

Yet the importance of Conscience and Christ can be indicated only by anticipating this later topic. Briefly, Rashdall's conception of the significance of the Incarnation turns upon the belief that humanity at its highest, especially in its pursuit of a perfect moral ideal, provides the most adequate possible revelation of the character of God.

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1. Cf. The Economic Review. Vol. III, pp. 136-145.

2. The claims of the individual, the state, and the Church, are considered in three thoughtful articles which he wrote for The Economic Review in 1896. See Vol. VI, pp. 59-75, 166-182 317-333; these were later reprinted in Ideas and Ideals, Chapters II - IV. Cf also Appendix F.
In the review of Smyth's book Rashdall mentioned two additional subjects which should be included in any complete treatise on Christian ethics: (a) A discussion of ' the relation between Christian doctrine and Christian practice' (Op. Cit., p. 138). (b) A detailed treatment of the content and application of the moral law as it is conceived in Christian teaching; this would entail a system of casuistry which would show men how to do right instead of merely how to escape from sin. Rashdall's own sermons, which abundantly emphasize the moral advantages to be derived from belief in Christian doctrine, provide an ample, though scattered, treatment of the former topic. (See Doctrine and Development, Christus in Ecclesia, and Principles and Precepts). His views on casuistry and nowhere more fully delineated than in the chapters just reviewed, though he applied the method there outlined in virtually all of his writings on practical topics, whether religious or secular.

To maintain that Christ uniquely revealed the nature of God, it is necessary to show that He did indeed uniquely fulfil this moral ideal in His life and teaching. Therefore the book as a whole con-:stitutes an apologetic on behalf of the ethical supremacy of our Lord; and although Rashdall does not regard this truth, once established, as comprehending the whole meaning of the doctrine of the Incarnation, it is correct to say that he regards it as the most important aspect of that doctrine. At the end of the volume[1] he intimates that Christ's supremacy over other religious teachers could be shown in other respects; yet he nowhere attempts such a demonstration with a fullness comparable to this discussion of His ethical significance. Hence his treatment of Christ's teaching is more than an essay in comparative ethics; for Rashdall himself, at least, the conclusions reached are of the utmost doctrinal importance.

His view of the relationship between individual conscience and external authority follows from the limitations inherent in each. The limitations connected with the former have just been mentioned in our account of his discussion of casuistry, where it was observed that knowledge of the proper means to the attainment of good ends demands 'an experience much wider than that of the average individual'[2]. More important still, all men are not equally competent to judge the value of an end, even when they possess sufficient factual knowledge to achieve that end. In reality, therefore, the morality of a large proportion of one's actions cannot be decided solely through individ-:ual judgment. The child begins life in dependence upon external influences for his moral education, just as the race began in sub-:servience to tribal custom. Even the more autonomous civilized adult remains tremendously influenced by tradition and the social environment; even he can be independent only with reference to

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1. Cf. CC., p. 280.
2. CC., p. 15.

isolated issues. Indeed, complete autonomy would be synonymous with anarchy.

Historically, the discovery that moral ideas are necessarily transmitted through tradition and education has been the source of ethical scepticism; reflection upon differences in national customs led the Sophists, for example, to regard all morality as founded upon arbitrary conventions. Rashdall has already sought to show that the self-evidence of moral truth, like that of any other body of such truth, is not undermined because it has been gradually discovered and must be learned afresh by every child; yet he has admitted that ethics, because it is related to concrete human affairs, cannot claim the precision which characterizes the abstract sciences. Questions concerning the means to a given end turn upom factual information, and therefore differences of opinion about them arise largely from variations in intellectual acumen and powers of observation[1]. But differences of insight into the value of ends 'by no means correspond with differences of general intellectual capacity'[2]; for value, as has been pointed out already, is related to affective and volitional dispositions, which enter into the ground of moral judgments, and thereby qualify the operation of the practical reason. For example, when the emotional capacity of an individual is defective, his experience lacks one part of the data on which these judgments should be based. Thus any aspect of character may give rise to 'inequality in men's power of discerning between right and wrong'[3]. Conflicting opinion does not justify the conclusion that objective truth in ethics is undiscoverable or non-existent; but it does indicate the insuffic-:iency of isolated individual judgment and the necessity for moral education, which make the operation of some measure of authority indispensable.

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1. Cf. GE. II, p. 151.
2. GE. II, p. 152.
3. Ibid., p. 154.

On the other hand the influence of authority must also be subject to limitations. A primary purpose of moral education is the training of individuals to accept or reject independently principles which were originally received on authority. Unquestion-:ing assent to traditional standards, or complete submission on the part of the individual to the consensus of social opinion (as the Hegelian ethic commends), would signalize the atrophy of moral development. For most great ethical advances have been due to the insights of a few individuals - pre-eminently to the originators and reformers of the great religions. Undeniably, even the most original moral teachers are largely moulded by the ideas of their own social heritage; but this does not gainsay the fact that they have freely exercised their critical faculties upon accepted beliefs and institutions - repudiating, refashioning or transcending them.

The inequality of individual moral insight thus attests to the necessity for some measure of both authority and autonomy; it makes autonomy necessary for those individuals capable of perceiving and accepting a high ideal on its own merits; it makes authority necessary if that ideal is to be effective in the lives of those who cannot independently appreciate its worth[1]. In this connexion it is impor-:tant to remember that 'the power of recognizing a moral truth when

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1. Rashdall recognizes that the harmonious and fruitful interaction of these two forces constitutes one of the most difficult prob-lems of applied ethics. The transition from unreflective child-hood to moral self-reliance is an especially delicate one because the consequences of general disrespect for moral restrictions are disastrous, even though that disrespect be aroused by some justifiable departure from convention. Hence the evil results of compliance with an otiose moral rule may in certain circumstances be less than those of rebellion; but ideally it should be an in-dependent recognition of this fact, rather than unquestioning con-:formity, which prompts one to submit to authority in such a case.

'it is once pointed out is much more widely diffused than the power of independently discovering it'[1]. Thus when authority is acknowledged at all, it should be that of the best men, rather than that of "public opinion"; it should issue from someone whose moral insights have proved superior to one's own already, so that it is reasonable to accept his authority where verification is impossible.

These general considerations Rashdall applies to the specific problem of how the life and teaching of Christ can make authoritative claims upon individual conscience. His principle would base acceptance of Christ's teaching upon its appeal to an unfettered conscience, rather than upon 'blind obedience'[2]; it also implies that if His teaching proves supreme within regions where personal judgment is capable of furnishing guidance, then it may reasonably be followed where one's own powers are inadequate. Negatively the principle affects religious authoritarianism as an attitude rather than any essential teaching of Christ Himself. Slavish submission to the letter of Scripture has been a cause of most of the religious outrages of history; some Christians have even seemed 'prepared to obey a dictum of Christ, no matter what they themselves thought of its morality'[3]. But the spirit in which Christ put forth His own message was one which assumed that His hearers could recognize its truth for themselves. He indeed spoke as one having authority; but even His most revolutionary and paradoxical sayings do not take the form of arbitrary rules which must be accepted without being understood; they appeal in a direct and startling way to the conscience of every individual[4]. With regard to miracles, He laid

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1. GE. II, p. 167.
2. CC., p. 29.
3. CC., p. 32.
4. Cf. a sermon entitled "Principles or Precepts", PP., Chapter I.

the stress not upon the supernatural power they manifested, but upon their mercifulness, as illustrating the unique moral purpose of His ministry.

In the preceding chapter we have seen that no body of ethical teaching can furnish authoritative guidance concerning the details of conduct; the most that it can accomplish is to put forward general principles which are universally valid for human society. In what follows it will be shown that Christ's ethical teaching takes the latter form; but full recognition of the originality and the absolute-:ness of the principles which He revealed is not in the least incom-:patible with the exercise of autonomous moral judgment. His teach-:ing cannot even be understood unless it commends itself to a capacity possessed by each individual; and the character of that teaching is such that it leaves men free to discover its significance for them-:selves, as they seek to meet the detailed needs of their own times.

Naturally Rashdall has little sympathy with attempts to defend the supremacy of Christ's ethical teaching on grounds other than its intrinsic worth. He does not believe that Christ's power to work miracles can constitute a proof as to the truth of His ethical utter-:ances; a similar power recorded of others like Moses and Elijah has not led to belief in their ethical infallibility. A more important claim frequently made by the Church is that belief in Christ's divinity implies belief in the truth of His ethical teaching. For reasons which will be explained in another chapter[1], Rashdall regards this as a reversal of the proper order in thinking; in his opinion, recognition of the moral supremacy of Christ's teaching and practice must constitute a fundamental ground for believing in His divinity.

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1. Cf. Chapter IV.

He even writes :

'If we once allow the self-evidencing truth of His moral teaching to occupy a prominent place in the argument for His Divinity, we are trusting to the validity of our own moral consciousness; and when we have done this, we can no longer profess ourselves willing to accept any and every moral precept of Christ, without any criticism of its contents, on the strength of the historical evidence that he uttered the words'[1].

2. Christ's Ethical Teaching[2]

Therefore Rashdall undertakes a study of Christ's ethical teaching with the sole purpose of discovering to what extent it may claim to appeal to the conscience of mankind as eternally true. Like most great moral teachers, Christ was not a systematic philosopher; His sayings, often couched in parable, take the form of intuitive insights into the significance of specific questions. Yet Rashdall holds that this does not make it impossible to discover certain fundamental principles which underlie all His injunctions. Indeed, he believes that the non-speculative character of Christ's teaching has concealed from many His undeniable intellectual gifts; the gifts which enabled Him to study the Old Testament with rare discernment and to meet skilfully the questions of learned friends and foes.[3]

Rashdall also takes account of the fact that our Lord drew upon an extremely advanced moral tradition, with which all His hearers were familiar. Portions of the prophetic and wisdom books of the Old Testament, he declares, surpass the highest ethical teachings of the Hellenic world. Undoubtedly the virtues connected with political and intellectual activity were better understood in Greece than in Palestine; but in 'those matters of personal morality

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1. CC., p. 28.
2. The succeeding discussion is based on CC., Ch. III; PP., Chs. I and XXVI; DD., Ch. XIV.
3. Cf. DD., pp. 231-234.

'which are apt to be most affected by the state... of religious belief',[1] the Jewish teaching is vastly superior; this is especially true with regard to sexual purity and charity,

Other influences altered the form in which the prophetic tradition entered into the Judaism of Christ's own time. One of these was a definitely retrogressive emphasis upon ritualism and legalism; it frequently thrust great moral issues into the background, fettering conduct to the minutiae of petty observances prescribed in the Pentateuch and the elaborate commentaries of the legalists. But the period subsequent to the great prophets contained progressive developments as well. The Exile brought with it a recognition of the importance of individual moral responsibility (viz: Ezekiel); and, because worship in the Temple was no longer possible, other less rigid forms of devotion gained a new importance which was not lost after the Return. Moreover, several Apocryphal books, though they embody no fresh ethical inspiration, do attest to a detailed and exacting application of the prophetic teaching.[2]

Rashdall has no patience with the assertion that Jesus contributed nothing to morality which cannot be paralleled in Jewish writings of His own period; but he does recognize that one of His greatest contributions consisted in the fact that He discriminated between the elements of permanent moral value in the Jewish tradition, and the body of legalistic accretions which weighed down the religion of His day. Even if this were His only claim to originality, it would be a considerable one. While acknowledging the authority of the Pentateuch, He attached little importance to the vast accumulation of "Pharisaic glosses"[3] which laid irksome and even inhumane

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1. CC., p. 80.
2. In "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs" especially, many religious and moral ideas closely resembling those of Jesus are to be found, and it is probable that He read the book Himself. (Cf. CC. p. 92).
3. CC. p.95.

restrictions upon the people. 'Within the Law itself He practically, if not avowedly, distinguished between the ethical parts of it and merely ritual or ceremonial regulations'[1]. Therefore He did not hesitate to depart from accepted practices when ethical purposes seemed to demand it; for example, He deprecated the 'system of clean and unclean meats which was the main foundation of (the) social barrier between Jew and Gentile'[2], and thus in principle anticipated, or even exceeded, the teaching of St. Paul in such matters.

Christ went beyond Judaism, not only in subordinating ritual to ethical requirements, but in emphasizing to a degree hitherto unequalled the importance of motive within the strictly moral sphere of the Law. He condemned evil desire in matters like anger, murder, and lasciviousness, as uncompromisingly as He condemned the overt deed; and on the positive side He taught that love for God and neighbour is the primary source of good actions. Rashdall points out, moreover, that this principle of love was extended universally, to include not only men belonging to other classes and races, but even enemies; this in itself constituted a transformation of the whole moral code. The highest teaching of Judaism had long counselled civility to strangers, but it had never sanctioned the equality of treatment which Christ's words imply.

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1. CC., p. 96. Rashdall holds that the "fulfilment of the Law" referred to in Luke 16:17 is altogether concerned with a development and application of ethical teaching in the Law and the prophets. He is inclined to question the authenticity of Mt. 5:17 f. (about "not one jot or tittle, etc."), but suggests that 'if Jesus said it, He must have done so at a period when His antagonism to Jewish legalism was not fully developed' (CC. p. 96 n). In fact he implies that the few sayings which specifically make concessions to legalism - virtually all of which are found in the first gospel - either spring from the Judaizing interest of the evangelist, or, if genuine, are inconsistent with our Lord's 'actual teaching and practice on other occasions' (Ibid., p. 98). In any event, he claims, no 'insistence upon ceremonial rules' can be found in the gospels at all.
2. CC., pp. 100 f.

That Jesus regarded His mission as primarily devoted to His own people cannot be doubted; but the studies of critics have not qualified the commandment to love one's enemies,[1] and this commandment, even apart from anything else, attests to the universal application which Christ desired for His teaching concerning brotherhood; for the term "enemies" surely cannot be restricted to the confines of the Jewish race.

Christ enjoined love not merely because of the external benefits which it brings, but primarily because of the supreme value of the loving character itself; He taught men that in promoting the spiritual well-being of their fellows and themselves they were following the will of God, who desires the true good of all His creatures.[2] It is this union of divine and human love in a single teaching, Rashdall contends, which constitutes Christianity's strongest claim to finality, and evokes the highest religious and moral aspirations of which the human heart is capable. Hence it is impossible to regard Christ's moral teaching as separable from the religion out of which it issues; it is impossible to hold that a system embodying the same ethical principles could replace those of the gospels. For when robbed of the religious motives which support it, when dissociated from fidelity to the Person whose spiritual insight and purity it expresses, the ethical content of the gospels is deprived of its compelling power.

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1. Rashdall admits that some of the universalistic statements in the gospels may be questioned on critical grounds; but, he argues, the very fact that Jesus based morality upon inward righteousness instead of upon 'descent from Abraham,... circumcision...(or) the observance of the distinction between clean and unclean meats' (CC. p. 111), indicates clearly that a Gentile who fulfilled the requisite conditions would not be excluded from the Kingdom. Concerning the authenticity of the parable of the Good Samaritan, see Ibid., p.112.
2. Cf. PP., pp. 253 f.

Appendix A. - Ethics and Eschatology.

At the time when Conscience and Christ was written, the eschatological theory of Christ's teaching had come into great prominence, largely through the influence of Albert Schweitzer. Rashdall devotes the entire second chapter of his book to a consideration of this theory, since he feels that it erroneously subordinates the ethical aspects in Christ's message to His annunciation of a catastrophic Day of Judgment; he also desires to refute the suggestion that Christ's ethical conceptions are so inextricably bound up with this fore-shortened view of history as to be largely inapplicable to modern problems.

He begins by contending that Schweitzer's theory has exaggerated the importance and the trustworthiness of the eschatological passages. In the Synoptics, predictions of how soon the Kingdom would come contradict each other, and ~~that~~ all are inconsistent with the passage - one of the best attested in the gospels - in which Christ professes His own ignorance of the date(1); Rashdall is therefore inclined to regard the passages which do mention a date as attempts by the evangelists 'to adjourn the date of the Coming' (2), in order to restore waning hope in the Parousia. He also regards passages which deal with Christ's own rôle in the Judgment as not much less doubtful than those which fix its date in the immediate future (3).

Rashdall does not attempt to deny, that Jesus may have looked forward to the sudden coming of the Kingdom in the near future. What he does wish to protest against is the tendency to overlook other elements in an exclusive emphasis upon eschatology; for it is this, he believes, which has led writers like Schweitzer to hold that Christ's 'ethical precepts (were) ... not much in advance of the higher rabbinic teaching of His time'(4), and were intended merely for the guidance of His followers in the brief interval before the Judgment. The eschatological position, Rashdall replies, neglects the fact that the gospels also contain a conception of the Kingdom as present, - that is, as being gradually established in the hearts of believers. These latter passages attest to the fact that Christ's ethical teaching was at least partially directed to the purpose of gradually winning men over in the present to a quality of life which would characterize all life in the perfect Kingdom. Thus, although no doubt the full establishment of the Kingdom was associated with a future Judgment, the essence of the conception was ethical. Only when it is acknowledged that in Christ's teaching the Kingdom is represented as the establishment of a perfect relationship between God and man, can any connexion be found between the sayings in which its coming is gradual and those in which it is sudden and catastrophic. The earliest utterance of Jesus about the Kingdom was joined with a call to repentance; and throughout His teaching the conditions for admission to it were described as moral and spiritual. The fact that He also regarded the Kingdom as a state of reward and punishment

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1. Cf. Mt. 26; 36; Mk. 13:32.
2. CC. p. 46. Rashdall does not seem to realize that his interpretation here would well support the thesis that eschatology is primitive in the gospel tradition. He suggests that none of these predictions 'certainly belongs to ... Q'. (Ibid; p. 44).
3. Cf. Ibid., pp. 48 f.
4. Ibid., p. 44.

enhances rather than diminishes the ethical worth of the conception; hence it is gratuitous to contend, as some have done, that this aspect of Christ's teaching causes a conflict between ~~between~~ His ethics and His eschatology. (1) When the gospels are compared with apocalyptic literature, the attention which they accord to details of catastrophe and reward is immediately seen to be moderate; from the prophetic and apocalyptic teaching concerning the Kingdom and the Messianic ideal, Jesus so unremittingly chose the most spiritual elements that, except for the "little Apocalypse",(2) the gospels contain virtually no mention of the Kingdom which is not closely connected with His preaching of righteousness.

What Rashdall is most concerned to prove is that even if Jesus expected the Kingdom to come suddenly in the immediate future, the value of His ethical teaching is not thereby destroyed; (3) for His teaching dealt almost exclusively with principles whose validity even a swiftly approaching cataclysm would not alter. Anticipation of an imminent termination of the race would transform the details of duty; for example, good works requiring long periods of time would have to be abandoned. But it would not affect the value of repentance, right motive, and love of God and man. Whether the Kingdom is seen in the perspective of a world which will long continue in time, or whether it is seen as a sudden supernatural intervention in history, the necessity for seeking it through righteousness is not diminished; and this latter was the essence of Christ's teaching.

In his own preaching and writing Rashdall usually lays most stress on Christ's teaching of a Kingdom already begun in the hearts of men, which he takes to be the Christian ideal for society; the idea of a full fruition of the Kingdom in the future, he associates with belief in immortality. Therefore he refuses to follow a writer like Father Tyrrell (4) in radically separating the "present" and "future" conceptions of the Kingdom. Tyrrell's view of the present social order is so pessimistic that he conceives of a future Kingdom, beyond history, in which God will redeem the evil of this world, as the only basis for Christian hope. Though Rashdall's own position is one which resolutely confronts the reality of evil, he is not ready to go so far. He holds that belief in a loving God, which justifies the hope of immortality, is drawn from the evidence of earthly experience; (5) such belief, he maintains, affords hope for improvement - though not for perfection - in this life. Precisely because he believes righteousness to be the primary condition for bringing in the Kingdom, he refuses to divorce the effort to realize it in this life from the hope that it will be perfectly realized in the future.

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1. For more detailed defence of this statement, see Appendix D.
2. Cf. CC. p. 59.
3. Rashdall seeks to show elsewhere that the validity of Christ's ethical teaching is not affected by the fact that He may have mistakenly believed in the imminence of a world catastrophe. And he does not believe that the doctrine of Christ's divinity implies omniscience in the human Jesus. Cf. # 194 ff.
4. Cf. his Christianity at the Cross-Roads.
5. Cf. # 149 ff.

3. Objections to Christ's Ethical Teaching.[1]

Rashdall claims universal validity only for 'the general principle of impartial love towards all mankind', which he finds at the core of Christ's ethical teaching. Since this is substantially identical with the ideal which he has already espoused in a purely theoretical discussion of ethics, acceptance of it here needs no further elaboration or defence. To those who deny the validity of Christ's ethical teaching because they uphold egoism or refuse to acknowledge the reality of moral obligation, Rashdall's reply has already been sufficiently indicated. Yet Christ's teaching embodied concrete details as well as general principles; indeed, it 'would have been very cold and unpersuasive apart from the particular applications and interpretations which He gave to it'.[2] When Rashdall turns to a consideration of the objections which have been urged against Christian ethics, he discovers that most of them refer to these concrete details; it is frequently claimed, for example, that His teaching is too closely bound up with a particular period of history and a limited racial mentality to be universally applicable to-day.

Rashdall sympathizes to a certain extent with such criticisms. He himself emphasizes the fact that the gospels do not contain a set of rigid precepts which can exhaustively determine the details of conduct. Concerning a question like that of divorce, he maintains that conscience immediately assents to Christ's defence of the general principle of monogamy; but whether or not divorce is justified in a given case cannot be contingent, he urges, upon

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1. The succeeding discussion is based on CC., Chapter IV.
2. CC., p. 135.

the literal application of some isolated saying of Jesus. For apparently the only cause which He acknowledged as sufficient was that of sexual infidelity, and even the verses which contain this exception may not be genuine.[1] Here, Rashdall argues, the rightness of conduct cannot be made to depend upon critical conjecture; for it is impossible to be certain in the case of any saying that it was rightly remembered and recorded by the evangelist or his informant, that it was correctly copied by scribes for centuries, or that it was accurately translated from Aramaic into Greek and then into English. On the contrary, only a free conscience, operating in the light of modern experience, can decide whether divorce in any given case is not - where all else has failed - the lesser of two evils, and therefore more compatible with maintenance of respect for the very institution which Jesus sought to defend.[2] He also believes that many objections brought against detailed aspects of Christ's teaching are the fruit of a misguided literalism, and that they may be removed merely by considering each saying in its relationship to the principle of love, which permeated His teaching as a whole. His answers to only the most important of these objections may be considered here.[3]

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1. Cf. _cc_., pp. 104 f.
2. It is interesting to note that while he was a witness before the Royal Commission on Divorce Rashdall was severely criticized, especially by high churchmen, for claiming that conscience rather than the literal application of gospel sayings, should be the guide in such a question. Cf. The Daily Telegraph, Nov. 24, 1910, for his testimony, and The Times, March 1911, for his controversy with Prof. Goudy on the subject. Cf. also Rashdall's article, "Divorce: The Question of Principle", The Modern Churchman, Vol. VI, pp. 566-75, - and a joint letter, which he signed, on "The Grounds of Divorce", Ibid., Vol. XIII, pp. 162 f.
3. Chapters III, IV and V, in Conscience and Christ, are followed in each case by a lengthy appendix. The first treats of detailed teachings of Jesus, the second of detailed objections to them, while the third discusses the manner in which apostolic writers, especially St. Paul, elaborated or fell short of them. These supplementary notes contain much valuable material, largely of an exegetical character.

To the charge that Christ's teaching counsels an exaggerated sacrifice of self, Rashdall replies that the saying, "Love thy neighbour as thyself", in principle asserts belief in the intrinsic value of every human soul, and therefore requires that one take account of his own needs as well as those of his neighbour. Because men usually err on the side of selfishness alone, it is frequently forgotten that the saying is also applicable against a destructive self-sacrifice, which fails to contribute to a good more important than one's own. No doubt Jesus stated the duty of giving to the needy in an unqualified form; pre-occupation with exceptional circumstances would have confused His hearers and diminished the force of His appeal. Nevertheless, there is nothing in His teaching which counsels charity in cases where it is contrary to the wisdom of a love which seeks the highest well-being of all men impartially. He was primarily concerned with promoting that inward unselfishness which usually expresses itself in giving; so long as one is motivated by generosity, it is entirely in keeping with His main purpose to consider how a gift may be most beneficial; thus good-will itself may restrain one from giving where it will instill laziness in the recipient, where other needs or responsibilities are more pressing, or where some means more effective than private charity should be employed to combat the evil of poverty.

Christ's statements concerning meekness, non-resistance and forgiveness, afford another instance, Rashdall claims, of a teaching which is inapplicable to modern life only so long as it is interpreted in a deadly literal way. It should be remembered that these sayings were delivered to a people who had no political power; they apply primarily to personal relationships, and their chief object is to denounce revenge. Rashdall does not mean to suggest that the

fundamental principles of Christian morality do not apply to every sphere of human action, social as well as personal. But if, as he contends, punishment and resentment may be joined with the purpose of promoting the malefactor's true good along with that of all other men, then indeed it is a mere abuse of Christ's teaching to claim that it permits all offences to go unpunished and meets evil solely with indiscriminate forgiveness. If Christ's own sayings and actions be examined as a whole, many circumstances can be found in which He thought it proper to bring indignation and resentment to bear against corrupt or hypocritical individuals who were undermining the spiritual life of a whole community. Moreover, He taught that even forgiveness should be contingent upon repentance on the part of the offender.[1.]

When he comes to consider Christ's attitude toward property, Rashdall is willing to admit that eschatological expectations partially explain the special obligations which He imposed upon His immediate disciples; and he stresses the fact that many of the most uncompromising demands for the renunciation of personal goods and worldly ties were addressed to this small band alone.[2.] In Rashdall's opinion, therefore, Jesus did not intend to make complete poverty a general condition for entrance into the Kingdom.[3.] Thus in seeking to apply the spirit of Christ's teaching to modern life, he does not feel compelled to sanction a universal renunciation of wealth. No doubt he reaches this conclusion partially under the

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1. Cf. # 214 ff.
2. Rashdall suggests that this fact may explain the passage about hating father and mother (Lk. 14:25 f. Cf. Mt. 10:37). He also believes that the demands made upon the Rich Young Ruler were exacting, not only because Jesus perceived that his wealth was a spiritual stumbling-block to him, but also because He was inviting him to become a disciple (Cf. Mt. 19:21).
3. In support of this statement he cites Christ's commendation of Zaccheus, who 'Resolved to restore fourfold to the particular persons whom he had wronged and to give half of his remaining goods to the poor' (CC. p. 152. Italics mine).

influence of a conviction, often expressed elsewhere, that economic equalitarianism would prove more injurious than beneficial if put into practice in modern society. He does recognize, however, that Christianity demands a readiness for any sacrifice which love requires; for some men wealth may be such a taint that only complete renunciation of it can bring about moral perfection.[1] He also affirms without reservation that Jesus desired property, along with everything else material, to be subjugated to the service of human welfare, - and that in so far as our social order fails to make wealth the servant, instead of the task-master, of all mankind, it undeniably falls short of the Christian ideal.

Finally, Rashdall regards the charge of morbid asceticism as entirely unjustifiable; for Christ never made suffering, or the avoidance of harmless pleasure, ends in themselves; what He endured was indispensable to the fulfilment of His mission. In fact, the gospels are full of evidence that He was censured for not rigidly following such practices as fasting.[2] Moreover, only one passage,[3] which has all the appearance of being a characteristic Matthean addition, could be interpreted as placing celibacy above marriage,

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1. Cf. GE. Bk. II, Ch. IV, on "Vocation". Some are especially fitted to serve God through great sacrifice.
2. Rashdall claims that since both Jews and early Christians tended to be ascetic, it is reasonable to suppose that traditional sayings of Jesus sanctioning their practices would have been preserved; yet modern criticism has cast doubt upon even the few references to fasting which do occur in the gospels. Of the two undoubtedly genuine allusions (Mt. 6:16 ff., and Mk. 2:19-22 with parallels), the former neither commands nor opposes fasting, while the latter contains a saying (about the new wine and the old wine-skins) which renounces the old ritual system, side by side with what is probably (as Loisy holds) 'an addition...reflecting the growing asceticism of the later Church' (CC., p. 162). For Rashdall's whole discussion, see ibid., pp. 156-62.
3. Mt. 19:12.

and it does not purport to be the enunciation of a universal principle. Elsewhere the gospel evidence unequivocally indicates that Christ attached great importance to the sanctity and permanence of monogamy.

4. Development in Christian Ethics.[1]

Thus far our review of Conscience and Christ has shown how Rashdall seeks to strike a balance between the legitimate claims of authority and autonomy. Christ's teaching of impartial love toward all mankind, together with its implications for specific aspects of conduct, presents a principle for which he claims universal validity. But he further claims that allegiance to Christ does not fetter the conscience because His teaching does not put forth a rigid, detailed code; the practice of Christianity thus requires the exercise of individual judgment in applying the law of love to the changing needs and conditions of each succeeding generation. A literalism which regards each gospel saying as a precept to be followed without qualification, conceals entirely the true relevance of Christian ethics to modern problems. It engenders a slavish legalism like that which Christ Himself denounced in the Judaism of His own times; it plays havoc with the sometimes subtle and metaphorical significance of our Lord's expressions; it fails to interpret each isolated saying in the light of His teaching as a whole.[2]

The fact that the fundamental principles of Christian ethics are susceptible of development and expansion therefore attests, not

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1. The succeeding discussion is based largely upon CC., Chapter V. For other sources, see foot-notes.
2. Rashdall cites several instances of how Christ's own actions contradicted some of His sayings if only the bare content of the latter, instead of their underlying intention, be taken into account. For example, He strongly condemned the use of the word "fool", and yet He is recorded to have employed it Himself on a few occasions. (For further examples, see PP. p. 9). A thoroughgoing literalism would imply that one should forgive exactly four hundred and ninety times, hate father and mother, and indulge in self-mutilation.

to their insufficiency, but to their abiding fruitfulness. Because Christ did not claim to expound a system which would exhaustively cover all aspects of conduct, Rashdall feels free to undertake an enquiry into the forms of development needed. The apostolic writers themselves, he declares, began the task of adapting the Christian message to changing circumstances, and the Church has regarded this as one of its appropriate tasks ever since. Indeed, if the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Fourth Gospel may be regarded as having some actual foundation in the later discourses of Jesus, this activity of perpetuating His influence was one which He foresaw and sanctioned.[1]

This development may of course take the form of increasing insight into the means for promoting the good of mankind; for obviously the use of new knowledge or the solution of complex modern problems cannot be held within the confines of modes of action which were best suited to enhance the general good in the first century. But Rashdall is willing to maintain also that the ethical teaching of Jesus can be supplemented legitimately with regard to its conception of the moral end itself. When Conscience and Christ is compared with the central principles of The Theory of Good and Evil, this becomes apparent. For though our Lord's teaching embodies an exalted conception of moral goodness, and does not fall into an ascetic condemnation of pleasure, it lays very little stress upon the value of intellectual and cultural activities. To be sure, He did not indulge in the anti-intellectualism which has sometimes characterized great religious teachers; nevertheless, Rashdall desires to provide a definite place for this

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1. Cf. PP. p. 250. The idea of development, as implicit in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, is one which permeates Rashdall's whole attitude toward Christian thought. Cf., e.g., # 177 and # 210. Also note the title of his first volume of sermons: Doctrine and Development. Cardinal Newman he regards as the writer primarily responsible for introducing the conception of development, in its modern form, into English theology.

additional type of value within the teaching of the Church. In so doing, he does not wish to detract in the least from the authority of the positive principles contained in the gospels. That is, in contending that the Christian conception of the moral end should inculcate elements which are compatible with our Lord's primary purpose of enhancing human welfare, but which are not made explicit in His recorded teaching, Rashdall is giving no colour to the assumption - often induced in modern writers on ethics by their obsession with the idea of moral evolution - that an ideal taught two thousand years ago can be in no sense final for life to-day. It is frequently contended, for example, 'that the ethics of Jesus were "world-renouncing" and that ours are "world-affirming" '; [1.] in fact it is chiefly in reply to this charge that Rashdall seeks to answer the problem of Christianity's relationship to cultural interests, and to consider fairly what that relationship implies concerning the finality of its moral ideal. [2.]

At the outset he wishes to establish the fact that, no matter how widely human needs and values may have expanded in some respects since the time of Christ, His teaching of love for one's neighbour remains valid; for that teaching prescribes the promotion of human welfare, however it be conceived; therefore it is capable of incorporating new goods into the moral end as they arise. [3.] If it be contended that the Christian conception of human well-being is itself "world-renouncing", the sense in which the epithet is used must be carefully examined. It is justifiable if it means that selfishness and lust are to be renounced, and even harmless pleasure subordinated

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1. CC., p. 199.
2. To the extent that this charge is based on the assumption that Christ's teaching was largely eschatological, it has been dealt with in Appendix A.
3. Cf. PP. p. 252.

to the ideal of universal love; it is wholly unjustifiable, as Rashdall has already argued, if it means that Jesus condemned pleasure as such, or sought sacrifice and pain for their own sakes. What he is chiefly concerned to maintain is that our Lord's teaching was not "world-renouncing" in the sense that intellectual and cultural activities cannot be reconciled with His conception of the moral end; no breach of fidelity to His ideal is entailed by an inclusion of these aspects, which He did not stress, in a modern conception of what love bids us promote for ourselves and others. Rashdall does hold, however, that because these pursuits are good, Christian teaching requires that they be cultivated for the benefit of humanity as a whole; thus it is opposed to barren intellectualism, and 'dilettante, anti-social Aestheticism'.[1]

The contention that Christianity is unduly "other-worldly" derives more plausibility from certain periods of the Church's history than from the teachings of its Founder, yet even this former ground for the charge is meagre. As hope in the Parousia waned, early Christians gradually turned to practical pursuits which the followers of Christ had largely set aside during His ministry and immediately after His crucifixion.

'All the industrial virtues to which Christianity has sometimes been supposed to be indifferent are enjoined by implication in St. Paul's precepts to the idle busybodies of Thessalonica'. (2)

The best aspects of Hellenistic culture and literature came to be held in high esteem by the more philosophical of the Fathers. As soon as the Empire was Christianized, believers were allowed to engage in public activities. And since the Renaissance, especially in the

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1. CC. p. 207.
2. Ibid., p. 209.

Protestant Churches, recognition of the value of secular culture has been almost unreserved. Moreover, monasticism was the product of a particular epoch, in which all civilized life - not only the activity of the Church - was profoundly affected by a mystical movement which issued largely from Neo-Platonism; it never became the accepted ideal of the Church as a whole. After all these reservations have been made, however, Rashdall is willing to admit 'that the ideal of other-worldliness...does represent the predominant tone both of the later patristic and of the medieval Church'.[1] Even Protestantism, though it has not sanctioned extreme asceticism, or denied the compatibility of righteousness with a secular calling, has in many of its phases imposed on men an austere mode of living from which many cultural values are almost wholly excluded.

He emphatically asserts that the modern Church is not departing from the spirit of Christ's teaching when it refuses to follow the medieval ideal, as represented in a work like Imitatio Christi, in disparaging secular culture, harmless pleasure, and extra-ecclesiastical callings. For religious devotion which issues in practical works of love is more in keeping with His life of tireless service, than is a life of pre-occupation with salvation and fear of Hell, or a 'life of solitary meditation'.[2] Though modern Christianity may owe a great deal to secular movements like the Renaissance, - 'in the attempt to remould all social life in accordance with the ideal of human brotherhood',[3] it is really returning to the spirit of its Founder. This does not mean that the morality practised by the modern world at all fulfils the demands of Christianity; many products of the modern spirit -

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1. CC., p. 214.
2. Ibid., p. 220.
3. Ibid., pp. 221 f.

Nietzschean egoism, ruthless industrialism, and new forms of condoning laxity in personal morals - are utterly opposed to the Christian ideal. Indeed, if the implications of its ideal are to be fully developed, the Church must undertake a much more searching and uncompromising criticism of modern society than it has hitherto attempted; too frequently it has been content to relieve suffering, poverty and injustice wherever possible, without confronting the necessity for so reorganizing society as to prevent these evils at their source. Christians may differ as to the best method for carrying out this reorganization, but that it will demand sacrifice on the part of privileged individuals for the welfare of the lower classes and of society as a whole, and that it must be founded upon subordination of individual self-interest to a collective good, cannot be doubted, if Christ's own teaching is the ideal toward which it is to be directed.

5. Christian Ethics and Other Systems.[1]

One final task remains in setting forth the grounds upon which Rashdall ascribes unique significance to the Christian ethic. Since it may be contended that equally exalted ideals have been put forward by other teachers, and that these ideals are likewise susceptible of development, he turns to a comparison of Christian ethics with other systems. He has already suggested that the prophetic teaching which Jesus presupposed and transcended, renders His ethical system superior to that of the greatest Greek philosophers. This is especially evident when Christ's teaching of humility is compared with Aristotle's

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1. The succeeding discussion is based primarily upon CC., Chapter VI, and PP., Chapter XIX.

conception of the "high-souled" man[1]. In the latter case the individual could view his own virtues with self-complacency because they related to civic duties, owed primarily to his own class, which were comparatively easy to fulfil; the Christian, with a more exacting and universal conception of duty, is acutely conscious of his own moral inadequacies, and realizes that such goodness as he can embody is due, not to personal achievement, but to the grace of God. Because he is dominated by love, the Christian can find no satisfaction in the moral inferiority of others; but just as he is free from contempt for others, he is free, too, from self-contempt. In him pride is swallowed up in respect for the potential worth of every human soul.

A more searching test of the originality of Jesus can be made, Rashdall believes, by comparing His teaching with that of the Stoics. In the writings of Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius may be found the same fundamental precepts which underlie Christian ethics: the inwardness and pre-eminent importance of all moral goodness, especially of benevolence. Often even their phraseology is strikingly similar to sayings in the New Testament. But when Stoic morality is considered as a whole, a great deal may be found, both in its principles and in the way they were practised, which puts it on a lower plane. The restriction of the Stoic ideal of goodness to virtue resulted in the doctrine of "apathy", which disregarded the true importance of pleasure and pain in contributing to or detracting from human well-being; hence Stoics sought to cultivate indifference, not only to their own pleasures

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1. See a sermon entitled "Christ and Aristotle", PP., Chapter II, and the remarks on humility in GE. I, pp. 204 ff. Prof. A. E. Taylor has suggested (in a lecture at Edinburgh University) that the passage in the Nichomachean Ethics (IV, 3. p. 1123 b) is Aristotle's description, not of his own, but of the contemporary Athenian's image of the ideal man, - and that it may therefore be intended (at least in part) satirically. This was also the opinion of Professor Taylor's late colleague at St. Andrews John Burnet.

and pains, but to those of others. As a consequence, their altruism was seriously defective because it contained no place for pity, and even fostered a measure of high-minded contempt. Their suppression of all emotion, though instigated in a laudable attempt to become impartial, at the same time weakened the impulses which support benevolence itself. They viewed virtue and wisdom as prerogatives of the highly cultivated and gifted classes alone; this resulted on the one hand in pride, and on the other in an absence of humanitarian warmth. Indeed, the primary intention of Stoic ethics was to enable the individual to transcend external cares, rather than to stimulate him in the service of mankind. In its later development, chiefly in the thought of Marcus Aurelius, this individualism was modified by an increasing emphasis upon another great Stoic tenet - that of living in accordance with nature. Under the influence of this teaching the unity of humanity received due recognition, and the Stoic temperament turned from a renunciation of social and political interests to a devotion to altruistic activities; yet underlying both individualistic and altruistic tendencies was a mood of disenchantment, and the wisdom of conforming to nature was conceived of in terms which were essentially prudential and negative. Hence nothing in the teaching even of a Marcus Aurelius can approach the warmth of Christ's faith in a loving Father; nothing in his practice can approach the Master's positive and forth-going unselfishness.

Even if the actual content of Christian and Stoic ethics were more nearly equal in worth, an extremely important difference would remain; the one is founded upon a faith in a loving God which quickens the will and instills hope, while the other can make no corresponding claims. Christianity perpetuates and nourishes this religious aspiration within an ecclesiastical community; and thus it always had

a great advantage over Stoicism in the effectiveness with which it could carry out its doctrines in practice. Indeed, the Christian tradition, through the work of the apologists, inculcated the highest aspects of Stoic teaching.

When he turns to a comparison of Christian ethics with that of other historical religions, Rashdall stresses from the first the very real differences which do exist; he is an unremitting opponent of the superficial view that at bottom all religions espouse the same world-view, or the same system of ethics. His discussion is restricted to a brief survey of those higher religions which 'identify the will of the supernatural being ... with the morally good'[1], since more primitive types of belief can hardly be considered seriously as possible alternatives to Christianity in the sphere of ethical teaching. His remarks concerning Judaism[2] have sought to show that Christ included its best elements in His own teaching and put forward principles which transcend anything to be found in the Old Testament. In short, he holds that traditional Judaism, with its racial exclusiveness, cannot vie with the Christian principle of universal brotherhood and the equality of all men as children of God. The ethical importance attached by Judaism to external rites also makes it inferior to Christian practice, in which the essence of true morality is regarded as inward and spiritual.

Mohammedanism repudiates distinctions of race and nation, but it also fails to fulfil the principle of universal brotherhood because it affirms the intrinsic superiority of the Mussulman, and even

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1. CC., p. 258.
2. Cf. #61 f.

'requires idolaters to be slain'[1]. It further violates this same principle by proclaiming the inferiority of women. Over against Christ's affirmation of monogamy it sets 'a limited polygamy and an unlimited concubinage'. It 'bases morality upon the arbitrary will of God'[2], while Christianity affirms the responsibility of the individual moral agent[3].

Zoroastrianism, which in its modern form of Parseeism has become largely monotheistic, Rashdall regards as an ethically vigorous religion, in which much may be commended. But he points out that in the Zend-Avesta 'ceremonial transgressions'[4] are to be punished more severely than moral ones; burial of a corpse, for example, merits eleven times as many stripes as murder. 'Like the Koran', the Zend-Avesta 'recognizes a fundamental distinction between a man's duty towards fellow-believers and his duty towards others'. In beauty of

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1. CC., p. 259. Rashdall's own principle of equality of consideration requires that individuals be treated in the light of their unequal intrinsic worth. (Cf. GE. I, pp. 223-41). Thus when two men are drowning, and only one can be saved, the more valuable life should be given the preference. (Cf. Hibbert Journal, Vol. XIX, pp. 457 f., where Rashdall shows that McDougall overlooks this point in his criticisms). The Mohammedan might therefore reply that, in so far as he is simply treating fellow-believers as intrinsically superior, he is doing nothing which violates this principle.
2. Ibid., p. 260. Several of Rashdall's criticisms would not be true of Islam to-day.
3. In a monograph entitled "Christianity and the Legalistic Religions" (in Pan-Anglican Papers, published by the S.P.C.K.), Rashdall contrasts Christianity as a religion of the spirit, with religions of the letter, especially Mohammedanism and Judaism. Here again, he finds the authority of spiritual religion to reside in the fact that it appeals not to supernaturally promulgated rules and precepts, but to the individual reason and conscience. What he regards as the distinctive meaning of Christian revelation is therefore destroyed by any theory of plenary inspiration concerning the Old or New Testament. But his argument rests upon the presupposition that any view which regards human reason as incapable of apprehending the full truth concerning God's nature and incarnation, necessarily looks to an infallible scripture which must be followed literally and blindly.
4. CC., p. 261.

expression, in clarity and forcefulness, in practical insight, he declares, 'its ethical precepts never rise above the level of the Pentateuch'[1].

Rashdall regards Buddhism, next to Judaism, as most worthy of comparison with Christianity[2]. He finds in Buddhism many ethical precepts similar to those of Christianity; it is universalistic, and it subordinates the ceremonial to the ethical. Yet there are several fundamental points of conflict between the two religions. Originally Buddhism was atheistic, while in its popular form it is virtually polytheistic, for it worships a multitude of '"Buddhas", or incarnations of Deity'.[3] In the sphere of ethics its similarity with Christianity ceases as soon as one compares the ultimate ends which each religion serves. In Christianity charity and self-sacrifice are enjoined for the sake of serving others and bringing in the Kingdom. In Buddhism this position is reversed; self-denial is regarded as an end in itself; while others whom the agent may serve are treated merely as a means for attaining his own good. In Christianity the worth of personality is coupled with the law of love; in Buddhism the ideal of self-renunciation is a corollary of the belief that individual personal existence is an evil. Buddhism therefore ends in the paradoxical assertion that escape from desire is the sole end worthy of being desired, extinction of the self the sole good of the self. Unlike that of Christianity, this ultimate ideal is incompatible with ordinary human pursuits, and it cannot be sought in practice by the great mass

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1. CC., p. 262.
2. Rashdall also mentions Hindooism, of which Buddhism is really a great reform movement; he dismisses it, however, with the remark that the caste system alone is sufficient evidence of its ethical inferiority. A long essay on Buddhism among his unpublished papers contains the fruit of a study more thorough and appreciative than the brief sketch in Conscience and Christ.
3. Ibid., p. 265 n.

of mankind. Christianity, in extremes of asceticism, has sometimes included "other-worldy" orders; but even so, the fundamental distinction has always remained that for such Christians renunciation of this world has been an expression of hope and confidence in a better world hereafter. Buddhism's future hope consists entirely in a negative release from evil; for it, world-renunciation is an end in itself[1].

Most of the religions here reviewed have undergone development in which the influence of Christian ideas has lessened some of the divergences just noted. This is especially true in the case of Buddhism, which in certain sects has become theistic, and has adopted doctrines resembling those of Christianity concerning salvation and immortality; in ethics, Buddhism has also become more positive quite independently, and these tendencies have been enhanced by its subsequent contact with Christianity. Similar reforms have taken place in Hindooism and Parseeism; while Judaism has been modified by Christianity ever since the latter's appearance. These transformations within other religious traditions should be welcomed by Christians in so far as they bring their believers into closer proximity to the ideals taught by Christ. It should be noted in passing, however, that Rashdall fails to see in these developments any justification for the lessening of missionary activity. He believes that their initiation was largely due to missions in the first place, and that so long as they fall short of full Christianity missions will be necessary. Because Christianity owes the great appeal of its message not only to the sublimity of its ideals, but primarily to the fact that they were fulfilled in the life of one historical Person, no mere acceptance of its ethical principles on the part of other religions can ever supply what is lost so long as devotion to the Person of Christ is absent.

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1. Cf. GE. II, pp. 254 f., and CC., pp. 263-71.

Rashdall is convinced, as has been suggested already, that God may best be conceived 'in the light of the highest moral ideal known to Humanity'[1]. The argument of Conscience and Christ has sought to show that because the character and teaching of Christ fully disclose this highest moral ideal, He uniquely reveals the nature of God. The sense in which this argument justifies adherence to orthodox language concerning the doctrine of the Incarnation will be discussed in a later chapter; before turning to such topics, however, it is necessary to examine his metaphysical defence of theism, wherein he attempts to vindicate the relationship between ethics and religious belief which this view of revelation presupposes.

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1. CC., p. 281.

CHAPTER III - METAPHYSICS.

One indispensable presupposition has underlain Rashdall's thought thus far in our survey; all that he has said is based upon an unwavering belief in the independent validity of moral judgments. Upon this foundation he has constructed his ethical system, and in the light of the conclusions thus reached he has examined Christ's ethical teaching. Instead of taking his stand within a body of what would ordinarily be called "revealed" religious truth, in terms of which all man-made systems stand adjudged, he has postulated a moral ideal as "independently" true; then he has gone on to maintain that the finality of a religious tradition is largely dependent upon the extent to which it teaches this ideal. The chapter just completed has outlined his reasons for contending that Christianity fulfils this condition as no other religion can.

Judgment as to the defensibility of this procedure must be reserved until his apologetic for Christian belief has been completed, but it is worth noting here that his metaphysical thinking, which is now to be surveyed, rests upon the same foundation as the two preceding chapters. In pursuance of his firm conviction that 'ethical judgments are not in any sense deductions or inferences from some previously accepted view of the Universe'[1], he makes ethics the point of departure in what he has to say concerning metaphysical questions. Certain metaphysical implications or postulates may be drawn from a basic belief in the objectivity of moral judgments, and metaphysical systems may themselves be judged in terms of whether or not their conclusions are compatible with a recognition of the full significance of ethics. Only a metaphysical argument can serve to refute an attack on the validity of ethical distinctions;[2] because ethical

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1. Ethics. p.78
2. ...'If the reality of Morals or the validity of ethical truth be once brought into question, the attack can only be met by a thorough-going enquiry into the nature of Knowledge and of Reality;' (GE.II, pp. 192 f.).

truth is immediate, however, such an argument is offered, not to provide ulterior vindication of it, but to reveal the inadequacy of systems which tend to undermine it. Thus he arrives at a series of postulates, which form the essence of his metaphysical thinking, in the very act of defending the validity of ethics against inimical theories.[1]

The first of these postulates is the reality of a continuous self which is the cause of its own actions; this he believes to be indispensable to the meaning of ethics. The second postulate, belief in the existence of God, he regards as essential to a full appreciation of the objectivity of moral values; but the denial of it, unlike denial of the first, does not deprive morality of all meaning. In other words, he believes that when the fact of moral obligation is

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1. Therefore most of what follows has a polemic, rather than a purely speculative, purpose. In 1909 Rashdall wrote: 'I am quite aware that all that I have written does not amount to a fully developed and articulated metaphysical system'. (Mind, Vol. XVIII, p.116). And he would have been the first to admit that the slender volume entitled Philosophy and Religion (published later in the same year), together with the occasional philosophical essays which issued from his pen in the years that followed, did not remedy this deficiency. Had his health permitted him to accept the invitation to deliver the Gifford Lectures for 1922-24 at St. Andrews (Cf. Matheson's Biography, p.212), a volume on natural theology, fit to take its place beside his three other major works, would now be in our possession. The opinions which will constitute the substance of this chapter would have been perfected and elaborated; yet they would have formed the basis of what he had to say, for very little change can be detected in his writings on these subjects. Whether this be a virtue or a vice, it makes possible the construction of a coherent statement of his metaphysical views, even though they must be woven together from a multitude of sources.
The most useful of these is Philosophy and Religion. In 1902 Rashdall published his first metaphysical essays as contributions to two Oxford symposia: "The Ultimate Basis of Theism" in Contentio Veritatis, and "Personality: Human and Divine" in Personal Idealism (edited by Henry Sturt). Other important sources which should be mentioned here are The Theory of Good and Evil, Book III, Chs. I - III; his Deansgate Lecture on "The Problem of Evil"; and his King's College Lecture, "The Moral Argument for Personal Immortality". Complete data concerning these, and other metaphysical writings, will be found in the bibliography.

fully thought out, it logically implies theism, though in practice many men believe in the reality of duty without believing in God. That a thoroughgoing belief in moral objectivity naturally leads to an acceptance of the theistic position, he regards as one of the strongest arguments in favour of the latter. In an unguarded moment he even goes so far as to write:

'The very fact that (an) assumption is a postulate of Ethics is by itself sufficient reason for declaring that it possesses metaphysical truth. It is implied in the idea of Morality, and the idea of Morality is a datum of the moral consciousness; and the data of consciousness are the only ground which we have for believing anything at all'.1.

Two other postulates, the negation of optimism and the reality of personal immortality, follow from the terms in which he builds his argument in defence of ethical theism.

1. Freedom.

Rashdall's view of the relationship between ethics and theism may be held in abeyance until the first postulate is discussed on its own merits. Philosophical theories which deny the reality of the continuous self may be refuted in the first instance, he claims, on an epistemological basis.

'...The existence of a continuous self', he writes, 'is implied in all knowledge. Knowledge comes to us piece by piece; and if we cannot treat the successive moments of our conscious life as successive moments of a continuously existing self, these successive experiences can never be built up into a single world. Deny the reality of the self, and you have no ground for believing in the existence of a world which is only known on the assumption of that reality'. 2

In other words, an object can never be known except by a cognizing subject; therefore any theory which wishes to avoid self-contradiction must admit that the latter is as real as the former, even if it does not assent to the idealistic proposition that the object cannot exist

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1. GE. II, p. 203.
2. GE. II, p. 199.

in any sense apart from some subject.[1]

Morality demands the existence of the self, not only as knower, but as 'the cause of its own actions';[2] for morality is meaningless unless the self is capable of being treated as possessing a spiritual character which is the product of its own activities and of its own susceptibility to spiritual influences. Materialism, which is opposed to this view of the self, will soon be dealt with at some length; but here another type of theory hostile to the idea of moral responsibility, which appears in the garb of absolute idealism, must be considered. This theory, which is usually associated in European philosophy with the influence of Hegel and which is a justifiable interpretation of at least one dominant aspect of his thought, so merges the individual self in a "universal reason" that it makes the former incapable of causing its own actions, just as it is incapable of causing events in nature. To be sure, in the writings of this school much is said with reference to the ego, and the manner in which it 'makes "Nature"';[3] but this language, when examined, is intended merely to convey that the self records natural events in consciousness. For the absolute idealist, nature could

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1. Another mode of thought which Rashdall regards as incompatible with morality is sensationalism. Although it has no necessarily direct bearing upon the reality of the self, it is best mentioned here because his refutation of it is likewise epistemological. Because he holds (as Sorley later contends in Moral Values and the Idea of God, p. 182) that 'from "is" to "ought", from existence to value, from the actual to the good, there is no way by the road of experience' (GE II, p.196), Rashdall argues that sensationalism, or empiricism in any rigid form, in effect denies that cognition of moral value is possible. Theories which make sensation the sole ground of knowledge usually leave only pleasure as a possible standard of value, and thus they form a facile alliance with hedonism. But even when this is not the case, the empiricist is obviously incapable of passing from sensory experience, which he regards as exhaustive for knowledge, to an a priori notion of intrinsic value.
2. Ibid., p. 200.
3. ~~GE. II.~~ Ibid., p. 201.

not exist apart from knowledge; but it must be noted that this relationship is purely cognitive, - not causal in the sense of implying volition on the part of the subject. It places events of consciousness upon precisely the same level as events in nature in the sense that the connexion between events in each case is for this theory one of purely logical necessity. Therefore ultimately it makes the self quite as impotent to affect its own actions as does materialistic mechanism. This charge justly applies, Rashdall believes, to the implications, at least, of Green's metaphysics. Green was an earnest moralist, and did not intend to construct a system with such consequences; nevertheless his conception of a "timeless" self, which he identified with a rational, but not causally active, "universal self-consciousness", is utterly incompatible with his affirmation of individual moral responsibility.[1]

This is the first intimation to appear thus far of a strain in Rashdall's thinking which will run through the whole body of this chapter. As a pupil of Green, he began as a convinced idealist, and he remained such to the end of his life. Early in his teaching career, however, he discovered that the centrality which he accorded to personality in his system removed him increasingly further from the positions of Green, and later of Bradley and Bosanquet. He early renounced, in defence of theism, a monism which seemed to him to nullify moral distinctions; and because at the time absolutism was exerting a pervasive influence on English philosophy, he was forced to combat it as fervently as he did naturalism.

Yet Rashdall's assertion that the permanent spiritual self is the cause of its own actions by no means stamps him as an indeterminist. Although his metaphysical position, as may be conjectured from what has been said already, manifests the influence of Lotze in

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1. Cf. Appendix C.

many respects, he differed from Lotze fundamentally in his attitude toward the problem of freedom. In this matter Rashdall was, in fact, a conformist rather than a rebel at Oxford, he accepted the dictum then current that each particular act of the self must stand in a necessary (i.e. a causal) relation to the character as a whole.[1]

His treatment of the problem of freedom begins by clearly setting out the two traditionally opposed positions. The essence of the determinist position, as he conceives it, is the contention that 'actions are the necessary result'[2] of the original character at birth, plus the influences of the environment; because undeveloped capacities may be resident within character, however, the determinist need not argue that future conduct can be completely predicted on the basis of past actions. Therefore the determinist may even admit that outward conduct and internal motives may be altered by the assertion of a 'hitherto latent capacity$_x$',[3] without the interposition of new stimuli in the environment. The essence of the indeterminist position is the claim that the individual has the power to perform each successive act without being impelled to do so, either in response to external attractions, or by reason of the character he has built up through previous experience. Rashdall is willing to grant that the indeterminist has made out his case if he can show that such 'undetermined choice constitute(s) <u>one</u> of the factors'[4] which direct deliberate human action. He regards it as unfair to claim that indeterminism must apply to all deliberate acts

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1. Cf. <u>Hibbert Journal</u> Vol.I, pp.403 ff. Rashdall's chapter on freedom (GE. Bk.III, Ch.III, Cf. PP. Ch.XXIII) also reflects a very considerable dependence upon Sidgwick, except where the latter admits that he finds intuitive evidence, at the moment of action, which supports indeterminism. (Cf. <u>The Methods of Ethics</u>, Bk.I., Ch.V. as a whole, and especially pp.65 ff., in the sixth edition).
2. GE. II., p.303.
3. <u>Ibid</u>., p.305.
4. <u>Ibid</u>., p.307; italics mine.

in order to be valid, - and especially unfair to interpret it as implying that volition can be carried on without motivation. The indeterminist may recognize, with the determinist, that deliberate action issues from desire, and that in the event of a conflict, the strongest desire prevails. On the other hand, the determinist need not regard the strength of desire as wholly dependent upon the nature of its object; he can give full weight to the internal control which the individual's own character may exert over motivation. In addition to false interpretations of the nature of the controversy, the ambiguous use of the word "freedom" itself has given rise to much confusion. The sense in which Rashdall uses the term when he refers to freedom as a fundamental postulate of ethics, implies merely that both good and bad acts are caused by 'a permanent spiritual self'[1], instead of mechanically, by a material organism.

In a glance at the history of the controversy over free-will, he observes that an interesting transposition has taken place. From patristic times through the Reformation, thinkers of a critical or humanistic bent defended the idea of human freedom against the protagonists of religious authority, in whose thinking the human will was completely subject to God's omnipotence. In the modern epoch, however, philosophers have tended to support determinism, and theologians indeterminism, because the problem has come to turn upon freedom as over against the reign of natural law[2].

Empirical considerations, though they are not decisive, have tended to put modern scientific and philosophical theory largely on the side of determinism. One of these considerations is the close relationship between mind and body, especially the effect of cerebral

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1. Op. cit., p. 309.
2. Cf. Ibid., pp. 310 f.

and neural conditions upon moral, as well as intellectual, capacities. Rashdall does not believe that these mental and spiritual capacities can be entirely explained in terms of physical causes, but he does hold that the latter should be 'included among the antecedents of human action'[1]. He also looks upon the scientific study of heredity, although its results are not complete, as indicating that some connexion exists between progeny and forbears in moral, as well as in physical, tendencies. Finally, he maintains that the applicability of statistical methods in predicting certain moral actions on the part of large numbers (for example, in computing crime rates) is inexplicable except in terms of regular causation; differences in rate between countries, or sudden fluctuations in such statistics, he claims, are almost always traceable to causes in the environment.

These three empirical considerations leave untouched the assertion that the moral and religious consciousness demands indeterminism, and if this assertion be true, it constitutes a powerful objection to determinism. But Rashdall is unwilling to assent to the contention that only undertermined actions, or the undetermined part of a man's character, can possess moral value. For this would imply that, though the indeterminist might recognize the influence of heredity and environment, he could attach no value to any virtues which are attributable to education or good family; nor could he attach moral worth to, say, a religious conversion which was due to the influence of a book or another person. Kant's assertion 'that no man can really be made better by the influence of another'[2], is the logical outcome of such a position. To this extent, Rashdall believes, indeterminism is actually opposed to ordinary moral judgments, instead of demanded

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1. Op. cit., p. 313. As will be seen presently, he does not believe in "physical causes" in the usual sense at all.
2. Op. cit., p. 322.

by them; for in practice, men do attribute moral value to aspects of character which have been determined. This being the case, either such moral judgments are erroneous, or determinism is compatible with the existence of at least some aspects of moral value.

In order to avoid misunderstanding it is necessary to say a word more in distinguishing the form of determinism which he defends, from mechanistic theories. Although he has recognized that "physical" causes play a part in conditioning mental events, he asserts that the determination of human actions is quite different from that of events in nature, because 'the influence of mind upon body is at least as obvious ... as the influence of body upon mind'[1]. His view of the relationship between mind and body is not, however, that of interactionism, as the last statement might seem to suggest; for according to his idealistic view of causation, which will be discussed presently, even purely physical events are ultimately caused by 'the Will of God which within the region of Mechanics works invariably (we have every reason to suppose) according to this law of uniform succession'[2]. To put the point more simply, he conceives of only one ultimate order of causality, vested in the will of God; but this causality manifests itself in two different aspects - as the final cause of human volition, and as the efficient cause of physical events.

'The way in which a self causes is quite different from the way in which mechanical events cause one another ... The self is not an event or a series of events. The ... psychical influences which are said to move the self have no existence of their own apart from the self. The self is present in each of them, and makes them what they are. Moreover, even if we regard the desires or inclinations which successively enter into the consciousness of the self as causes which determine its successive volitions, these are not mere events which act on succeeding events as it were a tergo, but presented objects which influence the self after the manner of final causes. In Mechanics the present in determined by the past: in the region of human action it is in a sense the future which determines the present'(3).

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1. Op. cit., p. 325.
2. Ibid., p. 326.
3. Ibid., pp. 326 f.

It is necessary to say an anticipatory word concerning the whole view of causality which underlies the distinction Rashdall is here making. He regards it as one of the major confusions of post-Kantian thought that the principle of mechanical uniformity in nature has come to be identified, by many writers, with the idea of causality. From Kant's contradictory accounts of causality, the noumenal cause gradually came to be rejected by later thinkers, while they accepted the phenomenal cause, manifest in the mechanical uniformity of nature, as an a priori principle. Thus arose the confusion against which Rashdall protests.

Subsequently it will appear that he does regard causality as an a priori category; but he holds that the principle of uniformity is merely an empirical generalization. Mechanical sequence does, of course, presuppose the law of universal causality, and within certain regions, such as physics and chemistry, experience teaches the reasonableness of arguing that the mode of occurrence of an event in the past is good ground for predicting a similar mode of occurrence as the result of similar conditions in the future. But the principle of uniformity does not exhaust the idea of causality. For, as he has just contended, another aspect of causality, namely, purposeful action on the part of rational beings, is strikingly different from mechanical uniformity. A given mode of action on the part of a human being in the past gives no ground whatever for contending that it will necessarily be the same in the future[1]. The distinctive feature of the principle of uniformity is that it applies to regions where purpose can be ignored. Hence the primary

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1. 'If (like Kant) I had got up at five every morning without a single failure for forty years, that would not prevent my getting up late on one particular morning if it seemed to me that the purposes of my life would be better served by some modification of my usual habits'. (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Vol. VI, p. 12).

reason for denying that the principle is a priori is that every voluntary action constitutes a violation of it in accordance with higher laws; this very definitely does not imply, therefore, that voluntary action, because it differs from mechanical succession, lies outside the law of universal causality.

The principle of uniformity is operative only in the sphere of purely inorganic phenomena. Its limits, like the principle itself, are fixed empirically, because experience indicates in what regions psychical states or the voluntary actions of rational beings may alter the sequence of physical events, and in what regions they may not; and it also teaches that to some extent biological organisms, because they demand a teleological explanation, fall outside the mechanistic region.

The essential reason why the principle of mechanical uniformity must be distinguished from the idea of causality lies in the very fact that volitions fall under the latter but not under the former. One volition does not follow as the mechanical effect of the psychical state or series of psychical states preceding it; it follows from the whole character, which is neither a psychical state nor a series of them[1].

The teleological attraction by which Rashdall conceives of the self as determined through the presentation of ideal ends stands opposed, then, to a mechanical explanation which would make human behaviour merely the result of antecedent physical conditions. Nor does the theory of self-determination, as he conceives it, make the human self 'simply the (passive) theatre upon which a certain action and reaction between ideas takes place'[2].

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1. This parenthetic passage concerning the principle of uniformity is based upon Rashdall's paper: "Causality and the Principles of Historical Evidence". Cf. op. cit. pp. 1-34. Cf. also Appendix E.
2. GE. II, p. 328. Italics mine.

It makes the present self the seat of causation; for though the character of the ideals which this self finds attractive is dependent upon its constitution, as moulded by heredity and environment, it is through striving, willed by the self in response to these ideals, that contemplation of them issues in effective action.

Hence Rashdall concludes that a theory of self-determination such as he espouses does not in the least undermine the meaning of judgments of value. For one thing, conditions which are entirely unrelated to human volition may be pronounced good or bad (in a non-moral sense)[1]; this is true, for example, of suffering resulting from disasters in nature and of ignorance due to lack of innate capacity. But even in the case of moral value, though such value attaches only to voluntary action, it is not destroyed by a deterministic theory of how the action came to be willed; for what is judged morally good or bad is the quality of the volition itself, or the state of character which it represents. Hence 'the difference between a crime and a disease is exactly the same for the Determinist as it is for the Indeterminist. The difference lies just in the fact that a better will would have prevented the one, while it could not have prevented the other'[2]. If the judgment which pronounces a given voluntary action morally good or bad is valid, it 'cannot be upset by any theory as to how the ... act came to be done'[3].

In its practical effects, he believes, a theory of self-determination does not undermine moral effort as fatalism does; for while the latter assumes that events will occur in a fixed and fore-ordained order, the former clearly takes account of the influence

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1. This statement reflects a position assumed in The Theory of Good and Evil (concerning judgments of value) which, as I argue in the critical section (# 250 f), is really incompatible with his metaphysical system.
2. Ibid., p. 329.
3. Ibid., p. 330.

which desire for moral improvement may exert upon conduct. Moreover determinism of this type, despite a widespread assumption to the contrary, does not undermine remorse or the sense of moral responsibility. Remorse arises primarily from the fact that the present self regrets some act performed in the past; but this is a state of mind which can arise in connexion with acts which were determined by a previous condition of character. A deterministic explanation of how the past act came to be done does not in the least lessen the abhorrence which the repentant self feels regarding the state of his character which prompted him to commit the bad action. New respect for goodness, or the re-assertion of good impulses which are part of his permanent character, have intervened since the offence; otherwise the man would not be repentant; and if that remorse be genuine, there is nothing in a deterministic view of it to undermine the recognition that certain impulses are bad, or to weaken the desire for ridding one's character of them.

In his discussion punishment is intimately related to moral responsibility. He admits that determinism is incompatible with retributive theories[1]. If, however, punishment be intended to reform the evil-doer and to protect society, then a theory which explains the offence as an 'inevitable consequence of a bad character'[2] does not in the least lessen the justifiability of imposing pain for the sake of improving that character, or of proscribing the offender's individual freedom for the sake of society. On the other hand, if a given action has no connexion with the previous self, no previous goodness of character could have prevented it. Indeed the indeterminist might protest on this ground that punishment for a "free" action is

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1. But he regards retributive punishment as indefensible; cf. # 213 ff.
2. GE. II, p. 334.

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unjust; and he might urge the futility of punishing in order to prevent future repetitions of the crime, since influences brought to bear upon the present self cannot determine future "free acts". Finally, Rashdall asserts, to believe with the indeterminist in uncaused events, is to entertain what is virtually an unthinkable notion; at the very least such a belief, because it ascribes acts to "pure chance"[1], is patently fatal to any idea of responsibility[2].

2. Theism.

The manner in which Rashdall has taken moral truth as his point of departure in investigating metaphysical questions might lead one to suppose that his treatment of theism will follow Kantian lines. Does he look upon ethical data as providing a sufficient foundation for theology? His own statement, previously quoted[3], to the effect that if a notion is a postulate of ethics, that is sufficient reason for according metaphysical truth to it, might easily be so understood as to lend colour to an affirmative answer. As a matter of fact he does not entirely adopt the Kantian procedure. In the passage quoted he really means to convey merely that metaphysical postulates demanded by the moral consciousness have a claim equal in importance to those derived from any other area of knowledge. This is revealed by his repeated assertions elsewhere that any single aspect of knowledge must be tested by and brought into harmony with the rest. Accordingly he bases his refutation of naturalistic ethics on the contention that whatever validity naturalism may attach to moral truth is really irreconcilable with its general theory of reality[4]. But he likewise

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1. GE. II. p. 337.
2. The problem of freedom receives further consideration in connexion with its bearing upon the problem of evil. Cf. # 122 ff.
3. Cf. # 87.
4. Cf. # 111 ff.

regards Kant's attempt to ground theology solely upon ethics as unsatisfactory, because the dichotomy between the theoretical and the practical reason in which it results leaves the postulates of ethics out of harmony with other aspects of knowledge and experience; and this, to Rashdall's mind, is almost as fatal as naturalism's failure to follow out the metaphysical and theological implications of ethics. Hence before turning to a consideration of the sense in which he looks upon belief in God as a postulate of moral objectivity, it is desirable to review the arguments by which he seeks to show that theism is metaphysically defensible on other grounds as well[1].

He attaches an especial importance to these arguments because at the turn of the century Ritschlianism, which deprecated all attempts to base theology on metaphysics, was exerting great influence upon English religious thought. He heartily agrees with the Ritchlian thesis that Christianity is based upon the immediate appeal which Christ makes to the individual conscience, but he denies that for most men contemplation of the character of Christ is sufficient by itself to instill belief in God. Belief in a revelation of God in Christ, he maintains, 'presupposes belief in the existence of a God to be revealed'[2]. Therefore the very first task of the theologian is to show that the theism which Christianity presupposes, is rational. Most significantly, he goes on to say that though Ritchlianism rightly accords a central place to the deliverances of the practical reason as a source of our knowledge of God's nature, 'value-judgments will not... assure us of the existence of God when taken apart from all the other rational considerations which lead up to the belief that the origin of the world must be found in a Spirit and a Will'[3].

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1. Cf. GE. II, pp. 220-223.
2. Liberal Churchman. Vol. I, p. 35. The article is entitled "Ritchlianism". For additional material on Ritchlianism, see GE. II, pp. 183 ff. and 252 f.; PR., pp. 161 ff.; PP. Ch. XXIV: "Harnack and Loisy".
3. Liberal Churchman. Vol. I, pp. 35 f.

Hence there can be no doubt that these "other rational considerations", to which we now turn, occupy what Rashdall regards as an indispensable place, alongside ethical grounds, in the foundation upon which his theistic system rests. For that reason they likewise possess an apologetic, and not merely a theoretical importance, since he repeatedly voices the conviction that an inability to find belief in God reasonable, is the chief obstacle for modern minds in the way of accepting full Christianity[1].

(i) - The Idealistic Argument.

In an influential essay entitled "The Ultimate Basis of Theism" (in Contentio Veritatis), in his Cambridge lectures on Philosophy and Religion, and in almost every writing where he discusses theism by itself, Rashdall takes an idealistic ontology as his point of departure. Indeed, in the course of the aforementioned essay he rather rashly writes that idealism is 'the necessary basis of Theism'[2], - 'the one absolutely convincing and logically irrefragable argument for establishing the existence of God'[3]. But in this case, as in the case of the ethical grounds for theism[4], he softens the extreme claims which he makes at the outset by admitting that the argument is insufficient to fulfil his purpose unless it is supplemented by other lines of reasoning. Characteristically, he appeals to idealism in the first instance with a practical end in view; it is, he claims, the most effective weapon against a materialism which frequently seems plausible to the "plain man". Rashdall believes that scientific research itself has rendered the older type of materialism untenable,

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1. Cf. e.g. Modern Churchman. Vol. IV, pp. 204 ff.; an article entitled "The Creeds".
2. CV., p. 8.
3. Ibid.,p. 21.
4. Cf. # 98 f.

but he sees in modern naturalism an ominous successor; for this type of thought still finds the basis of reality in physical events, of which it makes consciousness merely a by-product.

He begins by criticizing the assumption, so easily made by the philosophically untrained, that matter is the one reality 'of which we are most certain'[1], and 'with which we are in immediate contact'[2]. In the course of his reasoning he draws, at many points, upon the argument of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge.[3] With Berkeley he urges that even if matter does exist apart from mind, this fact obviously cannot be experienced or known immediately[4]. The widespread assumption that it does exist independently is therefore based on an inference. Now is this inference, on the basis of which it is asserted that matter possesses independently the qualities apprehended in perception, a justifiable one? Rashdall holds that it is not, and seeks to show that both secondary and primary qualities are mind-dependent.

Ever since Locke's analysis of human knowledge English philosophers have for the most part recognized the unintelligibility of contending that secondary qualities are the possession of matter apart from an experiencing mind; no notion of these qualities can be formed at all except as 'effects produced by bodies upon mind'[5]. Accordingly, all that Rashdall is willing to attribute to matter itself is the power to produce these effects, and apparently he agrees with Locke that this power is 'something ... totally unlike the sensation itself'[6]. To the

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1. PR., p. 6.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. Rashdall's Berkeleian argument is partially mediated through James Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism.
4. Rashdall's article on "Nicholas de Ultricuria, A Medieval Hume", in the Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. VII, pp. 1-27, suggests that this unconventional scholastic thinker anticipated several features of Berkeley's philosophy, including this one.
5. CV., p. 9.
6. PR., p. 9

suggestion that what the material thing possesses is really like what the mind knows in sensation, he retorts (with Berkeley) that a quality[1] which ex hypothesi exists apart from mind cannot possibly be like a sensation or an idea.

On the other hand, however, Locke did not go on to assert that primary qualities are also mind-dependent, as Berkeley did; this defect in Locke's analysis Rashdall attributes to the fact that primary qualities do indeed involve something other than sensation. In so far as solidity, shape and magnitude involve sensations like touch and muscular tension, he maintains that they clearly are to that extent as dependent upon mind as are secondary qualities.

However, primary qualities also imply spatial relations; and it is true that the idea of space cannot be built up through sensation. Yet the act of relating objects in space (or the parts of one object with each other) likewise implies mind:

> 'Relatedness only has a meaning when thought of in connection with a mind which is capable of grasping or holding together both terms of the relation ... Apart from mind there can be no relatedness; apart from relatedness no space: apart from space no matter. It follows that apart from mind there can be no matter'(2).

Rashdall is willing to admit that Berkeley's argument is defective when it 'tends to explain space away into mere subjective feelings'[3]. For this reason he has acknowledged that things present themselves through thought, not through sensation, as externally related and as possessing structure; but this correction of Berkeley only strengthens the idealistic hypothesis. Again, Berkeley often treated knowledge as a mere succession of feelings, not realizing that this succession itself involves a category which sensation cannot furnish; but, Rashdall

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1. The word "quality" is question-begging here, if it means "as sensed".
2. PR., p. 11. This argument from the nature of relations is partially derived from Green's Prolegomena, pp. 31 f. (Second Edition). It must be carefully distinguished from the argument from qualities, for reasons which will appear in the critical section.
3. PR., p. 15.

adds, temporal relations, like spatial, imply the presence of a relating mind.

For the rest, he takes over bodily Berkeley's familiar arguments: (a) since some sensations can be produced - as in "dreams or frenzies" - without the presence of physical objects, it is impossible to argue from ordinary sensations to the necessary existence of external bodies[1]; (b) even objects which are not present to perception are nevertheless present to the mind in thought at the very moment when one seeks to conceive of them as existing independently; they are thought of, indeed, in terms of the sensations which they would excite if perceived.

The argument from qualities may be reduced to the proposition that since we cannot perceive matter apart from mind (i.e., apart from perceiving), we have no foundation for asserting that it exists apart from <u>our</u> minds; the materialist must arbitrarily assert that matter possesses in itself attributes[2] which differ from the sensations by means of which we do experience the "external" world. The argument based upon conceptual knowledge is similar in structure, merely substituting "thought" where "sensation" stands in the argument from qualities. The argument from relations, however, has a wider significance. All three will be discussed in the critical section.[3]

Rashdall does not mean any part of his argument to imply that mind can be abstracted from 'all relation to the objects of its thought'[4]; he recognizes, in other words, that the conscious life of the self involves a relationship in which both terms are indispensable, and he maintains that such a position, although it affirms their

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1. The critic would of course retort that the presence of independent physical objects is precisely what distinguishes ordinary sensations from "dreams or frenzies".
2. I use this vague word because it is advisable to avoid the term "qualities".
3. Cf. # 272 ff.
4. CV., p.15.

inseparability, does not destroy the distinction between subject and object[1]. When his language is examined, however, it becomes evident that the only reality which he is willing to accord an object (or a physical thing) consists in what some mind thinks and perceives. Thus the distinction between (a) experiencing, and (b) what is experienced, falls wholly within the sphere of mind itself; the reality of things is regarded as mental in character. The question remains, however, as to whether his "proof" that matter can be neither perceived nor conceived apart from mind really contributes anything towards establishing the further proposition that material things cannot exist apart from mind.

Nevertheless the next step in his pursuit of the Berkeleian argument assumes that this proposition is well-founded. Although his contention, that because we cannot perceive or conceive matter as existing apart from mind we have no right to believe that it can exist apart from mind, is based entirely on the evidence of human experience, he clearly regards his argument as one which reveals a universal and necessary connexion between mind and matter. What he really desires to establish is the proposition that matter is intrinsically unintelligible unless it be regarded as dependent upon some mind. That this is the case is obvious from the fact that he goes on to admit that no single

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1. In Contentio Veritatis, pp. 15-19, Rashdall also argues that his idealism does not destroy epistemological and logical distinctions between "subjective" and "objective". In the case of a single self alone in the universe, he declares, the distinction between subjective feelings and judgments of objective fact would still hold, for only the latter are capable of being true or false. But because men live in a society of conscious selves, it should be recognized that the world of space and extended objects exists publicly as feelings do not; they possess the "objectivity" which belongs to data which can be apprehended only through thought. Moreover, private perceptions may be corrected more effectively when comparison with what others perceive is possible, than when one must discover his own errors in isolation. He discusses how this comparison can be made, in connexion with the problem of how one may know other selves. Cf. # 136 ff. and # 163.

human mind, nor all human minds together, can perceive (or in any way apprehend) all reality; he admits that human thought does not create the external world, but gradually discovers it[1]. This admission arises, of course, from the difficulty occasioned by the data of sciences like geology and astronomy; they record events in terrestrial and stellar history which occurred long before any human mind existed to perceive them. Rashdall can reconcile the reality of these events with idealism only by asserting that they existed in the mind of God. Undeniably the aspect of Berkeley's thought which this argument revives appears to be little more than an introduction of God as a deus ex machina, in order to bolster up the idealistic edifice at the very moment when it seems to be crumbling to bits. But perhaps it is more just to describe this affirmation of God's existence as a necessary conclusion, once it be assumed (a) that matter is unintelligible apart from some mind, and (b) that matter exists independently of human minds[2]. At the same time, our examination of this reasoning in the latter portion of this thesis will expose several difficulties which stand in the way of regarding it strictly as a theistic proof at all.

(ii) - The Argument from Causality.

Rashdall's argument has sought to reveal a natural rapprochement between idealism and theism. He qualifies this by recognizing that absolutism, in its exclusive emphasis upon the cognitive aspect of the Absolute's relation to the world, is in most forms uncongenial to theism. The sense in which Hegelianism seems to deny causality to the individual self has been mentioned already; now he seeks to show that

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1. Cf. PR., p. 17.
2. Cf. A.C. Ewing: Idealism, p. 389. The writer points out that proofs of the existence of God are merely like proofs of anything else in so far as they introduce the notion in question in order to meet an intellectual difficulty.

in effect it denies causality to God or the Absolute. According to this view the Absolute, being related to nature only in thought, can "make" it only in the sense that if nature were not present in thought it would not be real. Human minds, the theory implies, "make" nature in the same sense except for the fact that their sphere of knowledge is limited, while the Absolute's embraces the whole. Green's statement: "the world is as necessary to God as God is to the world"[1], envisages God merely as an eternal Contemplator who has no power actively to create or control the world. Yet, Rashdall urges, even human beings 'can produce limited changes in the world'[2]; whereas a God who thinks but does not will is 'annexed as by some inevitable, eternal, unintelligible fate'[3] to a universe of whose imperfections He is constantly aware, but which He is powerless to alleviate. Hence he sets himself against (what Dr. Webb has called) "the tendency toward immanence" in English philosophical and religious thought, because when he speaks of God as an eternal Mind he means to imply that He is capable of volition as well as of thought. The line of argument by which he seeks to defend this notion is doubly important, because without such a capacity, Rashdall holds, God cannot be conceived as a moral Being at all.

He begins once again with a scrutiny of the ordinary materialistic conception - in this case not of the existence of matter itself, but of physical causation. Because it is possible to distinguish in introspection between the experience of events which are caused by the self and "external" events which happen without the exercise of personal volition, the materialist assumes that the latter are due to a cause operative in space or the "external" world. But Rashdall

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1. PR., p. 30.
2. Ibid., p. 31.
3. DD., p. 274.

insists that 'space is part of the experience for which he (the materialist) seeks an explanation'[1]. This experience cannot be 'due to the impact of an external thing upon his mind'[2]; for the mind is not in space, and therefore it is not externally related to events in the way that one physical object is external to another. That an object is apprehended as occupying space, is merely one factor in the experience of perception; and this factor - far from affording an explanation of causality - is an integral part of the cognitive experience which as a whole requires causal explanation.

He once again follows Berkeley's argument, as expanded in this instance by Hume, when he maintains that the materialistic view of the universe can never genuinely account for causality. For all that observation of events in nature can yield is a notion of invariable sequence, and though this uniform succession may be accepted empirically as a fact, it cannot give rise to the notion of necessary connexion such as characterizes the self-evident truths of mathematics. In short, the phenomenon of uniform succession itself requires explanation, inasmuch as mere observation can never reveal why one event should give rise to another.

Yet the fact is undeniable that the mind does possess a notion of causality, as distinct from that of mere succession. Whence then arises this notion? Whence comes the belief that every event has a cause? Some may be inclined to reach the hasty conclusion that it represents a category for which no content can be found in actual experience. Rashdall, in reply, contends that one aspect of experience, and only one, has given rise to the idea of causality - and that is man's consciousness of his own volition, of his own power as a cause. This consciousness is seen at its purest in the form of a capacity to

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1. CV., pp. 26 f.
2. Ibid., p. 27.

direct the succession of one's own thoughts; but thought may in turn influence bodily movement and other events in nature, even though physical conditions may not lie wholly within the control of the self. In conscious volition can be discerned the real distinction between mere succession and causality, because the latter concept alone implies that 'union of power with purpose (which) can only be found in consciousness'[1].

Primitive man, being aware of himself as a cause, accounted for changes in nature as the result of the activity of unknown spiritual beings like himself. The progress of scientific knowledge has altered this inference in but one respect; to-day men realize that the parts and processes of nature are so interdependent as to be intelligible

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1. CV., p. 30. This aspect of Rashdall's theory of course departs radically from Hume. The latter maintained that it is no more intelligible to seek the origin of a category of causation in the awareness of volitional power than in the recognition of relations between events in the physical world. (Cf. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. pp. 64 ff. Second Oxford edition, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, impression of 1927). Rashdall replies to Hume's argument by citing the distinction between experiences which the self does cause, and those which it does not cause: One is conscious, for example, of a connexion, due to his own volition, between the formulating of a thought and the dipping of his pen in ink to write it down; but one is aware of not having caused, by some preceding thought, a twinge of pain which suddenly enters his consciousness. This distinction could not arise if the self could cause none of its states, as Hume's theory implies.
   Rashdall also criticizes Kant's identification of the idea of causality with that of logical connexion, since the latter does not imply time at all, while causality, being essentially related to activity, does imply it. He cites, however, a passage in Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism (Vol. II, pp. 191 f.) wherein Kant's posthumously published treatise on "The Connexion of Physics and Metaphysics" is shown to admit - as Kant's most mature opinion - that the experience of volition is the source of the idea of causality. Rashdall also cites Stout's Analytical Psychology, Vol. I, Bk. II, Ch. I, in support of the contention that the self is immediately aware of his own power as a cause. Dr. Stout's Gifford Lectures (Mind and Matter) contain his most recent defence of what he calls the "animistic" view of causality.

only in terms of the activity of one mind, rather than many. The regularity of natural law demands that this one mind be conceived as rational and teleological rather than as capricious. How God causes the order and design manifest in nature is best comprehended, then, on the basis of an analogy from human volition which is actively directed toward rational ends. A scrutiny of the problem of causation has thus brought Rashdall to a conclusion which supplements the idealistic argument and protects theism from the incursions of absolutism.

At this point the question naturally arises as to whether any philosophical view other than idealism is at all compatible with theism. Rashdall acknowledges that some realists have found it possible to be theists by holding that God created matter, which, once created, constitutes a type of reality distinct from mind. In his opinion, however, realistic theism implies a dualism which it is difficult to reconcile with the interconnexion and unity characteristic of the laws regulating the relations of mind and matter; philosophy and science alike presuppose that all mental and physical events taken together form 'a single inter-related, intelligible whole'[1]; thus they point to some one reality as underlying both types of events. Nevertheless, he finds realism far more intelligible than any attempt to conceive of ultimate reality as a tertium quid, wholly different from either mind or matter; for this conception there is no sufficient justification, speculative or empirical[2].

The argument from causality, he recognizes, has also been used by realists like Martineau and Reid, in a form which asserts that matter exists independently, though only mind can cause change.

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1. PR., p. 21.
2. For a detailed refutation of this theory, as manifest in the thought of Spinoza, see Rashdall's essay: "The Alleged Immanence of God" (ID. Ch. XI).

He holds, however, that such an employment of the argument rests upon an artificial separation of the concepts of matter and force which modern physics is making increasingly questionable. If ultimately matter is shown to be composed of centres of force, it will be extremely difficult for the realist to contend on the one hand that matter can exist apart from mind, and yet on the other hand that it cannot move 'without being influenced by an extraneous Mind'[1]. In the idealistic interpretation, of course, the existence of matter and the cause of its motion both have their seat in a single, universal Mind.

Even the moral argument for theism, to which we now turn, may be presented apart from the question of the independent existence of matter. As Rashdall points out, even though it be assumed that matter exists independently, it may still be held 'that matter possesses no value or worth apart from mind'[2]. The ultimate effect of such an argument, however, is to lead almost irresistibly to idealism, since it clearly implies that 'mind will explain matter, while matter will not explain mind'[3]. In short, if the human mind be recognized as the highest - that is, the most valuable, - type of reality, it is more intelligible to interpret ultimate reality in terms of it than in terms of anything lower; for 'the Reality from which all being is derived must possess at least as much worth or value as the derived being'[4]. The grounds and implications of such a line of reasoning must now be examined more fully.

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1. PR., p. 49.
2. Ibid., p. 26.
3. Ibid., p. 25.
4. Ibid., p. 26. Rashdall does not cite it, but there is a parallel argument (from the reality of an effect to the at least equal reality of its cause) in Descartes' Meditations, III. (Cf. Haldane - Ross ed. I. p. 162).

(iii) - God and the Moral Consciousness:
The Problem of Evil.

In taking up a consideration of the ethical grounds for belief in theism, we are returning to the main theme of the chapter; the arguments based on idealism and causality are really digressions called forth by Rashdall's desire to show that, though theism is in the first instance a postulate of ethics, it is a postulate which can be harmonized with other metaphysical considerations. Naturalistic ethics commits the blunder of espousing a metaphysical system which in effect is hostile to adequate recognition of the validity of moral judgments. Psychologically it is possible to affirm the immediate self-evidence of our knowledge of what is intrinsically good or evil, while remaining agnostic concerning any metaphysical implications of this fact; but such an attitude arbitrarily stops the process of thought at a particular point, and makes no attempt to harmonize moral judgments with other aspects of knowledge. Rashdall, by pressing the enquiry further, seeks to show that such harmonization is indeed impossible in terms of a naturalistic system.

Naturalism may affirm the usefulness of reason in the course of evolution, but this cannot provide a guarantee of the validity of knowledge, since in certain circumstances 'error and delusion'[1] may be similarly useful. Because naturalism identifies reality with material processes, and refuses to grant that mind underlies these processes, it makes all knowledge epiphenomenal; thus Rashdall maintains that complete scepticism is the logical outcome of a position which leaves room in this manner for an irremediable disparity between human ideas and cosmic processes, between thought and reality. To be sure, the practical utility of scientific knowledge may allay scepticism in that sphere; but the same does not obtain in the case of moral knowledge.

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1. GE. II, p. 209.

Ethical obligation tends to become meaningless as soon as its practical convenience is appealed to instead of its binding validity.

This is not the only respect in which he believes a naturalistic world-view to be incompatible with an acknowledgement of the objective validity of moral judgments. That incompatibility is especially apparent, he suggests, as soon as one asks where the standard of moral truth and falsity is to be found. Naturalism, realism and idealism alike encounter comparatively little difficulty in acknowledging that the laws which govern physical nature are independent of the individual's thought or feeling; but this is the case solely because according to the first two theories physical laws are regarded as somehow resident <u>in</u> matter[1]. A moral law, however, cannot possibly be conceived as existing in material things, because it relates not to physical facts, but to obligations and ideal ends.

Now naturalism may affirm that moral obligation is "objective" in the sense that it is the product of collective human opinion instead of an idea generated wholly within the individual experience; it may at least assent to the (undeniable) fact that an obligation can exist in and be valid only for minds. But it can never accord full "objectivity" to moral judgments in the sense of affirming that they have a foundation in ultimate reality, because it regards ultimate reality as mindless. Hence in practice it always tends to make public opinion, rather than intrinsic goodness, the standard of conduct.

We have already examined what Rashdall invariably means when he speaks of the objective validity of moral judgments; it is merely that if one is correct in judging an end (toward which an action is directed) to be good, then anyone who affirms the opposite is in error. Hence

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1. With reference to realism this statement is subject to the qualification noted on # 109 f.

he believes that the moral law exists independently of what any human being or group of human beings may feel or think, just as do the physical laws of nature. And yet he affirms that a moral law 'can exist only in and for a mind'[1]. Consequently morality can have the objectivity which he claims for it only if the absolute moral ideal exists eternally in the mind of God. It has the same objectivity as physical laws, because it has its source in the same Mind which wills the existence and processes of nature. Thus, in so far as human moral judgments are true, they have their ultimate ground in God. While he therefore admits that it is psychologically possible to believe in the validity of moral distinctions without believing in God, he holds that when this position is thought out either (a) this validity is seen to be relative merely to human conventions, and thus not ultimate, or (b) if ultimate, it is seen logically to imply theism. In this sense belief in God is a necessary postulate of a full and consistent belief in moral objectivity.

An especial importance attaches to this argument. Other metaphysical considerations may lead up to the idea that God exists, and works purposefully; but the moral consciousness alone can provide any insight into the benevolent nature of those purposes. The idea of causality itself must be supplemented by ethical data because its meaning cannot be complete unless it includes the notion of a final cause; and final causation implies the idea of intrinsic value towards the realization of which the whole process moves. In other words, the idea of universal purpose cannot be formulated apart from a capacity to pursue ends; and the benevolence of those ends cannot be judged except by the moral consciousness.

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1. PR., p. 74.

Herein Rashdall finds the great weakness which underlies purely speculative proofs of the existence of God, like the argument from design in the form advocated by Paley. He welcomes interpretations of evolution which establish the fact of teleology in nature, especially at the biological level; but even the data provided by these studies, he suggests, cannot in themselves demonstrate that the final purpose of the universe is benevolent. Indeed, he frequently asserts that purely empirical evidence taken from history and nature can be so interpreted as to provide as much ground for opposing the idea of a benevolent Guide, as for affirming it. He has sought to show, however, that the very meaning of the contention that goodness is a rational category ultimately implies that in so far as human moral judgments are valid, they are valid for all rational creatures; and this implies, therefore, that they characterize the purposes of God; or, conversely, they are valid in so far as they reflect the perfect goodness of God, which is the absolute norm of human moral judgment[1]. For this reason he looks to conscience as providing 'the only possible revelation of the character of God'[2].

The conviction that the purposes of God are revealed or apprehended (albeit only partially) in human moral judgments as benevolent, issues in a belief in the ultimate rationality of the universe. Yet this same conviction implies that evil cannot be resolved into mere appearance; it implies that if conscience rightly regards a thing as evil, then it must be evil in the sight of God also; and all experience attests to the present reality of things which conscience does judge to be inherently evil. Thus two seemingly contradictory conclusions, the

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1. Rashdall recognizes, of course, that many human rules of morality apply only to beings possessing bodily organisms. What he means to contend is 'that the ideal life for man must be such as commends itself to the supreme mind - that God pursues ends which possess absolute value, and that our ends, so far as they are right ends for us, must be in principle identical with the end or ends which have value for God'. (CV. p. 42).
2. PR., p. 63.

goodness of God and the reality of evil, stem from the same premiss; this problem, which has in divers forms always constituted the greatest practical and speculative obstacle to theism, strikes with peculiar force at the very foundations of Rashdall's system, and he attempts to answer it with characteristic candour and directness, characteristic willingness to pay whatever price rational consistency may demand.

As might be expected, he is first concerned to refute any theory which suggests that moral distinctions are not valid for God as well as for men; the most pernicious example of such a theory he finds in the hypothesis of absolute idealism that God is supra-moral. This hypothesis rests upon the assumption that though the world, when judged in ethical terms, is seen to contain both good and evil, the religious point of view transcends morality; religion, it is asserted, views all that happens as ultimately good, because it is willed by God. This implies, he maintains, that actions and conditions which seem immoral to men 'are in God perfectly good'[1]; it presupposes that the ethical point of view is infected with man's inability to see events 'from the point of view of absolute knowledge'; - that it is only a limitation of vision, restricting the scope of thought to human affairs, which brands pain and sin as evil; - that moral judgments do not reveal the nature of ultimate reality, in which things called evil, along with everything else, make a necessary contribution 'to the perfect beauty and harmony of the Universe'[2].

At the outset an ambiguity appears in this theory. Does it contend, Rashdall asks, merely that human moral ideas are incomplete and defective, and for that reason fail to afford adequate insight into the purpose of the universe? Or does it maintain that no moral

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1. GE. II, p. 269.
2. FW., p. 89.

distinctions whatever can be regarded as valid for God (or the Absolute)? The former assertion would be admitted by almost everyone; the latter, however, implies not merely that human moral ideas are imperfect, but that they are 'false and delusive', affording no dependable insight at all into the nature of reality. He argues that failure to distinguish between these two implications has led Bradley to put forward a theory which inconsistently seeks to include both; Bradley himself declares 'that the Universe as a whole is perfectly good'[1], but in so doing he must presuppose the validity of his own moral judgments, and, according to his own principles, such judgments cannot apprehend the Absolute because the latter by definition cannot enter into any sort of relation, even the cognitive. Furthermore, when Bradley claims that the Absolute may enjoy ends which seem cruel to men, but which are in reality better than the merciful ends of good men, he again posits an inescapable discrepancy between human moral judgments and absolute goodness. Such an Absolute obviously cannot be worshipped by men who desire to be moral. But on what grounds, Rashdall demands, can this discrepancy, and the superiority of the Absolute's ends over human ends, be asserted? Whatever the grounds, they are opposed to the moral consciousness, and he has repeatedly sought to show that if ethical knowledge is distrusted, it is gratuitous to accord validity to any other aspect of thought or experience. Bradley puts forward the conception of the Absolute ostensibly as fulfilling the demands of "harmony" and "coherence"; but clearly the notion fails to harmonize human moral ends with the "perfect" ends of the Absolute.

In a word, Rashdall insists that 'either our moral consciousness is a guide to the ultimate nature of Reality or it is not'. If it is,

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1. GE. II, p. 270.

then Bradley is wrong in asserting that things which are evil in the sight of men are good for the Absolute. 'If it is not', then 'Bradley has no right to assert that the Absolute is good'[1]. He virtually accepts the latter alternative, Rashdall holds, by suggesting that reality is the sole criterion of value[2]; this would of course make moral distinctions wholly inapplicable to the Absolute, would imply the unreality of evil, and would wholly repudiate the testimony of the moral consciousness. A few pages later, however, Bradley inconsistently reverts to the procedure of interpreting reality in terms of goodness: 'That which is highest to us', he writes, 'is also in and to the Universe most real'[3].

Against the subversive optimism of absolute idealism Rashdall sets the view, which he believes to be affirmed by the moral consciousness, that pain and sin are unequivocally bad. He admits that on purely empirical grounds the problem thus presented, to one who believes in the rationality of the universe, remains inexplicable. The amount of evil in the world seems entirely in excess of what might legitimately be considered necessary for the development of high moral character; it is even quite possible to argue that, so far as immediate experience

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1. GE. II, p. 275.
2. Cf. Appearance and Reality, p. 552.
3. Ibid., p.560. (Quoted in GE. II, p. 275 n).

Most of the foregoing discussion originally appeared in the Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. V, pp. 1-28, under the title: "Moral Objectivity and Its Postulates".

For further discussion of Bradley, see Appendix C. Rashdall also presents a refutation of A.E. Taylor's The Problem of Conduct (Ch. VIII) in connexion with the present argument; see The Theory of Good and Evil, pp. 280-85, and also Taylor's Element of Metaphysics and his review of McTaggart's Some Dogmas of Religion in The Philosophical Review (July, 1906), where he gives up some of the views criticized by Rashdall. Professor Taylor has subsequently altered his views, as is especially apparent, of course, in The Faith of a Moralist.

Rashdall also discusses Von Hartmann's theory of a supra-moral sphere, as expounded in The Philosophy of the Unconscious, Das sittliche Bewusstsein, and especially Ethische Studien; but Von Hartmann denies neither the reality of evil nor the validity of moral judgments. Cf. GE. II, pp. 275-80.

goes, the evil in the world outweighs the good. Hence he writes :

'It is only the evidence of the moral consciousness, taken in connexion with the...theistic argument as a whole, that forces us to believe that the world must have an end, that that end is good, and that the good is in principle the same good of which we have a doubtless inadequate but not fundamentally misleading revelation'(1).

Thus he is able to unite belief in the reality of evil with belief in the unqualified love of God only by regarding evil as a necessary means to the attainment of God's benevolent ends.

Obviously, if God must attain His ends through unavoidably bad means, His power is in some sense limited. Rashdall believes such an assumption to be implicit in virtually all theological attempts to explain evil, once its reality is fully admitted. Although some pluralists claim to be theists, pluralism regards this limitation of power as external to God, and thereby virtually abandons the conception of God as the ultimate source of all reality. Rashdall refuses to adopt such an expedient, for several reasons.

Pluralism can take either of two forms. On the one hand it may conceive of God as limited by a pre-existent, or eternally existing, matter, which is partly fashionable to His purpose, but also partly obstructive by reason of its being crude, imperfect and inert. Rashdall holds that such a view rests upon an antiquated theory; the doctrines of recent physics so identify "matter" with "force" as to make untenable any such dualism as is implied in the notion that mind seeks to impose form upon an independent, more or less resisting, material substratum. And of course all that he has said in defence of idealism is opposed to the ascription of an independent - let alone an eternal and uncaused - existence to matter.

, On the other hand pluralism may contend that God is limited by

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1. GE. II, p. 236.

pre-existing souls, and this alternative at least has the merit of resting upon a spiritualistic view of reality. The theory, whose history extends from Plato through Origen down to modern pluralism, is postulated, in this instance, 'to avoid the admission that God originates souls with evil potentialities'[1]; for it holds that all evil is traceable to the eternal and uncreated souls which limit God. But this speculative advantage is in Rashdall's opinion far outweighed by practical difficulties. He writes :

'The connexion between mind and body, between character and organism, between parental or racial character and individual character, is so close, that...(the pluralist) must suppose that every soul after each successive death is kept waiting in some extra-corporeal limbo till Evolution has developed parents to whom it can suitably be assigned, and an organism which will serve as a faithful expression of its present moral status no less than as an adequate discipline for its future moral advancement'. In short, this type of pluralism requires a mythology wholly 'unsupported by the...evidence of experience...and in the end... seems to give us no ethical advantage which we cannot have without it'(2).

For if evil does not arise from the nature of these eternal souls, then the theory encounters 'all the difficulties of Indeterminism', along with those of pre-existence; while if it does arise from their nature, then the universe is held to contain 'an inherent element of evil'[3], and this can be more reasonably explained as an uncaused limitation in God. Moreover, the close connexion between mind and body favours the inference that if God causes bodily processes, He also causes the accompanying mental processes[4]; for the life of the soul, - its beginning in time and its development, - is dependent upon a bodily organism. This fact is fatal to a theory which postulates uncaused souls as eternally existing apart from God. It need hardly be added that pluralism

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1. GE. II, p. 345. It is Rashdall (not I) who brings Plato's name in here; primarily Plato's God was limited by pre-existing ὕλη.
2. Ibid., pp. 346 f.
3. Ibid., p. 347.
4. Cf. FW., p. 93.

of any type is open to the further objection that it cannot account for the order and unity of the universe, which have already been found to indicate a single, universal Cause operative behind phenomena.

Having attempted to dispose of the view that God's power is limited by something outside Himself, Rashdall proceeds to defend the thesis that this limitation is inherent in God's own nature. It is important to grasp the exact sense in which he accepts the notion of divine limitation, because despite careful and explicit definition on his part, references to his opinions have often coupled his name with the theological excursions of H. G. Wells and others, whose views really differ profoundly from Rashdall's own. The key to his whole conception is the fact that the words "infinite" and "omnipotent" have frequently been applied to God in a fashion which he finds meaningless. God's power is finite, he holds, only 'in the sense in which everything real is limited'[1].

> 'The idea of a being who is omnipotent, in the popular sense of the word, is the idea of a being who has no determinate character or nature whatever. A Universe in which everything might happen would be a Universe in which nothing was caused... Real being must be being of a definite amount'(2).

Rashdall is willing to speak of God as "infinite", in the sense that He is the ground of all reality and 'is not limited by anything outside Himself'[3]; - as "omnipotent" in the sense that He ultimately possesses all the power there is, though that power is of a finite amount; - as "infinitely good" in the sense that 'He wills the best that He has it in Him to produce'[4]. But to conceive of God as "omnipotent" in the sense of denying that there are any necessities inherent in His nature - so that He could change the past, or construct a triangle with the sum

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1. CV., p. 46.
2. GE. II, pp. 344 f.
3. This statement concerning God's freedom from external limitation refers only to His power.
4. CV., p. 46.

of its angles not equal to two right angles, - is tantamount to denying that God is a rational Being. For such reasons even the most orthodox thinkers have not hesitated to reject the notion that "omnipotence" implies the power to do anything whatever, no matter how absurd. Aquinas, for example, defines the term 'as the power of doing all possible things'[1], and he regards anything which involves a contradiction as impossible. Therefore Rashdall concludes that if God's incapacity to do irrational things involves no breach in a proper and intelligible conception of omnipotence, neither does His inability to 'attain His ends without causing some evil'[2]. Rationality, in the sphere of moral purpose, involves willing the best ends attainable under the limiting conditions of the situation.

Be it noted that he does not recoil from frankly regarding God as the author of sin and pain, though he adds the rejoinder that God causes evil only as a necessary means to the greatest possible good. He believes that it is impossible to attribute to God omnipotence in the unqualified sense and perfect goodness at the same time. Between these alternatives a choice must be made; and as a moralist, he is willing to sacrifice anything which unwavering belief in the goodness and love of God may require. This alternative could not be entirely circumvented, he holds, even if the world were to be regarded as wholly free from evil. For even on such a supposition the amount of good in the world would still be finite, and it might always be demanded why - if God is both omnipotent and perfectly good - there is not yet more good, and why there are not more spirits to enjoy it; if God could have caused more good,

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1. FW., p. 94.
2. PR., p. 82.

and has not done so, surely He is 'deficient in goodness'[1].

The objection has been urged, by McTaggart for example, that if God's power is limited there is no assurance of His ultimate success, no assurance of immortality. Rashdall replies that if God is rational, and unhampered by forces beyond His control which cause evil, then

'we have a right to suppose that the world must contain more good than evil, or it would not have been willed at all. A being who was obliged to create a world which did not seem to him good would be a blind force... not a rational Will'(2).

Moreover, the belief that ultimately goodness must predominate over evil carries with it the conviction that in a rational universe beings capable of goodness would not be created unless in the long run the good were to predominate over the evil in their lives; such a faith cannot but regard the sufferings and evils endured by good men in this life as a preface to a better life[3].

An appeal to the fact of human freedom is perhaps the most frequent device of theologians in their attempt to account for evil without admitting limitation in God's power. According to the indeterminist statement of the argument, the gift of freedom is bestowed by God in order that men may achieve the highest good, namely, the development of moral character; yet because this freedom is real, it is always possible for men to choose evil. At the outset Rashdall throws suspicion on this line of reasoning by pointing out that it cannot apply to God; only theologians who make goodness contingent upon the arbitrary commands of the Deity, and therefore deny, in effect, that He is absolutely good, can contend that in His case the attainment of goodness involves the real possibility of evil. Here Rashdall is affirming the doctrine that

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1. FW., p. 97. For this reason Rashdall holds that Canon Peter Green, in his The Problem of Evil, does not go far enough when he suggests that God is limited merely by the law of logical non-contradiction. There would be nothing logically contradictory in a world which incorporated more goodness or less evil than it contains at present. Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol. X, p. 440.
2. PR., p. 84.
3. Immortality is discussed infra, # 149 ff.

God's will is determined by the necessities of His own nature - as opposed to the (Scotist and) Occamite doctrine that His will is free. This point will prove to be of considerable importance hereafter. At present all that concerns us is Rashdall's suggestion that since a deterministic conception of God safeguards rather than destroys belief in His moral goodness, a similar conception of the human self cannot detract from the reality of human goodness[1].

The view of causality already put forward implies that God is the ultimate cause of all reality, including the good and bad acts of souls. On the face of it, this seems incompatible with any affirmation of human freedom at all; but Rashdall tries to show that the power to direct our own actions, which we immediately experience, and which he is anxious to safeguard as a necessary postulate of ethics, is not affected by the fact that a more ultimate power - to put it plainly - causes the self which causes its own acts. In short, he desires to apply the distinction between first and second causes to human actions instead of to events in nature. God is the ultimate or first cause of human selves, bestowing upon them an original nature through heredity, and sustaining them in a world upon which they are continually dependent. Hence in one sense the character and the moral actions of every soul are willed by God. Yet this causal control is utterly different from a mechanistic ordering of events in nature, and it does not in the least conflict with the fact that each man is a being distinct from God, possessing a will distinct from God's. Every human action, then, is willed by the individual man and by God at the same time. Whether this notion of "double causality" can really be reconciled with belief in human freedom is one of the most

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1. Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol. X, pp. 437 ff.

important questions which we shall have to examine in the critical section[1].

His argument is much more convincing when he turns to a criticism of the indeterminist answer to the problem of evil. Indeterminists, in an attempt to avoid making God the author of evil, attribute evil to human freedom, on the hypothesis that real freedom, which involves the possibility of choosing evil, is necessary to the development of high moral character. Such a theory, Rashdall retorts, does not explain those sufferings of animals and men which do not arise from moral evil; nor does it account for at least the great preponderence of moral evil, which is due to hereditary and environmental influences over which the self does not have control. Thus all these evils have been caused by some force in the universe other than the "undetermined" wills of men; and for the theist, that force must be God. Apart from these considerations, God must be conceived by the indeterminist as "permitting" human freedom, in which case either He foreknows that freedom will result in evil, or He is not omniscient. If God is not omniscient, then He cannot with any certainty foresee that men will not choose a preponderantly evil course and thus defeat His purposes. Therefore the indeterminist must either acknowledge that God is the author of evil, or admit that His power is limited; for if God is not omniscient, that in itself constitutes a limitation. Either alternative leads to an admission that God cannot 'cause good without the possibility of evil'[2]; and this is precisely what Rashdall means when he speaks

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1. If it were not for this notion, I do not see how Rashdall could possibly have avoided pluralism; cf. # 135.
2. GE. II, p. 344.

of divine limitation.

Rashdall's own deterministic position admits that God is the 'author of evil' in the sense that He wills it 'only as a means to the good'; but he asserts that man is 'the sole author of evil' in the sense that he 'alone wills the evil otherwise than as a means to the true good'. It may be difficult to understand how his system permits him to attribute this power to man; but at least it is clear that he is anxious to make his position compatible with the doctrine that God is perfectly good, and does not 'will evil as such'[1]. Often determinism has been repudiated because of its association with an 'unethical Theology'[2]. One form of the doctrine of predestination not only makes God a wrathful and capricious Being to whose arbitrary will men must submit, no matter what may be the dictates of their own consciences; - it also conceives of God as creating bad men with deliberate foreknowledge, and with no other purpose but that they shall suffer an eternal torment which does not conduce 'to the moral improvement or future Well-being of themselves or others'[3]. Needless to say, he is anxious to dissociate himself from this "appalling theology". Indeterminism and determinism may alike represent the world as fashioned by God for the moral discipline and tutelage of souls, although it must be repeated that the former, because it admits that freedom may involve the

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1. GE. II, p. 345.
2. Ibid., p. 350.
3. Ibid., p. 350.

defeat of this purpose in individual instances, equally implies divine limitation unless it is presumed that God does not desire the salvation of all men. No matter what solution to the problem of freedom be adopted, Christian theology, should conceive of any suffering which God imposes in the discipline of evil not as 'hopeless, useless, unending'[1], but as a necessary means to moral improvement; it should conceive of evil as 'caused...by God only in order that it may be overcome'[2].

In his earlier discussion of freedom Rashdall has emphasized that determinism is not destructive of moral effort. The same holds true, he believes, when the idea of self-determination is brought into connexion with that of divine limitation. Both conceptions represent God as calling upon the human beings whom He has created to take part in a real struggle for the furthering of the good, instead of in a mock battle with an illusory evil.

'The rapidity with which and the extent to which the evil will be diminished and the good attained really does depend in part upon human effort. It is true doubtless that God knows how much each of us is capable of aiding towards the process, and how much he will aid; but we do not know, and no human being can ever know until he has acted'(3). Thus the struggle is one 'in which we have the ultimate power of the Universe on our side, but (also) one in which the victory cannot be won without our help, a real struggle in which we are called upon to be literally fellow-workers with God'(4).

Such a view, he argues, is surely more inspiring ethically than an unqualified belief in God's omnipotence, which implies that He can overcome all evil by a single fiat; for in the latter case the seriousness of evil as an obstruction to God's benevolent purposes is greatly diminished, and the moral goodness of mankind is no longer seen to be a necessary aid to the fulfilment of those purposes.

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1. PP., p. 226.
2. Ibid., p. 225.
3. GE. II, p. 355.
4. PR., p. 86.

3. Personality: Human and Divine.

Thus far this chapter has traced three metaphysical postulates which Rashdall bases primarily upon the moral consciousness, but which he has also sought to support through supplementary arguments. That the self is in some sense the cause of its own actions, he has held to be self-evidently indispensable to the meaning of ethics; belief in the existence of God appears on reflection to be implied in the full acknowledgement of moral objectivity; the negation of optimism follows from a recognition that the moral consciousness rightly pronounces many acts and conditions to be really, and not merely apparently, evil. Before turning to the fourth postulate, that of personal immortality, it is desirable to bring these first three into more intimate connexion by means of a discussion of the relationship between God and man. In what follows, the idea of personality emerges as the key to Rashdall's whole metaphysical position. The independence of the human self takes on an importance hitherto only partially intimated in connexion with the first postulate; while all that has been said already concerning God - His existence as an eternal Mind, as the Cause of all events, and as a moral Being willing benevolent ends - may be comprised, indeed, in the one term "personality", so long as it is properly understood. The third postulate, which has led Rashdall to a theory of divine self-limitation, furnishes especially good grounds for conceiving of God as personal, because to his mind the view that God is literally infinite necessarily implies that nothing is excluded from His Being, and this in turn implies that He "in-:cludes" human selves; but the meaning of self-hood, he contends, includes as one of its essential characteristics the impossibility of one consciousness fusing or overlapping with another. Hence the conception of God as infinite is incompatible, not only with his solution to the problem

of evil, but with the other two postulates as well: the independent reality of human selves, and the existence of a personal God. Adherence to these postulates therefore culminates in a conception of ultimate reality as a society of persons, consisting of God and created selves.

The first and most obvious characteristic of Rashdall's conception of personality is the stress which he lays upon its indivisibility. His notion of the constituents of goodness has already been formulated on the assumption that none of the activities of personality - thinking, feeling, willing, - is intelligible apart from the others.[1] Because he views this assumption as applicable to divine, as well as to human, personality, his reasons for reaching such a conclusion may well receive further attention.

He claims that feeling is inextricably bound up with thought because it is impossible to experience an affective state without knowing what is felt, and it is likewise impossible to experience a succession of such states without joining them to one another by thought in a relationship of priority and posteriority. On the other hand, thought which contemplates anything actual refers to what is or could be felt; and even though thought may have to do with abstract relations, devoid of all feeling-content, the thinker's own consciousness is affected by many sensations, such as sight, touch and body-temperature, at the very moment in which he indulges in thought, no matter how abstract; indeed, some of these feelings invariably arise from bodily conditions, like nervous tension, caused by the activity of thinking itself. Accordingly, Rashdall - reasoning from the nature of human personality to that of God - finds strong objections to the Hegelian doctrine that divine knowledge 'is 'simply the same as our knowledge of things when we think of them apart 'from present perception'.[2]

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1. Cf. # 15.
2. CV., p. 23. See DD., pp. 270 ff. for an early statement of Rashdall's views concerning the unity of consciousness.

He regards the attempt to isolate volition from thought or feeling as no less futile. Conscious volition implies direction of the will towards an end which must be contemplated in thought; moreover, this ideal object is desired, and though desire is more than feeling, it includes feeling. The consequences of attempting to conceive of God as capable of thought, but not of volition, have already been disclosed; it should also be noted, however, that Rashdall's position is equally antagonistic to the systems of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, which go to the other extreme from Hegelianism in that they view ultimate reality solely as a manifestation of will.

Thus the conclusions reached in the preceding pages on the basis of the idealistic, causal and moral arguments, may all be brought together under a single conception whereby God's nature is thought of as analogous to human personality. Rashdall readily admits that feeling, thought and volition must be very different in the divine consciousness from what they are in us: we cannot conjecture what feeling would be 'for a Being who has no material organism', because human affective states are localizable in a body; again, 'we cannot suppose...that in God there is the same distinction between actual present experience and the universal concepts employed in thinking which there is in us';[1] and finally, God wills all the objects of His knowledge, while we can control only a fragment of the universe we know. Nevertheless he claims that the inadequacy of the analogy from human personality cannot justify its condemnation as a piece of "crude anthropomorphism". He argues that though knowledge of other human selves is likewise inadequate, and founded solely on inference or analogy from the nature of one's own experience, this does not lead one to conclude that no knowledge of other selves is possible at all. In the case of God, as in that of a friend, imperfect

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1. PR., p. 46.

knowledge is yet sufficient to make possible communion and love. Moreover, theologians have always rightly recognized the inadequacy of any categories of thought as applied to God's nature. They have contended that thought, will and feeling or love, must be 'applied to God sensu eminentiori'.[1] These terms, so used, are simply the highest in which men can think at all. To conceive of God as a personality is assuredly less inadequate than any alternative procedure; to think of Him as possessing one function of consciousness, like thinking, but not the others, is equally anthropomorphic, and (as Rashdall has contended elsewhere) less intelligible; to think of Him in terms lower than attributes of consciousness is to dispense altogether with the idea that God is a spiritual Being.

In an essay entitled "Personality: Human and Divine" (in Personal Idealism), Rashdall adds several specific characteristics to his definition of personality. Besides the unity of consciousness, personality implies a certain permanence, a capacity to bring into relation the experiences of diverse moments; moreover, a person distinguishes himself not only from the physical objects of his own thought, but also from other selves; each self exists not only as an object of another's thought, but as a being which exists for itself. Having so defined the term, he turns to a more detailed consideration of the objections which have been urged against ascribing personality to God.

The manner in which the argument develops is somewhat puzzling, because it passes by an almost imperceptible transition from the necessity of conceiving God's nature as analogous to what human personality is, to what formally, at least, is the precise reverse, namely, the necessity of conceiving it as analogous to what human personality strives to become, but never attains. In reality, however, there is no contradiction in his argument on this score; for it moves

1. DD., p. 277.

from what is immediately known in experience, to something which that experience intimates, but which can be grasped only by inference and not immediately; logically, at least, this procedure is permissible.

At the outset he points out the difficulty of drawing any clear line - in the course of natural evolution or in the development of the individual - between a stage where personality is absent and one where it is present. Awareness of the content of feeling, which implies thought, must be ascribed in a rudimentary form to animals far down the scale of evolution; and even forms of action which appear to be wholly instinctive imply some consciousness of an act - if not of an end - for which there is an impulse; between these two extremes of blind instinct and deliberate action, are all degrees of reflectiveness.[1] Certainly in the case of higher animals, all the various characteristics of personality must be attributed to them in a more or less rudimentary form. In the course of evolution, therefore, it is impossible to say that the phenomenon of personality emerges at any given point; 'personality...is a matter of degree'.

Though an animal psychologist might wish to challenge many details in this reasoning, Rashdall's main intention is clear. He is correct, moreover, in maintaining that in the development of the human individual, no specific moment can be assigned when personality appears. Naturally, however, he does not wish to argue that because a transition is so gradual as to be imperceptible, no change is actually occurring at all. For this reason it is difficult to understand how he can add that 'the newly-born infant is no more of a person than a worm, except *dunamei*'.[2] As one critic has put it, this statement 'would work havoc with the principle that the only true definition is dynamical and prophetic'.[3]

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1. Cf. PI., p. 373.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 374.
3. H. R. Mackintosh in *The Critical Review*, Vol. XII, p. 538.

It might be supposed that the presence or absence of a moral consciousness would provide Rashdall with a clear criterion for the applicability of the term "personality"; but the moral consciousness, it will be remembered, he regards as an integral aspect of personality, an aspect which partakes of the same gradual development. It is likewise impossible, therefore, to define at exactly what point choice between conflicting impulses becomes deliberate enough to be called "moral".

All this seems, no doubt, to be a needless complication of a simple problem. If the mature human individual be taken as constitutive of what is meant by personality in the full and complete sense, then there remains no difficulty in admitting that rudimentary characteristics of personality are discoverable in lower forms of life. But Rashdall does not believe that even the mature human self fulfils what is meant by "personality". One of the criteria already mentioned, for example, entails the capacity to relate successive moments of experience in thought; human consciousness does this only imperfectly, forgetting much of its own past. Or when morality is considered, it is again apparent that even the noblest men fall short of an ideal of perfect personality. Hence Rashdall reaches the conclusion that human life stands at the peak of an evolutionary process whose very incompleteness points to a supervening goal which has not been concretely realized in earthly history.

'Indeed, we may say (with Lotze) that the ideal of personality is one which is never fully attained in human consciousness, and that God is the only being who is in the fullest and completest sense a Person'.[1]

Therefore the inadequacy of conceiving God's nature as analogous to human personality is now set in a clearer light. The term "personality" is imperfect as a description of God's nature so long

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1. CV., p. 33.

as it is associated with human limitations of power, knowledge and goodness; Rashdall removes this difficulty by contending, not that God transcends the notion of personality, but that men only imperfectly fulfil it. Nevertheless he insists that certain attributes which are found in human personality must be applicable to God: God must be 'an actual consciousness...distinct from other centres of consciousness'[1], capable of willing good ends, and thereby of perfectly fulfilling moral qualities which are the same in principle as those which human personality at its highest only approximates.

Rashdall now turns to objections more serious than those which have to do merely with the definition or use of terms. He seeks to defend the conception of God as a Person against absolute idealism, which tends to undermine this conception both by refusing to distinguish between God and the world (thus violating the principle that a person must be distinguishable from the objects of his thought), and by positing an Absolute which includes human selves in its own Being (thus violating the principle that a self is distinct from other selves)[2].

In maintaining that a person must be distinguishable from the objects of his thought, he might seem at first sight to be defending a thesis which is irreconcilable with the demands of his idealism; for his idealistic argument (though this may turn out to rest on a contradiction) asserts that objects exist independently of the individual's thought and will, only because they exist eternally in the thought of God and are willed by Him. Therefore Rashdall must

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1. DD., p. 10.
2. In an article written in 1919, for a debate on the question "Can Individual Minds be Included in the Mind of God?" (Proc. Arist. Soc., Supplementary Volume, No. 2, pp. 109-23), Rashdall reiterated, substantially without change, the position which he had defended seventeen years earlier in his essay in Personal Idealism.

find some way of harmonizing the contention that God is distinct from the world, which is the object of His thought, with the contention that the world cannot exist in independence from His thought and will. This he seeks to accomplish by differentiating between things and selves with regard to their ontological status.

In the first place he claims that the material things which God knows do not exist apart from His thought and will; and looked at from this point of view, the distinction between subject and object as it applies to God is merely a distinction between the Divine Self and 'its changing states';[1] the distinction, in other words, is between God's Self-hood and His knowledge of the physical world. This raises several questions which must be indicated here, but passed over for the present. Does Rashdall's conception really fulfil what is ordinarily meant by the distinction between subject and object? Is it legitimate to postulate a self as subject, which has an existence distinguishable from its own states? If the knowledge-relation, so far as material objects are concerned, falls wholly within the sphere of God's Mind or Being, how can the material world be "objective" or "public" in the sense that it may be directly apprehended by human minds? Does not the thesis that the reality of matter must fall within the sphere of some consciousness, either deprive knowledge of objective content (so far as material things are concerned), or imply that the states of God's consciousness can be directly known by human selves?

In the second place he claims that the existence of human selves as independently real in a sense in which material things are not, implies that God and His thoughts do not exhaust reality.[2] Therefore what his reasoning comes to is that the world of things may be regarded

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1. PI., p. 377.
2. Cf. Ibid., p. 377 n.

'as included in the very being of God'[1] (so long as this expression is not taken as a denial of the distinction between subject and object within the divine consciousness); human selves may not be regarded as so included. And perhaps it should be added once again that he strongly rejects the suggestion which he finds in Green's writings that God does not will the world; this suggestion, he believes, leads ultimately to a 'pantheistic identification between God and the world'.[2]

It is this necessity for contending that God wills the world, as a universal Cause, which at the same time involves rejection, not only of a monism based exclusively on cognitive grounds, but of pluralism as well. Yet in defending his position against the monistic doctrine that human souls are included in the Being of God (or of the Absolute), he reacts so violently against his opponents that in the end he very nearly goes over to pluralism.

He begins by asserting that if God "includes" other selves, then the bad as well as the good acts of individual men must be entirely attributed to Him;[3] the wilful sinfulness of men must be regarded as forming an element in the essential nature of God; the scoundrel must be held to be as much a "part" of God as the saint, since all beings capable of thought are, according to this hypothesis, incorporated in the universal Mind. This, of course, is a position which he finds intolerable. Within the limits of absolutism it can be escaped only by supporting the equally objectionable contention that God is supramoral. Rashdall has sought to steer a middle course between monism and pluralism by propounding a notion of double causality; he maintains that human volition is distinct from God's and yet he

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1. CV., p. 33.
2. CV., p. 34.
3. For the qualified sense in which Rashdall is willing to admit that God causes the bad acts of men, see # 125.

conceives of God 'as co-operating in some sense with whatever causality is exercised by human wills'.[1]

What further defence of his contention that the individual self is distinct from God can he offer? Absolutism, he declares, rests upon the fallacy of assuming that what constitutes existence for things is the same as what constitutes existence for selves.[2] Royce, for example, assumes that for a self to be in relation to another being it must be identical with that being, in the same sense that a mere thing really is constituted by its relations; this leads Royce to conclude that the individuality of the self lies in what it is for God. Rashdall claims, on the contrary, that while the _esse_ of a thing is to be known by spirits, 'the _esse_ of a person is to know himself, to be for himself...'[3] Royce's fallacy of assuming that the _principium individuationis_ of a self is what can be known about it results from the error, which is a presupposition of the whole absolutist position, of regarding thought - apart from feeling and volition - as the whole of reality.

If it be acknowledged, Rashdall continues, that the _esse_ of a self can be affected by its relation to things only through its own knowledge of them, then it follows that two persons might have experiences identical in content, and still remain two and not one. The absurdity of claiming that when two persons have exactly identical experiences (so far as content is concerned) they become one, is betrayed by Bradley when he 'contends that the Absolute may feel all our pains and yet not feel them _as pain_';[4] the retort is obvious: we _do_ feel them as pain. Rashdall's whole point can be summarized by

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1. PI., p. 380.
2. In _The World and the Individual_, cf. especially pp. 426, 433 f.
3. PI., p. 383.
4. _Ibid._, p. 384 n.

saying that the mutual apprehension of a universal on the part of two selves is not tantamount to a fusion or identification of their personalities. 'The Reality of the world is not abstract content, but living experience'.[1]

Bradley refuses to ascribe reality to the self because he fails adequately to distinguish between a self's knowledge of a physical thing and its knowledge of another self. It is true that both the thing and the other self are "not-self" from the individual's point of view; but whereas the thing 'has no reality apart from what it is' for selves, the other self has a reality which is not dependent on any such contingency. When one self knows another, it must be repeated, the identity between them is that of mutual knowledge of a universal; the selves remain two independent realities. If Bradley is correct in maintaining that nothing can be real unless it is without 'relation to anything outside itself',[2] then obviously (as Bradley holds) only the whole can be real.[3] If, however, it be acknowledged with Rashdall that relations to other selves do not exhaust an individual's reality, then the word "real" may be applied - in a usage more legitimate than Bradley's - to that nucleus wherein the self exists for itself, rather than, like matter, "for other". For this reason Rashdall claims that the individual self is "real", 'without being the whole of Reality'.[4]

Therefore he is able to conceive of God's relation to human spirits as similar to our own relation to other selves, although admittedly God knows far more concerning our past (since we forget) and our potentialities than we do ourselves. He has already recognized, moreover, that the functions of personality in God must be very different in their manner of operation from what they are in us.

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1. GE., II, p. 239.
2. PI., p. 385.
3. Cf. Appendix C.
4. PI., p. 385.

Nevertheless, he believes that God's knowledge of human selves must rest upon a similarity of content between His experience and ours, - a likeness between our capacities for thinking, feeling and willing, and something corresponding to them in Him. This philosophical conclusion is one which he takes over bodily in interpreting the doctrine of the Trinity, for it is in essential agreement with the scholastic teaching that 'God must be known as Potentia, Sapientia, Bonitas (or Voluntas)'.[1]

While so much is clear, an ambiguity nevertheless appears at this point. It can best be exposed by copying out two seemingly irreconcilable statements which occur on the same page (p. 387) in Personal Idealism:

'Doubtless God cannot be thought of as attaining his knowledge of other selves by the clumsy process of inference and analogy by which we so imperfectly enter into the consciousness of others: ...

'God must then, it would seem, know other selves by the analogy of what He is Himself; ... His knowledge of other selves may be perfect knowledge without his ever being or becoming the selves which He knows'.

If analogy per se is a "clumsy process", then it is difficult to understand how God can obtain His perfect knowledge of our minds through this means. Elsewhere, moreover, Rashdall admits that the distinction between immediate and inferential knowledge can hardly apply to God's consciousness.[2]

Yet even this difficulty does not diminish the force of his main contention that to speak of one self as including another is an 'instance of that all-fertile source of philosophical error - the misapplication of spacial (sic) metaphors. Minds are not Chinese boxes which can be put "inside" one another'.[3] Out of this

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1. PI., p.387. Rashdall would revise this formula to Sapientia, Voluntas, Bonitas, - including "power" under "will", and "feeling" under "goodness".
2. Cf. # 161.
3. PI., p. 388.

conviction grows Rashdall's antagonism towards mysticism; it likewise makes him suspicious of the term "immanence".[1] And the same view profoundly affects his conception of the Incarnation, because he cannot regard the indwelling of God in Christ as implying a personal identity between them.[2]

The theory of ultimate reality at which he arrives thus ostensibly accounts for the unity of the world, while at the same time postulating the conception of a limited God. An important difference, however, characterizes the two considerations (his solution to the problem of evil, and his conception of personality) which give rise to this notion of a limited God. The idea of personality is foreign to that of an all-inclusive Deity, because 'God is...limited by other...selves, in so far as He is not those selves'. But this limitation cannot be conceived as imposing an external limitation upon God's power; therefore he adds: 'He is not limited...by anything which does not ultimately proceed from his own Nature or Will...'[3] From the point of view of power, the limitations which necessitate evil are internal to God's nature.[4] This seems to neglect his own emphasis upon the "impenetrability" of consciousness, which implies that all the attributes of human personality, including powers of volition, must be external to God, if the personality is itself external to God. Whether real contradiction is involved depends upon the intelligibility of the account which he has given of how God and men co-operate in willing human action.

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1. See an essay entitled "The Alleged Immanence of God" in The Contemporary Review, June 1907 (reprinted in ID, Ch. XI).
2. Cf. #202.
3. PI., p. 390.
4. This is my word; Rashdall usually avoids such terms because they are open to misconstruction, but in the light of the foregoing it will not, I trust, be misunderstood here. No other expression seems better to suggest the important meaning which I wish to convey. Cf. # 289 n.

If this point is held in abeyance, Rashdall's metaphysical thought is seen to culminate in the conception that 'the world is neither a single Being, nor many co-ordinate and independent Beings, but a One Mind (sic) who gives rise to many'. 'Reality...is a community of Persons'.[1] The notion of a Mind which knows and wills the whole is perfectly compatible, he believes, with its not being the whole.[2] In so far as God is distinct from created spirits, He is neither the whole, nor strictly infinite. In so far as other spirits are created as acts of His Will, and are wholly known to Him, ultimate reality forms a unified system, 'but that Unity is not the unity of self-consciousness'.[3] The term "infinite", it must be remembered, is one which Rashdall regards as inapplicable to real beings; the denial of the distinction between each individual consciousness and God, which the conception of a literally infinite God involves, inevitably leads, he believes, either to a refusal to regard the individual as real, or to a refusal to regard God as self-conscious. In a word, if the term "Absolute" must be given a place in the philosophical vocabulary, he would make it synonymous, not with God, but with that society of persons which includes God and created spirits, and thus comprises all reality.

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1. PI. p. 391.
2. His argument that identity of content does not entail identity of existence, proves this point only in the case of cognition; his notion of double causality is designed, of course, to show that God can will all that men will without including them in His own Being. Cf. GE. II, p. 241.
3. GE. II, p. 240.

Appendix B. - The Problem of Time.[1]

The problem of time is one which may best be discussed separately because it intrudes at several different points into Rashdall's argument; yet, for a reason to be made clear, he accords it but the slightest treatment. First of all, his argument from causality, because it involves the idea of creation, - the idea that God wills the world, which consists of temporal events - raises the question as to whether or not this time-series is to be regarded as infinite. He perceives that the notion of an absolute beginning of existence must be rejected, because even if the creation of the world be conceived as having a beginning in time, God must have 'existed before that creation' (2). Therefore he leaves open the problem as to whether the material universe has resulted from an infinite or a finite series of physical changes, inasmuch as it belongs primarily to physicists and its solution would not remove the ultimate problem.

When all existence, including God's, is considered, the problem of time presents to the human mind an irresolvable antinomy. Rashdall really leaves the matter there, except to say that neither Kant nor any other thinker, has succeeded in surmounting the difficulty (3). It is impossible to conceive of time as having a beginning, to conceive of a moment which had no time preceding it; but it is likewise difficult to think of time as an infinite series 'which no possible enumeration of its members will make any smaller' (4). Accordingly Rashdall contends that to conceive of God as supra-temporal is unavailing, since He must contemplate the time-series either as finite or as infinite, even though it be supposed that He contemplates 'the whole series at once'(5).

He really inclines to the view that creation is "eternal", because he recognizes that (quite apart from the question of a beginning in time) the idea of creation must be accompanied by that of a perpetual conservation or sustenance of existence. Another reason, to which we now turn, also underlies this preference: that is his antipathy to the notion of a (purely) supra-temporal God or Absolute.

The problem of time has a second bearing upon his system, because the attribution of reality exclusively to a supra-temporal Absolute renders the temporal stream of consciousness, and the self whose life it constitutes, unreal. Thus for absolutism the distinctness of individual personality, which Rashdall makes normative for reality, is merely an appearance; time and the self it dismisses as an intertwined illusion. Here again, he claims, absolutism falls into

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1. This appendix is based upon the following sources: PI., pp.391 ff; GE.II,pp.244-6,353 f; PR., pp. 87-93; ID., pp. 90 ff; Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. V., pp. 27 f; Ibid., Supplementary Volume No. 2., pp. 119 f.
2. PR., p. 88.
3. Kant's solution Rashdall rejects because 'it involved the impossible supposition that the past has no existence at all except in so far as it is thought by some finite mind in the present'. (PR., p. 91).
4. PR., p. 90.
5. Ibid., p. 91. This is hardly an intelligible statement, however; for if the time-series is infinite, God's existence must be included in it, and therefore God would not then be supra-temporal.

its habitual confusion of content with existence; abstract truth is timeless, but this does not imply that the mind which knows it - and for Rashdall it is the experiencing mind, not the abstract ideas it contains, which is ultimately "real" - is out of time. Hence, though he admits all the difficulties involved in conceiving of 'God as a time-occupying consciousness... - persisting through... a continuum of experience'(1), he believes that such a conception affords at least a partial answer to the problem, while to think of Him as timeless is wholly unintelligible. Therefore it may be said that his position, so far as it goes, affirms the idea of God as existing in an infinite time-series, which He nevertheless eternally causes. This involves the notion of a cause contemporaneous with its effect, - a notion which he regards as difficult, but not as entirely unthinkable (2). For religious purposes, he maintains, it is sufficient to hold that God causes the time-series, whether it be infinite or not (3).

A third consideration, perhaps the most decisive of all, constrains Rashdall to hold 'that our time-distinctions must express, however inadequately, the true nature of Reality' (4). For his whole conception of the moral life is founded upon the presupposition that in the judgment of value an ideal end is acknowledged which is not yet real, but which may be attained through active effort; clearly, therefore, the notion of time as real is intimately connected with the validity of these judgments, and with the validity of a theism based on ethics. Consequently, every system which regards time as unreal, in effect denies that morality has any bearing upon the nature of reality; it reduces history to an illusion, and renders human effort incapable of really effecting 'any change in the Universe' (5). The logical outcome of such a system is a state of inertia or quietism, which denounces all ethical striving (6). Rashdall's ethical theism, because it conceives of God as pursuing benevolent ends, represents the moral life as one of active co-operation with God; therefore he thinks of 'God too as striving, but as striving for an end which will hereafter be realized in such a measure as to make the striving reasonable' (7). It must be one part of the truth about such a God to say that He is in time, though Rashdall believes that the antinomy at which human thinking halts must be transcended in God's knowledge, and that His relation to time must be different from ours. In any case, he maintains, if God knows our experience as it really transpires, He must know it as taking place in time (8).

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1. Proc. Arist. Soc., Supplementary Vol. No. 2., p. 120.
2. He cites as a suggestive analogy the case of attention as the contemporaneous cause of one's comprehension of meaning while reading a book.
3. Cf. PR., p.92.
4. GE. II, p. 245.
5. Ibid., p. 248.
6. Cf. ID., Ch. V.
7. GE. II, p. 354.
8. Ibid., p. 248.

Lastly, he contends that both space and time are "real" in the sense that they qualify human knowledge and experience; but he would also contend that both are mind-dependent, since both imply relations which can be grasped only by mind. He does not mean to impugn their "reality" then, when he refuses to speak of them as "real beings"(1), for he conceives of selves alone as real beings. Evidently he regards space as entailing a type of external relation which characterizes "physical" objects alone, while time, he believes, inheres in the subjective functions themselves.

One refreshing impression emerges from this rather complicated discussion. In his determination to press rational enquiry to its uttermost limits, Rashdall sometimes reaches conclusions which, for all their attempt at consistency, leave the haunting sense that his syllogisms have yet failed to uncurtain a mystery. It is heartening to find an intimation in his writings that after the intellect has reached its outermost boundaries, it has only touched the margin of a kingdom "wider than the measure of man's mind".

Appendix C. - Green, Bradley and McTaggart.

Separate consideration of three thinkers - Green, Bradley and McTaggart - seems called for at this point, not only because it is in reaction to their metaphysical views, more than any others, that Rashdall seeks to find a middle path for theism between absolutism and pluralism, but also because a considered treatment of each of these writers enters integrally into the body of his own works. Criticism, in his hands, is as much a creative task as is the exposition of positive conclusions. Moreover, special mention of these philosophers will elucidate in more detail the considerations which have impelled him to take up the metaphysical position we are reviewing in the course of this chapter.

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(i) - Green.

Rashdall's debt to Green as an ethical thinker has been cursorily mentioned; in the end he rejects Green's theory of self-satisfaction as falling into an hysteron-proteron similar to that underlying psychological hedonism. In reality, Rashdall claims, satisfaction, like pleasure, is a result, not a condition, of the desires which inspire action(3). For the present purpose,

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1. Cf. GE.II, p. 240.
2. Cf. GE.I, pp. 37-43; II, pp. 204 f., 246-9.
3. Cf. GE.I, pp. 37-43. For Rashdall's criticism of Green's conception of the common good, see GE.II, pp. 96-103.

however, it is sufficient to note that Green's doctrine of the "timeless self" seems doubly to confuse his system, since desires and satisfactions have meaning only in relation to a self which is in time. Through reference to this timeless spiritual principle, Green ultimately identifies the self with universal reason to which he denies volition; and thus he unwittingly undermines the significance of ethics. Green's language about the self's "striving" after satisfaction is of course wholly inconsistent with the idea that it is timeless.

Naturally Rashdall looks askance at this doctrine; Green, he believes, was misled by several rather elementary facts. Because the self persists through change, and, while existing in one time, can know events which took place in another, Green leaped to the wholly unwarranted conclusion that it is out of time altogether. Furthermore, his idealism led him to assume that the real world exists only for the thought-relation, and abstract thought is out of time; Rashdall, identifying reality as he does with the concrete mental events from which thought abstracts, holds that without relation to such events, which occur in time, universals have no existence and cannot be apprehended. Finally, Green seemed to believe that because the categories, when abstracted from their concrete data and employment, are out of time, the self which uses them is likewise timeless; Rashdall replies that a category is even 'less capable of identification with Reality'(1) than the abstract thought which it contains.

(ii) - Bradley.

Certain aspects of Rashdall's criticism of Bradley, which have not been sufficiently stressed in the foregoing chapter, can be brought together with considerable advantage by reviewing a masterly essay, entitled "The Metaphysics of Mr. F. H. Bradley", which was published by the British Academy(2).

When Bradley writes as an ordinary idealist, Rashdall finds himself predominantly in agreement with him. Bradley affirms, for example, that primary and secondary qualities are ultimately dependent upon perception; he even asserts that reality consists in experience, interpreting "experience" as including feeling and willing from which thought abstracts. But he refuses to conclude from this (as Rashdall does) that the individual human self is ultimately real, because he finds relations unintelligible; his definition of reality consequently demands that it involve no relation whatever. This employment of the word, Rashdall points out, excludes from its domain not only human selves and the God of theism, but even the usual notion of the Hegelian Absolute; for internal relations inhere within this Absolute, because it includes all lesser minds as inter-related parts. Knowledge of Bradley's Absolute, (as he himself contends) is impossible, because knowledge implies relation; yet all appearances manifesting themselves in relations imply a Reality beyond them, which they more or less adequately reveal. On the basis of this scepticism

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1. GE. II, p. 247.
2. Cf. Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. V. (Reprinted ID., Ch. XII).

Bradley seeks to expose the contradictions underlying all the categories: Knowledge is impossible without thought, yet thought implies the employment of universals which are abstractions from concrete reality. All knowledge is founded upon feelings and relations, which are unintelligible apart from each other; and yet to think of the two as related, ends in an infinite regress. Temporal existence involves contradiction, since 'that which becomes is and is not'(1); therefore the Absolute must be supra-temporal, although Bradley admits that he can attach no meaning to such a notion. Finally, morality presents an unresolved contradiction between self-realization and self-sacrifice(2); moreover, what conscience regards as evil can only be appearance, because reality must be perfectly harmonious and therefore good(3).

This uncompromising agnosticism degenerates into 'something very like platitude'(4), however, when Bradley goes on to admit that there are various stages which increasingly approximate this unattainable knowledge of absolute truth and reality. Rashdall is merely conforming with this principle of degrees of truth, therefore, when he advances various doubts as to whether Bradley's own system approaches this ultimate goal as nearly as possible.

In a word, he urges that this system incorporates three irreconcilable points of view: '(a) Idealism, (b) Spinozism, (c) Phenomenalism'(5). The foregoing account started with Bradley's idealistic mood, but arrived at a point where we found sentient experience to be adjectival to an unknowable, impersonal Absolute which transcends all relations, even that of subject and object. This latter is a Spinozistic mood; and really the notion of a substance which is neither thought nor extension comes nearer to Bradley's conception of the Absolute than does his own phrase "conscious experience", so long as that Absolute can know neither itself nor anything else. Bradley seeks to furnish an analogy from rudimentary consciousness in which feeling and knowing have not yet been discriminated; but this cannot serve to describe a consciousness which ex hypothesi is above, not below, the human level of knowing. If the self's consciousness is rejected, then only a Spinozistic tertium quid remains as a key to the nature of Bradley's Absolute, unless he turns to matter for his analogy. In any case, this Spinozistic view relinquishes all that he has said as an idealist, and, incidentally, fails to provide an Absolute free from relations, since it still holds that selves are adjectival to the Absolute as substantive.

When, in the closing pages of Appearance and Reality, Bradley seems to suggest that 'the Absolute in fact exists only in its appearances'(6), he renounces his fundamental distinction between the two, and writes as a Phenomenalist. Does Bradley believe in a conscious Reality over and above finite minds and appearances, or not? If the transcendent unity or harmony he speaks of is not achieved in or by a mind, he should not refer to the Absolute as experience and attribute feeling, or something which includes feeling, to it. But if it is achieved by a mind, how can this be reconciled with his suggestion that the Absolute exists only in the experiences of finite minds? Surely no human mind or minds can

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1. ID., p. 212.
2. For Rashdall's rejection of this antinomy, see GE. Bk. II, Ch.III.
3. Rashdall assumes that Bradley uses the term in an ethical sense.
4. ID., p. 213.
5. Ibid., p. 215.
6. Ibid., p. 217.

harmonize all contradictions and transcend all relations.

By shifting from one of his three moods to the next, Bradley gives his system a certain plausibility; but he betrays himself thereby into entirely contradictory conceptions of the Absolute: It is conscious experience and includes all knowledge; yet knowledge involves relation; hence the Absolute cannot know itself or anything else. In it there is no relation, yet it includes all relations. It includes all things; yet in it there is no plurality. If contradiction be the sign of unreality, Rashdall concludes, then surely Bradley's Absolute 'is the greatest unreality in this world of shams'.(1) To believe in it requires 'an act of faith ...(and) a sacrifice of the intellect (such) as no religious fanatic or infallible Pontiff has ever demanded'. In a word, 'Mr. Bradley has mistaken for Reality an (unachievable) ideal of knowledge'. (2)

One crucial point in the dispute between the two writers deserves special attention. Rashdall cannot accept at all the reasons which Bradley puts forward for refusing to regard conscious experience in human beings as ultimately unreal. Though Rashdall admits that sometimes knowledge may not correspond to absolute truth, because it involves abstraction from concrete perception, nothing whatever, he maintains, can be said against the reality of knowledge 'as an actual conscious experience'. (3) Perception and abstract knowledge (however imperfect), are both real. Considered as psychical experience, accurate and erroneous "knowledge" are equally real, and the distinction between them 'is best expressed by saying that there are degrees of truth, but no degrees of Reality'. (4) From this it follows that an Absolute which includes all human consciousness in a single, harmonious experience is veritably unthinkable; for if the human judgment that one sensation is posterior to another is really mistaken (as Bradley would contend), an absolute experience which includes no contradictions cannot include this judgment, and therefore it cannot be the whole of experience. Reality cannot be identified with coherent truth; for all conscious experience, including both true and erroneous judgments, is real. This conclusion of Rashdall's is compatible, it will be noted with his contention that God can know all conscious experience (i.e. be omniscient), without being or including all conscious minds. Accordingly reality must consist of this omniscient experience <u>plus</u> the experience of all lesser minds. God's knowledge of a man's experience may be complete; but the man's experience remains distinct from God's knowledge of it. This position of course frankly abandons Bradley's conception of the Absolute as excluding all relation. 'To talk about a One which somehow "includes" many members without being related to any of them and without their being related to one another is simply to take back with one phrase what has been conceded by another'. (5) Rashdall conceives of reality as a united whole, which is not related to anything outside itself because it is co-extensive with all that exists; within that whole the constituent parts (persons) are of course related to one another. He is willing to grant Bradley's contention that all categories are inadequate to apprehend the nature of reality; but he suggests that whenever

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1. ID., p. 220.
2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 221.
3. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 222.
4. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 223.
5. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 227.

Bradley seeks to transcend the use of these categories he ends in a position even more contradictory and inadequate. Once again, Rashdall admits that the process of abstracting from perception, by which in our ignorance we move from the unknown to the known (1), cannot be regarded as characterizing the thought of an omniscient Mind. But he denies that this indicates that such a Mind must be free from all relation.

In conclusion, therefore, it is necessary to state Rashdall's reason for refusing to believe that the idea of relation is contradictory. He writes: 'I do not see that, because we think of one sensation as related to another sensation, we therefore require a new relation to express the relation between the sensation and the relation, and so on ad infinitum. So to argue implies that we think of the relation as being an existence apart from that which is related, and that is inconsistent with the nature of a relation' (2). Once this point is established, Rashdall is free to contend that the distinction between God and other selves is real and intelligible (3).

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(iii) - McTaggart.

Despite his rejection of pluralism, Rashdall finds certain aspects of McTaggart's metaphysics instructive; the preceding refutation of Bradley manifests the influence of McTaggart's proof that the monistic Absolute either destroys the reality of human consciousness, or cannot be regarded as conscious itself. Furthermore, McTaggart, like Rashdall, regards ultimate reality as a society; but their agreement ends at that point.

McTaggart's system differs from the usual type of spiritualistic pluralism; it is non-theistic, because it acknowledges the reality of human and animal minds only, and yet it holds that these spirits together form an ordered system or society. Such a theory, Rashdall

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1. Because perception alone does not furnish "knowledge", according to Rashdall.
2. ID., p. 230.
3. This account has omitted certain statements in which Rashdall is hardly fair to Bradley. In one of these he suggests that in Bradley's system 'even the whole is not real, so long as it is considered as a whole, a collection, a plurality of parts' (ID., p. 209; cf. p. 214). Hoernlé (see the Review of Theol. and Philos. Vol. IX, p. 54) has brought out Bradley's point: The idea of the whole cannot be the whole, therefore it cannot be entirely true; the ideal of thought is to be the reality it contemplates, but if this could be achieved it would cease to be thought. The relevant point in Rashdall's refutation is that complete knowledge involves knowing all about its object, not being it. (Yet this would not hold, in Rashdall's system, in the case of God's knowledge of physical objects, wherein the existence of the object falls within His Being).

   Again Rashdall misinterprets Bradley when he takes (what the latter holds to be) this contradiction underlying all knowledge as meaning that knowledge and reality are at opposite poles, so that increasing approximation to the one implies correspondingly further removal from the other. (Cf. ID., p.211).
4. Cf. GE.II, pp. 347 f; PR., pp. 96-100, 123-26. At the time when the passages on which this critique is based were written, McTaggart's Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, and Some Dogmas of Religion, were available, but neither volume of The Nature of Existence was. Cf. Rashdall's review of Some Dogmas of Religion in Mind, Vol. XV, pp. 534 ff.

points out, gives rise to difficulties because McTaggart is too honest to assume that any soul, or even all souls taken collectively, can be omniscient. In fact, he admits that the known part of reality, without the unknown, does not form an ordered system; and yet, as an idealist, he must regard whatever is unknown by any mind as simply non-existent. Rashdall further objects to McTaggart's system because it involves the gratuitous theory of pre-existent, uncaused souls; it cannot even be strengthened through the device, common among pluralists, of attributing to God a scheme of pre-established harmony between soul and body. McTaggart does believe that the universe, as an ordered system, has a final cause (1); yet, as we have seen, he denies the existence of one creative and purposive Mind as the seat of final causation.

These contradictions arise, Rashdall suggests, from McTaggart's failure to reconcile two contrasting elements in his thought. His Hegelian affinites force him to assert that ultimate reality forms a unified system; but his pluralism, because it is non-theistic, destroys the only ground on which this former assertion could be substantiated without impugning the reality of individual consciousness.

The influence of Professor Pringle-Pattison upon Rashdall's theistic system must also be remembered. Rashdall's frequent references to Hegelianism and Personality show that the measure of agreement between this book and his own conclusions is not fortuitous. A dispute which arose between the two writers (2) will be referred to in the critical section. An article entitled "Personality in Recent Philosophy" (3) contains Rashdall's critique of four Gifford Lecture series: those of Dean Inge, Professors Webb, Pringle-Pattison and Sorley. To his mind these writers represent stages moving, in the order named, from the heresy of absolutism, to the full truth of a personalistic standpoint. Except for the chapter on freedom, Sorley's book contains an argument which Rashdall wholly accepts; apparently he overlooks the realistic tendencies which intrude themselves into Moral Values and the Idea of God.

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1. Cf. PR. p. 120.
2. This dispute arose as a result of Pringle-Pattison's criticisms of Rashdall in The Idea of God (pp. 387 ff.), and the latter's replies.
3. In the Church Quarterly Review, Vol. XC, pp. 19-50.

4. Personal Immortality.[1]

The fourth and last metaphysical postulate is that of personal immortality. It is a belief which is based upon acknowledgment of the objectivity of moral values, and which follows as a corollary from the foregoing conceptions of God and personality. Direct arguments on behalf of immortality, which depend upon establishing the "simplicity" of the soul, or its present independence of the body, require views which Rashdall regards as no longer philosophically tenable. Jesus rightly perceived, in his reply to the Sadducees concerning the Resurrection,[2] that belief in the future life flows directly from a man's conception of the nature of God. In espousing this same method, Rashdall continues to set himself against naturalism and absolutism, both of which are alien to the grounds and terms of his argument in behalf of personal survival; but these may now be left aside, since if he has not demolished them already, no further weapons in his arsenal can accomplish the task.

In connection with the problem of evil[3] he has put forward the proposition that, if the world is willed by a rational and loving God, its existence must at least be better than its non-existence; such an argument, it may be noted, rests upon his assumption that quantitative categories can be employed in a discussion about values with sufficient accuracy to justify judgments which relate to the preponderance of good or evil within a given whole, - whether that whole be the life of an individual or that of "the world".[4] Strictly

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1. Cf. DD. Ch. XI; GE. II, pp. 213-220: 261-65: 352 f.; PR. 77-79; PP. Ch. XXV; GM. Ch. V.
2. Cf. Mark 12:26.
3. Cf. # 122.
4. Cf. # 46 ff. See also Church Quart. Rev., Vol., XC, p. 46, where he defends this conception in criticizing Dr. Webb, et al.

this argument does not require him to do more than affirm that ultimately the good must predominate over evil in the lives of God's creatures; this might be so construed as to mean merely that the proportion of souls in whom good is uppermost will exceed that in whom evil is uppermost. But he is not content to let the matter rest at this point; he views the question in terms of the individual life, and therefore he contends that in a rational universe no soul capable of goodness would be created unless good were ultimately to predominate over evil in that individual life.

The question arises, however, as to why it is not possible, granting these assumptions, to have faith in the ultimate rationality of the universe without postulating immortality. Rashdall answers this question in his King's College Lecture.[1] It contains a reply to objections raised by Professor Laird in an article entitled "The Ethics of Immortal Reward".[2]

Laird begins by contending that 'the moral argument for immortality really implies the retributive theory of Punishment ... and Reward'.[3] He thus conceives of the moral argument as holding that, since in this life virtue is not rewarded and vice not punished in a manner adequate to fulfil the demands of the moral consciousness, these demands will be fulfilled by God in a future life, because they are valid and represent His will. This is, to a certain extent, the form adopted by Kant and Butler; but Rashdall, who has a deep-seated aversion to the retributive theory of punishment, rejects it as heartily as does Laird.

Rashdall denies, therefore, that immortality is necessarily

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1. "The Moral Argument for Personal Immortality". Reprinted in GM., Chapter V.
2. In The Hibbert Journal, Vol. XVI, pp. 580 ff.
3. GM., pp. 127 f.

postulated merely to insure these self-centred ends. The future life envisaged in the teaching of Jesus and in the New Testament generally, he claims, is not one which plays upon hope of pleasure or fear of punishment as the sole motives underlying the performance of duty in the present. The "reward" for righteousness which Jesus mentions is simply a more complete righteousness, to be achieved in the future life; such a reward will satisfy the hungering and thirsting of a man who is genuinely righteous, but not the desires of one who fulfils his duty solely from selfish motives.[1] Hence the Christian belief in immortality is not based upon 'a low view of human nature', which assumes that men will be virtuous only for the sake of some reward other than that of virtue itself. As will be argued more fully, it is precisely because Christianity recognizes the high moral capacities of mankind - which go largely unfulfilled in this life - that it cherishes the hope of a future life; the better a man is, the more inconceivable it becomes 'that it was only for this life that he came into the world'.[2]

Laird goes on to contend, however, that the rationality of the universe can be defended without recourse to any belief in immortality. He quite rightly points out that because virtue is an end in itself, its value is not contingent upon future reward: thus he is able to make the undeniable assertion that certain intrinsic values are actually realized in the course of history. Rashdall adds the comment that this empirical argument in support of the belief that the universe fulfils moral ends would seem to require that evil must be explained as a necessary means to the good - for example, as

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1. Cf. Appendix D.
2. PP., p. 246.

contributing to the development of moral character. If this be Laird's position, it is intelligible thus far.

Nevertheless, in Rashdall's opinion it does not afford sufficient ground for maintaining that the universe is ultimately rational and good; to make this further assumption without postulating immortality one must be able to hold that in this earthly life the good outweighs the evil. This implies not only that pleasure outweighs pain (which Rashdall doubts), but that enlightenment outweighs ignorance, beauty outweighs ugliness, and virtue outweighs vice. When one resolutely confronts the vastness of the world's misery, stupidity and sin, and compares it with the small number of those who in this transitory existence have realized with any measure of fullness the highest intellectual, aesthetic and moral ideals, the empirical evidence of history, taken by itself, seems positively opposed to belief in the rationality and goodness of the universe.[1] If this life be the end, Rashdall asserts, then it is impossible to say 'that the good (is) worth the evil that it costs';[2] it is impossible to say that the world's existence is so much better than its non-existence that its creation may reasonably be attributed to a loving God. Nor can he find any ground for supposing that humanity in the future will have so radically changed and progressed that its condition will at last justify the aeons of suffering and sin which were the cost of its evolution: 'There is as little empirical justification for an optimistic view of the future of humanity as for an optimistic view of its past or its present'.[3]

Hence Laird's refutation of the retributive theory of immortality may be accepted, and yet it still may be true that belief in the rationality of the universe demands some other theory of immortality.

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1. Cf. # 117 f.
2. PP., p. 242.
3. GE. II, p. 215.

Indeed, only if this life be regarded as a means to an end which lies beyond terrestrial history - a preliminary stage for the discipline and development of the individual soul - can the world be regarded as created and governed by a rational God whose loving purposes for men will ultimately be accomplished.

Not only is the total amount of evil disproportionate to that of the good, but their respective distribution is such as to increase the difficulty of believing in the rationality of the universe, if this world be the end of life. Rashdall has already argued[1] that virtue and happiness are both indispensable to the fulfilment of the whole meaning of goodness; hence to him a rational world-order demands a coincidence of these two elements in the life of a good man. He admits that if it were possible to believe that happiness and misery are distributed justly in this life, faith in immortality would not be a necessary corollary of belief in a rational God. But it is obvious, he declares, that virtue and happiness do not in fact vary together in accordance with a rational distribution; on the contrary, high moral character in this life seems inevitably to bring with it much pain. This distribution is unjust and puzzling only on the hypothesis that this life is the end. If, however, by reason of belief in immortality, this life is viewed as a period of discipline and preparation for a better life, then the sufferings of good men may be regarded as permitted by a loving God solely because they are necessarily instrumental to a larger good which will be fulfilled in a future state.

This affirmation of the ideal of distributive justice is not a reversion to the retributive theory. A rational ideal implies that the other values of life - happiness, knowledge, and the appreciation of

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1. Cf. # 14.

beauty - should be the possession of the virtuous man, not because he has earned them as a reward, but because virtue is not the only good; it alone does not constitute the ideal life. What must be emphasized is that the fulfilment of this complete ideal, even by the virtuous man - and still more clearly in the case of the ordinary and the wicked man - demands the postulation of a future life. Especially in the case of the wicked man, pain may be a propaedeutic necessary to his appreciation and attainment of the higher goods; this transformation of character is the only justifiable purpose which punishment serves. Rashdall also admits, of course, that pain and suffering may serve a disciplinary purpose even in the case of the good man. But he insists that the moral and spiritual attainments possible in this life are inadequate by themselves to account or recompense for the magnitude of human suffering; for he will not say that the true end of human life has been fulfilled so long as some men are virtuous without being happy, while others enjoy the lower goods and perhaps for that very reason are prevented from becoming virtuous:

'A Universe which would not ultimately bring about a greater co-existence of the higher and the lower elements of good than now exists' cannot be regarded as controlled by 'a righteous and loving Will'(1).

These various aspects of his argument can all be summed up in the conviction that man's capacity for goodness bespeaks some more ultimate destiny where it can achieve fruition.

'The contrast between the immensity of human capacity and the poorness of the attainment - that is the inmost kernel of all the great classical arguments for immortality'(2).

Sometimes belief in immortality has expressed itself as an egoistic desire which in its most degraded form becomes an 'enervating hope of Heaven and debilitating fear of Hell'(3). The true Christian

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1. GM., p. 136.
2. Ibid., p. 137.
3. PP., p. 243.

form of the belief, however, is one which is the outcome of a fully intelligible conception of the universe; in the absence of scientific evidence which definitely favours either belief or disbelief, the demands of reason and conscience afford adequate ground for espousing the former. The abuses which the doctrine has sometimes suffered need not blind one to the fact that, when properly understood, it gives meaning and hopefulness to the moral life in a manner otherwise unavailable. One who does not believe in immortality may be rigorously moral; yet if he is truly humanitarian, he cannot but be saddened and puzzled at the prospect of such great potentialities for goodness being cut off far short of fulfilment, so much suffering going unrequited, so many thwarted lives ending in defeat. Hence the belief is not cherished from selfish motives; it is desired for others, as well as for oneself, because of a disinterested conviction that the level of goodness attainable by men in this life is incommensurate with the more perfect destiny to which they are called by God.[1]

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1. For Rashdall's conception of duration or permanence as enhancing the worth of good character, see GM., pp. 139 ff.; PR., pp.78 f.; GE. II, pp. 261-65. Concerning the immortality of animals, see GE. II, pp. 352 f. The lecture which has been followed above concludes with an attack on absolutism's refusal to regard time and the self as real. Rashdall's barrage in this instance is turned, not only against Bradley, but against Dean Inge. Even on absolutist assumptions, he maintains, there is no reason for rejecting personal immortality; for if the Absolute comprises lives in time now, why should it not comprise immortal lives in time? The problem of how a life in time is related to a timeless reality is neither made easier nor harder if that life is regarded as immortal instead of mortal. Of course the absolutist regards all life in time as unreal; but Rashdall's purpose is served if it be admitted that immortal life will be as real (or, if you will, as unreal) as this present life. On the ground that it entails an impossible sundering of values from the personality which embodies them, he rejects any theory which postulates the perpetuation of "impersonal" spirit. Lastly, he shows that only a theory which regards temporal existence as unreal, requires that the idea of pre-existence accompany the idea of survival.

For Christian thought concerning immortality Rashdall accords a central position to the Resurrection of Christ, - not because it stands as an isolated and miraculous vindication of the Christian hope, but because it represents the culmination of a trust in the love of God which permeates the Christian's whole view of the world.

'What (one) think(s) of the historic Resurrection will depend largely on what (he has) independently come to believe about God and Christ, about the meaning of human life and the destiny of the human soul'.(1)

The critical difficulties surrounding the gospel accounts of this event are such as to justify some latitude of interpretation concerning the exact nature of the risen Christ's manifestation to His followers.[2]

'The evidence for the Resurrection vision is of a kind which can hardly appeal to those who are not already at least predisposed to the belief in human Immortality'.(3)

Rather than base faith in immortality solely upon the historicity of the Resurrection, he prefers to show how faith in the love of God and in immortality sustains belief in the Resurrection. Nevertheless, because through Christ men came to know the love of God as never before, and came to feel as never before 'that human nature at its highest is fit for immortality'.[4] His Resurrection has been for His followers

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1. DD., p. 170.
2. In a sermon entitled "Fighting Against God" (The Modern Churchman, Vol. I, pp. 696-706), Rashdall points out that St. Paul's account of the Resurrection appearance to Cephas, the rest of the apostles, and finally to Paul himself, is susceptible of a variety of interpretations with regard to its mode - physical or spiritual. This account he regards as the strongest evidence we possess for the Resurrection, because it was written twenty years before any of the gospel narratives (in their present form), forty years before the narrative of the empty tomb, and was, according to Paul's own testimony, the account widely believed by Christians shortly after the event. Rashdall claims, moreover, that various views of the mode of the Resurrection are equally compatible with the language of the Creeds. It is clear that in his own thinking he rejects the idea of a physical resurrection, and accepts that of a spiritual one.
3. DD., p. 180.
4. PP., p. 274.

in all ages the culminating point of their trust and assurance.

Here Rashdall concludes a philosophical argument, which he believes to be independently valid, by showing that the traditional Christian doctrine is compatible with it. This is a method which will characterize the whole of the succeeding chapter, wherein he seeks to show that the great Catholic doctrines can legitimately be interpreted in such a manner as to be harmonious with the world-view which he has constructed through the exercise of reason. The significant fact to note is not the result, - for Catholic orthodoxy does not favour the contention that there is any serious estrangement between the findings of natural theology and those of revealed theology; what must be observed is that Rashdall's method seems to base itself upon the presupposition that human reason is the final court of appeal in these high matters, and that Christian doctrine is to be brought before its bar. The views which constrain him to adopt this procedure appear in the next chapter, and until they are fairly considered, it would be hasty to conclude that the order of his thought makes Christian doctrine a merely confirmatory, and almost superfluous, appendage to philosophical theology. Nevertheless, it is obvious, even at this point, that his temperamental affinities with the eighteenth century at least lay him open to that grave danger which Archbishop Temple has strikingly described in writing concerning the Cartesian philosophy:

> 'It does not interpret the world in the light of knowledge of God, but makes use of God to vindicate its own interpretation of the world, and constructs its concept of Him with that in view. He is to be used for our purposes, not we for His. This is the essential principle of magic, which is thus found as a canker at the heart of Rationalism'. (1)

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1. Nature, Man and God, p. 84 n.

Appendix D. - Christ's Teaching Concerning Future Reward and Punishment.

Rashdall reviews the gospel evidence concerning Christ's teaching about the future life in an article in The Modern Churchman (1). The essay is important for several reasons: it refutes (by anticipation) Professor Laird's suggestion that the idea of immortality is really founded upon selfish hopes or fears as the motives for righteousness (2); it further confirms Rashdall's contention that Christ's eschatology was essentially spiritual and ethical (3); it exhibits the harmony between Christ's teaching concerning the destiny of the soul and His message of divine forgiveness (4).

In the first place, Rashdall points out, Christ made love of God, and not a veiled form of self-interest, the primary motive for righteousness; but He rightly recognized that belief in immortality is a stimulating and disciplinary motive supporting virtue, so long as it is related to love of goodness for its own sake. The "reward" which He contemplated was simply the complete fulfilment of righteousness, together with the blessedness which attends it. In essence, He conceived of the future life as one in which the effects of this life would be perpetuated. Hence His conceptions of reward and punishment alike refer primarily to a spiritual condition. His metaphorical description of the Messianic banquet, because it is meant to represent fellowship in the Kingdom, is therefore grossly misunderstood if its images are given a predominantly carnal significance. Similarly the rejection of the wicked must be understood first of all as involving spiritual suffering, like remorse, although physical pain - which is not inconsistent with punishment inflicted by a loving God - no doubt entered into the conception also.

Rashdall is mainly concerned to show that Christ did not teach a doctrine of everlasting punishment, because he regards this as inconsistent with His teaching about the love of God. Three passages in Matthew (5), in which Christ refers to "eternal punishment", are regarded by Rashdall as ecclesiastical additions, and he gives detailed exegetical evidence in support of this conclusion. But he adds that, in any event, αἰώνιος does not necessarily mean "eternal", and that if Jesus actually used the Aramaic equivalent, He was probably referring merely to the future Messianic punishment, without looking beyond the Judgment.

One last passage (6) concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost is susceptible of different interpretations, but in no case does it assert more than that the sin will not be forgiven at the Judgment; it says nothing concerning the duration of the punishment. Rashdall is inclined to regard Luke 12:10 as a faithful statement of what Q

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1. Op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 18-30. Republished in CC., pp. 290-306.
2. Cf. # 150 ff.
3. Cf. Appendix A.
4. Cf. # 215 ff.
5. Matthew 18:8; 25:41; 25:46.
6. Matthew 12:32 and parallels. See also The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology, pp. 56 ff.

contained, to which the other two synoptists have added their own explanations (1). In any case, he argues, a sin which is never forgiven does not necessarily imply eternal punishment; it might result in the extinction of the sinner, or in a full measure of punishment which is terminable. In putting forward this latter alternative, however, Rashdall seems to overlook the fact that if divine forgiveness is never granted, then the offender remains eternally excluded from fellowship with God; and surely exclusion from such fellowship is part of the essential meaning of any spiritual conception of punishment.

Rashdall also cites several gospel passages which seem to imply that punishment of the sinful will not be endless (2). This evidence, he admits, may be insufficient to prove that Christ rejected the doctrine of everlasting punishment, but it at least affords additional ground for being suspicious of passages which have been interpreted to mean that He explicitly taught it. In fact, Christ's teaching is so concentrated upon the Judgment, that apparently it does not confront the question of whether or how punishment will be continued after that event. Because of this inconclusiveness, the believer is not bound to accept as Christ's own a notion which he regards as incompatible with His teaching concerning the love of God.

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1. Cf. Streeter's comments in Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem, p. 171. Mark's addition (3:29) Rashdall takes as implying merely the possibility of an eternal sin; ἔνοχος ἐστιν, he suggests, may mean "is liable to" instead of "is guilty of".
2. Cf. CC., pp. 304 f.

CHAPTER IV - CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

1. Revelation.[1]

Rashdall's view concerning what sort of knowledge it is possible for men to have of God follows directly from his assertion that the divine consciousness does not include that of human selves. Rejection of the notion that two selves can be identical in being, carries with it, he believes, the inescapable implication that the immediate conscious experience of another person can be known only through inference. He grants that, theoretically at least, the content of knowledge may be conceptually identical for two persons[2]; whether he should not have used the word "similar" instead of "identical" is a pertinent question[3]; but apparently he holds, in any case, that such identity or similarity could be ascertained or verified only through an inferential process.

Consequently he contends that knowledge of God must be gained in the same manner as knowledge of other human selves; a large proportion of the preceding chapter, in fact, has been devoted to the contention that God's nature is best apprehended by analogy or inference from the nature of human consciousness. Rashdall denies that this theory of religious knowledge lessens the intimacy of communion between God and man; on the contrary, he asserts, it safeguards it. Surely acquaintance with other human selves is one of the most

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1. This discussion of revelation is based primarily on the following sources; PR., pp. 106-118; 127-56. PP., Chs. XVIII and XXII. ID., Ch. I. GM., Chs. VIII and X. Hibbert Journal, Vol. I, pp. 172 f; Vol. V, pp. 922 f. Modern Churchman, Vol. I, pp. 23-35. Theology, Vol. I, pp. 196-210. Four unpublished papers entitled: "An Address to the Durham Branch of the Churchmen's Union". "The Philosophy of Revelation". "The Study of Dogmatics". "The Study of Dogmatic Theology". Full details concerning these writings are given in the bibliography.
2. Cf. # 136.
3. Cf. Professor John Watson's article in Mind, Vol. XVIII, p. 245. See also # 281 ff.

intimate and indefeasible forms of knowledge that the mind can ever possess; and yet sympathy with another's feelings, the under-:standing of his motives, the sharing of knowledge with him, is possible, Rashdall holds, only through analogy based on immediate acquaintance with similar feelings, motives and knowledge in oneself.

Correspondingly, he views prayer as an activity in which man communes with God as with a friend. The distinctness of both God and the human soul in such a relationship is a necessary condition of there being any communion at all. If the self merely formed a part of God's consciousness, communion would be swallowed up in identity of being.

Moreover, if God is the source of all truth, a true inference concerning His nature is no less due to His activity in communicating knowledge to our minds, than a more direct apprehension of His nature would be. Rashdall does not mean to imply, however, 'that God's know-ledge of us is only inferential'[1]; he acknowledges that the distinc-:tion between inferential and direct knowledge which is imposed upon the human mind cannot be supposed to apply at all to God's omniscience[2]. While he presses the analogy between our own self-hood and God's in other respects, he partially relinquishes it as regards the mode of God's knowledge, because he believes Him to be omniscient. At first sight omniscience might appear to be a notion which could not be based upon or vindicated by analogy at all. For Rashdall, however, it seems to be implied in the very idea of perfect personality[3], and to be necessitated, along with the conception of God as universal Cause, by the demand for an explanation of the unity of the world.

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1. ID., p. 18.
2. For Rashdall's ambiguity on this point, see # 138.
3. Cf. # 132.

The view of religious knowledge to which he is most resolutely opposed is of course that form of mysticism in which the believer is united to God in an ecstatic transport, so that his own individuality seems lost in an immediate knowledge of or fusion with God's consciousness or Being. Even almost universal existence of belief in God, he argues, would not indicate in itself that this belief was founded upon immediate instead of inferential knowledge[1]. But as a matter of fact, belief in His existence is by no means universal, and this at least does away with the contention that an immediate knowledge of God is resident in every human soul. In reality missionaries and theologians have not found 'widely diffused intuitions of God' to which they could appeal; they have found it necessary and most fruitful to begin by arguing in favour of the world-view implied by theism; and having established this initial belief in God, they have then been able to lead their converts on to full Christianity. To be sure, 'the rational considerations which lead up to Monotheism are so manifold' that in widely separate regions and ages the Church has found beliefs already current which afforded a suitable starting point for its work among a people. 'But even among theistic nations an immediate knowledge of God is claimed by very few', and 'its existence is in fact denied by most of the great theological systems - Catholic, Protestant, Anglican'[2].

Of course this must not be taken to mean that Rashdall denies the possibility of any form of immediate knowledge whatever. He has already given such knowledge an important place in his moral system, and on this immediate knowledge, as we have seen, he bases a deductive process by means of which he arrives at a belief in God's existence. But

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1. Cf. PR., p. 107.
2. Ibid., p. 108.

"immediate", when Rashdall uses the term with reference to the indubitable knowledge that an end is good (or with reference to mathematical axioms), virtually means "self-evident" or a priori. Knowledge of God he does not regard as possessing this character, since it is altogether possible to doubt His existence; and he holds that such doubts must be met 'by arguments or rational considerations'[1]. What he denies, then, is that intuitive knowledge of a self is possible, and he even goes so far as to apply this generalization to knowledge of one's own self:

> 'It is only by reflecting on what is implied in many successive states of mind that I construct the notion of a continuous self. I will not say that my knowledge of myself is an "inference"; it may better be described as an "intellectual construction".'[2]

Christians in general, and virtually all of the great theologians, have been able to give reasons for holding their beliefs. If religious truth is indeed perceived intuitively or immediately, Rashdall contends, then these men have followed a false procedure; for no ulterior reasons can be cited in support of truth so apprehended; one can merely point out its self-evidence. Therefore, though a few Christian mystics have claimed immediate knowledge of God, he takes his stand with the balance of ordinary Christians who have always admitted that belief in God rests not on the certainty of sight, but upon faith. It is fair to point out, however, that he really uses the word "faith" in this connexion as signifying "intellectual assent"; and though (as will appear presently) he repudiates the distinction between natural and revealed thology, nevertheless it must be recognized that Christian thought - in St. Paul, for example - has usually contrasted "faith" in this sense with "faith" as a mode of apprehending

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1. ID., p. 10.
2. Ibid., p. 11.

revelation[1].

Rashdall does not hope to be able to disprove that a few especially gifted mystics possess, spasmodically at least, an immediate knowledge of God. And he is aware of the fact that the importance which he has attached to the insights of gifted individuals[2], together with his own assertion that "self-evident truths are not evident to everybody", might be so construed as to support the mystics' claim. He replies, however, that virtually all the propositions about God which appear to some as self-evidently true appear to others as self-evidently false[3]. Such contradictions arise, for example, as to whether God is a Person, and as to whether moral qualities can be ascribed to Him. Thus mysticism does not unequivocally confirm any body of religious truth; and when they conflict, one is left without criteria by which to decide between these alleged intuitions.

He goes on to point out that persons claiming immediate religious knowledge do not restrict it to a mere belief that God exists. They also assert the immediate truth of convictions which are 'clearly derived from the traditional teaching of (their particular) ... religious community'[4]. A Lutheran claims immediate certainty for his own special ideas about the forgiveness of sins, a Roman Catholic for his belief concerning the Immaculate Conception, and so on. Thus within the Christian Church itself the intuitive theory runs foul of conflicting "immediate insights"; from this Rashdall concludes that the theory really has its origin in a natural tendency of the human mind to regard whatever it passionately believes as "immediately certain".

But surely this is one instance where Rashdall has argued too

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1. Cf. E. F. Scott: The New Testament Idea of Revelation, pp. 167 ff.
2. Cf. # 57 f.
3. Cf. ID., p. 13.
4. PR., p. 109.

well; for could not the same be said of the immediate intuitions on which men base their judgments concerning the goodness of ends? He has admitted that men do indeed disagree on such questions; and he has been wise enough, in the case of moral knowledge, to limit his remarks to the bare assertion that if one man is right, then anyone who contradicts him is wrong. Obviously this does not furnish a criterion for deciding between conflicting intuitions. In short, one of the very objections which he urges against the validity of mysticism, he rules out of court as an objection against the validity of moral knowledge.

He recognizes that moral and religious discoveries are very intimately connected with the emotions and the will[1]; but he cannot regard this fact as furnishing any justification for the theory that thought is subservient to these irrational factors. Though profound moral insight and religious relief can hardly be the possession of one who has no interest or passion concerning such questions - though, indeed, their very quality is dependent upon character as a whole - it is merely a perversion of this truth to conclude, as pragmatism does, that a doctrine can be believed simply because one wishes it to be true[2]. To associate belief with the will in this manner sets

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1. He has already done this with regard to moral knowledge; cf., e.g. # 34 f.
2. Cf. PR., p. 130. Rashdall also criticizes the attempt of William James to overcome the difficulties inherent in mysticism by finding a "residual creed" which remains after the conflicts of intuition have cancelled one another. He writes concerning this attempt in The Varieties of Religious Experience: 'The most that it comes to, according to his own (James') showing, is that there is some consciousness beyond that of the individual', though 'no moral qualities are claimed for' this consciousness. But, Rashdall retorts, many mystics - especially Eastern - would deny that any predicates, let alone that of consciousness, can be ascribed to the Deity; some even claim that "the One" must transcend the distinction between Being and Not-Being. "Faith" in the Christian God seems preferable to intuitive certainty about 'that which may be indifferently described as Being or Not-Being' (ID., p. 14). See also his review of James' Varieties in Mind, Vol. XII pp. 245-50.

a false antithesis between faith and reason, between belief and knowledge. He does admit, however, that because religion relates directly to conduct, faith often adopts as a certainty for practice what the theoretical intellect alone might regard as merely probable; but this is not to say that such a procedure is irrational.

In order to understand why Rashdall regards knowledge of God as inferential instead of immediate, it is necessary to examine carefully his use of terms. (1) Sometimes he employs "reason" in a wide sense as synonymous with the intellectual capacity by which any sort of knowledge is apprehended. Therefore he rejects the distinction between revelation and reason, because he holds that religious knowledge is acquired through the exercise of this same capacity by which men apprehend truth in all other spheres, instead of through the exercise of some supra-rational organ or faculty. (2) At other times he contrasts (a) "reason" with (b) "intuition" as <u>modes</u> of apprehending truth. Both of these modes, if they genuinely yield knowledge, are "rational" in the first sense. The contrast here is between (a) truths which must be apprehended as the result of a discursive process, and (b) truths which must be apprehended by immediate insight because they are self-evident. In the former case, the truth of an idea must be tested by relating it to a body of truth already established. Ideas of the latter type are self-verifying, and though they may be systematized, they form the data which enter into an established body of truth, and cannot be tested by anything ulterior to their own grounds. The essence of his position is that moral judgments fall under class (b), -

as "intuitive", "immediate", a priori, and "self-evident"; while the knowledge that God exists falls under class (a), as discursive, because it must be reached as the result of an inferential process which moves from immediate moral judgments (or other data)[1] to a theistic postulate which is based upon them. (3) In other passages, which we shall examine presently, he draws yet another distinction concerning how ideas originate; this must not be confused with the distinction just made concerning how truth is apprehended. In this third case, (a) "reason" and (b) "intuition" are again contrasted; but because he is referring solely to "religious ideas", the distinction arises within the body of truths which fall under (2 a). He admits that some religious ideas may originate "intuitively", while others originate as the result of a discursive process; but the truth of these ideas can be tested, in both cases, only in terms of their compatibility with a system which contains those self-evident truths indicated as falling under (2 b)[2].

What he regards as the true relation between philosophy and theology can be illustrated most clearly by comparing it with his conception of the relation between psychology and theology. Increasing interest in the history and psychology of religion makes it urgently necessary, he feels, to distinguish between the psychological processes by which one arrives at religious (or any other) belief, and the reasons which make the belief true[3]. All forms of belief, whether they conflict or not, are data for the study of

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1. See the arguments from the nature of human knowledge and volition - that is, the "idealistic" and "causal" arguments.
2. I regret that this analysis of his use of terms is so complicated; but the succeeding discussion would be entirely worthless unless these distinctions were made exact here. His language is very confusing in any case. There is an acute criticism of Rashdall's use of "intuitive", "immediate", and "rational", in Dr. Webb's Divine Personality and Human Life, pp. 174-80.
3. See distinction (3) supra.

religious psychology, whose function it is to describe what actually takes place in the human mind; the question as to which are **true**, which false, falls within the domain of philosophy, - strictly within the domain of logic and metaphysics[1]. The fact that a belief presents itself to an individual as immediately true, or as apprehended through "feeling", is neither a guarantee of its truth, nor a proof that it is not really founded upon a particular conception about the nature of the universe whose truth must be judged by rational canons.

This same contrast between the origin of an idea and the rational tests of truth makes clearer all that Rashdall has said concerning the religious importance of especially gifted prophets and teachers. He is quite willing to admit that frequently the greatness of these men has not lain in their speculative powers. In other realms besides religion - in that of science, for example - new ideas are often discovered by processes which are "inspirational" rather than reflective; but this is especially the case in morality and religion because the process of apprehending such truths is intimately connected with purity of will and intensity of feeling. Rational reflection

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1. In a symposium (**with** Schiller and Bosanquet) on the question "Can Logic Abstract from the Psychological Conditions of Thinking?" (Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. VI, pp. 224-70; Rashdall's remarks: pp. 247 ff.), he argues that, though of course judgment is part of a psychological process which has other elements, it is nevertheless possible to attend to the question of a judgment's truth or falsity apart from these other features which stamp it as taking place in a particular mind. The pragmatist assertion that **what** we think to be true reflects what satisfies our desire, implies a distinction between satisfaction and truth, unless the assertion is a mere tautology; moreover, the pragmatist would hold the assertion itself to be "true" is a sense which presupposes this distinction. The fact that judging is a psychological process, attended by other psychological processes, may affect the individual's apprehension of the truth of a proposition, but not the truth of the proposition itself. Where emotional factors, for example, blur this apprehension, the only corrective is to focus attention upon the question of the proposition's validity, thus "abstracting" from the disturbing factors which attend the judging process.

alone, then, probably never could have disclosed many of the most profound truths of science, of poetry, and especially of morality and religion. All this has to do merely with the question of origin, the question of how an idea first came into the mind; and that is a question which he always separates radically from the question of whether or not the idea is true. The latter question, he claims, is one which reason alone is competent to answer. The special nature of religious visions, for example, is no guarantee of their truth; visions may be wicked and false; it is only when they are seen to be good and true on rational grounds that one is justified in regarding them as authentically "revealed"[1]. While he thus acknowledges that revelation may originate in intuitive processes (so far as the man-ward side of revelation is concerned), he is at the same time concerned to point out that 'a great deal of hard thinking'[2] which underlies teachings like those of the prophets and Christ, often goes unrecognized because of a tendency to identify religious inspiration exclusively with intuitive gifts. He wishes to establish the fact that religious beliefs may have their origin in reflective processes as well. But his main point is that, whatever the genesis of a religious idea may be, the question as to whether or not it is revealed is identical with that as to whether or not it is rationally true.

Now this position is open to a host of objections; and it is also susceptible of grave misinterpretation unless Rashdall's prevailing intention is discerned beneath his somewhat confusing use of terms like "reason" and "intuition". The first and most obvious criticism is that

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1. In an unpublished paper on "The Philosophy of Revelation", Rashdall illustrates this point by citing the case of St. Paul, who arrived at many of his religious ideas, not only because of the influence of a vision, but through rabbinic modes of thought and by assumptions concerning Old Testament inspiration, which men cannot share to-day. Here Rashdall implies that it is possible to accept religious beliefs which have not only been reached through psychological processes radically different from ours, but which rested on intellectual grounds, that seem to us false.
2. PR., p. 144.

such a theory makes religious truth the exclusive property of philosophers. In reply he reverts to one of his favourite convictions: that metaphysical arguments which the trained philosopher or theologian advances are in reality similar to the processes by which the beliefs of ordinary men are reached, except that the former are more thoroughly examined and more consistently worked out. Underlying what presents itself to the average man as self-evident religious truth is a world-view which he has probably accepted on authority, and which he is incapable of analyzing or defending against a sceptic[1]. This does not gainsay the fact that such a world-view is an elementary metaphysical system, and that its truth must be tested rationally; nor does it gainsay the fact that it is the peculiar task and duty of the theologian to make explicit the rational grounds of belief. Rashdall realizes that belief cannot be postponed until every complicated question pertaining to it has been critically examined; but this merely shows the need for the acceptance of authority in a sense which he has already held to be compatible with the exercise of conscience and reason[2].

Needless to say, many theologians would find the crucial objection against his view of revelation to be that it leaves no room for any body of religious truth, or any knowledge of God, which transcends the discursive operations of human reason. His method conflicts with the claim that in Christianity one confronts a special revelation which cannot be disclosed[3] by any rational process whatever. In order to understand the form in which he holds this position, it is necessary to note that when he speaks of knowledge that God exists, he uniformly holds that rational inference, not intuition, is the mode of apprehension; but

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1. Cf. ID., p. 15.
2. Cf. # 58 ff.
3. "Disclosure" must here be distinguished clearly from "apprehension". In the one case the human intellect constructs, in the other it receives. Of course reason "apprehends" what it discloses as the result of a discursive process. The question is as to whether, in religious knowledge, it apprehends something which it does not thus disclose or construct. Cf. # 166 f.

in the last few paragraphs our discussion has brought out an argument wherein he holds a conception of "reason" as discriminating concerning the truth of "religious ideas" which may originate either rationally or intuitively. No contradiction is involved, however, because knowledge of God's existence does not fall within the sphere of the "religious ideas" to which the latter argument refers. His real intention is disclosed in a reply which he makes to Auguste Sabatier's theory that certain great new religious insights, since their genesis cannot be explained in terms of past education or tradition, must 'be due to immediate revelation'. Sabatier's argument assumes, Rashdall maintains, 'that we have somehow arrived independently at a conception of God to which such inspirations can be referred'[1]. Certain "religious ideas", then, may originate intuitively; but they presuppose a belief in God which must be reached discursively. And, of course, even such data as intuition can supply (in this sphere) must be verified and tested by reason before being accepted as true.

Such a theory may seem to relinquish the idea of revelation altogether. But Rashdall protests that, in accordance with his idealistic theism, 'all knowledge may be looked upon as a partial communication to the human soul of the thoughts or experiences of the divine Mind'[2]. All truth has its source in God, but its apprehension is in the last analysis possible only through reason[3]. Hence he rejects the old distinction whereby natural theology was conceived as a rational investigation into the data furnished by nature and human experience, while revealed theology was conceived as based upon authoritative sources - the Bible[4], the fathers, the creeds, - which contained truths directly communicated by God (and often guaranteed by miracles)[5], only the more

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1. PR., p. 115.
2. Ibid., p. 141
3. See distinction (1), # 166.
4. For Rashdall's application of his general theory of revelation to the Bible, see DD., Ch. IV; CE., Chs. XVII-XIX; PP., Ch. XX.
5. Cf. Appendix E.

elementary of which reason might independently discover. To be sure, especial significance must be attached to moral judgments because they constitute an indispensable ground of the argument for belief in God's existence, and they afford the only available knowledge of His character, Moral and religious truths undoubtedly embrace the most important aspects of revelation; but this does not set them off as different in kind from other truth.

We shall have occasion to criticize his conception of revelation in detail later; but here it must be noted that his rejection of the distinction between natural and revealed theology is ambiguous. It is quite possible to agree with him that when "reason" is understood in the first sense denoted supra, the distinction between revelation and reason is merely one which, within the sphere of religion, differentiates a truth from the apprehension of it[1]; but this is not at all equivalent to agreeing with his contention that knowledge of God must be "rational" in the second sense - that is, discursive instead of immediate or direct. He mistakenly identifies the idea of direct revelation or immediate knowledge of God with a form of mystical union. He writes as though his refutation of mysticism left but one alternative; a discursive or inferential knowledge of God. Yet religious history abounds with evidence to show that the staunchest advocates of the idea of direct revelation have frequently been opposed to mysticism and (its usual partner) extreme immanentism. Many religious teachers have conjoined the declaration that God's existence is known because He speaks directly to men, with an equally fervent affirmation of God's "otherness".

The question remains, of course, as to whether these teachers presuppose a dualism between the natural and the supernatural so sharp that man's rational capacities as a whole (in the first sense), even

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1. Cf. C.C.J. Webb: Problems in the Relations of God and Man, Part I.

his capacities for moral knowledge, because they belong to the natural sphere, are regarded as incapable of receiving a knowledge of God. But it is possible to hold that knowledge of God is immediate instead of discursive, without holding that it is supra-rational in this latter sense. It is possible to assert that man has the capacity to receive what he could not discover by discursive reasoning, while at the same time acknowledging a limitation which arises, not only from the fetters which bind the intellect to the sensible and the temporal, but also from the blindness and waywardness instilled by sin. Man's capacity to receive revelation need not be denied, even though it be recognized that a gulf separates man from God which He alone can span, and that His self-revelation is at least as much a gracious work of saving man from the sin which shuts him off from fellowship with God, as it is an illumination of his intellect. Because Rashdall maintains that knowledge of God is rational, not only in the first sense, but in the second also, he seems to assume that no humanly insurmountable barrier separates the divine sphere from the created; we have yet to enquire as to whether this is really his intention.

As a moralist he takes a serious view of sin, and he recognizes the close connexion between purity of the will and moral insight. The story of the Fall expresses for him the fact that mankind has always fallen short of its own conception of the ideal; knowing the higher, man has deliberately followed the lower. But he passionately rejects the notion of total depravity; the tragedy of man's innate tendency towards evil can be fully appreciated without leaping to the conclusion that this defacement of the divine image has reached the point of complete obliteration. The conquest of sin is to be achieved, not through some morbid fear of punishment, - for men cannot be frightened into virtue - but through the love of goodness which Christ instills

into the human heart. Love is stronger than fear[1].

Once this moribund doctrine of total depravity is repudiated, every man is seen to possess some capacity for moral insight; especially gifted men have this capacity in higher degrees; but any moral ideal apprehended through this natural capacity is, in so far as it is true, identical in principle with the purposes of God. The distinctive truths of Christianity stand at the apex of man's knowledge and experience, because they have their origin in One who fulfilled the highest capacities of human nature. But all truth is alike in that it issues from God and is apprehended by man. The supremacy of the Christian revelation does not imply that it has been received either through some abnormal agency operative in man, or through some special manifestation from the God-ward side different in kind from what occurs in the apprehension of all truth. This being so, what place can Rashdall assign to Christian doctrine? Revelation becomes in his system a matter of degree, 'and revelation at its highest is never of a kind which supersedes the exercise of reason and conscience'[2].

On its negative side his view is one which refuses to grant Christian documents and traditions an authority different in kind from that which he accords to great philosophers and other extra-Christian sources of teaching. In his desire to make all truth "of one piece", he denies that theology has any special sources of information which shuts off even a portion of its truth from the purview of philosophical investigation. On the contrary it should be the ideal of theology to bring traditional beliefs into harmony with modern secular knowledge. In an essay on Aquinas[3], Rashdall tries to show that his own view of

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1. This paragraph is based upon two unpublished sermons entitled "The Fall of Man" and "Original Sin". The doctrine receives fuller treatment in the subsequent discussion of the Atonement.
2. Theology, Vol. I, p. 198.
3. Cf. GM., Ch. VIII.

theology is parallel, in one important respect, to the Thomistic view because both conceive of

'Theology as a science in which the results of all other sciences, the highest generalisations in all departments of thought, are summed up and harmoniously combined in a great theory about the ultimate meaning of the world - about the relations between God, the World, and man'[1].

But there is of course this profound difference between the two; whereas Rashdall wishes to achieve his synthetic and unified system by harmonizing philosophy and theology through reason, St. Thomas firmly established for Catholic orthodoxy the distinction between natural and revealed theology; he took a modest view of what reason could discover independently, stopping short of the doctrine of the Trinity[2]; and revelation, he maintained, could disclose all the truths of natural theology, and then, in addition, those distinctive Christian truths which far transcend reason.

It must be set down to Rashdall's credit, however, that he has no desire to achieve his contemplated harmonization either through a distortion of current (non-religious) thought so that it conforms to traditional doctrines, or through an artificial straining of doctrine in order to bring it into conformity with philosophic truth:

'All in the new ideas that is true will have to be embodied in the theology of the future: and whatever in the theology of the past is not true will have to disappear'[3].

Thus secular and Christian thought may each contribute to a unified body of truth; but the standard of truth, the norm of selection and rejection, is reason.

On its positive side, his theory by no means makes Christian

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1. Cf. GM., p. 198.
2. Nevertheless it is primarily to Aquinas that Rashdall appeals in seeking to show the reasonableness of the doctrine of the Trinity, because St. Thomas (following St. Augustine) held that there were "analogies" to the Trinity in human experience. Cf. # 191 f.
3. GM., p. 200.

doctrine superfluous. To say that all truth must be apprehended through the natural capacity of reason does not in the least discount the fact that only men of extraordinary gifts, especially men of exceptional moral purity and religious devotion, could have discovered the fundamental truths of Christianity in the first instance; after their discovery, of course, quite ordinary men can appropriate them, though they can only do so because these truths appeal to their own conscience and reason. It is precisely because men are sufficiently sensitive to moral and spiritual truth to be aware of their own limitations, that they find in Christ alone the complete and perfect revelation of God.

Thus he recognizes that there is much in the Christian tradition which a theistic philosopher, building his system solely in the light of modern knowledge, could not evolve for himself; he is ready to admit that one of the great weaknesses of liberalism is that is has in some respects cut itself off from organic relationship to the many great truths contained in this tradition, because it has often neglected the task of studying dogmatic history. He declares that if whatever is of enduring value in Christian thought is to be made available for modern men, the great doctrines must be understood and their truth interpreted in the language of our own time. The succeeding portions of this chapter have to do with Rashdall's own attempt to contribute to the fulfilment of this task. The benefits which he anticipates from such a study are multifarious; but primarily, he believes, it will bring out afresh the fact that the teaching of the Church does not consist in a set of dogmas which were established at the outset, and then merely defined with greater precision through each succeeding period; it will show that the truth has been reached through a process of gradual development in which men sought to meet specific problems as they arose. By disclosing instances wherein a given tendency like

Arianism was widespread in one period, but condemned as heretical in the next, it will leave the conviction that this same process of doctrinal development, which was legitimate and necessary in the past, is equally so to-day.

In this manner Rashdall's conception of revelation places Christian truth in organic connexion with the whole body of truth; in Christ, God's unbroken and progressive[1] self-revelation to the mind of man reached its culminating point; but the history of revelation compasses man's whole, age-long quest for truth. Since Christ, the activity of revelation has been carried on by the work of the Holy Spirit, especially within the fellowship of the Church; but Christianity to-day, as in the past, is capable of appropriating, of "baptizing into Christ"[2], ideas which have their origin outside its ecclesiastical confines.

This conception of revelation, he believes, is conducive to a proper appreciation of the degrees of truth represented by the ethnic religions; but it is noteworthy that, in comparing them with Christianity[3], he seems to make the "appeal to reason and conscience" a test external to all religions, - an independent standard in terms of which each is assigned its relative position on the ladder of revelation, with Christianity placed on the top rung. A general word of comment concerning this method must be added presently. Suffice it to say here that Rashdall emphasizes its superiority over the superficial eclecticism to which the study of comparative religion sometimes gives rise. All religions are not equally true, nor are they merely variant expressions of the same truth. His principle not only makes necessary a distinction between the higher and lower

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1. i.e. from the point of view of human apprehension.
2. A phrase which Rashdall took over, I believe, from Dr. Percy Gardner.
3. Cf. # 77 ff.

forms of religion[1]; it requires a frank recognition of the fact that even 'the highest religions ... are at certain points diametrically antagonistic to each other'[2].

On the other hand, while this same principle avoids the absurdity of claiming that Christianity possesses all truth and other religions none, it nevertheless raises the question as to whether Christianity may rightly be held to be the absolutely and universally true religious system. Rashdall answers this question in the affirmative; but his reasons for doing so are worth analyzing. Christ's teaching of 'the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man'[3], he finds, 'combines an ethical ideal which appeals to the universal Conscience with a Theism which commends itself to Reason'[4]. Is it unfair to paraphrase this by saying "Christ's teaching is absolutely true because His ethical injunctions are substantially identical with an ethical system which Rashdall believes to be independently true, and because His conception of God is compatible with the theistic philosophy which Rashdall believes to be independently true"? Rashdall goes on to say that because moral and religious truth is inseparable from the personality of the teacher, Christ's own Person has rightly come to be regarded by His followers as the centre of the Christian revelation; but here again, as will be seen in what follows, the claim of Christianity to finality, the claim of Christ to be the perfect Revealer of God, rests ultimately upon the appeal which Christ Himself makes "to the moral and religious consciousness"[5]. That is, for Rashdall this claim

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1. This distinction is based on whether or not the religion in question is closely connected with morality. (Cf. DD., p. 178). To some extent Rashdall falls into the fallacy of judging primitive religion in terms of civilized, instead of primitive, morality.
2. PR., p. 150.
3. Ibid., p. 153.
4. Ibid., p. xv.
5. Cf. PR., p. 156.

rests upon whether it commends itself to reason, the sole arbiter of ethical, metaphysical and religious truth.

Appendix E. - Miracles.[1]

Rashdall's remarks on the question of miracles merit special mention because they illustrate very clearly his consistent rejection of supernaturalism. The factors determining his view have already been set down in connexion with the distinction which he draws between the principle of uniformity and the idea of causality.(2) Because he regards the former principle merely as an empirical generalization, he refuses to concur in the assertion, widespread at the turn of the century, that a break in the uniformity of nature is a priori inconceivable; and yet this is not to say that he believes that any event whatever could happen without a cause.

But when the question is one of historical evidence, rather than merely one of whether or not a miracle can possibly occur, it is necessary to take into account not only the documentary testimony, but the nature and probability of the event itself. Estimation of the value of the documentary evidence requires a specialized knowledge of the literary habits and mental peculiarities of the period or race concerned; but estimation of the likelihood of the fact itself requires that the uniformity of nature, within the physical sphere, be given due weight as an empirically established law. Documentary evidence itself is dependent upon the trustworthiness of natural law for the reliability of sense perception and of the host of inferences based upon it, without which any testimony would be unintelligible; therefore when this evidence implies a departure from natural law, it is destroying the basis on which its own verisimilitude rests.

Consequently Rashdall concludes that though the possibility of an exception to natural law must be admitted, an isolated miracle could not be understood or related to experience as a whole; sufficient experience of a given type of non-uniformity would justify belief in it, but an isolated miracle can never be proven - no matter what the documentary evidence supporting it - because in the nature of the case it cannot provide this sufficient experience. For this reason, 'the devout modern Catholic who believes that, under certain conditions, miracles are matters of daily occurrence, (has) a much stronger logical position than the modern Protestant or Anglican, who believes that miracles were confined to Judaea and stopped at the end of the first century'. (3)

All this applies, however, merely to the realm of mechanical uniformity, which is superseded in the psychological, and to a lesser extent in the biological, realm, in a manner for which general but not rigidly exact limits can be set. For example, knowledge concerning what sort of laws govern psychic phenomena is as yet very imperfect; but psychical research has indicated that the laws of the mind are different from those of mechanical necessity, and it therefore

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1. This appendix is based on the following material: Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. VI, pp. 1-34.; CV., pp. 51-56; PR., pp. 157-161. An unpublished paper entitled "Miracles".
2. Cf. # 94 f.
3. Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. VI, p.23.

proscribes the rejection of an event of this character merely because it cannot be reconciled with physical laws. If the "miracle" is one which belongs to a whole class of events, especially if it is of a type which occurs to-day, like faith-healing, then there is no reason why it should not be accepted on sufficient documentary evidence, even though the psychological law which it exemplifies is not yet thoroughly understood. To insist that all credible events must conform to laws which fall within the present state of our knowledge is to shut the door to scientific progress.

These considerations greatly reduce the religious significance of miracles, because most of the "miracles" which are acceptable merely fall within the province of imperfectly known laws of psychology and biology. On the other hand, to base the truth of a doctrine upon the fact that it is attested to by some event which is literally supernatural, is exceedingly precarious, because scientific thought rejects precisely this type of miracle. In a word, revelation attested to solely by miracles of this sort cannot present an acceptable alternative to the truths which claim to be revealed upon rational grounds. Rashdall follows this latter conviction unwaveringly, notably with reference to belief in immortality and belief in the Incarnation. And above all, he insists that an accompanying miracle cannot be regarded as the guarantee of infallibility for a teaching, especially if that teaching is rationally indefensible.

2. The Incarnation and the Trinity.[1]

The most regrettable public incident in Rashdall's life occurred as the result of a paper which he read on "Christ as Logos and Son of God" at the Cambridge Conference of Modern Churchmen in August 1921. What he intended as a modern defence of belief in the divinity of Christ was distorted by the press and blazoned forth as a denial of this belief. Rashdall was by no means the only victim of misrepresentation and of the bitter attack which ensued from Roman Catholics and high churchmen. His keen sense of justice was outraged by remarks which some of his critics made without verifying the report, and despite the fact that, because previously he had often expressed the same convictions contained in the paper, they must have known what his real views were. Several commentaries upon the conference, such as Dr. A. C. Headlam's article in The Church Quarterly Review,

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1. This discussion is based on the following sources: DD., Chs. II, III, V-VII, XIV; CV., pp. 48-51; PR., pp. 168-85; CC., 278-85; Jesus : Human and Divine; PP., Chs. IV, XI; GM., Chs. III, IV; and many articles in journals, which are indicated in the bibliography.

Canon O. C. Quick's in The Commonwealth, and Father Vincent McNabb's in Blackfriars,[1] were for the most part temperate, scholarly, and manifestly eager to be fair.[2] However, Bishop Gore's reaction inflicted a deep personal wound upon Rashdall. Much of what follows is based upon the replies which he made to his critics - and with especial fervour to Bishop Gore - from his pulpit in Carlisle, and in the pages of The Modern Churchman. Later the original essay, and three sermons relating to it (the last only indirectly) were made into a little book entitled Jesus: Human and Divine. I have sought to omit, however, all references of a personal nature, and to glean from his replies to criticism only such material as elucidates his enduring attitude toward the questions involved. What strikes one most forcibly is the facility with which, under the pressure of attack, he found plausible support in dogmatic history for the view which he had always held. His very earliest sermons contain interpretations of the Incarnation and the Trinity which were the direct outgrowth of an already stable philosophical world-view; and long before the Cambridge controversy, he had sought to show the relationship between the form in which he adhered to these doctrines, and the language of traditional Christianity; but if it had not been for the controversy, many aspects of his significant attempt to bridge the gap between liberalism and orthodoxy might not have been published.

For several reasons it is advisable to preface the statement of Rashdall's own views on these doctrines with a brief account of what he has to say about their historical development. As one who firmly believed that wherever possible the meaning of traditional dogmas

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1. See the bibliography. W.J. Sparrow-Simpson's Modernism and the Person of Christ (published two years later), also discusses this conference directly.
2. This statement cannot be said to apply to Headlam's remarks about Kirsopp Lake and Foakes-Jackson.

should be understood and their value conserved, he had formulated his own conceptions of the Incarnation and the Trinity, long before the controversy, against the background of a penetrating study of Christian history; this was a task for which his early training as an historian equipped him, in some ways, admirably; and by 1915, when he delivered his Bampton Lectures on the Atonement, he had painstakingly studied most of the important literature.[1] As a matter of fact, he intended to write a full study of the doctrine of Christ's Person, corresponding to his volume on the Atonement; but English theology was deprived of this work by the disease which encumbered the closing years of his life and caused his comparatively early death. Directly after the outbreak of the Cambridge controversy he wrote:

'...The only satisfactory way of filling in the outline which I give of a possible interpretation of the doctrine in my little paper at Cambridge - is a book...which should include a survey of the history of the doctrine, an estimate of the permanent philosophical value of the enormously various doctrines defended at different times by writers now commonly regarded as orthodox, and an attempt to decide how much of the elaborate structure which they have built up is capable of defence or re-statement in the language of modern philosophy. Such a book I hope, if I live, to write...' 2.

What follows cannot in any degree repair the loss; by tracing chronologically the phases of doctrinal history wherein he did find a basis for his views, and then by briefly stating those views themselves, it can merely suggest in barest outline what would have been his most mature contribution to theology.

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1. See, for example, his statement (Atonement, p. xiii) to the effect that he had read through all the fathers there treated, except Augustine (and in his case, everything relevant to the subject); a glance at the table of contents will indicate what this seemingly casual remark implies.
2. Modern Churchman, Vol. XI, p. 475.

(i) - An Historical Sketch of the Doctrines.[1]

The doctrine of Christ's divinity, Rashdall believes, was the outcome of the attempt on the part of the early Church to express its recognition of His unique significance; it was not explicitly contained in His own teaching about Himself. That is, unless the Fourth Gospel is regarded as containing a verbatim report of Christ's discourses, there is no evidence to indicate that Jesus claimed 'Divinity for Himself'.[2] Even in this gospel - except for the prologue, which of course is not represented as a teaching of Christ Himself - few passages imply that He regarded Himself as a member of the God-head.[3] That He did permit Himself to be called the Messiah is unquestionably true; but the Jews did not think of the Messiah 'as God or equal with God'.[4] This interpretation of historical fact does not in the least imply that the Church was wrong in ascribing divinity to Christ. Rashdall regards the doctrine as true, although it cannot be found in Christ's own sayings; and this is a position which the Church has never branded as heretical.

On the other hand, the long process of development and controversy through which the doctrine of the Incarnation reached its final form, did take its point of departure from Christ's claim to Messiahship, and to a unique relationship with God. The first important stage in this process culminated in the Pauline teaching, in which the idea of

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1. At many points in the succeeding discussion Rashdall's interpretation is, to put it mildly, disputable. Here, and in the review of the historical chapters of his work on the Atonement (# 214 ff), my chief purpose has been to reproduce faithfully what he says. In a few of the footnotes I have added criticisms of his scholarship, but these by no means cover all the debatable questions.
2. JHD., p. 11.
3. 'The claim to be the Son of God does not necessarily imply "God-head"'. (Ibid., p. 12 n). Cf. John 10:34-36.
4. JHD., p. 13 n.

Messiahship was identified with the conception of the risen Lord as a semi-divine figure which far transcended anything contained in Jewish thought. The strongest utterance to be found in any undoubtedly Pauline epistle is, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself";[1] St. Paul did not more explicitly define the relationship of Christ to God, except to affirm the pre-existence of the Messiah. Moreover, he identified the Spirit and the indwelling Christ in a manner which was modified by the more precise Trinitarian distinctions of later theology.[2]

Despite the relative simplicity of the Pauline Christology, the Church definitely profited from the fact that early Christian thinking did not rest at this point. St. Paul's failure to distinguish between the heavenly Christ and the man Jesus was remedied when his Christology came to be interpreted by the author of the Fourth Gospel in the light of the Logos doctrine.

The notion of the Logos grew up in a period when metaphysical speculation had given rise to the conception of a God so ineffable that some intermediary was needed to establish connexion between the Deity and the created world.[3] In one interpretation, God was believed to have given birth to the Logos, who in turn created the natural world. In attempting to interpret Judaism to the Greek mind, Philo of Alexandria imparted a highly speculative form to the conception; he used language strikingly similar to that of the Fourth Gospel - calling the Logos, for example, "the only-begotten Son of God"; but he did not identify it with the Messiah. This identification was the unique contribution of the author of the Johannine Gospel; so far as

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1. II Corinthians 5:19.
2. For Rashdall's most extensive treatment of St. Paul's Christology, see Atonement, pp. 127 - 30.
3. Rashdall attributes this conception to Neo-Platonism, cf. JHD., p. 21. He apparently forgets that Philo and the author of the Fourth Gospel lived long before Plotinos.

historical research can disclose, he was the first to teach that the divine Logos, through whom God had been revealing Himself in all ages, finally became incarnate in the human Jesus. Thus he rectified the vagueness of the Pauline Christology by enabling Christians to affirm both the humanity of Jesus, and the divinity of the indwelling Logos.

This interpretation of the Logos doctrine was developed further by both Justin and Origen. As apologists influenced by the heritage of Greek philosophy, they held that though the Word was incarnate in Jesus in a unique manner, it had nevertheless been operative in revealing God in all ages, dwelling in the prophets and enlightening all who earnestly sought and found God's truth; they believed that even pagan philosophers like Socrates and Plato could be said to have been inspired by the Logos.

In the Fourth Gospel, however, the relationship between God and the Logos was left undefined; questions concerning the status of the Word before it became incarnate in Jesus, and the sense in which it existed as distinct from God the Father, remained unanswered. Through a long series of controversies the Church sought a solution.

In the early stages two tendencies (Adoptionist and Sabellian) are distinguishable. One held Christ to be virtually a man who had been 'deified after death on account of His virtues'.[1] The other started from the divine side instead of from the human. It crudely identified the divine Son and the Father, holding that the one God had dwelt in the human body of Christ.

In reaction against such tendencies the adherents of the Logos Christology sharpened the distinction between the Father and the Word, tending to make the latter a separate and inferior divine personality. The Church was thus drifting towards polytheism; and though the Arian

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1. PP., p. 41.

controversy resulted in the triumph of strict monotheism, so pervasive had been Arian influences, that it took many years of conflict after Nicaea to eradicate their effects within the Church.[1] The Athanasian position, as embodied in the Nicene Creed, virtually saved monotheism; and its insistence upon the unity of the God-head became the orthodox doctrine of the Church.[2]

So far as the metaphysical formulae of Athanasius can be understood in modern terms, it is apparent that when he affirmed the pre-existence of the Logos, he conceived of the "Persons" of the Trinity not as separate minds or beings, but as activities distinguishable within the undivided God-head.[3] In declaring the Son to be equal, co-eternal and of one substance with the Father, Athanasius did indeed stress the fact that the distinction between the two "Persons" is not 'a distinction between two separate Divine Minds',[4] and thus he struck the mortal blow against Arianism. Yet he was not a Sabellian; he quite clearly asserted that the distinction between the Father and Son was a real and eternal one. What he was concerned to maintain was that it was a

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1. Rashdall is here referring to the genuine Creed of Nicaea (325 A. D.), sometimes known as the "Nicene Faith". This must be distinguished, of course, from the so-called Nicene or Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Creed which is (perhaps mistakenly) said to have been framed at Constantinople in 381 A.D.
2. The conception of the Holy Spirit underwent a similar development. 'At first...(it was) regarded as identical with the Word'; but gradually the Word came to be thought of as alone incarnate in Jesus, and the Spirit as the medium whereby 'the subsequent word of God was carried on in human hearts' (PR., p. 170). Thus at last the doctrine of three distinct "Persons" within the God-head emerged.
3. Neither "prosopon" nor "hypostasis" - the two Greek terms which were used as equivalent to "persona" - occur in the body of the Nicene Creed. The latter, which became the orthodox term for the Persons of the Trinity, is used in the anathemas attached to the Creed, but in the quite different sense of being synonymous with "ousia". Thus, at the time of the Council of Nicaea, it was characteristic only of Arians to speak of three "hypostases" or "ousiai". Athanasius belonged to the group who maintained that there was but one "ousia" and one "hypostasis" in the God-head, 'and were accused ...of Sabellianism for doing so' (GM., p. 82.).
4. JHD., p. 60.

distinction 'within the nature of...(a single) Divine Being'.[1] There are, indeed, passages which would seem to indicate that Athanasius regarded the distinction, after all, as one existing between two separate personalities; but it must be remembered that he was bound by the necessity of accepting both Testaments *in toto*, together with "extra-canonical authorities",[2] and that some of his inconsistencies are attributable to contradictions in his authoritative sources. Certainly his prevailing thought on the matter is reflected in his insistence upon the term "homo-ousion", and upon the phrase "from the 'ousia' of the Father" in the Creed. The whole meaning of the Nicene Creed is that the eternal distinction between the Father and the Son is

> 'not a distinction between the one eternal God and another inferior, created God,...but a distinction within the Being of the one and Only God'. 'The Logos did not owe His existance to any act of the Father's will, any "begetting" in time: the Logos was an element in His eternal Being'. (3)

This is clearly seen from the fact that for Athanasius the Father and the Son did not each possess knowledge, as would be the case if the distinction between them were one of "persons" in the sense of "personalities". 'The Logos *is* the Wisdom of God: and there is no other Wisdom of God'. Against the Arians, who maintained that the Son was created by the Father's will and therefore 'had a beginning in time', Athanasius urged that 'the Father does not know except through the Logos'. Therefore, he argued, it is impossible to hold that the Logos was created; for 'before that creation the Father could not have had even the thought of creating the Son or the World through Him'.[4] In a word, for Athanasius the Son *is* God as thinking and knowing.

Rashdall accepts Athanasius' position up to this point; and he differs precisely at the point where Athanasius holds a view which was

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1. JHD,, p. 24.
2. Cf. GM., p. 83.
3. GM., p. 84.
4. *Ibid*., p. 85. Cf. *Or. contra Arianos*, III, 61-63; *De Synodis*, 18, 52; *De Sentent. Dionysii*, 23.

later to be condemned as Apollinarianism.[1] So far as any unambiguous statement can be found, Athanasius relegated everything human in Christ to the sphere of the body; Christ's mind, he believed, was the indwelling Logos, and therefore was subject neither to limitation nor growth. In interpreting passages wherein ignorance is recorded of Christ, he ascribed that ignorance to the flesh, rather than to the soul.[2] At this period, then, Athanasius assumed

'that in Jesus Christ there were two elements...the Logos which was divine, and a body which was human; and even the body ceased eventually to be human, since by the indwelling of the Word, it was actually by degrees converted into the divine substance'. (3)

'As an old man'[4] at the Synod of Alexandria (362 A.D.), Athanasius conceded that Christ had a human soul, since he then had come to recognize that otherwise His redemptive work would not have included 'the whole man'. But this does not alter the fact that his view at the time of Nicaea was "Apollinarian";[5] and it may be doubted whether

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1. Cf. GM. pp. 87 ff.
2. Concerning Christ's professed ignorance of the day and hour of the Judgment, Athanasius writes: '...the Word, not as ignorant, considered as Word, has said, "I know not", for He knows, but as showing His manhood, in that to be ignorant is proper to man, and that He had put on flesh that was ignorant, being in which, He said according to the flesh, "I know not".' (Or. contra Arianos, III, 45. Quoted, GM., p. 89). Similarly in explaining Luke 2:52 - "Jesus increased in wisdom and stature..." - Athanasius ascribes increase to the body alone, since it is inapplicable to the Logos. (Cf. Ibid., III, 52. Quoted, GM., pp. 90 f).
3. GM., p. 91. Or contra Arianos, III, 53, is the authority for the last clause.
4. GM., p. 92. If this is an attempt on Rashdall's part to suggest that Athanasius was in his dotage when he came to believe that Christ had a human soul, it is quite unjust. In 362 A.D. Athanasius was not over sixty-five years of age, and was apparently still quite virile.
5. Cf. Gore: The Reconstruction of Belief, p. 503 n. 'Dr. Rashdall... reproduces an earlier paper in which, with astonishing emphasis, he accused Athanasius...of being Apollinarian...In a note to the republished paper, in consequence of protests, he modifies his statement thus: "In his earlier days". What should we think of an historian of to-day who should speak of Mr. Gladstone in retrospect as "a strenuous Tory",...and then explain that he was referring to his hot youth?'

even at this later period, Athanasius believed that the consciousness of Christ 'was not purely and entirely divine'.[1]

Therefore it remained for the Church to condemn Apollinarianism and thus finally to preserve 'the idea of any real humanity in Jesus ...by the Catholic formula "perfect God and perfect man"'.[2] The question of the relationship between the divine Logos and the human soul of Jesus was settled at last by affirming the equal reality of both. Rashdall holds that this solution is definitely contrary to Athanasius' doctrine that the Word remained "unchanged" in the Incarnation,[3] since 'there is surely a difference between a Logos united with a human soul and a Logos not so united. If there is a difference, there must be change'.[4]

At the Synod of Alexandria it was finally decided that the word "hypostasis" could be used in two different senses: (a) as denoting either the Father or the Son, (a usage formerly associated with Arianism); or (b) as synonymous with "ousia", (favoured by Athanasius as applicable to the unity of the God-head). Inasmuch as the former usage was precisely the one protested against at Nicaea, some change evidently occurred between the two councils. The nature of the change can be understood only if it be remembered that at the time of Nicaea the Church as a whole was on this point nearer Arius than Athanasius in sentiment. The latter's position was an innovation which had to win its

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1. GM., p. 92. I criticize this statement infra, # 340.
2. PR., p. 171.
3. Rashdall states that this doctrine was 'not asserted by the Nicene Creed'. (GM., p. 94). He must be referring solely to the main body of the Creed; for in the appended anathemas occurs the statement: '...those who say that the Son of God was... capable of change or alteration, these the Catholic Church anathematizes'.
4. Ibid., p. 94. The attempt to maintain 'that the personality of the Logos was just the same after as it was before the incarnation, and therefore purely divine - leads up to the line of thought which was to culminate in the doctrine asserted at Chalcedon - but not contained in the actual Canons of the Council, or reproduced in our Articles - that the Logos took upon Him "human nature", but not a human personality, that He was man without being a man'.

way against grave difficulties. The Synod of Alexandria probably represents a compromise. The Church had reacted against extreme Arianism to such an extent that the Athanasian party was willing to allow moderate Arians to use the term "hypostasis" in expressing the distinctions within the God-head; in return, 'the Arians gave up the three Ousiai and agreed that there was only one Ousia in the God-head'. As a result the usage of "hypostasis" in which it was equivalent to "ousia" was no longer necessary, and gradually disappeared. While 'the Arians agreed to adopt the Nicaean formula, Homo-ousion, but they practically explained it in a sense approximating to the moderate Arian Homoi-ousion'.[1.]

This compromise was brought about largely by the Cappadocians. When one compares their views with those of Athanasius it is quite apparent that although they asserted the unity of the God-head, they nevertheless thought of the three "hypostases" 'on the analogy of three human individuals',[2.] and thus approximated the position of the Homoiousian Arians. It was always 'difficult for the Cappadocians to avoid the semblance of (a) Tritheism'[3.] in which the separate Deities always acted in concert; despite the compromise, Athanasius - who continued to speak of the one hypostasis - presents a strong contrast to such views.

St. Augustine's theology, which was based on this compromise, became the foundation for the conception of the Trinity that was destined to dominate Western Christianity. The Athanasian Creed is but a 'bad epitome' of his De Trinitate, - 'bad because everything which tends to explain the doctrine and make it intelligible is left out'.[4.] It is quite clear from this treatise and other passages in

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1. GM., p. 107.
2. GM., p. 108 n.
3. H.R.Mackintosh: The Person of Jesus Christ (third edition), p. 104. Quoted, GM., p. 109.
4. GM., p. 110. Cf. Atonement, p. 444 n.

Augustine's writings that he followed Athanasius in regarding the Trinity as representative of distinguishable activities within the one Divine Mind. He habitually employed the analogy of three faculties operative within one human mind in seeking to make intelligible the unity of the Triune God. The activities associated with the "Persons" vary somewhat. The Father is Principium, Memory or Mind; the Son is the Wisdom, Knowledge or Intelligence of the Father; the Holy Spirit is the Love or Will of God; but the term Principium is 'also applicable to the Son in virtue of the double procession', 'and sometimes... created beings are...included in the being of the Word'.[1.]

That Augustine did not conceive of the three Persons as distinct minds or personalities is most clearly shown in his teaching 'that the love of the Father for the Son is the Holy Spirit'.[2.] Such a statement is meaningless if the Holy Spirit is regarded as a separate personality or consciousness. Undoubtedly it is possible to find passages in Augustine, as in the case of Athanasius, which are inconsistent with his real view; he was even more stringently bound by external authority. But wherever he succeeds in making the doctrine intelligible at all, it is clear that he conceives of the individual human mind as the Imago Trinitatis, and of the Triune God as Una Mens.

The scholastic view is really but a precise restatement of the Augustinian position. Abelard was the first medieval theologian to interpret the Trinity in this manner, holding that 'God is Power, Wisdom and Love or Will'.[3.] Though he was condemned by his ignorant contemporaries at one time for Sabellianism and at another for Arianism, his teaching was taken over by Peter Lombard in the Sentences, and

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1. GM., p. 111.
2. GM., p. 111. Cf. De Trinitate, VII, Ch. iii, 6.
3. GM., p. 112.

became the orthodox interpretation of the doctrine.

Aquinas accepted the work of Augustine and Abelard almost without change. In his formulation he applied the term Potentia to the Father, instead of Principium, but explained the former as meaning "the power of generating the Son".[1] He restated more clearly the Augustinian doctrine that God knows all the objects of His thought, including Himself, through the Son (just as the human individual can distinguish in introspection between the self as thinking subject and as the object of one's own thought); - and that God loves all the objects of His love, including Himself, through the Holy Spirit.[2]

(ii) - Correctives.

In the first instance Rashdall employs the facts of dogmatic history as a corrective against mistaken assumptions concerning what orthodoxy requires and proscribes. For one thing, it assuredly frowns upon any conception of the divinity of Christ which is so formulated

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1. GM., p. 113.
2. Rashdall offers detailed evidence for these statements by citing specific passages from Aquinas' writings (Cf.GM., pp. 113 ff).
   In all these examples the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity are represented as activities of a single consciousness rather than as distinct and self-existing "personalities". In a few obscure passages, (Summa Theol., Quaest. xxxvii, Art. 1, and Q. xxxvi, Art. 2. Cf. GM., pp. 115 f., foot-notes) in which Aquinas refers to the reflexive love of the Son for the Father, a separate consciousness seems implied; a careful examination of the passages suggests, however, that the love of the Word is for that which He thinks, and consequently a love for the Father from which the thinking proceeds. Nowhere is the separate consciousness of the Word asserted; and, even in these two difficult passages, the Holy Spirit is always "love", not "a lover". This latter fact in itself shows that the term "Person" did not per se connote "separate consciousness" to Aquinas.
   A further difficulty is created by the fact that Aquinas speaks of the "Persons" as "Hypostases", meaning thereby "Substances" of which attributes may be predicated, but which themselves cannot be attributes of anything else. This apparently contradicts his whole contention that the "Persons" are 'three relations...within the divine Mind' (GM., p. 118). The use of the concept "hypostasis" was forced upon Aquinas by authority, and he employed the term to avoid the appearance of Sabellianism. He avoided self-contradiction only by claiming 'that in the divine nature relations.. are real things', there being 'no difference between the abstract and the concrete' (Ibid., p. 119). By this device the term "hypostasis" is construed merely as attesting to the concrete reality of the distinct activities of the three Persons, and does not at all imply that they could exist apart from each other.

as to conceal the reality of His humanity. Rashdall has already sought to show how Athanasius himself, at the time of Nicaea, was really an Apollinarian; and Irenaeus, though he too preceded Apollinarius, held a similar view.[1] It is therefore not surprising that both this heresy and Monothelitism have been unwittingly entertained down to the present time by Christians who have believed themselves to be quite orthodox. In reality the orthodox position asserts 'that Jesus was in the fullest sense a man', possessing not only'a human body,'[2] but also 'a human soul, intellect, will'; any view which is irreconcilable with this position is quite as unorthodox as one which seeks to derogate from His divinity. Rashdall himself regards a view which starts with a strong affirmation of Christ's humanity,as the key to an understanding of His divinity,as affording the surest foundation for Christian belief. Only when His 'struggles and temptations,... His faith in God,' and His love for men, are regarded as those of a real human individual, and not those of an omniscient, supernatural Being, can men appreciate 'the attractiveness of His character',[3] and the splendour of His moral and religious achievements. In the orthodox Christology he finds enshrined the absolutely central truth that Christ's divinity is to be discovered in the fact that He embodies human life at its highest.

Rashdall discerns in what he takes to be the Pauline doctrine of the "Kenosis" of the Son a useful corrective against Apollinarian tendencies, which at the same time illuminates the significance of Christ's humanity.[4] For the doctrine is most reasonably interpreted

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1. Bishop Gore cites strong evidence against this interpretation of Irenaeus. Cf. The Reconstruction of Belief, p.497 n.
2. JHD., p. 13.
3. JHD., p. 43.
4. Many critics to-day hold that the Kenotic theory is not Pauline, and that Phil., Ch.2, has been misinterpreted.

as meaning that when Christ took on the "morphe" of a slave, He "emptied Himself" of certain divine attributes - that is, these attributes were in abeyance in the earthly life of the man Jesus Christ. The real humanity of Christ surely implies that this earthly life was not characterized by omnipresence and omnipotence. 'The very idea of Incarnation' loses all meaning unless it can be assumed that in Christ the divine power was working under human conditions and limitations.[1] Rashdall so extends this Kenotic doctrine as to hold that Christ also "emptied Himself" of omniscience; this has always been, he suggests, the last respect in which theologians have affirmed His real humanity. The reality of His sufferings was stressed at an early date in reaction against the danger of Gnosticism, and the importance of the Atonement kept alive within the Church a firm sense of the humanity of His body; the emotional aspects of His life - His sorrows and sympathies - were likewise regarded as implied in His humanity. But theologians have often been loathe to admit that His knowledge, His intellectual capacities, were likewise human and limited. Rashdall argues, however, that full recognition of Christ's originality as a moral and religious teacher, and of His uniqueness as the Revealer,

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1. DD., p. 36. 'The ubiquity of our Lord's Human Body ... has never (I believe) been entertained except as a support for the Lutheran doctrine of Consubstantiation.' (Ibid., p.36). 'The miracles ... do not prove Omnipotence, though they do prove the possession of more than the normal control of the human will over the processes of physical nature. The most striking ... are more often ascribed directly to the Father than to the will of the Incarnate Son.' (Ibid., p.37). 'Certainly Christ's works of healing ... would constitute a far less touching manifestation of tender, human affection than they do now, if we were forced to believe that in that human soul which felt sympathy with the sufferer, and felt the power to relieve his pain, there were also all the while the consciousness of capacity to bring to an end by one word of power all the sufferings of all humanity.' (Ibid., pp.37 f.).
   Of course Rashdall is here seeking to show the unacceptability of a conception which regards Jesus as omnipotent in the literal sense. Even when this sermon was written (1889), he would not, I believe, have attributed this power to remove all suffering by fiat to God Himself.

does not necessitate the belief that He was omniscient[1]. He goes on to show (following Gore partially) that Jesus clearly accepted traditional Jewish beliefs about the date and authorship of certain Old Testament passages which criticism has found to be erroneous. Also (however much eschatological theories need to be modified) it is probable that Christ 'entertained some expectations about the future which history has not verified'[2]. He admitted His own ignorance of the exact date of the Judgement; but it is reasonable to assume that He believed it to be nearer than the 1900

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1. Cf.# 188.n2. The sermon entitled "Limitations of Knowledge in Christ" (DD. Ch.III), in which he first expounded this interpretation, was delivered a year before Bishop Gore defended the same notion, with qualifications, in his well-known contribution to Lux Mundi. It is hardly profitable to enquire as to which theologian was the earlier to perceive this further possibility in the development of a Kenotic Christology. (Cf., however, Modern Churchman, Vol.XVII, p.482). Rashdall always cites Gore's Bampton Lectures and Dissertations on the Incarnation, as well as his essay in Lux Mundi, whenever he defends this notion, although he criticizes Gore's treatment of the question. He was prompted, I think, by a genuine sense of gratitude to Gore for the service his writings rendered to English theology, and he was anxious, wherever possible, to find common ground with a churchman from whom he so frequently and sharply differed; but at the same time a touch of irony underlay the manner in which he represented Gore as a haven of refuge for liberal theologians on this point.

Rashdall contends that Gore makes the blunder of attributing limitation in knowledge to the Second Person of the Trinity. (Cf. the latter's Dissertations, pp. 93, 97, 105). Gore is so concerned to hold that the Word retained His personal identity in the Incarnation that he cannot accept the form of the Kenotic doctrine which attributes limitation to Christ's human consciousness alone; this, he sees, would involve a "Nestorian theory of double consciousness$_x$". As a result, he has no alternative but to maintain that though the Incarnate Word was thus limited, nevertheless as a member of the God-head He remained at the same time omniscient in the "cosmic sphere$_x$". In order to avoid the implication that 'the Universe was for some thirty-three years carried on without'(GM. p. 97) the participation of the Omnisdient Word, he is forced to suggest that the Incarnation necessitated a bifurcation of the Word Himself whereby the Word as subject to limitations of the flesh is ignorant of matters which the Word as omniscient eternally knows. And all this speculation is intended to support the contention that the Word retained His "personal" identity "unchanged"! Gore's whole difficulty, according to Rashdall, results from the fact that he construes the term "Person", when used with reference to the Trinity, as meaning "personality" in the modern sense; hence in attempting to explain how the human soul of Jesus was united with the Word so conceived, he is forced to resort to the desperate measures just indicated. Needless to say, Athanasius would have violently objected to any suggestion that the Word was ignorant.

2. JHD.p.16.

years which have intervened.[1] 'Augustine and ... other Latin Fathers,' who asserted Christ's omniscience, virtually 'impeached His veracity'[2] in attempting to explain passages like this. Nor is there any ground for maintaining that Christ knew the vast body of facts which it has taken the physical and historical sciences thousands of years to accumulate, together with the infinite store of truth still undiscovered. If Christ could have known all this, only an infinitesimal segment of which the most gifted individuals can hope to master even with the aid of findings which centuries of research have produced, He would not have been human in any meaningful sense of the word.[3]

Here again, then, Rashdall argues that belief in Christ's divinity should rest not upon the infallibility of His knowledge, but upon the sublimity of His character. That Jesus did share current 'Jewish beliefs about the Old Testament, about Angels, about the personal Tempter,'[4] seems undeniable; but it is indefensible to insist that such beliefs must still be accepted on the presupposition that Christ's knowledge was infallible and His statements about such matters final. Such a procedure veils the real sense in which Christ was perfect,

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1. Because of the fact that the eschatological theory was one of the early turning-points in the current reaction against liberalism, it is interesting to note Rashdall's attitude towards it, as contained in his reply to Prof. Burkitt's The Failure of Liberal Christianity. As we have seen (in Appendix A.), he stresses the manner in which Jesus "spiritualized" - that is, made ethical and rational - the traditional Jewish eschatology. But to the extent that Christ literally believed in an imminent cataclysm, Rashdall argues, His ideas must simply be looked upon as mistaken; and this is more embarrassing for conservative theologians than for liberals. Hence it does not strengthen the position of those who stress the "supernatural" in religion to have Biblical scholars point out a "supernatural" element in the Gospel narrative which has to be dismissed as an illusion'(Modern Churchman,Vol.I,p.30).
2. DD.p.38.
3. Cf.DD. p.230.
4. Ibid. p.47.

and the real reason for attributing divinity to Him. On the other hand, it is remarkable to what a small extent He was limited by the current conceptions of His time, and how completely he transcended them in the spiritual sphere. Such limitations of His knowledge as are apparent do not in the least detract from the infallibility of His spiritual insight and the sinlessness of His character.[1] Many truths concerning creation and nature which form a part of speculative theology did not enter into Christ's own message. The scientific, historical and philosophical ideas which He may have received from the thought of His own day have in many respects been superseded; but such ideas were only incidental to the gospel of divine love and human brotherhood which formed the essence of His teaching. The eternal truth of that gospel remains unaltered by changes in scientific and philosophical knowledge. In short, because His supremacy was in the sphere of spiritual insight, not in the sphere of natural knowledge, the Church may remain true to the Spirit of Christ and yet accept new scientific discoveries, even though the latter directly contradict opinions which He seemed to hold about natural phenomena.

Two other conceptions which have often been associated with the doctrine of Christ's divinity must be mentioned briefly. In the first place, Rashdall points out, the orthodox position does not hold 'that the human soul of Jesus pre-existed'.[2] Origen maintained such a view because he believed in the pre-existence of all souls. St. Paul taught the pre-existence of Christ before the question of the two natures had really arisen. But the orthodox Christology of the Church teaches that it was the Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, and not the human soul of Jesus that pre-existed. According to Catholic doctrine, the human soul of Jesus 'was born at a

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1. Cf. DD., p.50.
2. JHD., p.15.

particular moment of history', and remained distinct from, though 'perfectly and for ever united with the Word'.[1] Rashdall has no difficulty whatever in accepting this orthodox teaching, because he also accepts the Thomistic interpretation of the Trinity in which it is denied that the Logos pre-existed as a separate consciousness. Rashdall contends that to look upon the Logos as a consciousness separate from the Father leads to Arianism if the former be made subordinate, or to Ditheism (or Tritheism) if the idea of equality be adopted. On the other hand, if the distinction between the Persons be conceived as arising within the divine Mind, the idea of a pre-existent Logos presents no difficulties.[2] It is hardly necessary to add that to contend 'that the whole Trinity was incarnate in Christ'[3] is heretical, and involves Patripassianism as one of its consequences.

Secondly, Rashdall maintains that the question of the Virgin Birth has no decisive bearing upon the question of Christ's divinity. This is altogether in keeping, it will be observed, with his general conviction that miracles cannot provide a firm foundation on which to rest the validity of Christian doctrine. This conviction is especially strong with reference to the Incarnation, because as the history of doctrine shows, it has often been the attribution of miraculous powers to Christ that has made belief in His real humanity unintelligible. Belief in Christ's omniscience is a good example. Therefore Rashdall writes:

'I do not see that the strongest assertions of a Divinity which is compatible with real humanity need involve miracle'. 'To say that Christ was the Son of God and a participator in the Divine nature while no other man ever was a Son of God or a participater (sic)

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1. PR., p. 178.
2. Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol. IV, p.213.
3. PR., p.179.

in that Nature in any sense or to any degree would, indeed, be to make Jesus so entirely a miraculous or exceptional Being that His appearance on this earth would by itself constitute the most direct and complete exception to the laws of nature - so much so that the assertion that he was nevertheless a man would become something quite unintelligible.'[1]

But this is to anticipate. On the question of the Virgin Birth itself he points out that in those gospels which contain an account of it, it could not have been regarded as a proof of Christ's divinity, because these gospels do not even assert Christ's divinity, as distinct from His Messiahship.[2] On the other hand, the Fourth Gospel, which does assert Christ's divinity, does not mention the Virgin Birth.

'The author of the Fourth Gospel could not well have left the fact unrecorded if he had thought that the Divinity of Jesus stands or falls with the Virgin Birth.'[3]

The question of the Virgin Birth is one which must be settled in terms of historical evidence; but that evidence is of such a nature that conscientious Christian scholars remain divided as to the correct answer. Surely belief in Christ's divinity cannot be held in abeyance, Rashdall suggests, until the issue is finally settled; nor need it be affected by a denial of the Virgin Birth.

'The two beliefs are quite independent of each other. According to the Church's doctrine the Son of God did not become Son at the moment of the Incarnation. He was Son of God from all eternity.'[4]

(iii) - The Positive Meaning of the Doctrines.

We are now in a position to consider the positive meaning which Rashdall attaches to the doctrine of the Incarnation, in the light of the considerations just outlined, but also in the light of his metaphysical views. Once Christ's real humanity is affirmed,

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1. Modern Churchman, Vol.1, pp.380f.
2. Cf. Ibid., pp. 374 f., for evidence supporting this statement.
3. Ibid., p.375.
4. JHD., p.37.

the intelligibility of the doctrine becomes contingent, he believes, upon what conception is entertained concerning the relation between God and human nature in general. Here it is best to quote his opinion in full, from his Cambridge paper:

'If "Divine" and "human" are thought of as mutually exclusive terms, if God is thought of as simply the Maker of man, if man is thought of as merely a machine or an animal having no community of nature with the Universal Spirit who is the cause or source or "ground"of the existence alike of Nature and of other spirits, then indeed it would be absurd to maintain that one human being, and one only, was both God and man at the same time*'. 'That man is not merely the creature and play-thing of God, that there is a certain community of nature between God and man, that all human minds are reproductions "in limited modes" ... of the Divine Mind, that in all true human thinking there is a reproduction of the Divine thought, and above all that in the highest ideals which the human conscience recognizes there is a revelation of the ideal eternally present in the Divine Mind - these are the presuppositions under which alone any real meaning can be given to the doctrine. All modern philosophers who recognize that the knowledge of God is possible are agreed that we can only attain such knowledge by thinking of Him in the light of the human mind at its highest'. 'I quite agree ... that it is impossible to maintain that God is fully incarnate in Christ and not incarnate at all in anyone else. On the other hand, the philosophical critics of theology do not, as it appears to me, recognize how spiritually valueless - nay, how ethically pernicious - such a doctrine becomes when God is thought of as incarnating Himself equally in all human beings, the *worst as well as the best*'. 'There is much in human nature which is not Divine at all. It is just because it so emphatically negatives such a non-moral doctrine of Divine immanence that the Christian doctrine of a supreme Incarnation in <u>one</u> historical Person becomes so valuable*'. 'If we once recognize that it is especially in the moral consciousness at its highest, and in the lives which are most completely dominated by such a moral consciousness,that God is revealed, then it becomes possible to accept the doctrine that in a single human life God is revealed more completely than in any other. If we believe that every human soul reveals, reproduces, incarnates God <u>to some extent</u>; if we believe that in the great ethical teachers of mankind, the great religious personalities, the founders, the reformers of religions, the heroes, the prophets, the saints, God is more fully revealed than in other men; if we believe that up to the coming of Christ there had been a gradual, continuous, and on the whole progressive revelation of God (especially, though by no means exclusively, in the development of Jewish Monotheism), then it becomes possible to believe that in One Man the self-revelation of God has been signal, supreme, unique. That we are justified in thinking of God as like Christ, that the character and teaching of Christ contains the fullest disclosure both of the character of God Himself and of His will for man - that is (so far as so momentous a truth can be summed up in a few words) the true meaning for us of

the doctrine of Christ's Divinity.'[1]

Behind this statement lies the whole world-view which has gradually emerged in the preceding pages. The "community of nature" between God and man of which Rashdall now speaks, is but another way of referring to his belief that ultimate reality is a society of persons. By reason of the very fact that they are persons, men are able to apprehend in part the truth whose source is in God, and to know and fulfil in part, through conscience, the purposes which He wills. The more fully they develop their highest human capacities, the more nearly do men become like God. Such a world-view, Rashdall suggests, can alone make the belief that Jesus perfectly revealed God consistent with His full humanity. A world-view in which the divine sphere is utterly different from the human makes the Incarnation miraculous, irrational; and for Rashdall this is equivalent to making it meaningless.

Doubtless he would have held that any doctrine of the Fall which declares the Imago Dei to have been wholly destroyed, separates human nature from the divine so completely that both spheres could not possibly meet in one person. To be sure, he conceives of a very real difference, which arises primarily from man's moral imperfection, as separating man from God; but all men, in so far as they are morally good, have diminished that difference to some extent; in Christ, primarily because of His moral perfection as a man, that difference vanishes. Rashdall's ethical and metaphysical convictions are such that a morally perfect man is ipso facto divine, because his will, his entire consciousness

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1. JHD., pp.17-21. This statement was taken over in large measure from his book on The Atonement (cf. pp.447 ff.); hence his views concerning the Incarnation - the same views expressed in his Cambridge paper - were available to Bishop Gore and to all his other critics long before the Girton Conference.

within its human limitations, is nevertheless wholly in harmony with God's will and nature. God's nature is love; and that love was incarnate in Christ in the sense that He was perfect in love, even as God is. Rashdall's convictions are also such, however, that this "identity" does not imply a fusion between God's consciousness and that of Jesus; the identity is one which unites humanity and divinity, because there are respects in which they are alike; but the one Person in whom they meet is not "personally" identical with God.

The key to the whole question of Rashdall's "orthodoxy" is his view of the relationship between the Logos, as a Person in the God-head, and the human soul of Jesus. Since for him their identity cannot be "personal", it must be, rather, one of principle, - one of devotion to the same moral ends. Rashdall would contend, with the support of thinkers like Justin and Origen, that the divine Logos has been incarnate "to some extent" in every human being who has partially known God and sought to obey Him; but, in accordance with his constant recognition of the fact that men differ in degree in their spiritual insight and moral goodness, he denies that the Logos was fully incarnate in any person but Christ. And when he goes on to contend that 'however great the coincidence between ... the character of the human Jesus and of the God who was revealing Himself in and through Him, there remain two natures, two wills ... not one',[1] he can invoke Chalcedon and the sixth council[2] in defence of his position. Hence the indwelling of the Logos in Christ, though complete, does not imply, for Rashdall, that it supplanted the 'human will and understanding'[3] in the soul of Jesus. To summarize his conception in the simplest possible terms: God and Christ

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1. CV., p.50.
2. Held at Constantinople in 680 A.D. Rashdall, in his brief summary, neglects to cite the fact that it was this council which condemned Monothelitism.
3. CV., p.50.

remain two separate personalities; but Christ is distinct from other men and uniquely united to God as His Son because Christ alone is like God in the only sense that it is possible for a man to be perfectly like God. Hence one cannot say that Christ was a "mere man", because mere men are not perfectly like God; but neither can one say, without qualification, that Christ was God. Each statement denies one half of the two-fold truth.

It is quite clear why the divine and human spheres are not discontinuous in Rashdall's thinking: they meet in the moral consciousness. 'For those who believe that truth is one ... God can as little be above morality as ... below it.'[1] A theology which relegates morality to the sphere of the "natural" man, and then declares that this sphere has nothing in common with God, declares in effect that the practical reason cannot lead us aright and ends logically in moral scepticism; moreover, it destroys the distinctive claim of Christianity to finality - a claim which rests upon the fact that it clearly affirms the connection between divine and human goodness as revealed in Christ. For the Christian, God is "above" man in the sense that He is perfect in love, knowledge and creative power, but He is not "above" man in the sense that He altogether transcends the moral distinctions which reason discloses.

It is illuminating to observe how the preceding chapters fall together in a single theology of the Incarnation. In the chapter on ethics (I) we have seen how Rashdall maintains that in moral judgments human reason apprehends objective truth; in the chapter on metaphysics (III) how he argues that this implies that the highest moral ideal of humanity is the most adequate revelation of the character of God; and in the chapter on Christian ethics (II) how he shows that Christ, in teaching and embodying the gospel of universal love, perfectly fulfilled this highest ideal. The

1. DD., p. 111.

orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation - though couched in metaphysical formulae whose idiom is not that of today - expresses in essence the truth in which such a course of reflection culminates: that Christ perfectly revealed the nature of God, and perfectly consummated that ultimate relationship which binds all humanity to God. Because Christ fulfilled what man is eternally meant to be, He showed forth what God is. The centre of the Christian revelation, the centre of the moral ideal for humanity, therefore resides not in books, or rules, or doctrinal formulae, but in a character;[1] only when external authoritative sources are examined and understood under the guidance of the Spirit of Christ, can the truth which is in them be grasped. Thus a rigid literalism, even as regards the sayings and deeds of Christ Himself, must be supplanted by an interpretation which sees the events recorded in the gospels in due relation to one another and to the circumstances under which they were uttered - an interpretation which glimpses, behind them all, the character of Him who shines through them.

The sense in which Christ is unique, the sense in which the Logos was fully incarnate in Him alone, must be set forth with the full emphasis which Rashdall accords to them, even though these conceptions are almost purely ethical in his theology. It is precisely because all other men, even the best, have revealed God's nature so imperfectly that belief in the uniqueness of Christ is central to Christian faith. Rashdall leaves not the slightest doubt concerning his own conviction at this point. The difference, he says, between assenting to Christ's uniqueness in the sense of

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1. The title of the seventh sermon in Doctrine and Development is "Revelation by Character".

"monogenes huios",[1] and merely affirming His high worth as the greatest of a class of religious teachers, is the difference between full Christian belief and the lack of it.

This Christo-centric view of revelation, although it is woven skilfully into the whole fabric of his religious philosophy, is no mere convenience of thought. He has a profound antipathy for the type of theory issuing from both Christian and non-Christian writers, which would make a symbolic "Christ idea" the essence of Christianity, and claim that the truth of our religion would stand unaltered even if no such person as Jesus had ever lived. He believes that such a view grows largely out of the conviction that the search for the historic Christ and His actual teaching is futile; for, though it sometimes admits the probability of His having greatly influenced and in a sense originated the Christian ideal, it holds that His own conception of His message was immediately so expanded and re-interpreted by His followers, that it is now

> 'impossible to disentangle the actual teaching of the Master from the teaching of His school'. It is impossible 'to see his ideas' apart from what 'has been read into them or evolved out of them under the influence of other ideas and other environments'.[2]

This point of view, because it recognizes the importance of development in Christian thought, is misleadingly close to Rashdall's own. The cardinal difference arises from the fact that

1. Rashdall writes, following Lightfoot's Clement of Rome's Commentary on Ad. Corinth., I.25, 'the true meaning of "monogenes" is not so much "only-begotten" as "the only one of his kind"'. That is, the term as used in the Fourth Gospel means that Christ was a Son of God 'in a sense which (the phrase) can be applied to none other' - that He revealed 'God's nature in a way which no other has done or ... can do'. (DD., p.78).
2. DD., pp. 90 f. Rashdall finds a variation of this view, of course, in Hegel, who seemed to take Christ 'as a mere symbol of this union between the divine and human nature, and ...(make) little of the historical Jesus'. (Atonement, p.448 n). And the type of criticism against which Rashdall is primarily directing his attack is that of Baur and the Tübingen school, who applied the Hegelian dialectic to the figure of Christ; that method makes the "Christ-idea" a speculative fusion of the universal and the particular, which has little to do with the Jesus of history. Cf. Liberal Churchman, Vol.I, pp.19 ff.; Vol.III (No.21), pp.11 -29.

for him the value of a doctrine like the Incarnation, and the legitimacy of its development, rest upon the facts of history. His estimate of creeds and controversies - what he accepts and what he rejects - is founded upon the criterion of what he believes to have been the actual character of Christ during His earthly life.[1] By virtue of this criterion he is able to affirm the doctrine of the indwelling Logos, and yet to reject a denial of the human limitations of His consciousness.

He believes that Christianity would be irreparably injured if the religious consciousness of Jesus came to be regarded as 'not what an actual human soul once felt and thought, but merely what the imagination of His disciples postulated that He must have felt.'[2] Christianity owes its great power to the fact that it directs its allegiance to a Person who fulfilled in a real earthly life and under real human conditions the ideals for humanity which He taught; the appeal of a Person is always more commanding and concrete than that of a disembodied ideal. If a fictitiously constructed "Christ idea" were really to make men lose faith in the historic figure, they would have no alternative but to turn to lesser men - prophets of other times, or their own fathers and teachers - to inspire them amidst the struggles and temptations of life.

'Better, more stimulating, more helpful a thousand-fold, some struggling faulty life of warm flesh and blood that has really grappled with temptation and come out not wholly vanquished, with all its sins and all its shortcomings painted with the blackest brush that the most remorseless of biographers has ever wielded, than some imaginary portrait drawn by the selective imagination of discipleship or some frigid make-believe of modern metaphysical rhetoric!'[3]

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1. Rashdall holds that even the most non-human, speculative conceptions of Christ ever put forward, in an age when the historical sense was not alert, were fashioned in the serious belief that they represented Him as He really was. Cf.DD., pp. 96 f.
2. Ibid., p.98.
3. Ibid., pp.98 f.

Therefore Rashdall deems it idle to talk about fulfilling the Christian ideal except through following Christ Himself. For the relationship with God which Christ claimed for Himself, He claimed also for all mankind through Him. His mission was primarily one of mediation and communication; and to the extent that Christ as a human being transcends the religious and moral capacities of all other men, in that same measure men are able to establish a relationship **with** God through Christ which transcends anything that would be possible without His aid. "To as many as received Him gave He power to become the sons of God."[1]

Some may be quite willing to assent to the fact that in Christ they see the noblest fulfilment of what man is meant to be, and consequently the most adequate revelation of God's nature that has been vouchsafed to man, and yet feel constrained to ask whether it is not possible that the course of religious evolution may at length produce one greater than He. From a speculative point of view, Rashdall replies, this possibility cannot be denied <u>a priori</u>; but for the practical verities of the religious life, it is irrelevant; it is enough that Christ was the first to incarnate the love of God in such fullness that all preceding revelations are seen to culminate in Him, and all subsequent developments within the Church which have stood the test of faith and practice are seen to be merely contemporary applications, or doctrinal statements, of what is explicit or implicit in the character and teaching of the Master. The work of the Spirit within the Church is never complete, because the riches of truth in Christ are inexhaustible. One who realizes the full import of Christ's character will not have time for egregious speculation as to whether human life can be "better" than His, or whether God can be "better" revealed than as unfailing love.

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1. John 1:12.

The significance which Rashdall finds in the doctrine of the Trinity can be briefly stated in the light of the foregoing. Once it is recognized that, according to orthodox teaching, the Persons of the Trinity are not separate consciousnesses,- once it is realized that modern divines who write as though this were the case would have been regarded by the framers of the creeds as sheer tri-theists - the greatest difficulty which the doctrine presents is removed. Undeniably the subtle metaphysical distinctions of the Athanasian Creed do not convey much to the modern mind; but its central teaching, as derived from Augustine, is susceptible of quite simple interpretation. The misunderstanding arising from the creeds and other references to the Trinity in worship is therefore quite inexcusable,[1] and it has caused much needless harm. When properly understood, the truth conveyed by the doctrine is simply the essence of Christian theism - that God is best conceived in personal terms,as thinking, feeling and willing.[2]

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1. Rashdall's attitude toward the creeds is stated in three articles in The Modern Churchman: Vol.I,pp.23-35 ("Is Liberal Theology a Failure?"); Vol.IV, pp. 204-14 ("The Creeds"); Vol. XII, pp.444-51 ("The Present Value of the Creeds"). (Cf. also PR., pp. 171-75, and Matheson's Biography, pp.123 f.). He holds that where they reflect an outworn cosmology or an antiquated view of natural law, considerable latitude of interpretation should be permissible. The Athanasian Creed particularly needs such re-interpretation, because it contains a true conception (of the Trinity) which the average layman seldom grasps when hearing it (thirteen times a year) without explanation or qualification.
(Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol.I, pp.30 ff.).
2. In a reply to Dr. Sanday's article (in the Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. IV, pp.1-16), which criticizes the form in which Rashdall interprets the Trinity, the latter is able to point out that these remarks really apply to St.Thomas' triad: "Power (or Principium), Wisdom and Will". Rashdall himself prefers the division, "Power, Wisdom and Love" (which Dr. Sanday suggests); this differs from Aquinas in the sole respect of construing "love" to include "feeling"; Aquinas,of course, could not adopt such an interpretation because of his Aristotelianism.
(Cf. PR., pp.183f. n.)

Moreover, if what Rashdall has said about the Kenotic theory of the Incarnation can be accepted, and if he has thereby shown successfully that the Logos as incarnate in Christ cannot be thought of as "unchanged" and "personally identical with" the Second Person of the Trinity, a further tremendous source of confusion will have been removed.

'All the difficulties of the doctrine of the Trinity have arisen from thinking of (the) relation between God and the pre-existing Logos as if it were of exactly the same kind as the relation between God and the Incarnate Son.'[1]

Once the Second Person of the Trinity is regarded as an activity of a God who is Una Mens, the doctrine of the "indwelling" of God in Christ is understood as affirming not a "personal identity," but a "community of nature" between God (or the Word of God) and Jesus. The belief that Christ completely revealed the character of God gives real meaning to the phrase, "of one substance with the Father, God from God..." Naturally the word "substance" (ousia) had a metaphysical connotation in the fourth century which we cannot recapture. But we can affirm that Christ was of one substance with God in the same sense that He was of one substance with men; this does not imply any bifurcation of His personality; it means merely that just as He partook of the essential nature of manhood, so He shared the essential nature of Divinity. This view is entirely compatible with the orthodox (Nicene) doctrine as regards the relation between God the Father and the Logos or Wisdom of God; and it departs from Athanasius' view of the personal identity of Jesus with the Second Person of the Trinity, and from the theory that Christ was man without being a man, precisely because it takes seriously the teaching of the Church concerning the human soul of Jesus.

1. DD.p.22.

Needless to say, Rashdall can no more conceive of the Spirit as indwelling in human beings in a sense which implies "personal" identification, than he can conceive of the Second Person as being personally identified with the human Jesus. Enough has been said already about the Spirit, however, to make it evident that the Trinity has value for him as a doctrine which brings into 'connexion the two great aspects of the divine self-revelation'.[1] The Spirit is but the continuation of the historic revelation vouchsafed in the Son; it does not supersede what was manifest in that life; rather, it reveals the eternal meaning of Christ's life to believers in every age. Even the sayings of Christ, Rashdall has contended, must be interpreted in and through the Spirit if they are to be fully understood.

Finally, Rashdall believes in a very broad sense that the Spirit "bloweth where it listeth". Wherever the truth resides within the minds and hearts of men, the Spirit is operative. Often its workings are carried on outside the confines of the Church considered as a visible and terrestrial institution. Secular thought is continually bringing forth new knowledge of the nature of the world, which the Church should welcome; voices other than that of theology may yet express great and fundamental truths of human life. In the Spirit of Christ the Church has a 'criterion by which to test all other theories of conduct, all ideals of life, all schemes of social regeneration',[2] and by this criterion it may fulfil its mission of receiving 'all that the Spirit shall teadh by whatever organ He may speak'.[3] The claim of Christianity to finality rests upon Christ's appeal to the conscience of mankind; the eternal significance of His life can be discovered afresh, as contemporary in its implications, by men in every age. This is God's work of perpetuating through His Spirit the revelation given once and for all in Christ.

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1. DD. p.27.
2. DD. p.31.
3. Ibid, p.32.

3. The Atonement.[1]

Fortunately Rashdall did have an opportunity to undertake an exhaustive historical exposition and re-interpretation of one central Christian doctrine. His Bampton Lectures, entitled *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, are his most important contribution to theology and his last extensive published work,[2] and they may be taken as an example of what he wished modern theologians to do for the whole body of Christian dogma. That is to say, in them he traced the origin and development of the idea of Atonement, with a view to preserving whatever truth might be found in traditional conceptions; at the same time he attempted to show the necessity and justifiability of continuing the process of doctrinal development by taking into account changed notions concerning the physical universe, concerning human relationships (in this case, especially with regard to punishment and justice), and concerning the nature of Biblical inspiration and authority.

The need for such a study appealed to him as most pressing in the case of the doctrine of the Atonement. On the one hand he recognized the paramount importance of the question of salvation for the religious life of all Christians; he realized that for the great majority belief in the Incarnation has its primary significance in connexion with the work of Christ. On the other hand he was convinced that no doctrine, except perhaps the closely associated ideas

1. This discussion is based upon the following sources, in addition to his Bampton Lectures: DD., Chs. VIII-X; CE., Chs. III and VI; GE. I, Ch. IX; PP., Ch. XII; ID., Ch. IX. *Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. III, pp. 178-211. No fuller statement concerning Rashdall's views with regard to such ideas as grace, faith and justification, can be given than is contained in the course of this section.
2. The lectures were delivered in 1915, published in 1919. His most important writings on ethics, philosophy and religion, thus fall, so far as their preparation is concerned, between 1902 and 1915.

of total depravity and eternal punishment, had been put forward in ways so repellent and fundamentally immoral.

His purpose in undertaking an historical survey in this case is somewhat different from that which prompted it in his discussion of the Incarnation and the Trinity. There he was concerned to defend himself from the imputation of heresy. No such necessity could arise in his Bampton Lectures because an authoritative doctrine of the Atonement has never been defined by a creed or a general council. Indeed, Rashdall used history in this latter case to show that no particular interpretation can claim to be the orthodox doctrine of the Church. The publication of his volume evoked the criticism of "objectivists,"- but always tempered with admiration for the scope (though hardly the impartiality) of his scholarship. Despite the fact that Rashdall called his survey 'brief and summary,'[1] it contains such a wealth of critical detail, especially with regard to the New Testament and the patristic period, that it is impossible to do justice here to his exposition. Because the volume is readily accessible, we must be content with selecting for brief mention a few fundamental points which are indispensable to an understanding of his own interpretation.[2] Any details which such a procedure excludes now, but which call for special consideration, will be indicated briefly in the latter portion of the thesis, at the time that criticism of them is offered.

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1. Atonement, p.435.
2. Therefore the additional material, appended to almost every chapter, wherein Rashdall offers exegetical substantiation for his interpretations, and a mass of other historical data, must be virtually ignored. His treatment of Greek theology after Origen (cf. pp. 288-320) is especially valuable, but it falls outside the main argument of the book.

(i) - Punishment and Forgiveness.

In order to understand the strong predispositions with which Rashall approached the history of the doctrine, it is necessary to keep in mind his own view of punishment and forgiveness. Once he had made up his own mind on a problem, he was peculiarly adept at finding support for his convictions in other writers; and sometimes he was peculiarly incapable of grasping the real intention of opposing opinions, despite a genuine desire to be fair.[1] As early as 1892 he had preached a sermon in defence of the Abelardian interpretation of the Atonement;[2] when this fact is joined with his chapter in The Theory of Good and Evil on "Punishment and Forgiveness"[3] it is possible to follow the positive and negative criteria which he brought to bear upon Christian literature throughout his Bampton Lectures.

Once again it becomes evident that his theological opinions are in large measure determined by his moral theory. In a word, he evinces a strong antipathy for the retributive theory of punishment, because it is retrospective rather than prospective, and justifies punishment solely on the ground that the offender has merited it. It treats punishment as 'an end in itself apart from (its) effects',[4] and thus treats human personality merely as a means. Now Rashdall does not deny that indignation and resentment, which often find expression in the retributive theory, are morally healthy so long as they are brought into subjugation to a higher principle. That

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1. An Oxford professor said to me in conversation that Rashdall was especially remembered at New College for three qualities: His courage in undertaking colossal tasks of scholarship; his infectious, hearty laugh; his refusal to grant an opponent a single point.
2. Cf. DD., Ch. VIII.
3. Op. cit., Vol. I, Ch. IX. Cf. The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 20-31 ("The Theory of Punishment"); Vol. V, pp. 241-43 ("Mr Bradley on Punishment. An Explanation"); Vol. X, pp. 193-206 ("The Ethics of Forgiveness").
4. GE. I. p. 300.

principle, as he believes (in accordance with his ideal utilitarianism), is one which regulates punishment in the light of the good ends which it may serve both for the offender and for society; because punishment involves pain or some other evil, its goodness can be instrumental only, not intrinsic. Instrumentally it may have value both as a reformatory and as a deterrent agency. Even when punishment cannot accomplish its primary end of reformation, it is usually justifiable on the ground that the condition which it brings about in the mind of the offender, is less evil than would be the case if his wrong-doing went unpunished. Therefore the true good of the malefactor can always be promoted to some extent; but this extent must be kept within such confines that it does not conflict with the good of society.

The most repellent theories of the Atonement Rashdall finds to be based upon the retributive notion that punishment somehow cancels guilt irrespective of its effect on character; but they do not even remain faithful to the retributive idea when they conceive of guilt as cancelled through the sufferings of an innocent one. The theory of vicarious punishment is inconsistent with belief in a righteous God; for this latter belief implies that God imposes punishment or remits it only with a view to serving a moral purpose.[1] "Goodness", for Rashdall, refers to an actual condition of individual character. Hence the only way in which guilt can be cancelled, sins taken away, forgiveness made possible, and the soul made righteous, is through a real inward transformation. Guilt and righteousness are not conditions which can be "imputed". Naturally this has nothing to do with the wholly different conception of vicarious suffering;

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1. The reformatory theory of punishment also makes it difficult to conceive of God as condemning men to eternal punishment; if the God of love foreknows the destiny of souls, His remedial punishment will in the end succeed in its purpose. Cf. Appendix D.

suffering for the sake of others enters into any life which dedicates itself to loving purposes.

Even the acknowledged value of moral indignation, then, is contingent upon its being compatible with and subservient to love. Hence one of the greatest defects of the retributive theory is that it leaves no room for forgiveness. Resentment, as Bishop Butler observed, is not necessarily incompatible with good-will,[1] but forgiveness may imply remission of punishment. The alternative adopted must be the one which the best feasible ethical end dictates; ideally it would further the welfare of the offender and society alike, but unfortunately in practice the wider interest often makes it necessary to punish men whose own moral good 'would be best promoted by forgiveness'.[2] Rashdall supplements Butler's rationalistic wisdom, however, with a still deeper insight borrowed from Sir John Seeley, the author of Ecce Homo:

> 'Vengeance often loses its moral effect just because the avenger of the wrong is its victim, while forgiveness often touches the heart just because the forgiver is the man who suffered the wrong'.[3]

This peculiar advantage of forgiveness over punishment in furnishing evidence of love must be remembered in deciding the path of individual duty; but it must also be taken as a guiding principle for understanding how the God of love reveals Himself to His children.

(ii) - The Doctrine Considered Historically.

Rashdall's historical enquiry concerning the Atonement begins with a study of what Christ Himself taught about forgiveness of sins. He asks whether our Lord connected it in any way, as Christian thought has done,[4] with 'the atoning efficacy of His death'. Here, as in the

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1. Cf. GE. I, p. 307.
2. Ibid., p. 310. It is important to note how closely Rashdall associates forgiveness with remission of punishment.
3. Ibid., p, 311.
4. Atonement, p. 4.

case of the Incarnation and the Trinity, Rashdall maintains that a doctrine may be true, even though examination discloses that it is the product of later reflection. But here also, Christ's own teaching has a primary importance; for if no theory may claim to be exclusively founded upon His own conception of salvation, then the individual Christian is all the more free to decide which is most true; and, on the other hand, this decision will be greatly affected if any theory proves to be definitely imcompatible with the spirit of His message.

Our Lord's earliest teaching joined a call to repentance - the fundamental condition of forgiveness - with His annunciation of the Kingdom. Enough has beensaid already concerning the fact that, despite their eschatological setting, His conceptions of His Messianic office, the Kingdom, and the conditions for entering it, were primarily ethical and spiritual.

'The clear, unmistakable, invariable teaching of Jesus was that men were to be judged according to their works, including in the conception of works the state of the heart and intentions as scrutinized by an all-seeing God. The righteous were to be rewarded, the unrighteous were to be punished.'[1]

His conception of judgment according to works and character was not incompatible with His teaching of divine forgiveness because of the profound significance which he attached to repentance as 'a radical change of heart or character'[2]: The sinner whose life is transformed by a contrite return to God thereby becomes righteous and will be admitted to the Kingdom. This doctrine of forgiveness grew directly out of His teaching of the Fatherhood of God, which also implied that the punishment necessarily imposed on the unrepentant had a reformatory purpose and was therefore likewise an expression of divine love. Divine forgiveness was closely connected with human forgiveness, as in the

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1. Atonement p. 12. See Appendix D, concerning the nature of this reward and punishment.
2. Ibid., p. 24.

Lord's Prayer, because a man's willingness to forgive others was taken as a sign of a genuine change of heart wrought by repentance.

The essential question is whether Jesus adds to this teaching the further condition of belief in His Messianship as necessary for approval at the Judgment. Rashdall's general conclusion is that the synoptic passages which might be held to confirm such an idea, reveal on inspection that what is enjoined as necessary for salvation is not some specific belief concerning His person or work, but obedience to His words because they reveal the will of God.[1] Nowhere in the Synoptic

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1. For detailed evidence in support of this statement, especially concerning Mt. 10:32, see op. cit., pp. 21 f., and 56-8. Two passages, which seem fundamentally opposed to Rashdall's interpretation, and which played an important part in the development of later theories, must be mentioned briefly. The first of these is the "ransom" passage (Mk. 10:43-5, and parallels); Rashdall seeks to discredit it as an ecclesiastical addition, holding that Luke's account (22:27), in which the word "ransom" does not occur, is the more primitive, and also suggesting that the identification of the conception of the Suffering Servant with that of the Messiah (if this is indeed the intention of the saying) came more probably from later tradition than from Jesus Himself. Moreover, he regards it as an isolated passage, irreconcilable with Christ's teaching as a whole; and he tries to show that in any case it does not imply that Christ's death was expiatory or substitutionary, let alone the sole means of procuring forgiveness for sin. (See pp. 27-37 and 49-56 for detailed exegesis).

Concerning the second passage, which occurs in the account of the Lord's Supper (Mk. 14:22-25 and parallels; cf. I Cor. 11: 23-25), he maintains that the sole reference to forgiveness, in Matthew's narrative, 'may most confidently be set aside' (Ibid., p. 38) as a gloss. The reference to "the blood of the covenant" Rashdall likewise refuses to regard as genuinely uttered by our Lord; at the same time he seeks to show that, by reason of its association with Jer. 31:31, it implied free forgiveness, not expiation. "This is my body which is for you", as recorded by St. Paul, - even disregarding the fact that the Synoptics (here Rashdall follows what he takes to be the genuine text of Luke) omit the words "for you", and interpreting the saying as referring exclusively to His impending death, - means merely that He is about to sacrifice His life for His followers in fulfilment of His Messianic mission. So long as the Matthean reference to the remission of sins is omitted, there is nothing, either symbol to suggest 'that Jesus was dying "for" His followers in any other sense than that in which He had lived for them' (Op. cit., p. 44).

Gospels, he asserts, is there the slightest authentic suggestion that Jesus regarded anything besides repentance - whether it be His own death, or any belief or sacrament - as necessary for divine forgiveness.[1]

'Even those who formulated the theology' of the atoning efficacy of His death, 'do not suggest that their teaching on this head rests upon any express word of the Master, nor do they claim to be in any way authorized to contradict that teaching'.[2]

Hence Rashdall contends that Christ's own simple, yet profound, teaching of divine forgiveness must be taken ~~as~~ as the basis of any true doctrine of the Atonement, and a chief argument which he urges against some of the traditional theories is that they cannot possibly be reconciled with this teaching. Yet he also finds in the idea of a suffering Messiah a revolutionary departure from Jewish traditions, which may be integrally associated with Christ's mission of revealing God's love. Whether or not this idea constitutes a retrospective expansion of Christ's own teaching (and Rashdall believes that it does), it truly expresses the meaning of His work, - especially when it is seen to imply that in inspiring others to follow Him in the way of sacrifical love, He leads them into the way which, as He taught, brings forgiveness also. The primary fact to be remembered is that when Rashdall defends the notion that God judges a man in accordance with his actual moral condition, his inward character and its outward expression in works, he is basing his interpretation both on what he believes to be self-evidently true on ethical grounds and on what he believes to have been our Lord's own teaching.

'If', through repentance, 'a man has actually returned to a right moral state', then he 'is already reconciled to God'.[3]

How, then, did Christians come to associate the forgiveness of sins with the atoning death of Christ? The absence of this idea from the early speeches of Peter and Stephen in Acts, Rashdall takes as indicating that for a period after the Crucifixion salvation through

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1. Cf. Op. cit., p. 26.
2. Ibid., p. 27.
3. Ibid., p. 49.

the Messiah was a belief which had not yet come to be connected with the prophetic passages which gave rise to the idea that Christ's death was an atoning sacrifice. That this connexion had been made before St. Paul began preaching, however, is apparent from his own statement that he had "received" the doctrine "that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures".[1] The idea that the Messiah could suffer an ignominious death raised a tremendous difficulty, especially for Jewish Christians; this was overcome, Rashdall believes, when some time not long after the Crucifixion the primitive Church found prophetic passages, notably the Suffering Servant poems of Deutero-Isaiah,[2] which could be taken as foretelling that the Messianic task would involve suffering in order to save believers from sin. Although the doctrine of the Atonement therefore came to be accepted on scriptural authority, it no doubt corresponded also with the moral regeneration which early Christians themselves experienced. Yet it was inevitable that this authoritative acceptance should be supplemented eventually with theories which sought to explain 'why Christ's death was necessary',[3] and how it alone made forgiveness available. The first of these, and 'ultimately... the most influential',[4] was that of St. Paul.

Only Rashdall's own estimate of the Pauline theory need be considered here; this can be indicated best by presupposing those aspects of his treatment of the apostle which are the common property of all students of the New Testament, and by concentrating upon a few distinctive points. Assuming that St. Paul thought of sin as the inevitable result of the Fall and man's fleshly nature, with death as its penalty, Rashdall distinguishes first of all between the objective

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1. I Corinthians 15:3.
2. For the frequency with which this passage was cited in apostolic literature, see Atonement, pp. 79 f.
3. Ibid., p. 82.
4. ~~Op. cit.~~ Ibid., p. 82.

ground and the subjective appropriation of justification;[1] St. Paul departs from the Master's teaching when he makes the former a purely gracious act, independent of the sinner's repentance. Because he accepts the doctrine on authority, he gives no explicit account as to why this act, the death of Christ, was necessary for the remission of sins; yet he clearly leaves the implication, as though unwillingly, that God's righteousness demanded it: Christ suffered death, the universal penalty for sin, in order that men might be released from both. The idea of vicarious punishment, then, cannot be eradicated from his system, although it does not occur very frequently. Furthermore, the efficacy of the death (though here again St. Paul is not explicit) is associated with the fact that Christ Himself merited no penalty, and accepted the Cross voluntarily.[2] Through participating in this one act of Christ the believer might be freed from sinful flesh (and the Law),[3] just as through the one act of Adam all men were made sinners; closely associated with this was the notion that Christ, as perfect man, incorporated the whole of humanity in Himself. But it must be noted that St. Paul expounds this expiatory or substitutionary theory mainly in juridical, rather than sacrificial, language. Moreover he represents reconciliation as involving a change in man, not in God; Man's sin is removed; God's love, which is compatible with the imposition of a penalty upon sinners, remains constant. Hence Rashdall's subjective explanation of how reconciliation is made possible, is to this extent compatible with the apostle's thought. Here the fundamental agreement between St. Paul's conception of God and his Master's, is most apparent; divergence arose, Rashdall

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1. Cf. Op. cit., p. 90.
2. Cf. Ibid., pp. 94 f. The Anselmic theory is thus implicit in Paul's thought.
3. But the Spirit carried with it a disposition to adhere to the moral (not the ritual) obligations of the Law; thus St. Paul's position does not end in Antinomianism. (Cf. Ibid., p. 106).

maintains, because the apostle felt obliged to reconcile an authoritative Old Testament teaching of death as the inevitable penalty for sin, with Christ's teaching of forgiveness.

When St. Paul speaks of the subjective conditions of justification, it is possible, Rashdall believes, to detect two different strata of meaning. In his doctrinal statements "faith" is set forth as a form of intellectual belief about Christ, though it refers to His Messiahship and Resurrection, and not to some special theory of the Atonement. In these same statements justification itself means "declare righteous", not "make righteous". But this aspect of his thought is off-set by conceptions derived from his own inner experience, in which "faith" involves a personal surrender to Christ, and the Holy Spirit (communicated at baptism, - a rite attended by a 'profession of repentance')[1] brings with it moral regeneration and good works: thus justification results in santification. Only so is St. Paul able to avoid making ficitious the righteousness which is "imputed"; the process of santification, begun at the moment of conversion or baptism, is one which gradually regenerates the sinner, but does not make him fully righteous until the Judgment. Therefore, full salvation implies a moral regeneration which expresses itself in good works. Because St. Paul's own conviction brought with it wholly new capacities for fulfilling the commandment of love, he fell into the error of assuming that "faith alone" would have the same effect in others. There is nothing in his doctrinal statements to cope with cases which do not conform to his own experience. Therefore Protestant teaching concerning justification can rest its case upon the letter of his teaching; but his own inner conviction clearly associated full salvation with faith which also produces love; and the cleavage thus caused in his thought is best expressed by

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1. Op. cit., p. 112.

'the scholastic distinction between an unformed faith (fides informis), mere intellectual belief, which saves not, and a perfected faith (fides formata) which saves because it produces love'.[1]

Hence Rashdall finds a cleavage, in St. Paul's teaching on the Atonement, between the demands imposed by the Old Testament upon his doctrinal theory, and the inner convictions based upon his own moral and religious experience. To the former belong his substitutionary conception of Christ's death, his conception of imputed righteousness, his conception of faith as intellectual belief. If his belief in the plenary inspiration of the Old Testament is no longer binding upon Christians, Rashdall claims, then neither are the theoretical conclusions which he reached because of it. On the other hand, the portion of the apostle's teaching which reflects his own experience, contributed inestimably to the understanding of Christ's work; for in this experience he saw revealed in Christ's life, and supremely in His death, the love of God; he saw that by responding to the example of this life, men might be so transformed in character as to follow the same way of love which alone could lead to full salvation and God's forgiveness.[2]

Unfortunately it is impossible to review here the chain of evidence, - running through all the remaining canonical books of the New Testament and through the earliest fathers and apologists up to Irenaeus - by which Rashdall supports certain theses already put forward. Suffice it to say in summary that wherever these writers refer to anything approaching a substitutionary or expiatory theory, they do so (he holds) on the scriptural authority of "Messianic" prophecies. For this reason such references usually consist in a simple affirmation of the fact that Christ died "for" mankind,[3] thus making possible the forgiveness of

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1. Op. cit., p. 120.
2. Concerning the extent to which St. Paul's own experience reflects the "Mind of Christ", see especially op. cit., pp. 106 ff., and PP., Ch. III.
3. Concerning the distinction between ἀντί and ὑπέρ, see Atonement, p. 93. Except for I. Thess. 5:10 and Gal. 1:4, in which some readings give περί, St. Paul uses ἀντί ; and this is generally the case with these other early Christian writers. Concerning the use of ἀντί in the ransom passage, see DD., pp. 128 ff.

sin; therefore these writers feel under no complusion to defend the doctrine by furnishing an elaborate explanation of it. Here Rashdall finds further evidence for his belief that the doctrine originated in an acceptance of scriptural authority, however much it may have found confirmation in the reflection and experience of the early Church.

In fact, none of these writers follows St. Paul in putting forward even a tentative explanation of the idea of 'substitution or vicarious punishment'. Where they do provide any explanation, 'the efficacy attributed to Christ's death is subjective rather than objective, prospective rather than retrospective, moral rather than judicial'.[1]

Here again, then, Rashdall finds an hiatus between doctrine accepted on authority and explanation based on experience; this is widened by the fact that for most of these writers the ethical effects associated with the latter spring from the Incarnation viewed as a whole, and are not identified exclusively with Christ's death at all. Rashdall finds especially noteworthy this refusal to follow the central ideas of the Epistle to the Romans, even as St. Paul came to have increasing authority. This was partially due to the fact, he believes, that St. Paul's doctrine of justification was simply not understood.[2] Hence even when his language was ostensibly accepted, it was so re-interpreted that the major emphasis fell solely upon his inspired utterances concerning the moral regeneration wrought in the heart of the believer by Christ's life and death.

Special mention must be made of the Epistle to the Hebrews,[3] because of its sacrificial language. Clearly in this epistle the death

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1. Atonement, p. 148. The Epistle to Diognetus, IX: 2-5, one of the latest writings in the period under discussion, seems to contain an exception to this generalization; but the substitutionary passage in question contains no theoretical explanation; it merely reiterates the ransom passage, interpreted in the light of Is. 53 and St. Paul. See Atonement, p. 206 n; pp. 215 f. give the entire passage.
2. Cf. Atonement, p. 149.
3. Cf. Ibid., pp. 150-164.

and blood of Christ are represented as the symbol of an accomplished work of purification. Thereby the writer seeks to make Christianity acceptable to Jews who attach great significance to such rites. Far from putting forward an idea of vicarious punishment, he always explains the redeeming effect of the sacrifice in terms of a new knowledge of God's will and new power to perform it, which Christ's life as a whole makes available. Wherever salvation is dependent upon anything objective, it is always the intercessory activity of the risen Christ which this writer emphasizes, not His death. For him, faith implies belief in God, but he values it because it enables men to do good works, not because it constitutes 'by itself a new kind...of righteousness'.[1] And the object of faith is not some past event, but 'the future fulfilment of God's promises'.[2]

In all these writers, for reasons similar to those given in the case of St. Paul, Rashdall rejects the idea of vicarious sacrifice, but finds the basis of a true doctrine of the Atonement in their conception of salvation through the moral and spiritual influence of Christ's life and teaching.

Clement of Alexandria, the first of the important patristic writers whom Rashdall considers, really falls under the generalizations just discussed; in his teaching salvation comes through the knowledge of God, which the whole Incarnation, and not merely the effect of Christ's death, made possible. Clement, too, sometimes repeats the formulae derived from prophecy, but his explanations always turn upon moral and subjective transformation.

In Irenaeus Rashdall finds the first definite objective theory of redemption to be formulated after St. Paul, - a theory necessitated partly by the Gnostic controversy, in which discrepancies between the Old Testament conception of God, and the God of mercy revealed in Christ,

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1. Cf. Atonement, p. 161.
2. ~~Op. cit.~~ Ibid., p. 162

again came to the fore; - but also necessitated by the canonical authority which St. Paul's writing were coming to possess. Irenaeus calls attention to the fitness of God's method of redemption by stressing the parallelism in the restoration through one man's obedient suffering, of what had been lost through one man's Fall; this gradually takes the form of a theory in which the whole creation is recapitulated in Christ, and it even anticipates the notion that all humanity suffered in Christ. Hence for Irenaeus, the very idea of salvation involves the Incarnation as a whole; for only a man could remove a penalty incurred by man; yet only a man 'united with God'[1] could be incorrupt, and God alone could grant salvation. Greek theology largely followed Irenaeus in thus making salvation primarily a 'restoration of...incorruptibility and immortality' rather than a 'retrospective forgiveness of sins'.[2] But he explains this salvation as being brought about through a ransom paid to the Devil for the release of mankind, who had become subject to him through the Fall.[3] Presumably this theory was designed as in keeping with the righteousness of God; because Satan had no claim over the sinless Christ whose death he caused, God therefore had the right to release man from his power.

Rashdall notes that Irenaeus and his followers failed to see the incompatibility between a ransom theory and a theory of expiatory sacrifice or vicarious punishment; yet if Christ died to satisfy the claims of the Devil, He did not die to save men from the punishment demanded by God's wrath or righteousness. Rashdall adds, in fairness to Irenaeus, that in his writings the triumph over the Devil sometimes seems to be through the regenerating influence which Christ brought into the world. For nearly a thousand years, however, the ransom theory dominated tradition[a] thought concerning the Atonement; to be sure,

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1. Op. cit., p. 239.
2. Op. cit., pp. 239 f.
3. Irenaeus may have arrived at this idea by substituting the Devil for Marcion's "Demi-urge", - the God of the Jews, from whom Christ set men free; but in any case, Christ's redemptive works was prevailingly regarded at this time as a triumph of some sort over the Devil. Cf. Ibid., pp. 241 f.

many variations not found in Irenaeus were introduced; and this fact is exhibited by each of the next two writers whom Rashdall considers.

In Tertullian, the theory receives its Latinized, judicial interpretation; several distinctive, and for the most part unfortunate, features therefore first gain prominence in his writings; actual corruption, as well as actual guilt, seems to be inherited; the death of Christ is the chief purpose of the Incarnation, and the latter would not have occurred at all had it not been for the Fall;[1] the power of the Devil over man is treated virtually as a just one; morality is dependent upon the arbitary will of God, though this is incompatible with Tertullian's attempts to show the justness of the Atonement.[2] Many elements in this coarse theory, in which relations between God and man are exhibited primarily as legal transactions, endured long in the theology of the West.

In Origen, for the most part, Rashdall finds a theory very nearly approximating what he regards as the truth of the Atonement doctrine;[3] for Origen makes the teaching and example of Christ's whole life, and not merely His death, the means of salvation. It is by the moral influence upon the believer of the love and self-sacrifice revealed in Christ, that His work is accomplished. This, of course, is essentially pre-Irenean in tone; but there are other strains in Origen's writings, not only where the death is plainly used merely as a symbol for Christ's whole life and influence, but where the ransom theory seems to be accepted. Origen even adorns the theory with the notion that through Christ's death the Devil was tricked into his own undoing. Yet his theory is not couched in legalistic terms, nor does it attribute anything virtually immoral to God Himself. Becauses he uses traditional

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1. Cf. op. cit., pp. 249 f.
2. Cf. Ibid., p. 253.
3. He also esteems, of course, Origen's view of the Logos, and of philosophy as the propaedeutic to theology. No doubt his admiration for Origen is well founded. But his deprecation of Irenaeus' ability is hardly warranted merely by the fact that Rashdall holds a different theory.

conceptions, he often speaks of Christ's death as a sacrifice or propitiation; but the explanations which he appends always lend an ethical significance to these terms such that he can 'attribute()... the same kind of efficacy, in an inferior degree, to the deaths of the martyrs and the good works or intercessions of other good men'.[1] He once speaks as though God's punishment for sin fell upon Christ; but Rashdall seeks to show that this is merely an obeisance to authoritative language which is foreign to Origen's real theory. Similarly, Origen seems to accept St. Paul's doctrines, but in commenting upon them he follows only those aspects which can be construed as teaching that justification means "making righteous" instead of "counting righteous". It is impossible to give any place here to Rashdall's account of Origen's world-view, except to say that the latter's emphasis on free-will required him to regard the love revealed in the Incarnation and the Cross as persuading rather than coercing men to choose goodness. Origen's "moral influence" theory was, Rashdall concludes, a replica of Christ's teaching, with 'the quite consistent addition'[2] that the example of Christ Himself instills the repentance which brings with it regeneration and God's forgiveness.

The ethical explanations which Rashdall believes to have harboured the real views of most early Christians were swallowed up in the ransom theory, against which only a few scattered protests, from Adamantius and Gregory of Nazianzus for example, can be found before the twelfth century. Yet Eastern theology mitigated what it accepted as a traditional doctrine, because it accorded primacy to the Incarnation as bringing to man knowledge of God, and the recapture of his lost divinity; thus it found reason for Christ's coming other than as a device for saving a fragment of the race from sin and death; and it was free from juridical

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1. Op. cit., p. 263
2. Ibid., p. 275.

conceptions. Latin theology, on the other hand, had the merit at least of holding more steadfastly to the reality of Christ's humanity and suffering, though this very tendancy also gave rise to a separation between the Father and the Son whereby one Person in the God-head might "placate" the other by His sacrifice. The legalistic scheme of Tertullian reached its culmination in St. Augustine, but several writers contributed significantly to the intervening development.[1]

In a rather harsh section, Rashdall seeks to show that St. Augustine's theology, so far as the Atonement is concerned, merely crystallized and hardened elements taken over from St. Paul. Irenaeus and Tertullian. Therefore this exposition, which is largely carried out in the form of a comparison of St. Augustine's teaching with St. Paul's, need not detain us. It extracts almost all the worst features of a juridical, substitutionary theory from St. Augustine's writings; the Incarnation would not have occurred if the Fall had not made necessary redemption through Christ's death; Christ's suffering is represented usually as substitutionary punishment, just in itself because through inherited guilt all men deserve it; this suffering destroys the Devil's "just" dominion over man. And then, at the end of his treatment, Rashdall attacks St. Augustine's own character as one in which "asceticism and ecclesiasticism have extinguished morality".[2]

Interwoven with this account are remarks which may help to relate Rashdall's general philosophical position to his attitude toward certain doctrinal conceptions; these are more germane to our purpose than a review of notions which have already been mentioned in previous writers. First of all, so long as the idea of original sin is not interpreted in terms of a literal Fall, Rashdall finds a great measure of truth in it. He has no sympathy with Augustine's idea that man's will was free,

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1. Cyprian, Ambrosiaster, and Ambrose, Augustine's own master. Cf. op. cit., pp. 327-30.
2. Ibid., p. 345.

in the indetermistic sense, before the Fall, and he repudiates the doctrine of inherited guilt and total depravity; he would stress the fact that the doctrine of original sin is compatible with a belief that the Imago Dei was merely impaired, not destroyed, while Augustine only admits this perfunctorily.[1] On the other hand Rashdall rejects the Pelagian teaching which assumes that, theoretically at least, man could become sinless apart from grace. In other words Rashdall, as a determinist, acknowledges the moral dependence of the individual upon heredity and environment; more specifically, he cannot conceive of a sphere in which the individual could act without divine assistance, and this is what he means by "grace". In a very real sense he acknowledges that such goodness as man achieves, he "receives"; he receives the ideal which prompts him to good actions, and the power which enables him to perform good actions.

'Certainly no modern theistic philosopher', he writes, 'will quarrel with St. Augustine for saying that neither right belief nor right action is possible without a divine activity in the soul'.[2] But of course Rashdall would hold that the virtues of the so-called "natural" man are within the sphere of the effects of grace and not outside it, and that the operation of grace is by no means confined to the sacraments, as St. Augustine tended to believe.

For similar reasons he can accept the idea of predestination, but not in its Augustinian form; the whole question turns, he contends, on 'our idea of the end for which men of evil character are brought into the world'.[3] He rejects St. Augustine's theory because it arbitrarily confines salvation to those who have fulfilled certain requirements of belief, and thus automatically condemns to eternal torment - for example - all pre-Christian pagans, irrespective of their actual moral character. He also rejects St. Augustine's purely negative view of evil, which

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1. Cf. op. cit., p. 336.
2. Ibid., p. 341.
3. Ibid., p. 338.

conserves God's absolute omnipotence without making Him the cause of evil. In connexion with a discussion of "faith", it comes out quite clearly that Rashdall objects to making specific doctrinal belief a condition of salvation; for he cannot approve of St. Augustine's teaching on the subject, even though the latter makes both faith (belief) and love indispensable. Evidently Rashdall holds that to show forth love like Christ's is the primary test of "faith" in Him, and that this is sufficient for salvation even when unaccompanied by intellectual assent to a particular dogma.[1]

The way is now clear to consider the few pages wherein Rashdall's historical exposition is most freighted with significance for his own, and all modern, theology; for the twelfth century revolt against the ransom theory brings us to Anselm and Abelard. His remarkably clear and succinct résumé of Cur Deus Homo needs no reproduction here; what he commends most is St. Anselm's steadfast insight into the blasphemy of contending that God owed the Devil a just debt, or that the Devil had any rights over mankind which had to be circumvented. Moreover, St. Anselm held that through the example of Christ the believer might be aided in his effort to avoid sin, once he had availed himself through baptism of the "satisfaction" which the Son offered to the Father. Thus he gave some place to the "moral influence" theory; but this stands side by side with the idea that Christ's sacrifice obtained forgiveness even for post-baptismal sins, so long as the sinner himself gave satisfaction for them through penance.[2] Except for his one revolutionary departure, St. Anselm's theory is but a more consistent and skilful attempt to show the justice of the Atonement in juridical terms like Tertullian's and Augustine's.

Rashdall finds, beneath St. Anselm's masterful logic, a confusion

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1. Cf. Op. cit., p. 341. Rashdall's attitude on this question is defined more exactly in what follows; Cf. # 239 f.
2. Cf. Ibid., p. 355.

between a debt, or a personal affront, which ordinary justice permits the creditor or injured party to forgive voluntarily, and a criminal or moral offence, the penalty for which cannot rightly be set aside. But his primary reason for rejecting the Anselmic theory is that, like all substitutionary theories, it allows the attribution of guilt, which should be confined to the offending individual, to be extended to all mankind, who suffer eternal torment to satisfy God's honour unless they are redeemed; and, conversely, it implies the even more repellent notion that a penalty inflicted upon a sinless Christ can somehow make it just to release those who are really guilty.[1] Such a theory (Rashdall asserts) reflects a conception of justice cruder than any St. Anselm himself would have employed in human affairs. It was possible for him to indulge in such reasoning only because he followed

'the old bastard Platonism which makes the universal "human nature" into an entity separable from any and all individual men... "Humanity" is supposed to have contracted the debt in the first Adam and to have discharged it in the second'.[2]

Finally, though St. Anselm himself conceived of 'the Father as fully co-operating in the scheme of redemption',[3] his theory inevitably tended towards a dichotomy between the justice of the Father and the love of the Son.

In Abelard's theory, except for a few minor lapses,[4] Rashdall at last finds teaching about the Atonement which in its simplicity reaches the source of the doctrine's power, and eliminates all immoral and unintelligible accretions.

'The efficacy of Christ's death is now quite definitely and explicitly explained by its subjective influence upon the mind of the sinner. The voluntary death of the innocent Son of God on man's behalf moves the sinner to gratitude and answering love - and so to consciousness

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1. Rashdall acknowledges Anselm's distinction between satisfaction and punishment; but he adds that it cannot be regarded as absolute, because Anselm himself sometimes refers to Christ's death as punishment. Cf. Ibid., p. 352.
2. Op. cit., p. 353.
3. Ibid., p. 357.
4. Cf. Ibid., p. 363.

of sin, repentance, amendment'.[1]

What most appeals to Rashdall is that here, merely by isolating from all abstract theories the moral transformation which takes place in the heart of man at the thought of Christ's love as a revelation of God's love, Abelard has made God's punishment and forgiveness apply to the actual moral character of the individual, and has cut away all fictions concerning inherited guilt or imputed righteousness. The God of love is not one who brings into the world souls predestined to eternal torment because in the sin of Adam they too had derogated from His honour; the God of justice is not one who punishes Christ in order that He may "count" the real sinner righteous. A great many Christian writers had taught the central idea of the Abelardian theory; Abelard's originality consisted in casting off the murky cloak of traditions which concealed it.

The nature of Rashdall's approval must be clearly understood. In the Incarnation he sees God actively revealing His nature as love to mankind; the fullness of this revelation required that it culminate in Christ's suffering on behalf of His followers. Therefore, to put it simply, Rashdall believes that God was doing something of supreme significance in Christ (strictly, through Christ) in the hearts of men. What was God doing? Through the revelation of His own love in Christ He was providing the only means wholly adequate to an awakening of such repentance for sin, and such gratitude for love, that forgiveness would be possible. The Atonement does not represent a bargaining, in some celestial realm, between the Persons of the Trinity; it is the direct activity of God in bringing about the true moral welfare and salvation of His children; and this loving purpose He could not achieve without the suffering of His Son. And it is only when this cosmic significance of Christ's death is grasped, through belief in the

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1. Op. cit., p. 358.

Incarnation, that the subjective response awakened in the heart of the sinner has its full regenerative effect. Christ is the medium of reconciliation only when 'gratitude to (Him) passes into and becomes indistinguishable from gratitude to the Father whom He reveals'.[1]

Rashdall's account of scholastic theories must be dismissed with a very few words; this is one of the ablest chapters in the book, possibly because research for his Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages had early given him a considerable acquaintance with the thought of the period. In Aquinas, of course, he finds new magnificence of structure rather than new material, except that several (Platonic) extravagances of St. Anselm are corrected through the infusion of Aristotelianism. For the idea of humanity as a Platonic universal in the first and second Adam, 'Thomas substitutes the simpler Pauline thought of the head and its members'.[2] He fuses the Anselmic emphasis on merit and satisfaction with the idea of a ransom paid, not to the Devil, but to God; and at the same time he makes room for the Abelardian theory. His doctrine of the "efficiency" of Christ's death - a really Pauline parallelism between His death as cause and man's death to sin as effect - makes way for a close connexion between the Passion and the sacraments as a "stream of grace".[3] Although his Aristotelianism caused him to regard the individual's moral status as the result of his own actions, Aquinas really shared St. Augustine's determinism, except in so far as he (Aquinas) contended that original sin alone could not make a man worthy of damnation; the good works preparatory to justification, which St. Thomas mentions, are accordingly due to "prevenient grace"[4]. The very capacity to earn merit, which plays such an important rôle in

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1. Op.cit., p. 361. I have stressed this point more fully than Rashdall's own lectures do, because since their publication many critics have assumed (erroneously, I believe) that his "subjective" theory necessarily weakens appreciation of the fact that in the reconciliation of the individual believer the initiative lies with God.
2. Ibid., p. 374.
3. Cf. Ibid., pp. 377 f.
4. Cf. ~~op. cit.,~~ Ibid., p. 379.

the scholastic scheme, is itself a gift of grace. Justification therefore involves an actual infusion of virtue through grace, and, correspondingly, the faith which saves requires love and good works. This central characteristic of the scholastic teaching is one which Rashdall sets over against Lutheranism sharply; but he regrets that in Aquinas' teaching the operation of grace came to be associated almost exclusively with the sacraments, especially with penance, and the stress on merit gave rise to the immoral idea that credit could be transferred from a treasury accrued through works of supererogation. All this prepared the way for the priestly commercialism against which Luther rightly revolted.

In the Scotist reaction against Aquinas, with its emphasis on the will and upon grace as love, Rashdall naturally finds traces of undeniable advance. Even pagans are capable of some virtue because they are not wholly beyond the reaches of divine love. The death of Christ is conceived as a sacrifice for sin, but not as a substitutionary punishment; God willed to accept it simply through love. But the dependence of goodness upon the arbitrary will of God is limited only by the fact that 'the first table of the decalogue' springs from His 'essential nature';[1] hence love and good works in the human sphere come to be associated with obedience to the arbitrary commands of the Church.

The nominalist opponent of Duns Scotus, Occam, became really his successor in theology to the extent that he carried this tendency out to its fullest; some of the nominalists even went so far as to make the first table of the decalogue dependent on the will of God, thus destroying the idea of intrinsic goodness altogether. In them the dichotomy between revealed and speculative truth became virtually complete; hence they felt any rational explanation of the Atonement to be entirely unnecessary.

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1. Cf. op. cit., p. 384.

This account of scholasticism, inadequate though our summary has been, provides indispensable prolegomena for understanding Luther and the other reformers. Rashdall seeks to show that Luther's diatribes apply only to that degenerate nominalism in which he himself was trained; even then, Rashdall claims, they misrepresent the later scholasticism when Luther asserts that it conceived of salvation as possible without grace. Rashdall's own admiration for the best aspects of scholasticism, especially for Aquinas' attempt to bring all knowledge under the aegis of a unified theology, and for the Catholic conception of "faith working through love",[1] partially accounts for the ferocity of his chapter on Luther.[2]

He begins by characterizing Lutheran theology as a hardening of St. Augustine's, which in turn represents a hardening of perhaps the worst aspects of St. Paul's.[3] Hence in Luther culminates that fixation upon the death of Christ which neglects 'His Person, work, and teaching'[4]. Yet in accounting for this death, while there are traces of the ransom theory and of Anselm, Luther largely follows merely the worst phase of Nominalism in making it wholly arbitrary and utterly irrational; but whereas writers like Occam had renounced reason only in contrast to revealed theology, not in speculation, Luther renounces it altogether. Worse still, he revives the idea of a substitutionary punishment; and his irrationalism of course spares him the necessity of reconciling this with the simultaneous assertion that Christ's death springs from the love of God. He presses the consequences of the Fall farther than St. Augustine had ever done by holding that it completely obliterated the Imago Dei. In all these tendencies he was followed by Calvin, sometimes

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1. Gal. 5:6. Cf. Atonement, p. 368.
2. It must be admitted that Rashdall's familarity with German sources on the Atonement is obviously much less extensive than his study of the Greek, Latin, and even French, literature.
3. Cf. Atonement, p. 397.
4. Ibid., p. 398.

even more uncompromisingly. Thus Reformation theology wholly rests upon an immoral doctrine of the Atonement; Roman Catholicism could at least part with these base elements,[1] if it would, and still have something left.

Other important aspects of Luther's teaching must be noticed briefly: his contempt for human nature, which denies freedom of any sort,[2] and ends in the ultimate extravagance 'of holding that, even after grace, a man ought to hate himself and desire his own damnation'[3]; his agreement with St. Augustine (but also with scholasticism) that faith is impossible without grace, but his departure from St. Augustine in denying that even after justification man is capable of good works; his emphasis on depravity and "faith alone" to such an extent that at times he disparages repentance; his doctrine that divine pardon does not alter sinfulness at all, so that the righteousness imputed is fictitious, not only at the moment of justification, but equally so afterward. This last teaching is Luther's sole claim to originality; for St. Paul had taught that after justification God gradually makes a man really righteous, and St. Augustine had taught that justification itself makes a man righteous. To be sure, Luther sometimes admits that in santification God begins to make men really better;[4] but this[15] flatly opposed to the dominant view at least of his later writings, and it conforms, in fact, with the scholastic teaching which he is eager, above all else, to discredit.

This revulsion went so far with regard to the scholastic conception of faith that for Luther the word comes to mean 'mere intellectual belief - that and nothing else';[5] for him justification

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1. Op. cit., p. 400 n.
2. In this Luther fell into the Pelagian error of holding that an act willed by man could not at the same time be willed by God, and therefore lay wholly outside the area of grace. Cf. Ibid., p. 402 n., and Rashdall's own theory, # 123 f.
3. Ibid., p. 401.
4. Cf. op. cit., pp. 406 and 412.
5. Ibid., p. 407.

is accessible, not only without penances and indulgences, but without good works and love itself. 'At...times belief in the atoning efficacy of Christ's substitutionary death becomes the sole article of faith'[1]; and this entails a confidence on the part of the individual concerned that in his particular case salvation is assured. "Believe that you are saved, and you are saved"[2], is no caricature of Luther's teaching. Anyone who wishes to show that these statements represent 'temporary aberrations provoked by the heat of controversy'[3], who wishes to contend, in short, that the true Luther, as seen especially in his early writings, really believes that justifying faith involves love, is in effect appealing to an argument which makes Luther's position on this point indistinguishable from the best scholastic teaching. Rashdall does not put this observation forward as implying that the Reformation was unnecessary; as a revolt against institutional absuses, he believes that it was. But so far as doctrine is concerned, he writes:

'It is not too much to say that there was nothing in Luther's positive (as distinct from negative) teaching that was at once new and true'.[4] 'The least valuable part of the inheritance which modern Christendom owes to the Reformation...is its distinctive dogmatic theology, which was in truth very largely moulded upon the traditions and ideas of medieval Scholasticism in its last and most degenerate phase'.[5]

This is the core of Rashdall's diatribe against Lutheranism; but he relentlessly heaps on other charges. He seeks to show that Reformation theology generally, in its temper though not in its formal statements, gave rise to a divorce in the mind of the ordinary religious person between the loving mercy of the Son and the wrath of the Father. Again, he finds Luther specifically denying that Christ's message brought a new and higher moral law into the world. Finally, Luther's exclusive emphasis on belief in a specific doctrine makes the perdition

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1. Op. cit., p. 409
2. Ibid., pp. 409 f.
3. Ibid., p. 413.
4. Ibid., p. 413.
5. Ibid., p. 416.

of non-Christians certain and throws doubt on the salvation of everyone but Lutherans; furthermore, it sees in incredulity, honest doubt, 'serious enquiry into religious truth'[1], the archetypal sin. The only reformer who really mitigated this doctrine of election was Zwingli.

At the end of the discussion Rashdall utters a word of esteem for Luther's courage and admits the rightness of his protest against ecclesiastical corruption; he recognizes that in many important respects Luther brought about an effective reassertion in practice of the connexion between Christianity and high morality. But even then he cannot refrain from interpolating remarks about Luther's grave personal faults; and as a "parting shot" he quotes a passage - to show a different side of the practical effects of this teaching - in which Luther admits that his own certainty of salvation often led to negligence and indifference.[2]

(iii) - The Doctrine Considered Systematically.

The foregoing pages have been designed to reveal Rashdall's own views as they emerge in his survey of the history of the Atonement doctrine. Negative considerations have played an important rôle, because of his conviction that, in regard to this doctrine especially, the removal of immoral accretions is the primary task confronting anyone who desires to set free the jewel of truth embedded beneath. Perhaps a word more in this vein is advisable before we turn to a brief glance at the positive side of the matter. Most aspects which Rashdall finds objectionable in the traditional scheme of redemption fall away as soon as belief in the verbal infallibility of the Bible is outgrown; for on this belief rest the idea of a literal Fall, and the whole anthropology which underlies Pauline, Augustinian and Lutheran theology; on it, too, rests the very authority of St. Paul's

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1. Op. cit., p. 415.
2. Ibid., p. 417.

theorizing, an aspect of his teaching which otherwise might never have captured the mind of the Church. Again, all substitutionary theories rest upon a retributive view of punishment which presupposes that God must satisfy some abstract principle of vengeance, irrespective of the welfare of mankind, in order to be just. But it is noteworthy, Rashdall suggests, that the retributive theory itself makes punishment of the innocent, in place of the guilty, immoral; at the same time it makes Christ's own teaching of forgiveness immoral. This idea of retribution is still involved in any theory which holds that all humanity suffered punishment in Christ; furthermore, this latter theory involves a fearful abuse of the Platonic universal, in which the universal of humanity, incarnate in Christ, is separable enough from individuals to spare them actual punishment, but at the same time so inseparable that every individual 'may nevertheless be deemed to have been punished'[1] in Him. And then to regard Christ as a mere universal, Rashdall maintains, is to deny His real humanity.[2]

Rashdall's own positive view of the meaning of "faith" grows directly out of critical and historical considerations. Once the Lutheran formula is rejected, he believes, the way is open to regard Christ's death as inseparably connected with that revelation of God's love which His character and His whole ministry brought to mankind; salvation from sin, viewed as an awakening of love which transforms the heart of the sinner, must be seen as flowing from the Incarnation, from which Christ's death cannot be isolated for purposes of exclusive emphasis. Moreover, rejection of this same formula makes possible a return to the perennial teaching of the Church, prior to the Reformation, that justification implies an inward moral transformation which must be included within the very meaning of the word "faith". Rashdall takes this as indicating, not only that belief without love is fruitless,

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1. Op. cit., p. 424.
2. Cf. Ibid., p. 425.

but that repentance and moral goodness are sufficient to make a man justified, 'no matter what may be the state of his intellectual belief'.[1] This latter assertion, however, misrepresents his real intention; for he does not really mean to maintain that the gradual moral improvement which he associates with the meaning of justification[2] can be carried forward in any full sense without that aid and influence from Christ which follow from certain definite beliefs about Him. He is eager to show that any theory of forgiveness which disregards or minimizes a genuine change of heart is unfaithful to the teaching of the Master; and this eagerness betrays him into an exaggeration directly opposite to the formula "faith without love" which he places on Luther's lips. A moment later, however, Rashdall returns to a true statement of his own position when he affirms that belief in Christ is the most powerful force in the world working for man's salvation. He desires to dissociate himself from the assumption that those outside the Church can be neither morally good, nor the recipients of grace, in any sense; but even so, he recognizes that the highest secular morality in the world to-day owes much to Christ; and as for those who have never heard of Him, the goodness which in some measure[3] "justifies" them 'is the goodness which Christ approved'.

One further word needs to be added lest it be supposed that, in rejecting the notion of imputed righteouness, Rashdall seems to affirm that a man must become actually sinless before he receives forgiveness. Justification, which he conceives as a relationship between God and man brought about through the influence of Christ within the heart of the believer, is the process of making the sinner righteous. As will appear in a moment, he certainly does not believe that this process can ever be completed in this earthly life.[4] Divine

1. Atonement, p. 428.
2. He refuses to distinguish it sharply from santification. Cf. op. cit., p. 428.
3. Ibid., p. 430.
4. This point has already appeared, it will be remembered, in the discussion on immortality.

forgiveness, then, does precede the attainment of complete righteousness, but it is offered because by its sacrifical nature it awakens that love and gratitude, that desire to overcome sin, which in themselves constitute the primary conditions of righteousness and of sustained fellowship with God.[1] Hence the Cross does not make all other sacrifice unnecessary; rather, it draws all believers into that same sacrifical way which leads on steadfastly in love, even unto death.

Once again, as always in his discussion of Christian doctrine, Rashdall closely associates the concluding question as to what positive teaching about the Atonement is true, with the question as to what 'will most commend itself to the knowledge and experience of the present day'.[2] His own view has been sufficiently expressed and defended in the course of the previous survey; it is found most clearly in Abelard, but Rashdall would claim that it has its root in the most vital aspects of early Christian experience, especially St. Paul's, and that - apart from intrusions which are really inconsistent with it - it is in keeping with 'the dominant view of the best Greek theology...pre-eminently of Origen'.[3] And his view of justification is, of course, essentially that of the best period of scholasticism. He finds, too, that modern writers must choose in the end between this subjective view and some substitutionary or expiatory theory; only confusion can result from the attempt to avoid this issue, which seems to characterize some contemporary works on the subject.

The chief objection urged against the subjective view, as Rashdall recognizes, is that (though true as far as it goes) it is insufficient, because it leaves no room for the 'objective necessity

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1. Cf. DD., pp. 162 f.
2. Atonement, p. 436.
3. Ibid., p. 437.

for the death of Christ 'independently of its effects on the believer'[1]. But Rashdall shows conclusively, in a reply to Dr. Denney,[2] that the moral transformation which Christ's revelation of God's love brings about in the hearts of men is itself one term of a necessary and intelligible relation between the work which culminated in Christ's death, and the condition of sin which necessitated that work. In other words, the Crucifixion was the necessary consequence of Christ's faithfulness to His task of revealing God's will through perfect obedience. Rashdall and more conservative theologians are agreed, then, that in the work of redemption the initiative lies with God; the difference arises when Rashdall claims that no expiatory or substitutionary device is necessary because God can accomplish His redemptive purpose through a revelation in His Son, which vanquishes sin when the believer responds in repentance and love to the divine love beheld in Christ. Accordingly he views the Atonement as a primary, but not as the sole, purpose of the Incarnation. And once his view of the Trinity is accepted, no such difficulties can arise as those which result when the Son is conceived as a separate Being, pre-existing with a will of His own distinct from that of God the Father. Still less can the Atonement be thought of as some kind of legal transaction between two Persons in the God-head.

Rashdall's conception of Christ's death as the culmination of His unbroken task as the revealer of God's love, likewise brings his view of the Atonement into harmony with his entire view of revelation, and its forcefulness depends upon a whole-hearted belief in Christ's divinity:

'All human love, all human self-sacrifice is in its way and degree a revelation of God... In proportion as' this is felt, 'the answering love which the self-sacrifice awakens will be love to God

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1. Op. cit., p. 439. Italics mine.
2. Cf. Atonement, p. 440 n. Rashdall's reference to Denney's The Death of Christ, reads "pp. 126-7"; it should be read "pp. 176-7".

as well as love to man. The love of Christ will have this regenerating effect in a supreme degree in proportion as it is felt that the love of Christ supremely reveals the character of God'.[1]

This raises, of course, the whole question as to whether the sufferings of Christ reveal a suffering God. Rashdall's metaphysical position naturally safeguards him from Patripassianism in one respect; for him, the sufferings of the human Jesus could not be the sufferings of God. But on the other hand, he conceives of God as capable of feeling, or of something corresponding to it. The opposing Aristotelian view, which underlies the Catholic aversion to this idea, is incompatible with the doctrine that God is actively loving. If Christ's character is taken as revealing the character of God, then it is inconceivable that the Father does not suffer because of the sins and pains of His children, and it is above all inconceivable that He should not have suffered with Christ. The sufferings which Christ endured through love may be taken as representative of the sufferings which God Himself endures, because His nature is love. The Atonement, then, is the culmination of Christ's task as revealer because:

'No kind of death could have revealed the sympathy of God so impressively as a death of suffering, voluntarily submitted to from love of the brethren'.[2]

In conclusion it may be well to point out the way in which Rashdall's conception of salvation continues the line of thought suggested earlier in his discussion of immortality. To do this it is necessary to go even further back, where in the chapter on moral theory we considered his contention that value, especially the more spiritual goods,[3] is enhanced by duration. Couple this with his impassioned remarks about how far short even the best men fall of perfect goodness in this life,[4] and it becomes apparent that though

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1. Cf. op. cit., pp. 449 f.
2. Ibid., p. 454.
3. Cf. especially # 48 and # 155 n.
4. Cf. # 152.

he conceives of salvation as a process of actual moral improvement which begins here, he follows the teaching of St. Paul in believing that it can only be completed hereafter. And by very reason of this present incompleteness, even in Christians, Rashdall finds reason to hold that the hope of salvation cannot be entirely withheld from those outside the visible Church who nevertheless through repentance have become in some degree better. For to the extent that men are loving and become better, they are fulfilling what Christ taught. To recognize degrees of salvation, as well as degrees of revelation, is merely to recognize that God proffers His grace to all the creatures whom He has made in His image. Again it appears, then, that the supernatural- in this case the operation of grace - cannot be regarded, according to Rashdall, as a sphere sharply differentiated or disconnected from the natural or moral; ordinary human goodness, wherever it is found, is a manifestation of grace.[1] This does not bedim, rather it intensifies by contrast, our appreciation of the fact that full salvation from sin, full forgiveness, full knowledge of God's love, are to be found through Christ alone.

Appendix F. - The Church and Its Relations.[2]

No survey of Rashdall's religious philosophy would be complete which failed to mention his profound sense of the importance of the institutional and practical side of religion. Unlike many liberals, he was fully appreciative of how much had been gained through the stress which the Oxford Movement laid on worship. In fact, one volume of his sermons, (Christus in Ecclesia) is devoted almost entirely to an interpretive study of Christian institutions. This aspect of his work should always be remembered when his views concerning the authority of the Church seem to tend towards a rampant individualism which he really did not countenance. For example, he repeatedly criticized Harnack's

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1. Cf. CE., pp. 82 ff.
2. This appendix is based primarily upon the following sources; DD., Ch. XV; CE., Chs. I, II, IX, XXI-XXV.; ID., Chs. II-IV. The Modern Churchman, Vol. VII, pp. 331-44 ("The Spiritual Independence of the Church"); Vol. X, pp. 518-24; cf. also pp. 570 f. ("Reunion and the Lambeth Proposals"); Vol. XIII, pp. 21-29 ("What Is the Church?). The Contemporary Review, Vol. LXXXI, pp. 129 ff. ("Our Unhappy Divisions" - in collaboration with several others). "Clerical Liberalism" in Anglican Liberalism, pp. 77-134.

lectures on What is Christianity? because, in their Ritschlian stress on individual piety, they failed to do justice to the importance of corporate worship and ecclesiastical organization.

On the other hand, Rashdall gave much attention throughout his life to the social implications of Christianity, to the relations between Church and state, to the Christian use of wealth and property, and to concrete problems of administration, discipline, liberty and religious education arising within the Church.[1] Unfortunately these wider questions must for the most part be passed over in the brief statement which follows concerning his formal conception of the Church.

Rashdall's answer to the controversial question as to whether the Church is visible or invisible can be put very simply. The Church is a terrestrial society which is striving to realize the Christian ideal; hence any adequate conception of it must include both its visible and inviaible aspects. To identify the Church with an unascertainable body of elect souls, to make it wholly invisible, is to overlook the fact that the Christian community is concerned to foster definite purposes and to carry on definite activities within this world, although this is not, of course, its sole task. On the other hand, to identify the Church completely with a visible institution is to overlook the fact that no earthly society, in its doctrinal pronouncements, its moral teaching, or its temporal activities, ever can wholly and infallibly fulfil the truth of the Christian ideal. To the extent that a group of His followers succeed in fulfilling Christ's ideal of love for God and man, it is a Church; and to the extent that it fails, it is not.

From this conception of the Church, several conclusions follow: For example, apostolic succession cannot provide a decisive criterion for distinguishing between what is a part of the Church and what is not.[2] Or again, the decisions of majorities at councils, whether in the past or the present, cannot be regarded as infallible statements of Christian

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1. In this connexion his articles in The Economic Review and his contribution to Anglican Liberalism are especially worthy of attention. For his interpretation of Christ's own teaching on specific moral questions like the use of wealth, see CC., pp. 119 ff. Some of Rashdall's own best pulpit teaching on these questions is to be found in Principles and Precepts, especially Chapters V, VI, VIII, XIII, XIV. His essay, "The Philosophical Theory of Property", in Property, Its Duties and Rights (Edited by Bishop Gore), pp. 33-64, contains his most extended discussion of a question which he felt to be of paramount importance for Christians.
2. Rashdall subjects the whole question of the episcopacy, apostolic succession and the principle "no priest, no eucharist", to a close examination in the course of five articles in The Modern Churchman, Vol. IV, pp. 74-78; 146-157; 251-261; 318-328; 371-383. (Cf. CE., Chs. VII and VIII). He comes to the conclusion that none of these ideas can claim historical foundation in the form that they are held by orthodox churchmen; therefore, he suggests, their value - which he is far from denying - should be conserved in some manner which will not arrogate exclusive claims to the Anglican Church. The true test of a Church is spiritual, not ritualistic.

   These articles illustrate clearly the courageous way in which Rashdall, when he became convinced that an idea was false, always adopted the policy, not of disregarding it by following his own conscience in silence, but of speaking out in active attack against it. In fact, he hardly left room for compromise.

truth; Rashdall feels especially strongly on this point because he habitually attaches the largest measure of authority to the insights of the best men, οἱ φρόνιμοι , and they are usually in a minority, especially, he seems to think, where Bishops are gathered together,[1]

Rashdall is ready to defend these conclusions on the basis of critical evidence. The gospels do not indicate, he declares, that Christ's commissions to His followers conferred the power to rule or to decide infallibly on doctrinal questions; there is no well-attested passage[2] which suggests that He gave an exclusive power to the apostles which was transmitted to succeeding Bishops in the laying on of hands. In fact, government by a group of Presbyters or elders probably preceded the episcopal form. So far as Christ's own teaching is concerned, the Spirit is to be with all His followers, wherever two or three are gathered together in His name. Christ founded the Church as a brotherhood, marked off from the rest of the world by the fact that it sought to follow His teaching. Some form of organization became necessary for this society in the spreading of the gospel; but the same authority which established the resulting orders and rites, has the power to alter them. Episcopacy, for example, has value in securing continuity; but no exclusive necessity attaches to it which should be allowed to prevent re-union where that is possible on the basis of brotherly love. None of these remarks is intended to minimize in the least the indispensability of the Church for the perpetuation of Christianity; earnest Christians who see its defects should not, for that reason, remain outside it; on the contrary, they should work for its perfection from within by assuming the responsibility of membership in some definite organized branch of it.

In practice Rashdall strongly favoured re-union as an ultimate ideal, although he realized that the serious barriers to it must be surmounted very gradually. He did not believe in dispensing with episcopal ordination; but he urged the opening of Anglican services to Non-conformist ministers, and their voluntary reabsorption into the Anglican communion with or without such ordination.[3]

He supported the idea of establishment because he thought that under such a system the Church had more freedom to pursue its spiritual ends than would be the case if it were governed exclusively by the majority decision of an autonomous ecclesiastical assembly; the clamour for disestablishment, he felt, was motivated not by a desire for liberty, but by a desire on the part of high churchmen to crush dissention and restrict membership and priesthood to those who would assent to narrowly confined dogmas. At the same time, he recognized the need for widespread reforms in the present system[4].

Rashdall's view of the relation between Church and state is based upon the general conclusions reached in his ethical writings[5]. He rejects the social contract theory (and, of course, that of divine right) as the basis of political obligation, and represents the authority of the state as coterminous with the extent to which it serves the true well-being of its citizens; and that well-being he conceives as identical with the Christian ideal. This leaves rebellion as a right and a duty when the state fails to serve its true purpose. On the other hand, no institution like the Church, which

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1. A previous discussion (# 54 ff.) has already disclosed why Rashdall attributes authority, but not infallibility, to the Church.
2. The only passages in which ἐκκλησία occurs in the words of Jesus are in Matthew, and almost certainly reflect early second century views.
3. Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol. X, pp. 518-24.
4. Cf. Ibid., Vol. VII, 331-44.
5. For his discussion of this topic, see especially: ID., Chs. II and III CE., Chs. XXI and XXII; and an essay on "The General Function of the State" in Good Citizenship (edited by J.E. Hand), pp. 3-31.

affects the state's ultimate end, can be wholly outside the sphere of its authority; the extent to which it controls or grants autonomy to such institutions, should be determined solely in the light of how the state may best promote the spiritual welfare of its people.

Although the Church and state thus serve the same end, the former must retain its identity, because it can best promote this end through functions and methods which the state cannot take over. For example, the state must be coercive, - the Church, voluntary. Moreover, the state must serve its essentially Christian purpose while at the same time taking into account the suffrage and rights of non-Christian citizens. On the other hand, the Church is obliged to exert itself, not only in its task of teaching and worship, but in attempting to remove political and social evils by every legal means, where the state has failed to do so; it cannot look with indifference upon material conditions, or the economic system underlying them, which hinder the promotion of an individual and collective life dominated by the spirit of brotherly love.

When it is asked how these considerations affect the status of the individual, Rashdall replies that the ordinary "rights of Man" should be protected by the state in so far as this conduces to the general welfare, and that they should not be sacrificed unless the individual's own interests are given their due place among those of all concerned[1]. To carry this topic further would lead us beyond our present theme; suffice it to say that the temporal authority of the Church, no less than that of the state, must find its limits at that point where its intervention prevents the growth of character by undermining individual responsibility in economic, political and moral matters. Both institutions are justified in securing opportunities and benefits for the individual when he is unable to provide for himself, - not those which he could so provide. Usually the individual can best fulfil his political and religious duties by submission to authority; but when he is convinced that rebellion or schism, despite all its evil consequences, is more compatible with the Christian ideal than submission, then he must be faithful to the Christian ideal.

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1. Cf. CE. I, Ch. VIII ("Justice"), and ID., Ch. IV ("The Rights of the Individual").

PART TWO - CRITICAL REFLECTIONS

Introduction.

The primary purpose of this thesis has now been accomplished; I have thought it best to systematize and interpret Rashdall's writings without unduly interrupting the continuity of the argument. Whereas the fulfilment of this intention has necessitated an attempt at thoroughness, the critical reflections which will now be offered do not constitute a complete examination of what the preceding section contains. A few fundamental themes have been selected, not because they are necessarily more important than others which are neglected, but because they seem to me, for various reasons, to represent the points at which Rashdall's system most needs further scrutiny.

I have sought to show the interconnexion between my comments in the course of an argument which is primarily concerned with the analysis of specific problems; but because these remarks are based, in so far as possible, upon the implications of Rashdall's own system, no explicit criticism of his thought as a whole is offered except in connexion with his theory of revelation. There I briefly indicate a view which, in my opinion, avoids the defects of his unmitigating rationalism. This much more radical type of criticism - a type which is based upon my own point of view instead of upon his - also inevitably colours my discussion of the Incarnation and the Atonement.

The succeeding arguments follow roughly the order of the expository section. Perhaps my own interest in the problem is sufficient excuse for the attention which I devote to a purely ethical question at the outset.

1. The Right and the Good.

Recent controversy in ethics has raised many difficult questions concerning the relationship between the two notions "right" and "good". Hence one who reads Rashdall's ethical writings will continually judge

them unfairly, - will find them, in fact, confusing, - unless he remembers that distinctions which are widely accepted to-day were only beginning to appear (or, in many instances, merely reappear) when he was writing his last books in this sphere. One fact, above all others, must be remembered throughout the ensuing discussion: the distinction between an action and its consequences, upon which all deontological[1] theories rest, always appeared to Rashdall to be radically artificial and unintelligible. To ask whether an action would be wrong apart from all harmful effects, was to raise a meaningless question concerning a meaningless abstraction; for without these effects it would not be the action which it is. While this point of view must of course be tested against later expositions of the deontological theory, it is only fair to keep in mind the fact that he had no opportunity to develop and strengthen it in the light of them.

The best point of departure for an analysis of Rashdall's use of ethical terms is the passage in The Methods of Ethics[2] where Sidgwick dintinguishes between a wider and a narrower significance of the term "ought". In the narrow, categorical sense of the term it implies, as Kant contended, that the agent is capable of doing what he ought to do. In the wider sense the term involves reference to ideal conditions, whose realization may transcend the capacities of the agent, although he "ought" (in the narrower sense) to strive to realize these conditions in so far as he can.

Rashdall follows this distinction. He uses the terms "right" as synonymous with "ought" in its narrower sense, as applying solely to voluntary actions. He employs "ought" in its wider implication to

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1. "Deomtological" is used to-day to denote the theory opposed to "teleological"; Sidgwick was followed by Moore and Rashdall in employing "intuitionism" in this connexion; but, as Professor Broad has remarked, this term misleadingly suggests a distinction based on epistemology, with "empiricism" as its opposite. Cf. Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 206.
2. Cf. op. cit.(Sixth edition), pp. 31-34.

express the hypothetical idea that a contemplated state of affairs ought to be brought about by agents if they can bring it about. A difficulty arises, however, when (in The Theory of Good and Evil) he also uses the wider sense of "ought" with reference to affairs other than actions. Because this wider sense ("ought to be") is for him synonymous with "good" or "value", we are thus confronted by the question as to whether he attaches meaning to the latter notion apart from any reference to what some agent is hypothetically or categorically obliged to promote. He writes:

'Entirely apart from the question, "who caused such things?" I judge that pain or discordant music or ugly pictures (i.e. as experienced by conscious beings) are bad things. They seem to me to be bad whether they arise from chance or necessity or voluntary action. Only because I have so judged is there any ground for the judgment "it is right, in so far as it is possible, to get rid of these things"; but, whether they can be got rid of or not, they are equally bad'(1).

This is a serious mistake. In a metaphysical system like Rashdall's, the notion of obligation can have no meaning apart from its bearing (hypothetical or categorical) upon the voluntary actions of persons. In terms of such a system if a state of affairs "ought to exist", although it transcends the capacity of any human agent to bring it about, then this can only mean that God ought to bring it about; for obligation can exist only in and for minds[2]. But God cannot be subject to obligation because He has no impulses to do what is other than best; in Kant's terminology, His will is "holy". Therefore there is no sense of "ought", apart from hypothetical or categorical reference to the actions of some other conscious agent or agents, which can have any meaning. This is a point of the utmost importance; for, once established, it reveals the fact that if Rashdall remains faithful to his metaphysical position,

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1. GE. I, p. 136.
2. Cf. # 112.

he cannot claim that "value" or "good" supplies any ground for pronouncing judgments concerning "right" which is not already entailed in the meaning of what it is or would be right to do. In that case "right" would not be deducible from "good" or definable in terms of it.

Because his ideal utilitarianism seems to have many features in common with Moore's Principia Ethica, one is apt to leap to the conclusion that Rashdall, like Moore (in that book), holds "right" to be definable as instrumental to the good. But in his last ethical writings[1], he nowhere speaks of "right" as definable[2]; and yet in those books he retains the teleological criterion (of "right") which he expounded in The Theory of Good and Evil. The conclusion to which this mode of reasoning leads him is that "right" and "good" are correlative notions, which mutually imply one another, but neither of which is deducible from the other. In other words, the relation which binds the two notions together is synthetic, not analytic.

Now although Rashdall fails to give any indication of the fact, I can only interpret this as representing an important change in his position. In The Theory of Good and Evil he puts forward a conception of value which is incompatible with the idea of mutual implication. As we have just seen[3], he there holds "good" to be logically prior to "right"; he asserts that until a judgment of value is pronounced, there

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1. Ethics (1913) and Is Conscience an Emotion? (1914).
2. To be sure, he often speaks misleadingly of "right" as meaning "that which promotes the good" (strictly, the best possible), and of "good" as meaning "ought to be pursued". (Cf. Ethics, pp. 61 and 63n). His remarks in other contexts, however, make it clear that he does not regard either notion as definable in terms of the other. Despite a somewhat careless use of language, then, we may take it that he intends to follow Sidgwick in holding that, though a right action is indeed one which tends to promote universal well-being, this relation to the notion "an intrinsically good (or best) end" does not constitute a definition of "right". No other interpretation seems possible in the light of (a) many explicit statements to the effect that "right" is an unanalyzable, sui generis notion, which cannot be defined in terms of any other notion which does not already imply it, and (b) many similar statements to the effect that "good" implies "what ought to be done".
3. Cf. also # 25.

is no possible ground for forming a judgment concerning "right". If "good", in this connexion, does not necessarily imply "right", we can only conclude that at this stage of his thinking Rashdall regarded "right" as deducible from "good"[1]. As we have seen already, this earlier position is one which can be shown to be irreconcilable with his metaphysical views; and perhaps it was a discovery of this fact, or the direct criticisms of Prichard[2], which caused Rashdall to abandon it.

The real question which confronts us, then, is whether his later view is compatible with the teleological criterion which he never abandons. In other words, does the theory that judgments concerning "right" are strictly immediate (as they must be, if "right" is strictly indefinable and sui generis) necessarily imply that "right" can be known without reference to the value of consequences, or does it not? Even in The Theory of Good and Evil he contends that "right" is known immediately in the sense that if I know what action within my power will realize (either in itself, or through its consequences, or both)[3] the greatest good in a given situation, then it is self-evident that this action is right, and that I ought to perform it. So long as "good" does not necessarily imply "what ought, if possible, to be done", however, this contention does not fulfil what deontologists desire; for either it still implies that some ground, other than the notion of obligation itself, can be cited as furnishing a reason why it is right to perform the action in question, or it appeals to the notion "ought to be", which is meaningless unless it already presupposes that the object "ought to be promoted, in so far as possible". In other words, if Rashdall really

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1. I cannot see why this does not also imply "definable in terms of", although Rashdall does not explicitly use the expression, even in The Theory of Good and Evil.
2. Cf. # 26 f.
3. This is a question yet to be discussed.

attaches independent meaning to the term "good", he must represent moral knowledge as entailing two distinct judgments; (a) a judgment concerning the value of the end which the action will promote, and (b) a judgment concerning the obligation (or absence of it) to bring about the state of affairs possessing these (positively or negatively) valuable characteristics. The latter, however, "self-evident" when considered alone, is not "immediate" (as he takes the former to be) in the sense of resting on no grounds other than what the notion in question itself implies. Indeed, he admits this when he writes:

'We saw that fundamentally these moral judgments were judgments of value: they decide what is good, not immediately and directly what is right'(1).

Does his later view of mutual implication circumvent this difficulty? Here the essence of his contention would seem to be that it is meaningless to talk about what action is right without reference to an end which ought to be promoted; and, conversely, it is impossible to conceive of an end as being good except as that toward which it is or would be right for some conscious agent to direct his action. We do not deduce from the fact that an action is right that its end is good (or best), nor do we deduce from the fact that an end is good (or the best possible) that it is or would be right to promote it. This position still reflects his refusal to speak of either the action or its end in abstraction from the other. Moral conduct entails a purposive relation; therefore, to denominate the two terms of that relation is merely to look at the same thing from different aspects; and to discuss either term as though it could stand independently of the relation is to indulge in meaningless abstraction. As Dr. Broad has put it:

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1. GE. I, p. 100.

'It is surely possible that both "good" and "right" are indefinable, as both "shape" and "size" are, and yet that there is a synthetic, necessary, and mutual relation between them, as there is between shape and size'(1).

Whatever may be said in criticism of it, this new position is much more defensible than that put forward in The Theory of Good and Evil (at least, as there stated); and, so far as this question is concerned, it is a pity that the larger work has inevitably received more attention than the less accessible smaller books mentioned supra. One basis for reconciliation between deontological and (idealistic) teleological theories which Dr. Muirhead suggests in his review of the whole recent controversy, turns out to be precisely the conception of mutual implication just discussed[2]. Yet most critics (Muirhead included) have assumed that Rashdall's position at this point is either identical with Moore's, or merely a variant of it, and The Theory of Good and Evil affords at least some justification for this assumption[3].

Before proceeding further, perhaps I should summarise the manner in which Rashdall has revised his position at two points: (a) "Right" is indefinable and sui generis; this is incompatible with any teleological theory which implies that consideration of the value of an end can furnish a logical ground for asserting that it is right to promote that end. (b) "Right" and "good" mutually imply one another; this is

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1. Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 177.
2. An illustration of Muirhead's is identical with one of Rashdall's. Compare Rule and End in Morals, p. 45, with Ethics, p. 14, and Is Conscience an Emotion?. p. 46.
   Perhaps I should here draw attention to the fact that on pages 45 and 46 in this last book the word "analyzable" appears in a context which makes the argument nonsense unless this be taken as a misprint for "unanalyzable". Rashdall's handwriting, as I know from consulting his manuscripts, was amazingly bad; as a result, his proof sheets must have contained an unusually large number of errors; some of these were never corrected, and they may be found in all his books. Usually they are obvious, but sometimes they leave the reader with the sensation that either he or the author has momentarily lost his wits; cf., e.g., ICE, p. 29, line 6, where "more" should read "less".
3. In what follows, however, we shall see that even on the basis of this work Rashdall has sometimes been misinterpreted.

incompatible with the assertion that "good" is logically prior to "right".

One point at which, even in The Theory of Good and Evil, Rashdall seems to differ from Moore, has to do with whether "right" is related to the intended or to the actual consequences of an action. For very different reasons, Moore and deontologists agree that rightness may conceivably have nothing to do with the ends which the agent intends to promote; the former holds that rightness is dependent upon actual effects, and the latter hold that in the first instance it is not dependent upon effects at all, actual or intended. Rashdall has argued that, although the general effects of an action are frequently so clear that their connexion with duty is obvious, once it be admitted that the value of consequences is necessarily related to the rightness of the action, then there is no escape from admitting that the total chain of consequences - extending indefinitely into the future - should, ideally, be taken into account. As he acknowledges, this fact imposes a severe limitation upon the practical trustworthiness of casuistry. Moreover, even if "right" be related synthetically, instead of analytically, to "good", the possibility still remains that in any given case the extension of one's knowledge concerning the value of the action's consequences (since this involves at the same time an extension of one's knowledge concerning what it is right to do) may necessitate a revision of judgment concerning one's duty in that situation[1].

Now is the value (of the consequences) here referred to (a) that which the agent intends to produce by the action, or (b) that which actually results from it? Clearly the former alternative might entail the admission that some actions are right even though their actual

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1. Cf. # 18.f.

consequences are bad or indifferent. The latter alternative opens the way to the converse possibility that an action done from evil or indifferent motives might be right because it actually produced the best possible results. Rashdall's remarks fail to clarify his position, because they may be so interpreted as to support either alternative.

For example, if on Monday an agent performs an action whose consequences he expects and intends to be the best possible in the situation, and if on Tuesday he discovers, through an extension of his knowledge concerning those consequences (and thus concerning what it was right to do), that a different action, which he could have performed on Monday, would have produced better results, then was his action on Monday right or not?[1] Obviously from Tuesday onwards, he should act in the light of what he now sees to be his duty in such situations; perhaps this is what Rashdall means when he speaks of extended knowledge as sometimes resulting in a "redirection" of duty. If this implies that a right action is always one which is intended to promote what the agent supposes to be the best possible results, then the agent's action on Monday was right, and Rashdall has adopted the former alternative mentioned above. To say that the action on Monday was not right implies that rightness depends upon a relation to which motivation may be entirely irrelevant (i.e. the latter alternative supra). He seems to prefer the former alternative, even in The Theory of Good and Evil, despite the fact that it really involves relinquishing the criterion of ideal utilitarianism; but one can never be sure of this because he uses the ambiguous expression, "tends to promote universal well-being", with reference to right action. Because the difficulty under discussion

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1. For the sake of simplicity, we must generously assume that the agent's mistake on Monday was not due to any moral defect or culpable negligence.

is a commonplace one, it is disconcerting to find no adequate attempt to deal with it in such an extensive treatise.

Obviously, error can arise in two respects in connexion with purposive action; one may err in judging (a) concerning whether an action actually will promote a given end, and (b) concerning whether the end promoted is actually good (or best). This gives rise to four logically possible ways in which the rightness of an action may be related to the value of its ends, although in practice, I think, ethical writers would seek to defend only the first or the last. Rightness may be related to: (1) the actual value of the actual consequences, (2) the actual value of the intended consequences, (3) the supposed[1] value of the actual consequences, or (4) the supposed value of the intended consequences.

In order to avoid complications we have thus far neglected an extremely important aspect of Rashdall's theory, and perhaps discussion of it now will throw some light upon the question just raised. As we have seen already[2], it is incorrect to interpret his position as attributing intrinsic value to ends alone, and not to actions as well[3].

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1. This word is used merely for want of a better. It is meant to indicate that what the agent judges to be the value of a given end may or may not be its actual value.
2. # 19 f.
3. Professor Joseph has rightly pointed out (in Some Problems in Ethics, p. 100) that on a strictly utilitarian view right action cannot possess intrinsic value; therefore right actions (e.g. on the part of others) cannot be included among the ends (which, ex hypothesi, possess intrinsic value) promoted by a right action. This he takes to be a sufficient refutation of Rashdall's position in The Theory of Good and Evil. But the refutation simply neglects the fact that in this treatise Rashdall does regard right action as possessing intrinsic value. Intrinsic value, on his theory, attaches to the conscious "states" of selves; and I see nothing contradictory in claiming, as Rashdall does, that an action, considered as a "state" of the self (which usually manifests itself externally in bodily movement) can possess positive or negative value, just as do other experiences or states of the self. I put forward this comment with some trepidation, because Professor Joseph was for many years a colleague of Rashdall's.

(Continued on Page 259)

He does not agree with Moore that the value of an action is wholly instrumental; he contends, on the contrary, that an action possesses intrinsic value which must be taken into account as related to that action's rightness. Let us begin by examining his assertion that, although it is meaningless to consider the rightness of an action apart from relation to the value of its consequences, this does not imply 'that its morality depends wholly upon those consequences[1]'. Rashdall's meaning cannot be interpreted properly unless a rather obvious point is understood in connexion with the idea of mutual implication. This idea, if it is intelligible at all, must presuppose that the whole gamut of degrees of goodness is at least hypothetically related to rightness. That is to say, many ends can be judged to be good, although the promotion of them is not judged to be right because they are not the best possible ends in the situation; nevertheless, if the idea of mutual implication is to be taken seriously, the judgment, "X is good (in however slight a degree)", must always be taken as tacitly implying that it would be right to promote X, if there were nothing better which one could promote. Now if the statement under consideration can be reconciled with Rashdall's revised position, it must be taken as

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(Continued from Page 258)
Nevertheless, the statement quoted on # 19, another remark in which he differentiates his own position from Moore, who 'appears to be unwilling to give the good will the highest place in his scale of goods' (GE. I, p. 79n), and his whole discussion of the pre-eminent position of "virtue" or "dutiful action" in the summum bonum, cannot be interpreted except as indicating that Rashdall attributes intrinsic value to right action. Therefore, Professor Joseph's remarks are extremely puzzling when, in criticizing Rashdall's position, he writes: 'For the act which has no intrinsic goodness is held right because its consequences have; but if these are acts like it, they can have no intrinsic goodness either, and, therefore, cannot justify the action whose consequences they are... He (i.e. Rashdall) agrees with Sidgwick that I can only owe to do an action, or that an action can only be right, because of its consequences...' (op. cit., p. 100. Italics mine).

1. Cf. # 19. Although the statement here in question occurs in The Theory of Good and Evil, the same position is retained after he has revised his view concerning the relationship between "right" and "good".

an attempt to suggest that an action may possess an intrinsic value which involves this same hypothetical reference to "right". Many actions may be said to possess an intrinsic value additional to (but not unrelated to) the value of their ends; and although this intrinsic value may be recognized, even when the action is not right (because it is not related to the best possible end in that situation), nevertheless this recognition implies that the action would be right if no intrinsic value greater than that which it embodies could be realized. One qualification must be stressed, however; because he refuses to divorce the action from its consequences, it would seem to follow that, although the intrinsic value of an action can be recognized as distinct from and additional to the intrinsic value of its consequences, the two could never occur or be judged out of relation to one another; and it might follow from this that these two types of intrinsic value vary together. If this last is really the case, then Rashdall is committed to the theory that rightness (and the intrinsic value of an action) is related to the intended, not to the actual, consequences; and he should then say that an action possesses intrinsic value in a degree which corresponds to what the agent supposes to be the degree of value possessed by the ends which he intends his action to promote.

The statement under consideration has been overlooked by all critics who assume that The Theory of Good and Evil maintains the thesis that the rightness of an action is to be judged solely by reference to the value of its consequences. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Rashdall could have meant this statement to imply that an action acquires intrinsic value only as a result of its being right; for obviously if (as he holds in this work) intrinsic goodness may be appealed to as a logical ground for the rightness of an action, this "good" must be known prior to "right". Unless one is willing to

suppose that he fell into a very elementary fallacy[1], his statement in The Theory of Good and Evil must be interpreted as referring to some intrinsic goodness in an action which, like the intrinsic goodness of its consequences, may be known prior to and apart from its rightness; while, because he retains the conception after revising his position, it must be supposed that in this latter case he takes the intrinsic value of an action (like that of its ends) to be known in connexion with[2] the rightness of that action.

Now that the intrinsic value of right actions has been discussed, we may return to the question as to whether, on Rashdall's view, rightness is related to actual or to intended consequences. If he regards the rightness of an action as related[3] to: (a) the intrinsic value which attaches to an action when its motive is good, and (b) the intrinsic value which actually resides in the action, then the relationship between "right" and "good" must be restated; for here the value of an action cannot be regarded as a consequence of the action (for the sake of which it is performed); hence whereas formerly right was held to be somehow related to the value of consequences, it must now be held to be related to whatever value comes into being in, as

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1. J.G. Riddell seems to believe that Rashdall falls into this fallacy in GE. Cf. Riddell's article: "The New Intuitionism of Dr. Rashdall and Dr. Moore" in The Philosophical Review, Vol. XXX (1921), pp. 545 - 65.
2. That is to say, whatever the order in which a thinking subject does, as a matter of psychological fact, view the question, there is seen to be no logical order of priority-posteriority between "right" and "good", once the process of thought is completed. Whether the subject begins with "right" or with "good" (to be realized in or through the action), either notion necessarily implies the other from the outset; neither is reached by deduction from the other. Of course, the subject may be unaware of the fact that this is the case.
3. Analytically in The Theory of Good and Evil; synthetically in his revised theory.

well as through, the action. This position may provide a ground for mediating between the agent's intention and the actual results of his conduct; but it raises problems of its own. Let us consider what some of these problems are.

If rightness is related solely to intention, right acts might have bad results; if rightness is related solely to actual results, right acts might be done from bad motives[1]. This is the fundamental dilemma which must be solved, if possible. Now if an action possesses intrinsic value whenever its motive is good, then this actual intrinsic value which the action brings into being is related to intention, not to actual results. But if the actual results were bad, then the positive intrinsic value of the action would have to be weighed against the negative intrinsic value of the actual effects. Here, it will be noted, one sort of actual intrinsic value is being compared with another. An action done from good motives - whatever its actual results - always brings into being some intrinsic value (namely, the intrinsic value of the action itself); but does this intrinsic value always outweigh the value of the effects? This becomes a peculiarly difficult question when it is remembered that, according to Rashdall, the "virtue" of another person may constitute a factor in the intrinsically good end which an action promotes. If an action which was intended to promote the moral welfare of others were to eventuate (through no fault of the agent) in the moral degradation of the others instead, then would the intrinsic goodness of the action be sufficient to outweigh the intrinsic badness of its effects? For unless the action brings into being a state of affairs which is good on the whole, the action (in accordance with the idea of mutual implication) cannot be said to be

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1. Deontological theories, dissociating rightness from results altogether, must also hold that right acts might be done from bad motives.

right.

Rashdall has contended[1] that the "virtue" of others (as an end) cannot come into competition with the virtue of the agent, because if his action promotes an end in which the various types of value are accorded consideration appropriate to their relative importance (quality) and magnitude (quantity), then the agent is performing his duty; but this argument fails to make clear whether this good end, in which virtue, cultural interests and pleasure are properly adjusted to one another, is the end which the action actually promotes, or is merely intended to promote. Hence the fundamental dilemma remains unresolved.

There is a possible solution to this problem which Rashdall does not elaborate, but which is implicit in his revised position. At first glance it might seem that with regard to the above example he would be forced to say that, ceteris paribus, the actual moral welfare of several persons is more important than the actual moral welfare of the agent; this would lead to the conclusion that the action brought into being a situation which was bad on the whole. And if "good" implies "ought to be brought about", then the action was not right, despite the fact that the agent's intentions were the best possible, But the dilemma can be stated in this manner only by neglecting the hypothetical bearing of obligation upon the agent's actions; if it be remembered that "good" implies "ought to be brought about in so far as possible", then the agent has fulfilled this condition. If the agent promoted the moral welfare of others (judging this to be the best possible end) to the best of his ability, then his action was right. This may be seen by viewing the question in the negative. It was obligatory upon the

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1. Cf. # 24.

agent to avoid making any contribution to the moral degradation of others, in so far as he could avoid this; and he has fulfilled this obligation, despite the fact that his action actually did contribute to their moral degradation, and therefore brought about a bad result which ought not to have been promoted, if the agent could have avoided it.

This solution remains faithful to the idea of mutual implication, and it avoids that dichotomy between the value of an action and the value of its consequences, which Rashdall deplores. On the other hand, the intrinsic value of an action (since it depends upon intention) can never come into conflict with the supposed value of the intended consequences, because the two reflect an identical condition of the agent's intellect and will. Moreover, from the moralist's point of view, there would seem to be considerable justification for holding that an action <u>is</u> what the agent intends to bring about thereby, once the efficiency of the means and the value of the end have been judged as accurately as possible.

Some writers (notably Prichard) have protested that, because one cannot control motives, it can never be one's duty to act from certain motives. Admittedly, no particular desire or emotion can be summoned at will to give rise to an action which promotes a good end. But the formula which has been followed throughout has qualified right action as promoting good ends <u>in so far as possible</u>. The limitations which circumstances impose upon an agent may circumscribe not only his capacity to carry out a given course of action, and his capacity to judge accurately the value of a contemplated end, but also his capacity to desire that end. If he is (e.g., physically) unable to bring it about, or unable to recognize its goodness, or unable to feel any desire or inclination to bring it about, then, so far as I can see, he is not obligated to perform the action in question. Of course, any of these

disabilities may have arisen as the result of failure to perform his duty in the past; that is a different point.

When it is asserted, then, that right action is related to the supposed value of the intended consequences, and to the intrinsic value of the action itself (which reflects the character of its intention), this assertion presupposes that some motive actually does underlie the agent's intention; and if his intentions are good, the motive is good; if his intentions are bad, the motive is bad. It cannot be one's duty to act from good motives if he cannot do this; but unless he acts from good motives, his action is not right.

In order to hold, then, that an action is right, it is not necessary to contend that the ends which the action actually brings about are actually good or best. It is merely necessary to contend that what the action brings about (in itself and through its ends) constitutes the best state of affairs which the agent could promote[1]; and this may be true even when the action actually brings about bad or indifferent effects.

The foregoing analysis has been designed to disclose, if possible, the strongest position which can be found anywhere in Rashdall's writings on ethics; and it has elaborated this position in respects which he overlooked. If we had taken these writings as a whole, and had then proceeded to set earlier arguments over against later, contradictions could have been easily, but fruitlessly, exposed. The change which took place in his thinking concerning the relationship between the right and the good, although he draws no attention to it explicitly, is almost the only one of fundamental importance which can

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1. "Could" takes into account the fact that he may be unable to feel any desire or inclination or other motivating force (like the sense of obligation), which will cause him to set about performing the action.

be found anywhere in his writings. For that reason it has merited careful attention.

His revised position is immune to some of the criticisms which have been brought against The Theory of Good and Evil, but not immune to all. In his refutation of "Intuitionism" he has contended that an action which is not directed toward some good end is, from the moralist's point of view, fundamentally irrational. As it stands, this refutation seems to mean that an action, if it is to be regarded as right, must be done for some "reason" other than its mere rightness. But the discussion of the judgment of value, which concludes this very refutation of "Intuitionism", should have made the flaw in this argument obvious to his mind. For if a judgment of value, as Rashdall there claims, can be rational even though it is based upon immediate insight and not upon grounds external to what "value" itself implies, why cannot the same be consistently said concerning judgments of "right"? As Dr. Ross has put it:

> 'When we have to choose between the production of two heterogeneous goods, say knowledge and pleasure, the "ideal utilitarian" theory can only fall back on an opinion, for which no logical basis can be offered, that one of the goods is greater; and this is no better than a similar opinion that one of two duties is the more urgent'(1).

When he later admits that "right" is indefinable, and hence, that it must be known immediately, Rashdall is thus abandoning the teleological position in so far as it implies that the goodness realized in or through an action can furnish a logical ground for holding that action to be right. But does this admission require him to admit that "right" can ever be judged in abstraction from, and without any reference whatever to, the value which the action is intended to bring into being? He would contend that it does not; and the preceding analysis has shown that, although he fails to state clearly the nature of the value-situation to which he conceives rightness to be related, such a statement

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1. The Right and the Good, p. 23.

can be constructed on the basis of what his position implies.

When he assents to the fact that recognition of "right" is immediate, he is conceding the point for which deontologists chiefly contend[1]. Therefore only theories which hold, as against the idea of mutual implication, that "right" is logically prior, and that "good" is deducible from it, remain fundamentally opposed to his position. For this reason it was necessary to stress the fact that Rashdall does not regard the intrinsic value of an action as dependent upon and logically posterior to its rightness[2].

By revising his theory, he greatly reduces the distance which separates him in The Theory of Good and Evil from the position of a writer like Prichard. Rashdall would have to admit that the obligatoriness of an action is not logically grounded in the fact that the action is purposive - that is, for the sake of bringing some value into being, either in itself or through the end which it serves. If recognition of "right" is immediate, then to seek its logical ground in the value of the action or its ends, constitutes a fallacy analogous to the epistemological absurdity of attempting to cite reasons in order to prove that one knows that he knows. Prichard has stressed this point. On the other hand, however, Rashdall might admit that rightness cannot be logically proven by reference to (what Prichard calls) non-moral factual data (i.e. the value of the action or its ends), and yet he might contend at the same time that rightness, though judged immediately, can never be known apart from these data because the very action which is so judged always does, as a matter of fact, either possess intrinsic value, or conduce to ends which possess it. "Right", while known

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1. Nevertheless, even after making this admission, Rashdall might be accused of treating the value of an end as though it supplied a logical ground for holding the action which promotes it to be right.
2. Cf.# 260 f. This is a fundamental point at which Rashdall, in his own opinion, differs from Kant.

immediately, is nevertheless always known in connexion with "good", and cannot be known apart from this connexion. Indeed, Prichard seems near to admitting something of this sort when he recognizes that non-moral processes of thinking which take into account the relations of the action to moral agents (the individual agent and others) and to good ends, may be necessary before the general character of the action is understood; once this non-moral thinking is completed, however, Prichard claims that obligation is appreciated immediately, not deductively. If this non-moral thinking were regarded as necessarily implied in connexion with judgments of "right", then the two writers would be in agreement at this point. To be sure, Rashdall must now admit, as against his earlier position, that discrepancies of moral judgment between persons reflect varying degrees of insight into the obligatoriness of actions which cannot be deduced from varying degrees of insight into the value of ends; yet he can still maintain that the two types of insight vary together.

At one point, however, an important difference arises between the two writers. Prichard claims that an action can be right without being done from a good motive[1]. For example, one can fulfil the obligation of paying a debt without being motivated by the sense of obligation, and without desiring to produce any good effects whatever; one can even pay a debt from bad motives. As we have seen, Rashdall so relates rightness to the intention to promote good ends that, in his theory, an action cannot be right unless the agent can and does possess some motive

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1. Prichard mentions (a) acting from the sense of obligation, and (b) acting from a desire or an emotion which is good (because directed to good ends), as the two main types of acting from good motives. He agrees, however, that a right action cannot possess intrinsic value unless done from a good motive; the two types of motivation just mentioned thus give rise respectively to values which are related to each other; but neither value is deducible from the other. The best action is one which is right, and at the same time motivated by both (a) a sense of obligation and (b) a good desire. Cf. Mind, Vol. XXI. (1912), pp. 21 ff.

which causes him to promote the best consequences, in so far as he is permitted to do so by the instrumental circumstances, his own insight into the value of ends, and his own capacity to be motivated toward them.

No other ethical problems can be discussed at length in these pages; but I must mention very briefly one further source of confusion before turning to other topics. Certain passages in The Theory of Good and Evil seem to treat the various elements which Rashdall describes as "types" of value as though they possessed value in isolation from anything else. In accepting Moore's doctrine of the organic whole he writes:

> 'It is equally true that we could not pronounce on their value as elements in a whole unless we found a value at least in some one of them taken separately... Just so pleasure is a good taken by itself...'(1).

If this statement is to be taken literally, it is utterly irreconciliable with Rashdall's own insistence upon the indivisibility of consciousness[2]; the whole point of his argument in this latter connexion is that pleasure cannot even occur "separately" or "by itself" - that is, apart from other aspects of consciousness which possess other types of value (positive or negative). Every judgment which pronounces upon the value of a "state" of consciousness therefore has an organic whole as its object, and the elements which enter into this organic whole cannot be judged out of relation to it. The sentences just quoted, and other similar remarks, imply that an action which produced pleasure

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1. GE. II, p. 40 n.
2. Cf. # 15. Compare the statement quoted above with GE. I, p. 75: 'It may be true in a certain rough and popular sense that in thought or even in the good will, if either be taken in abstraction from the two other elements, we could discover no value at all, while in pleasure we could find such a value. That is the assumption upon which all Hedonism is based; and the assumption might perhaps be admitted... if we could attach any meaning to pleasure taken absolutely by itself'.

unaccompanied by anything else, would be better than one having no valuable results; but Rashdall's real meaning, I think, is that, of two results which possess equal value in all respects except pleasure, the one yielding the greater pleasure possesses the greater intrinsic value.

Similarly, when he speaks of "virtue"[1] as possessing intrinsic value, and therefore as being a suitable element in the end which it is right to promote, he really means that when two ends are equally valuable in every other respect, that which possesses more "virtue" is likewise more valuable. Yet there are passages in which he seems to assume that a single right action, taken separately, possesses the highest intrinsic value.

In fact, in his entire chapter on the commensurability of values he writes as though each type of value were to be apprehended through distinct intuitions, which could then be compared and brought together in a second intuition, the latter giving rise to judgments concerning the value of the whole. However, to claim that an ideal of conduct can be built up from an aggregate of isolated immediate judgments concerning the value of particular "goods", is not different in principle from the unsystematic intuitionism concerning knowledge of "right" which Rashdall strongly criticizes.

What I have taken to be his prevailing view avoids these difficulties and stands much more closely allied to orthodox idealistic doctrine in ethics than many of his critics realize. For if value is regarded as a notion which characterizes every aspect of consciousness, and if no

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1. "Virtue" would here refer usually to the value of right actions and of good moral character in <u>others</u>, which a particular action of the agent promotes. It does not refer to the "virtue" of this particular action, because the intrinsic value of this action cannot be its own end. Cf. # 260 f.

aspect of consciousness can be intelligibly abstracted from the others, then the value of particular things or experiences is dependent upon how they stand in relation to a unified pattern or standard of value. Virtue, knowledge and pleasure are related to value as species to genus[1]. Of course nothing inclines him, however, to the wider notion in which human willing is included in a universal will, as a part in a whole.

Nevertheless, the manner in which he associates each "type" of value (virtue, knowledge or cultural interests, and pleasure) with a corresponding aspect of consciousness (willing, thinking and feeling) rests upon a radically defective, though trite, division. I should prefer to regard the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive events as fundamental; this would obviate expressions like those in which Rashdall writes as though the "intellect" were external to conation and emotion, for these latter are cognitive. Despite his rejection of the facultative psychology, it is a tendency to hypostatize these mental "capacities" which leads him into the blunder of holding that particular goods have value even when taken separately. A sounder psychology would have held him faithfully to his principle that this is to indulge in unjustifiable abstraction. Especially it would have saved him from treating pleasures and pains as though they constituted a separate kind of experience. As I see it, the pleasure-pain series can qualify both cognitive and non-cognitive events, because sensations fall under both of these categories; that is, some sensations (e.g. visual) are cognitive, and some are not.

(An adequate discussion of judgments of value would leave us insufficient space for very pressing questions. One criticism of Rashdall's theory was so fundamental that I

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1. If I understand his theory, this is precisely what Joseph means when he speaks of "right" as "a form of goodness". Cf. Some Problems in Ethics, p. 73, and his discussion of the doctrine of organic wholes, pp. 84 f.

ventured to incorporate it in the expository section, # 42 ff ; clarity concerning his conception of "moral objectivity" was indispensable to a proper interpretation of his metaphysical system. I briefly refer once again to this topic infra, # 310 ff.).

2. The Idealistic Argument.

At the beginning of a discussion of idealism it is important to specify the meaning of the term. Rashdall employs it primarily with reference to the theory that matter cannot exist apart from the experience of some mind, and we shall follow this usage. Many writers use the term to include 'all those philosophies which agree in maintaining that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe'[1]; in this sense all theists are "idealists", even though they may hold realistic views concerning knowledge or perception. On the other hand, many arguments for theism are not "idealistic" in Rashdall's narrower sense; hence they are not affected by what I shall say in the following pages. Indeed, the succeeding criticisms must be understood throughout as referring solely to Berkeleian idealism, and not even to other forms of idealism (e.g. Royce's system) which also might be brought under the narrower usage just denoted. This is a legitimate procedure, because in some respects Rashdall's idealistic argument (with its attendant view of causality, and the personalistic metaphysics in which it culminates) follows Berkeley so closely that many objections apply with equal force to both.

Berkeley's "new philosophical principle" was put forward in the first instance as a protest against the doctrine of representative perception and its distinction between (a) the object as independently existing, and (b) the object as perceived. The latter of these, in the Cartesian theory, is regarded as a tertium quid between the mind

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1. Norman Kemp Smith: Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, p. 1. Pringle-Pattison also follows this usage; cf. Mind, Vol. XXVIII, p. 1.

and the real object. Initially Berkeley argued that the object as perceived is the real object; and at this stage he admitted that "ideas" could be "representative" only in the very different sense of "representative of other ideas". He contended that if a proximate object intervenes between the mind and the "real" object, there is no possible way of determining (i.e. by comparison) whether, or to what extent, it faithfully represents the real object. His own theory, of course, does away with any radical distinction between appearance and reality.

Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities rested upon the representative theory and its dichotomy. In order to substantiate his own views Berkeley therefore repudiated this distinction, and his argument forms, as we have seen, the starting point for Rashdall's idealistic "proof". It is important to observe, however, that Rashdall rightly interprets Berkeley's dominant view when he claims that his idealistic thesis does not destroy the distinction between subject and object, although it does make this distinction infra-mental. Berkeley's principle is essentially an affirmation of the mutual inseparability of subject and object; but he regards each term as signifying a mode of existence distinguishable from the other. This distinction has an important bearing upon the way in which Rashdall formulates his final metaphysical views. For a subject, on this theory, can never be a perceived object; its reality consists in the active exercise of the functions of thinking, willing, perceiving and feeling. On the other hand, an object can never be a centre of subjective activity; it cannot produce changes in other objects; hence the Berkeleian view cannot locate the source of causation in the "physical" world.

Although Berkeley's writings do not always unequivocally affirm

this view, Rashdall is justified in cleaving to the distinction on which it rests. He too holds that, although objects are "in the mind", there remains an irreducible distinction between (a) what is experienced, and (b) the activity of experiencing.

In Rashdall's idealistic "proof" of the existence of God, three quite distinct types of argument can be discriminated; they have to do respectively with perception, conception and relations. The second of these[1] is really incidental; it alleges that objects which are not perceived are nevertheless related to mind whenever they are cognized in any form, even whenever they are imagined as existing independently. This is the only respect in which the Berkeleian argument is "epistemological" in the sense of being based on the nature of knowledge as such, instead of on a particular theory concerning the characteristics of material things and how they are perceived by us. If it were valid, it would apply to all objects of knowledge, and not merely to physical objects. Epistemological arguments are probably the weakest in the entire idealist case; and we shall not linger over this one. It may be reduced to the assertion that whatever is known[2] is a concept, and concepts exist only in minds.

Now unless one is willing to contend that a concept does not refer to anything beyond itself (and Rashdall does not contend this), it is necessary to draw a distinction which this argument overlooks. "To conceive" may refer to (a) the concept as "a mental state or act", or to (b) what the concept "stands for" objectively. The former of these is of course mind-dependent; but this does nothing to prove that the latter is. The concept, "an object existing independently", is in

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1. Cf. # 103.
2. According to Rashdall bare perception does not yield "knowledge" in the strict sense of "being objectively true".

relation to mind in the former sense; but the object for which it stands is not for that reason necessarily in relation to any mind; hence until some other reason is brought forward, the concept itself is by no means unintelligible. If it is contended that all concepts refer[1] to objects which are necessarily mind-dependent, this contention must be based on some ground other than that which this argument supplies. Berkeley and Rashdall support this contention, of course, because they hold that our concepts (in the former sense) refer to "ideas" existing in the mind of God. But in that case the argument from concepts is not a "proof" of the existence of God; rather, the existence of God is postulated in order to support an idealistic thesis which could not stand otherwise.

The first argument - from perception (or qualities) - must be distinguished from the second and third. It must be distinguished from the second because a representative theory of perception is quite compatible with the assertion that we possess direct awareness (non-inferential knowledge, other than that afforded by perception) of objects as existing independently; some realists to-day actually follow this procedure, while others hold that direct awareness implies direct perception. On the other hand, it is possible to contend that our perception of physical objects is direct, while we only come to know them as existing independently of our minds by means of some other type of cognition which transcends the evidence of perception; this other type of cognition may be direct and intuitive, or it may be inferential. Rashdall's view, I believe, ultimately implies both a representative theory of perception and a representative theory of knowledge (the latter including all objects of cognition, and not merely physical objects).

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1. In the latter sense supra.

But if Berkeley's early views concerning perception were rigidly maintained, they could be reconciled with his argument for the existence of God only by contending that knowledge of physical objects is representative (i.e. of "ideas" existing in the mind of God), while perception of them is not; otherwise Berkeley, too, would be forced into the theory of perception which above all else he sought to avoid.

The first argument must be distinguished from the third because, at best, the Berkelaian argument from perception can establish only that we have no evidence for believing that any material things exist independently of our human perception, while the argument from relations attempts to show that belief in matter as existing apart from mind is intrinsically unintelligible; obviously the latter, and not the former, is reconcilable with the belief that physical things can exist independently of our minds so long as they are dependent upon God's mind.

These distinctions make it almost self-evident that the first two arguments are virtually useless so far as supporting a theistic proof is concerned. Together they establish merely that objects cannot be perceived or known apart from some mind which perceives or knows. This hardly needed proving. It is a proposition which must be true whether or not material things are dependent upon perceiving and knowing minds for their existence. If all cognition, as well as perception, is regarded as "shutting us up to our own ideas", then clearly the conclusion that we have no evidence of their existence apart from these "ideas" cannot be used as an argument for believing that objects (physical or otherwise) exist in the mind of God. While if either cognition or perception is held to refer beyond itself to ideas existing in the mind of God, one is forced to adopt a representative theory in either case; and in neither case does the evidence of our own cognition or perception do anything to establish the idealistic hypothesis

concerning the ontological status of the trans-subjective objects to which they refer. If the term "object" is taken as necessarily correlative with "subject", then "objects" cannot be said to exist apart from some mind; but it does not follow from this that all existing things are objects. The assertion that no material thing can be perceived or conceived as existing except in relation to a perceiving or thinking subject, does nothing to prove that no material thing can exist except in these relations.

The strongest mode of reasoning which a Berkeleian idealist can adopt is to argue that the intelligibility of the relationship between material things and knowing minds favours the probability of his general hypothesis that matter cannot exist apart from some mind (although it does not furnish a sufficient ground from which this hypothesis follows necessarily). Rashdall's argument from the nature of relations[1] could serve this purpose; but, as he says, it is irreconcilable with the empiricism of Berkeley's Principles. What it purports to demonstrate is a universal and necessary connexion between relations and a mind which does the relating; hence it goes beyond the evidence of human experience, and asserts that precisely because many relations lie beyond the purview of any human mind, they imply the existence of a divine mind. If this argument is valid, it leads to the conclusion not only that the entire physical world is dependent upon God's mind (since each part is related to every other), but also that all human minds are dependent upon God's mind (since we continually stand in relations to the physical world and, granting for the moment the conclusion of the argument, to God, of which no mind other than God's could be continually aware). Recognition of this dependence in the case

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1. Cf. # 102.

of the material world leads Rashdall to speak of it as existing "in" God's mind; perhaps other parts of his metaphysical system are sufficient to justify his refusal to regard our dependence on God's mind as likewise implying that our minds are included in His; but undeniably the argument from relations, when thus generalized, tends to diminish the sharpness of the distinction which he draws between the ontological status of human selves and that of material things.

In any case, the fact remains that what this argument assumes concerning the intelligibility of relations seems self-evident to some philosophers, and not even plausible to others. For this reason the theistic "proof" which is based upon it is inescapable only if one begins by assenting to the idealistic premiss; and it is difficult to see how the necessity of assenting to this premiss can be established by argument. Nothing besides the relation is required to hold its own terms together; the only question which arises is whether the relation itself must be "in" a mind in order for it to do this; and I can see no way of forcing anyone by logical argument to answer this question in the affirmative.

By postulating God's existence the Berkeleian argument avoids what has often been cited as the cardinal fallacy of idealism, namely, the epistemological contention that the individual mind "makes" the objects which it perceives or conceives. But the considerations which necessitate a theistic conclusion are incompatible with the first two arguments which Rashdall retains as factors in his theistic proof. He admits that (a) physical objects possess continuity and stability; (b) several minds may perceive one object simultaneously[1]; (c) we perceive (and know) objects without ourselves causing the perceiving

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1. This point will require further examination.

(and knowing). These considerations clearly imply that the material world has existed and still does partially exist apart from the perceiving (and knowing) of the individual; while the first two idealistic arguments, if valid, would show that we have no reason for believing that it can so exist.

Berkeley's error can therefore be summarized as follows: (1) his arguments from perception and conception, if valid, would establish (of course) the conclusion that matter cannot exist apart from some mind; (2) his theistic postulate renders these arguments invalid, yet he retains the general conclusion which they would establish if valid; (3) hence he argues that matter can be independent of the individual human mind only because it is dependent for its existence upon the mind of God. In so far as Rashdall revives these first two arguments, his reasoning falls into the same contradiction[1].

One further point must be mentioned. An argument by analogy from human to divine cognition is well-nigh contradictory if based on the Principles. To be applicable to God's knowledge, the thesis there in question (that the esse of physical things is percipi) would necessarily imply sensuous limitations which Berkeley was unwilling to attribute to God because he associated them with physical embodiment. Rashdall's own argument has the advantage of differing from Berkeley's in two contrasting ways: (a) he does not defend Berkeley's thesis in its extremely empirical form; (b) he is willing to attribute "something corresponding to feeling" (but not, of course, bodily limitation) to God.

To point out the respects in which God's knowledge must differ

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1. Hence it is unfortunate that he joins the argument from relations so closely with the first two. Moreover, even on purely Berkeleian grounds the above fallacy might be avoided by retaining only the argument from causation (in connection with the argument from relations). That is, it might be claimed that human perceiving and knowing are caused by some agency other than the individual, and that a mind endowed with will is the only possible cause of anything.

from ours does not invalidate an argument from analogy if relevant points of similarity remain. But, so far as Rashdall and Berkeley are concerned, this analogy breaks down. For if physical things can exist apart from human knowledge[1], but not apart from God's, then God's cognitive relation to them differs at precisely the point where analogy is supposed to establish a similarity. Rashdall evinces some misgivings when appealing to analogy in this connexion[2], although he gives no indication of realizing that his first two arguments are inconsistent with any appeal to analogy whatever (concerning cognition).

A theistic idealism which admits that physical objects are independent of our minds, while yet maintaining (for reasons other than those given in Rashdall's first two arguments) that matter is dependent for its existence upon some mind, might be compatible with realistic theories concerning human perception. Dr. Ewing thinks that Rashdall's system can be brought under this generalization[3]. Rashdall pays very little attention to modern realism, but his objection to it as an ontology cannot be divorced from his views concerning perception and knowledge. For reasons which we shall examine presently, he is forced into representative theories concerning both; and Ewing's remarks fail to show that on a representative theory of perception (at least, such a form of it as Rashdall must hold) 'the identical object we perceive at the same time (could be held to exist) independently of us in the experience of God'[4].

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1. The same holds with regard to perception.
2. Cf. # 129, # 138 and # 161.
3. A.C. Ewing: Idealism. Cf. pp. 387 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 388. Italics mine. Indeed, I cannot reconcile this statement with Ewing's admission on the preceding page: 'And any ideas of physical objects that God may have are in any case never conceived by Berkeley as being either the immediate object of our perception or in direct relation to our perception, for the causes of our perception are for him not God's ideas but God's will. Even if there are physical objects "in God's mind", according to Berkeley they are not the physical objects which we perceive in any ordinary sense of the word perceive'.

Thus far we have seen that the Berkeleian argument, even as Rashdall restates it, cannot move with logical necessity from the sphere of human consciousness to the sphere of divine consciousness. Even when the theistic case is assumed to be established, however, several difficulties arise. First of all, do the qualities which a perceived thing presents to different observers belong to a numerically identical object? So far as I can see, Rashdall can admit only that what each observer perceives is qualitatively similar to what the others perceive; each object of perception remains numerically distinct from (though similar to) every other. On this theory the unity of a publicly existing physical thing arises from the fact that the numerically distinct objects are respectively presented to many different percipients as the result of a single act of God's will. Furthermore, there is an archetypal world of physical objects in God's mind; hence when several human percipients are acquainted with the "same" object, there is a qualitative similarity between the object in God's mind and the object in each percipient's mind; yet the archetypal object - A - remains numerically distinct from all the objects like it - a^1, a^2,.... a^n - in ~~in~~finite minds.

So much for perception. Rashdall's theory of cognition is also representative because he holds that one individual can know an "object" which exists in another mind only by means of an "idea" (concept or judgment) which "represents" (or "refers objectively to") that other "object" (i.e., that other concept or judgment as a mental state or act)[1]; the cognition which is thus carried out is inferential, not direct. Hence even when his theory of perception is supplemented by his

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1. Rashdall admits that he does not believe in the existence of any objects other than "ideas", so long as this admission is not taken to mean that he restricts this existence to ideas in his own mind, and so long as the word "idea" is made equivalent not to "sensation" (cp. Berkeley), but to "object of thought". Cf. Mind. Vol. XVIII, p. 108.

theory concerning judgments and concepts, the archetypal object - A - exists solely "in" the mind of God, a^1 exists solely "in" the mind of human knower 1, a^2 solely "in" the mind of human knower 2, etc. Accordingly, the continuous existence of A can be postulated by knower 1 only on the ground of an inference which transcends the fact that a^1 (which, ex hypothesi, is similar to A) exists only spasmodically (i.e., whenever 1 perceives or in some way cognizes it).

I have outlined this matter in some detail because Rashdall has been accused of defending a theory which must either (a) lead to a pluralistic monadology or (b) admit that human minds can know directly (non-inferentially) archetypal objects as they exist in God's mind. He refuses to accept pluralism, and the latter alternative is even more obnoxious to him because it would imply (if subject and object are strictly correlative) that the subjective activity of the individual is in some sense identical with or included within the subjective activity of God[1]. Personally I believe that the continuity and stability of the physical world are known directly, not inferentially; but my purpose here is to analyze Rashdall's argument fairly, not to present a defence of a realistic theory of direct cognition.

The Berkeleian theory of causation can be reconciled with Rashdall's foregoing views. Concerning God's knowledge of the objects existing in our minds, however, he seems unwilling to say that it is merely inferential. Otherwise the assumption that a^1, a^2, a^3,....a^n are numerically distinct from A would require the curious assertion that God has no direct knowledge of the objects which He produces in finite minds through an act of volition; but even if His knowledge of these objects were merely inferential, that would not mean that they are in

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1. Cf. G. Dawes Hicks: Berkeley. (Leaders of Philosophy Series). One of the chief contentions of this book is that Berkeley cannot escape these alternatives.

no sense objects of His cognition[1].

Once again, space-time is not broken up into a plurality of self-enclosed spheres unless it be denied that finite minds can know space-time, and the physical world which it contains, inferentially (instead of directly) as they exist in God's mind.

A further word must be added concerning Rashdall's relation to Berkeley; he fails to call attention to the fact that in Siris the latter modified his position, to a great extent abandoning the empiricism of his earlier works in favour of a quasi-Platonic theory. Yet the corrections which Rashdall suggests with regard to the Principles, in according an important rôle to conceptual thought and judgment, were largely made by Berkeley himself in this last of his philosophical writings. Here he relinquishes the doctrine that for material things esse is percipi; and, although in its place he contends that conceptual thought is necessary for knowledge of real things, he does not now assert that they are dependent for their existence upon being thus known by the human individual. He retains his idealistic hypothesis only by conceiving of reality somewhat after the manner of Platonic Forms which exist eternally "in" the mind of God[2]. Consequently the "ideas" presented to finite minds in perception are now regarded as transitory, phenomenal appearances of this objectively real world, which can be apprehended only imperfectly by human beings. This pursuit by Berkeley of the implications of his earlier theistic position seems to lead to a conception of God as including finite minds; for if the real world is regarded as existing after the manner of Platonic Forms in the mind of God, then the conceptual knowledge which finite minds

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1. Unless one assumes that all knowledge must be non-inferential.
2. This interpretation of the Platonic system was the dominant one in Berkeley's own day; some writers contend that it originated with Philo. Most scholars now take the Timaeus as elaborating a world-view in which the Forms constitute a hierarchy external to the mind of God.

may have of it is possible only through participation in the mind of God. ~~He~~ Berkeley seems at times to suggest that finite minds are dependent for their existence upon this participation.

Siris, I take it, was written as the result of long reflection during which Berkeley came to suspect that his earlier system led to a pluralistic monadology in which each person (including God) is confined to a self-enclosed sphere. I have attempted to state fairly Rashdall's reasons for thinking that he avoided this latter difficulty; he holds that one self can have inferential knowledge of another self and its states. Nevertheless, this does not adequately account for the unity of a publicly existing physical object. Can anyone believe that when a ball is thrown over a high wall from A to B, the ball which A throws is numerically different from the ball which B catches, (A being the only human mind which experiences the throwing, and B the only human mind which experiences the catching)? And can anyone believe that the ball remains numerically the same throughout the whole process only for God's omniscient mind, and that this ball is numerically different from that (or "those") which A and B experience? Moreover, even if one can defend this position, is the belief that the ball retains its numerical identity really based upon an inference as to the character of God's knowledge? And if so, does not this inference give one a knowledge of the "real" ball of which one's own experience is but a partial, a "phenomenal", appearance? The proper answers to these questions would show, I believe, that in an idealistic system which reduces the physical world to mental events, there is no middle ground between monism and pluralism; we have no space to pursue this subject except to note that Siris tends to support this general conclusion. Rashdall's emphasis upon inference fails to meet the difficulty for the following reason. This inferential process affords

knowledge of a reality which is either more ultimate than our direct experience or equally ultimate with it. If the ultimate reality of a physical object be regarded solely as what it is in the mind of God, then the unity of the world is accounted for, but only at the cost of a phenomenalistic theory concerning human (direct) knowledge of that physical object. While if each individual's knowledge of a physical object be regarded as a reality distinct from (though similar to) and equal in ultimacy to God's knowledge of that object, the resulting theory avoids phenomenalism, but it fails to account adequately for the unity of the world.

One concluding word needs to be said as to why many writers have not been favourably impressed by Rashdall's attempt closely to associate theism with Berkeleian idealism. He often uses language which seems compatible only with a correspondence theory of truth; yet in apologizing for this mode of expression he once admits that Professor Joachim's criticism of the correspondence theory must strike all idealists as forceful[1]. This is a topic which receives so little attention in Rashdall's writings that there are really no sufficient data for discussing it. From what he does say, however, concerning the fact that every judgment possesses an objective reference which determines its truth or falsity, it seems difficult to imagine how he could consistently have avoided the admission that a true judgment is true of something other than itself. Of course the object of a judgment need not be external to the subjective experience of some human self; for example, it can be the sensations or emotions of the judging individual or those of another self; or it may be another judgment (or concept) in the mind of some human self. But all of these possible objects themselves ultimately imply a reference to some object which is

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1. GE. II, p. 210 n. Cf. H.H. Joachim: The Nature of Truth.

external to the psychological states of any human self[1]. On Rashdall's theory an infinite regress is avoided because every judgment refers either directly, or indirectly (through one or more other subjective processes), to an object other than itself which exists in the mind of God. Now if he regards this ultimate object as merely another judgment (or concept), his position is at least akin to the coherence theory, which mentions only a system of judgments (or concepts) in its account of truth. But is this judgment (or concept) in the divine mind true of something other than itself? Rashdall must say that so far as the archetypal world of physical objects is concerned, their existence and God's knowledge of them both fall within the divine consciousness. So far as the subjective states of other selves are concerned, they are external to God's mind; they are objects which transcend the judgments by which He knows them. God's knowledge must involve something akin to sensory perception; otherwise Rashdall is caught in Berkeley's difficulty; for the only type of cognition which the latter (in Siris) can attribute to God is the intuitive apprehension of universals, and this precludes God from knowing the particularity and concreteness of the world. Furthermore, if this were the character of God's knowledge, it is impossible to imagine how He could know the perceptual content of our minds even inferentially, inasmuch as this inference must be based on something similar in God's own experience.

The realist protests most vigorously at this point that in all our knowledge it is not (primarily) the cognitions "in" the minds of other selves which constitute the objective reality to which one's own cognitions refer; rather, one's own cognitions and those of others alike refer to objects which are external to the minds of all. On

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1. Only judgments or concepts are true or false; but Rashdall admits that sensations and emotions presuppose a transcendant object (physical or ideal), even when it is not fully known.

this basis he demands why we should not suppose the same to be true in the case of God's knowledge; thus he might claim that he, and not Rashdall, has some right to argue by analogy from the nature of human cognition to that of divine cognition. Realism can meet the difficulty concerning perception, while avoiding the arbitrary assumption that God's cognitions must constitute the objective reality to which the cognitions of human minds refer, and vice versa.

Without entering into a defence of the realist position, we may acknowledge that, so far as the physical world is concerned, Rashdall avoids in one respect the blunder of identifying the knower's experience with the reality of the object known, only to commit it in another; he avoids it with regard to human knowledge only to commit it with regard to divine knowledge. Naturally he is reticent about making confident assertions with regard to this latter; but his theory clearly leaves God's knowledge of physical things without any objective reference to a reality such as is presupposed (instead of constituted) by knowledge in every instance of human experience. Yet he does not fall into the absolutist preconception that knowledge and being are universally correlative, because even in the case of God's knowledge he postulates a type of reality (the subjective experiences of other selves) which God can genuinely know[1], but which falls outside the sphere of His own being.

It is altogether possible to reject Rashdall's doctrine that physical things are ultimately reducible to the subjective experiences of some mind, without postulating the metaphysical self-existence of things. Many of the ablest protagonists of theism in recent years have occupied an intermediate position, in which minds and things are

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1. As we have seen, Rashdall says nothing unequivocally about the character of this knowledge except that it cannot be immediate for God in the same sense that it is immediately present to the individual mind which experiences it subjectively.

regarded as existences distinct from, but not "independent" of, each other; the organic relatedness which these writers stress seems to them to require that neither the physical nor the mental be regarded as reducible to the other. Such a theory postulates a physical world which is dependent upon God's knowledge and creative activity, but which exists externally to Him and to all other minds, instead of merely as a form or phase of some conscious experience. From such a standpoint, for example, Pringle-Pattison has offered very incisive criticisms against Rashdall's idealistic argument[1]. He has shown how it is entirely possible for the realist to hold that the physical world exists not self-sufficiently, but as the medium for the divine creation of conscious life and the enhancement of spiritual values.

3. God and Human Selves.

Let us next consider the adequacy of Rashdall's conception of God as "personal" in the sense of being a particular self external to all other selves. Already we have found reason to believe that his analogy from human to divine cognition cannot hold. We shall have occasion to question the argument from analogy in other respects in a moment. Yet he might urge that he has fully admitted the limitations of his argument; he does not seek to impose upon God those restrictions which characterize human knowledge and power, especially as they arise from the conditions of physical embodiment. To this, however, there are several replies which might be urged by one who yet defends the theistic position.

For one thing, when the idea of personality is abstracted from its associations with human limitations, only a series of negatives

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1. Cf. Mind. Vol XXVIII, pp. 1 - 18. A host of other recent writers regard a realistic epistemology as compatible with theism.

seems to remain, while personality is surely something positive. Rashdall's list of the positive characteristics of self-hood hardly escapes this criticism: for these characteristics can be ascribed to God only as kinds of thinking, feeling, willing, continuity through time, etc., which are unlike ours in the very respects which seem to make these characteristics what they are. He must conceive of God as thinking in a manner which is foreign to what, for all we can know, is the essential nature of thinking; and so, too, with regard to willing, feeling, and His relation to time. If these be regarded as conditions which no theistic system can escape, because God must be conceived as transcending human limitations, then they serve to throw doubt upon the one point at which he does retain a definite characteristic as qualifying divine and human personality alike, namely, that of "impenetrability"[1]; for he does not modify his insistence that so far as its subjective experience is concerned, every self is external to every other.

Here it may prove illuminating to compare Rashdall's argument with that of Lotze, on whose support he draws at this point in combating absolutism. The two arguments are similar in that they both regard personality in man as but a partial approximation to the full and perfect personality which can be attributed to God alone; moreover, they are alike in that they both find the essence of personality in the self-existence of a centre of conscious experience. To a certain extent, this association with Lotze renders Rashdall's argument impervious to the objection, which nevertheless has been frequently urged against him, that he conceives of God "merely as one of the selves". This objection is unfair if it neglects the fact that Rashdall

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1. Rashdall deprecates such expressions, but I can find no better word. I do not mean it to minimize the importance of his contention that one self may have genuine (inferential) knowledge of another.

does not regard God as confronted by other beings of the same status. The distinction between perfect and imperfect personality remains, and the selves who are external to God's Being as centres of consciousness, are nevertheless dependent upon Him for their creation and continued existence. Rashdall's argument seems to be more consistent than Lotze's at one point; for the latter writes that because 'full Personality is possible only for the Infinite, perfect Personality is in God only'[1]. If "infinity" be construed strictly, as excluding nothing, it is difficult to see how Lotze can reconcile his own conception of personality with it.

Yet there is still a great deal to be said for the contention that Rashdall arbitrarily retains this one characteristic of "impenetrability", which is associated with human limitations, as applicable to divine personality, after having relinquished such limitations in every other respect. However proper it may be to remain agnostic concerning the mode of God's self-conscious existence, it is fair to ask whether what his own theory implies at this point is more intelligible than any other. If, for example, his belief in divine omniscience is pressed, then clearly he must say that although the immediate experience of a human self is never directly present to God's mind in the same sense that it is directly present to the mind of the individual, nevertheless God's knowledge of this experience is perfect and complete, while the individual's knowledge of it is not. Yet how can this be the case, so long as the experience in question is regarded as internal to the conscious life of the individual, but external to that of God?

Rashdall may well ask, however, whether one can give up the conception of God as a centre of consciousness distinct from every other,

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1. Microcosmus. E.T. Vol. II, p. 685.

without falling into an absolutism which is really alien to ethical theism. So long as thinking, feeling and willing are regarded as necessarily correlative with the existence of a particular centre of consciousness, his arguments on this score are, indeed, well-nigh unanswerable; but it might be urged, with considerable foundation, that the very distinctions which he draws between these functions as exercised by God and as exercised by men, seem to indicate that this correlation cannot be pressed with any confidence with regard to God's consciousness.

Many advocates of theism would admit what he has to say concerning the externality of one self to another, and for this very reason they would protest that an individual cannot be regarded as external to God in the same sense that he is external to other human selves. Admittedly consciousness, as we know it, cannot include another consciousness; but Rashdall himself (they might urge) does not attribute consciousness as we know it to God. Such a position necessarily relinquishes Rashdall's conception of personality[1] as applicable to God, but its proponents would not admit that this involves relinquishing the conception of God as a conscious Mind or Spirit[2].

'Thus I should say', writes Dr. Webb, 'that if by affirming the "Personality of God" we mean that the relation of man to God is such as that in which the religious man knows himself to stand - a relation which expresses itself in prayer, worship, thanksgiving -

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1. I.e., in so far as it involves the idea that God is a particular centre of consciousness external to every other.
2. Rashdall rightly protests, it seems to me, against Pringle-Pattison's terminology when the latter uses "God" in one sense as a conscious centre distinct from the Absolute, and in another sense as an all-inclusive Being identical with the Absolute. (Cf. Church Quarterly Review, Vol. XC, p. 43). In the succeeding discussion I attempt to throw some light on the question as to whether God can be conceived as a Mind which is (a) more than the finite selves included in it, and yet (b) not a centre of consciousness separate from or external to these elements which it includes.

then to deny the personality of God is to make religious experience illusory; but that on the other hand the very relation, which is thus experienced, is quite distinguishable from the relation of one finite person to another finite person. So that, if we refuse to use the word "personality" except of a finite person, I think we must deny that "personality" in this sense can be rightly attributed to God'(1).

This alternative view will appeal to theists who feel that Rashdall's ~~his~~ theory fails adequately to explain how God integrates the various experiences of human selves, each of which affords a partial knowledge of the material world and in so doing affords a partial knowledge of the divine experience which unifies the whole material world. The explanation of these facts demands a community of knowledge which cannot be accounted for merely in terms of inference[2].

Again, Rashdall's theory sunders content from reality, because he holds that a content may be "common" to many selves, while its "reality" cannot be[3]. He would reply that "reality" is constituted by a conscious experience which contains content, but which is not exhausted by it; this content as experienced is not sundered from reality; but the content of knowledge or purpose qua "common to many selves" is a universal which is abstracted from the conscious

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1. Problems in the Relations of God and Man, p. 252.
2. So long as God is regarded as organic to the world, this criticisn of Rashdall could be based on the realistic, as well as on the idealistic position. The idealist protests because he conceives of the common physical world as internal to the life of God, and the individual's partial knowledge of it as non-inferential. The realist protests because he conceives of this common physical world as external to God and to human minds (though not out of relation to God, if the realist be theistic), and knowledge of it as likewise non-inferential. The criticisms of idealists like C.F. D'Arcy and John Watson are therefore similar in many respects to those of a realist like Pringle-Pattison; but Watson fails to understand Rashdall when he accuses him of solipsism. Re D'arcy: cf. Proc. Arist. Soc. Supplementary Vol. II. (1919), pp. 148-58. Re Watson: cf. his The Philosophical Basis of Religion, pp. 108 ff., and Mind, Vol. XVIII, pp. 105-17; 244-51. Re Pringle-Pattison: cf.# 299 n.3.
3. This applies to community of purpose or goodness, as well as to community of knowledge. cf. GE. II, p. 68.

experience of any particular self[1].

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1. Rashdall asks whether, if two minds begin with different contents and then gradually become increasingly alike in content, at the moment when the contents become "identical" they would become one mind; and he answers in the negative. (cf. Proc. Arist. Soc. Sup. Vol. 2., pp. 109 ff.). Now we have already found reason for supposing that he can never declare that the contents can be numerically identical; but if the question is asking what would happen if they could be, then the answer - on strict Berkeleian principles - would have to be in the affirmative. The identity which Rashdall really has in mind is not, however, numerical; it is what remains when one has abstracted from individual differences; but even so, the answer should be in the affirmative, because in order for all qualitative differences to vanish, the two contents would have to be perceived by completely similar organs occupying the same points in space-time.

Even if he could prove his case with regard to human minds, this would afford no justification for assuming that there are not differences between the divine mind and those of men which are not manifest between them qua centres of consciousness.

Another point may be mentioned here, although it has little significance for philosophical theology. Rashdall's view of the self cannot make room for the phenomenon of multiple personality, in which one mind literally "includes" another; for example, personality A may know all that personality B does, while B has no knowledge of A. (cf. Morton Prince: The Dissociation of a Personality). This evidence has little bearing upon religious belief because the latter has to do with a conviction that there can be harmony of will and purpose between God and men. Nor does multiple personality indicate that an "inclusive" mind is necessarily righteous and benevolent. Dr. Schiller once suggested that a God conceived on this sort of an analogy would be mad. (cf. Proc. Arist. Soc. Sup. Vol. 2., pp. 140 ff.).

Any evidence tending to substantiate telepathy as an empirical fact is also incompatible with Rashdall's views concerning our necessarily inferential knowledge of the contents of other minds.

Finally, Rashdall's identification of reality with conscious centres implies that "reality" expands in accordance with the birth-rate; and because of immortality, it is continually expanding. He rejects Bradley's conception of degrees of reality (cf. # 146); as centres of conscious experience, therefore, human minds are segments of reality additional to and equal in reality to God's mind. I pass over the question as to at what point in the evolution of the individual or the race there begins to be a reality external to the mind of God, because Rashdall has admitted that it cannot be answered (cf. # 131 f.). But the statement - that "personality is a matter of degree" (cf. # 131.) - on which he bases this admission, is one which seems to be utterly irreconcilable with his rejection of Bradley's doctrine.

And what of animal minds? If he will not contend that an animal, like a physical thing, exists only as what it is in relation to God and human minds, then is he willing to admit that the experiences of animal minds constitute a third type of reality external to human and divine experience? If so, could he maintain that this "reality"is not different in degree from the other two types?

The crucial question here is whether or not Rashdall regards God's experience as participating in a universal, which is common to that of other selves, in such a sense that the universal itself no more "exists" in His mind than it does in the mind of any particular human self. In terms of his own theory it is clear that if the universal does not exist in God's mind it is not "objectively" valid. While if it does exist in His mind, then God is not one of a system of selves, externally related to every other; for the experiences of these selves are included within this universal. Here his own argument concerning relations might well be used against him; he has admitted that every self stands in a relationship to God of which the self is not constantly aware; when this is the case, Rashdall's idealistic theory of relations would require him to say that this relation exists only in God's mind. In other words, God's relation to human selves is internal to His mind, not external. If one self cannot thus include another, then the only alternative is to admit that God is not a self in this limited sense.

Rashdall protests against this alternative on the ground that it makes God an abstract universal without any existence or self-identity other than that of the particular selves which it includes. In reply an analogy might be suggested which is at least as legitimate as his own, inasmuch as both move from the known to the unknown. The human mind is an inclusive unity, although it contains diverse elements (sensations, emotions, conations, concepts, etc.) which arise from our experience of an impersonal material world; this unity insures their proper qualities and relations to these elements, without transmuting them into something else, and without being merely co-extensive with them. The self contains diverse elements without being a mere aggregate of conscious phases or states[1]. On this basis an analogy

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1. Rashdall would agree with the argument up to this point.

might be drawn whereby it is suggested that, similarly, human selves are unified in the all-inclusive mind of God in such a way as to secure to each its own individual identity. Just as the self includes sub-personal elements within a personal identity, so God includes selves within an all-embracing, supra-personal identity to which nothing is external; but this identity is something more than a mere aggregate of the selves which participate in it. The analogy implies that this "something more" is not separate from or external to these finite centres of consciousness (i.e., as one centre is external to another), any more than the unity of the self is separate from or external to its phases or states. The dependence of human selves upon God, which Rashdall fully admits, will then be due to the fact that a self, abstracted from the supra-personal whole into which it enters, is as inconceivable as is an isolated sensation or emotion when abstracted from the unified life of the self. All this can be said without affirming that finite selves can merge subjectively.

Some other aspects of the question at issue will be discussed presently; it may be asked here, however, whether to conceive of bad men as thus included within the Being of God is any more or any less objectionable, on ethical grounds, than to conceive of God as in some sense causing their bad actions. Furthermore, whether this is a feature to be welcomed or deplored, it is clear that the view based on our analogy can express the notion that God is both transcendent and immanent[1], as a self is both transcendent of and immanent in the particular elements which enter into its experience. The more fully one recognizes the multiplicity and individuality of the human spiritual world, the more difficult does it become to explain its

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1. I here use these terms in Rashdall's sense. He regards God as transcendent only, because he holds that He is external to all other selves.

unity so long as God is regarded solely as transcendent, as external to human selves. And to whatever extent Rashdall admits that this externality does not limit God's relation to selves as it limits our relation to other selves, he lessens in a corresponding measure the force of his "personalistic" argument. Even if one grants his point that the subjective experiences of individuals cannot enter into the mind of God with the same immediacy that they enter into the mind of the individual, is not a "Self" who can perfectly know all that other selves know, will all that they will, and feel that they feel, necessarily a Being who transcends the limitations which Rashdall places upon the idea of divine Personality?

Finally, the foregoing considerations tend to weaken the cogency of his argument when he asserts that because we can know other human selves only inferentially, we can know God only inferentially. To whatever extent he admits that God's relation to us surmounts the barriers which separate other selves from us, he must admit that God's communication to us of His will and nature is not circumscribed by restrictions similar to those placed upon human intercourse. I do not propose to dwell further upon this point because it is not affected by whether or not one agrees that knowledge of another <u>human</u> self must be inferential; and a discussion of the idea of revelation (to which we shall turn presently) should suffice to elucidate Rashdall's views on that question without touching directly upon his theories concerning the "impenetrability" of personality.

4. <u>Purpose</u>, <u>Evil</u> <u>and</u> <u>Freedom</u>.

The idea of causation is important, quite apart from Rashdall's idealistic employment of it, because of its logical connexion with the notion of cosmic purpose, which theistic writers naturally interpret

in terms of divine will[1]. All theistic writers must confront the problem of how divine causality, which creates and sustains the very instruments through which it operates, can be at all analogous to human volition, which we exercise primarily through the effort demanded by a more or less recalcitrant environment. Purposiveness seems to be allied with the limitations involved in human conation and feeling; it operates through selection and construction in the adjustment of available means toward the realization of an end yet to be attained.

In what respects, then, is purposiveness attributable to God, and in order to be so, in what respects must it be purged of human associations? It is clear, in the first place, that God's creative activity cannot be conceived narrowly on the analogy of a designer who adapts himself to conditions independent of his intellect and will[2]; Rashdall renounces the argument from design in this form. In his conception the end is not severed from the process; it is, rather, the key to the interpretation of the process as an organic whole. Purpose does not supervene upon the natural order; it is immanent in it throughout its extent.

Again, divine purpose transcends human purposes in the sense that the latter are often not wholly rational, not universally worth achieving. In the teleological activity of a divine Mind, who is subject to no conditions external to His own nature, the outcome justifies the process.

At two points, however, Rashdall retains characteristics which

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1. Rashdall's defence of the validity of the idea of causation itself, is incidental to the wider argument, and any discussion of this prior question would be too extensive an undertaking for this thesis, especially since the recent development of the "regularity" theory at Cambridge.
2. Rashdall tends to agree with the Thomist view that God's will is determined by His reason.

he believes to qualify all purposiveness. First, he cannot escape a temporal reference, for he refuses to regard process are illusory. Yet the fact remains that God's creative activity must be continually the realization of perfect goodness (i.e., of the greatest possible goodness); if this be regarded as a contradiction, he could only reply that the sustenance of the supreme values, as God's eternally realized purpose, seems to require the temporal process. Why this is the case - that is, why the temporal world exists at all, - must remain an unfathomable mystery. If, then, there is a cosmic goal, which from the temporal perspective is not yet achieved, this can only be because it is continually being achieved through the temporal process, which is the only possible means for bringing it about.

Secondly (and this follows necessarily from the preceding point), he retains the notion that purposiveness, even in God, implies something akin to effort. The necessity under which God operates is not external to His nature, nor is it willed by Him. It arises from the fact that He is a determinate Being in whom "conation co-exists with fruition"[1]. In other words, we have no data for conceiving of Him in abstraction from His nature as Creator. Volition cannot be attributed to Him in a sense which suggests the possibility of a free choice between achieving His ends through process or achieving them through fiat; but it can be attributed to Him in a sense which implies the continuous affirmation of His own essence as creative Goodness.

Before turning to a consideration of the relation of this conception to human freedom, it is important to note that, although Rashdall regards the problem of time (i.e., whether or not the time-series is infinite) as insoluble, his position really requires the view

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1. I think this is Bosanquet's phrase, but it is applicable in this context to Rashdall's position.

that creation is eternal, not in time[1]; the notion that the world and the divine activity which sustains it are coeval with God's existence, is in agreement not only with the results of the foregoing discussion, but also with the principle that subject and object are meaningless abstractions when conceived apart from one another[2]. Augustine's suggestion that the world was created cum tempore, non in tempore would appeal to him as unsatisfactory because it postulates an absolute beginning of time, and thus still involves an initial abstraction of God's existence from the creative process. The Greek doctrine of the eternity of matter, against which the Christian conception of creation ex nihilo arose, is conversely unsatisfactory because it likewise postulates an absolute beginning of God's creative activity, prior to which matter existed.

One other special point deserves attention here. Professor Pringle-Pattison has criticized Rashdall's views on the ground that when divine activity is regarded as motivating every natural event it becomes indistinguishable from mere physical force[3]. Efficient causality, he contends, is a category which is applicable only within the physical world; accordingly he maintains that it cannot express relations in which God, as a spiritual Being, is involved. He does speak of God as willing, but the action of His spirit upon human spirits operates after the manner of final causation, and is not at all analogous to physical force.

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1. Cf. # 141 ff.
2. The advantage of this position is greatly lessened, however, because of his Berkeleian "mentalism", which prevents him from asserting that the archetypal world - existing as the object of God's thought - is common to (i.e. numerically identical with) the world which we know directly. Thus his position is always open to the charge that it divests reality of that genuine "otherness" which gives rise to the common content of all minds, human and divine.
3. Cf. Mind. Vol. XXVIII, pp. 17f. For the entire dispute with Pringle-Pattison cf. his The Idea of God, 387 ff., 407 n., and Mind, Tome cit., pp. 1-18; and Rashdall's replies: Mind, Vol. XXVII, pp. 261-83; Proc. Arist. Soc., Supplementary Vol. II, pp. 114 ff.; Church Quart. Review, Vol. XC, pp. 40-44.

Rashdall would admit this last point, but he would include efficient as well as final causation in a spiritual category which must not be confused with the principle of uniformity in nature, although the former explains the latter[1]. Granting that a soul is created, not ab extra, but through a process in which it is given an opportunity to "make" itself, he asks whether the ordering of nature, which the efficacy of this process entails, is itself uncaused. He contends that it is unintelligible to conceive of God as willing good ends, through the exercise of final causation, without willing the means also. Indeed, Pringle-Pattison's criticism seems to overlook his own doctrine that the realization of value depends upon the stability of the natural order, of which God is the "cause" (if only in the sense of being the ratio whose nature is expressed in the system as a whole)[2]. Rashdall cogently urges that it is difficult to conceive of how God's nature can thus afford an explanation of the particular things and events which enter into this system if He does not exercise efficient causation in relation to them[3].

The fundamental difficulty remains that if the time-series is infinite, efficient causality must be "initially" contemporaneous with its effect[4]; but this is not insuperable, Rashdall claims, so long as one renounces Pringle-Pattison's notion that one event causes another, and recognizes that the true cause of the infinite series is a spiritual Being who persists through the succession of events. Moreover, because he interprets causation in terms of will, Pringle-Pattison must attribute some sort of volitional "activity" to physical events

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1. Cf. # 94 f.
2. Pringle-Pattison admits that God is the cause of the natural order in this sense.
3. Cf. The Idea of God, Ch. XVI, and Mind, Vol. XXVII, pp. 270 ff.
4. Rashdall admits this difficulty in the case of an infinite time-series; I should think it more likely to appear in the case of a finite time-series, but I do not propose to discuss the problem.

themselves, or regard them as uncaused.

We are now in a position to discuss a problem so difficult that almost any theistic system falls into formal contradiction in attempting to solve it[1]. In terms of Rashdall's thought it takes the following form: If God's volition embraces the whole temporal process, then what men will must fall within this inclusive purpose. On the other hand, if human willing is distinct from God's, as his whole system requires, then God's power would seem to be externally limited. How can Rashdall affirm that God is finite in the sense that He does not include human wills, and at the same time assert that this finitude does not involve any limitation which is ultimately external to His power? Rashdall's reply, of course, is that what men will, so far as content is concerned, must fall within the divine purpose; but in willing, as an aspect or function of the self's existence, every human individual remains distinct from the will of God as an aspect of His existence. Just as in cognition our knowing is distinct from God's knowledge of it, although He remains omniscient, so in volition our willing is distinct from God's, though it falls within His purpose and He is all-powerful. Whether such a position does not require an extension of the idea of divine personality beyond the limits which Rashdall places upon it, is a question which has already been mentioned; certainly nothing in human experience can provide an analogy for a self, in Rashdall's sense, on whom other selves are thus dependent. It should be noted, however, that to conceive of God as including human wills (in such a sense that individual personality is not destroyed but fully realized therein, because God's purpose is more than a mere aggregate of these wills, and bestows on them an organic unity)

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1. I do not mean to imply that the problem has no rational solution; in what follows it will appear why I must confess that I have not yet found one.

does not necessarily imply that He is omnipotent in the sense of being indeterminate. In short, such a conception is quite reconcilable with the sense in which Rashdall conceives of God as limited solely by the necessary character of His own nature as Creator and as Goodness.

The question immediately arises, on Rashdall's view, as to whether our exercise of volition (granting that it remains distinct from God from the point of view of subjective origin) can ever go contrary to what God wills if we are dependent for our existence and thus for our power of action upon the fact that these latter fall within the divine purpose. The problem as to how one can say that sin retains its intrinsic character as rebellion against God, without in some way admitting an external limitation upon His power, seems to be not susceptible of a rational solution. Hence I shall not cavil against Rashdall because his proffered solution fails to accomplish the impossible. He admits that sin, although it is contrary to the will of God, must arise as a result of the necessary conditions which determine the mode of God's creative activity; but ultimately sin falls within the divine purpose because the temporal process within which sin occurs is the continual realization, in so far as possible, of God's essential goodness. This position, then, involves a formal contradiction: sin is contrary to the will of God, yet He must cause it (i.e. will it) in the process of fulfilling what <u>is</u> in accordance with His will.

Rashdall's distinction (# 125) between man, who wills evil as such, and God, who wills evil only as a necessary means to a good which redeems it, fails to remove this difficulty. For <u>that</u> men should will evil as such must somehow fall within the divine purpose as a limiting condition.

Therefore in replying to McTaggart's question, ... 'How can God's nature at once impel towards an end and yet be the sole obstacle to

his realising that end?'[1] Rashdall admits that there may be no ultimate answer[2]. Many critics[3] have failed to do justice to the answer which he does give, however, because they assume that the necessity which imposes limitation upon God's power must either be willed by Him or be external to His nature. In reality Rashdall adopts neither alternative, and it is possible to avoid them both. He claims that although God possesses "all the power there is", this is insufficient to bring about His perfectly good ends without employing any evil means whatever; but this insufficiency is not itself willed at all; it merely sets the limits to what God, as perfect Goodness, can will. Is theism destroyed, then, by a theory which admits that God, although He does not cause this limitation, does cause the evil which arises necessarily as the result of it? To claim that it is destroyed assumes, it seems to me, that possibility and impossibility are alike to God; and for several reasons this is indefensible. As has been argued already, to attribute volition to God does not imply that He chose to create this world after freely considering a number of alternatives. The actual world is the ground of the distinction between possibility and impossibility, and to conceive either of God or of some "possible" world, apart from or prior to the actual world involves meaningless abstraction. As creative Goodness, God's nature is determinate.

However difficult this conception may be, it is preferable to either alternative. For to hold that God is externally limited by the conditions which determine His nature is to assume that truth and goodness have meaning apart from His essential nature. On the other hand, to hold that He is not in any sense limited by truth and goodness, so that they are the result of His fiat rather than

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1. Some Dogmas of Religion, p. 232.
2. Cf. Mind, Vol. XV, p. 540.
3. E.g., Pringle-Pattison in The Idea of God, pp. 387 ff., and R.B. Tollinton in The Modern Churchman, Vol. V, pp. 532 f.

necessary aspects of His nature, is to assume that contradiction of the laws of logic and wanton hatred of mankind are "possible" for Him. Hence Rashdall claims that just as God's intellect is limited by rationality, so His power is limited by what perfect goodness can accomplish. In this sense a world with less evil is impossible. Why this should be the case is ultimately inexplicable.

The chief difficulty in Rashdall's theory arises in connexion with the sense in which God may be said to be the cause of evil. If I understand his doctrine of double causality (# 123), it implies that although human volition is genuinely distinct from God's, nevertheless every occurrence is willed by God. Accordingly, every action which men cause is in some sense willed by God at the same time; from the point of view of self-hood, two wills are thus involved; but from the point of view of what is willed they are identical[1]. Occurrences which lie beyond the province of human voluntary control are of course caused by God alone. It is on the basis of this hypothesis that Rashdall differentiates sharply between causation in which a human self is active, and that which takes place at a mechanical level.

Solely within the terms of his own deterministic position, however, this theory cannot ultimately escape the idea of external limitation of God's power. This can be shown by comparing it with its opposite. Obviously indeterminism could be supported in a fashion which would be more compatible with emphasis upon the distinctness of human volition from God's. Moreover, it can give a satisfactory account of the true nature of sin, as literally contrary to the will of God, the responsibility for which rests solely upon man. The indeterminist may admit that God is responsible for the conditions which give rise to the possibility of sin, but not for the sinful action itself; and this

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1. Qualitatively, or "in principle"; not numerically.

possibility which God does permit may be regarded as a necessary condition of there being a moral order at all - as a necessary condition, in other words, of the world's being the best possible. On the other hand Rashdall must contend that the sinful action falls within the all-inclusive area of what God wills; the difference between the divine and the human causation of a sinful action arises not from what is willed, for that is the same (or similar), but from the character of the two personalities involved. God wills it because it is an unavoidable means to the good; man wills it from intrinsically evil motives. Unless this latter distinction is wholly abandoned, therefore, God does not cause the sinner to have intrinsically evil motives. Thus there remains a sphere which is external to what God wills. For this reason Rashdall fails to reconcile the conception of God as free from external limitation with the doctrine that man is "free" in the sense of exercising self-determination; and I cannot see how any other consistent argument could accomplish this task.

An attempt to employ indeterminism as an expedient for safeguarding God's omnipotence as well as His benevolence soon ends in self-contradiction. Rashdall argues rather convincingly that any consistent defence of this position implies an external limitation on God's power. Apart from this, the indeterminist who urges that God Himself <u>wills</u> that men shall be free, ends in a contradiction similar to the one already noticed. For in plain language this argument is reducible to the notion that the fulfilment of God's purpose entails that men shall be empowered to obstruct the fulfilment of His purpose.

Some indeterminists attempt to avoid this dilemma by contending that because God's time-span is infinite, His understanding embraces knowledge of all events, past, present and future, in an immediate intuition. This view differs from Rashdall's in so far as it implies that man is free to act within certain spheres in a way which God does

not cause in any sense; but both agree that God foreknows that human action will ultimately serve the purpose which He does will, namely, the fulfilment of the moral order. Rashdall's deterministic position, however, is much more compatible with this conception of divine foreknowledge. How is it possible to contend, for example, that God foreknows not only the possibility, but the actuality of sin, without at the same time admitting that God causes sin in the sense of willing the condition (human freedom) which gives rise to it? Again, indeterminists often maintain that universal knowledge does not necessarily imply universal determination; but in the nature of the case is it not impossible to account for how there could be foreknowledge of a genuinely undetermined action? Genuine contingency, which sets the cardinal distinction between determinism and indeterminism, implies that God Himself cannot foreknow whether or not the gift of freedom will ultimately fulfil, instead of defeat, His universal moral purpose. The argument that God may know human minds from within, even if it is valid, does not afford any avenue of escape from this for the indeterminist. For surely the individual himself, on an indeterministic theory, does not know the character of his spontaneous acts until they are performed.

Is there any rationally consistent view which can claim that man is the sole cause of sinful actions, without admitting the possibility that God's purposes may ultimately be frustrated? I shall only suggest an outline of the preliminary requirements of such a view. In the first place, it must avoid one of the contradictions just discussed by relinquishing the conception of divine foreknowledge in the sphere of free moral action[1]. In the second place, it must eschew Rashdall's

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1. The principle of indeterminacy in physics may affect the question of God's foreknowledge and determination of mechanical events; but this must not be confused with the topic now being discussed.

attempt to maintain that whatever power man does have, although it is external to God's power as selves are external to one another, is not external in the sense that it may go contrary to what He, on His part, wills[1]. These are the demands of speculation; they cannot satisfy the religious consciousness, which accepts belief in God as ultimate reality, together with belief in the reality of moral evil, - not as a speculative theory, but as a paradox of faith. So far as rational argument is concerned, however, Rashdall has shown that anyone who regards his determinism as incompatible with full moral responsibility, must either fall into contradiction or admit divine limitation at two points where he refuses to do so[2]. Nor is it possible to argue that because moral freedom is a necessary condition without which God's creative purpose could not be fulfilled, therefore, because moral freedom is real, His purpose is being or will be fulfilled. The utmost that can be said on an indeterministic basis is that, though freedom to sin is real, it results in spiritual death; in accordance with the extent to which, through the self-discipline learned under freedom, men become concerned in the triumph of the spiritual order, and hence in the destiny of their own souls, sin will promote its own destruction, righteousness its own conservation[3].

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1. I have confined myself in the foregoing to the problem of sin, because it is paramount for a deterministic view like Rashdall's. For an indeterministic theory the paramount problem is man's initiation of moral goodness. Thus arises the antinomy: either God is in no sense responsible for the moral goodness and evil of human actions, or He is in some sense responsible for both. In either case His goodness implies some form of limitation. But it would be difficult to find a theological system which remains within these confines. The strict Calvinist, for example, somehow reconciles belief in God's unfailing love with an array of notions like omnipotence, total depravity and irresistible grace.
2. I.e., re divine foreknowledge and undetermined human action.
3. Theistic belief does not necessarily postulate that all moral evil will be conquered or extinguished; so long as the future life is envisaged as temporal, the necessity for moral effort in the future life against the presence of evil is neither more nor less inexplicable than it is in this life. Rashdall himself is inclined to doubt Origen's optimism concerning the salvation of all souls. (Cf. Atonement, p. 458).

This last point must not be confused with the conception that the natural order is so constructed that evil contains the seeds of its own destruction; for on the plane of natural evolution it is difficult to argue that traits which give rise to moral evil are self-eliminating. On the contrary, they often possess survival value in a high degree; hence on this level the evidence is indecisive, although, conversely, the survival value of traits which give rise to altruism and love should not be minimized. As an environment fit for the education of morally free agents, the natural order is malleable to both good and evil purposes. Moreover, the threat of physical death or misfortune as a consequence of moral evil, though it may play an appropriate part in the discipline of embodied souls, does not disclose the true meaning of freedom, wherein moral maturity can be attained solely through factors which lie within the sphere of individual assent.

The question of physical evil presents the final aspect of our problem. Rashdall has rightly urged that an indeterministic view of sin does nothing to account for the origin of evils which are not related to moral factors. The problem can be avoided by maintaining the Kantian view that only the good will is good; in that case pain is intrinsically neither good nor bad, and hence its reality occasions nothing incompatible with belief in God's goodness, though it does require some explanation as to how pain conduces to making life better (i.e. morally better) than it would be without it[1]. This is not Rashdall's view, however, and the problem of pain is doubly important for him because he attributes efficient causality to God in willing the laws of nature. This seems to necessitate the hypothesis that the particular evils which attend the operation of natural law are willed

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1. Cf. R.G. Collingwood's article entitled "What is the Problem of Evil?" in Theology, Vol. I, pp. 66-74.

by God as means to a particular good end. Therefore he must believe that no particular physical evil is ever greater than is necessary for the welfare either of the suffering individual or of some other person. It is not solely for this reason that Rashdall believes in personal immortality, but this belief does afford him the only possible ground for an adequate solution to the problem thus raised. Even so, he does not attempt to explain how sufferings which in this life do not conduce to human welfare - and he admits that they occur - can be instrumental to some future well-being which will justify them.

I shall merely mention a solution which seems to me to be more satisfactory. Some degree of regularity in the natural order can be shown to be requisite for the nurture of moral beings; and the onus of proof lies on anyone who claims that such a natural order could serve this good function without giving rise collaterally to pain. Hence the theistic solution to the problem would in this case take the form, not of showing that pain necessarily conduces in every instance to moral good, but of showing that it necessarily attends the regular operation of the natural order, which is good as a whole because it is instrumental to the temporal appearance and maintenance of the moral order. Then the maldistribution of value in the lives of individuals, so far as physical evil is concerned, will be taken as <u>not</u> specifically willed by God at all. Against this theory Rashdall would doubtless press the question as to how God could will the general uniformity of natural law without willing the particular operations incidental to which the evil in question arises. To this there could be no complete answer; but when the absence of a moral order is seen to be the alternative to natural regularity, it is possible to contend that all individuals share to such an extent in the benefits which result from this regularity that the evils attendant upon it, though in some particular instances they do not conduce to moral improvement, are

nevertheless worth the price.

5. The Objectivity of the Moral Law.

Rashdall's theistic argument from the objectivity of the absolute moral ideal (# 112 f.) which can exist only for some mind and yet is neither apprehended nor realized fully by any human mind, has been criticized by Dr. Tennant[1]. It must be admitted that the word "absolute", which Rashdall uses in this connexion, is open to misconstruction. He does not mean it to suggest a morality which has no connexion with particular circumstances; he merely means that because moral goodness, like physical nature, is presented to our minds instead of being created by them in the act of judgment, it must have an "existence" which is not dependent upon our apprehension of it. Here the idealistic argument (when corrected as above) and the moral argument are parallel to each other.

Nevertheless this argument, if it is valid, must be applicable to all universal propositions. The moral ideal of which Rashdall is speaking falls in the class of universal propositions which are true without necessarily being true of anything actual in space and time[2]. Rashdall's Berkeleian metaphysics lead him to say that all such propositions[3] "exist" in the mind of God; but in order to avoid confusion it is necessary to note that most writers would prefer to say that such non-existential propositions "subsist". All propositions which are true whether or not they are realized in fact (and moral judgments are of this nature) must be regarded as hypothetical; but it may be possible to hold that, in the case of moral judgments, such

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1. Cf. Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, pp. 97 f.
2. At least, so far as our knowledge goes; and I think that Rashdall would admit that the moral ideal as it "exists" in God's mind, while it is relevant to all temporal events of a moral character, might also be in some sense supra-temporal.
3. E.g., the laws of logic. Cf. Leibniz' theistic proof based on the necessity of postulating a God to think these laws.

propositions always refer to characteristics of actual existents, while they (i.e. moral judgments) remain hypothetical only because they are valid whether or not these characteristics are ever actually related in a certain way[1]. But Rashdall's system requires him to say that all valid hypothetical propositions, whether or not they possess this bearing on existence (as we know it)[2], nevertheless "exist" in the mind of God. Dr. Tennant seems to me to be unfair to Rashdall, however, when he suggest that 'ideals and ideas may thus "exist" without even being valid'[3]; Rashdall's point is that when we pronounce propositions which remain valid even though they may refer to nothing actual in space and time, these propositions can be valid only because they refer to a sphere of reality wider than existence as we know it. Invalid propositions, he would say, do not refer to anything real; and while it is true that valid and invalid propositions alike "exist" as psychological "states" in some subject, the very distinction between them is that the former agree with an objective reality while the latter do not.

Rashdall might have avoided such misinterpretation by frankly distinguishing between "reality" and "existence" (as we know it), making the former a term which includes the latter and much else besides[4].

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1. For example, willingness on the part of one man to sacrifice his life for another in a noble cause is judged to be good, whether anyone has actually done so or not; but all the characteristics involved can be conceived only as possessed by existing persons. So far as I understand his views, this is Professor Sorley's meaning when he writes of 'value as a unique predicate with a definite bearing upon existence'. (Moral Values and the Idea of God, p. xiv; cf. pp. 76 f.).
2. And some, like those of geometry, almost certainly do not, though, as Sorley suggests, they may be radically different from moral propositions.
3. Op. cit., p. 98.
4. Sorley adopts this expedient; cf. op. cit., pp. 206 ff. Professor Taylor prefers to widen the terms "existence" and "actuality" to include "values and "ideals" as well as the spatio-temporal world. (Cf. The Faith of a Moralist, Vol. I, pp. 51-55).

Still, his meaning is clear; all propositions (true and false) which are ever entertained at all "exist" subjectively in some mind; but when a proposition would remain valid even though nothing in the spatio-temporal world ever "realized" it, or when it remains valid even though no human mind apprehends it, such a proposition must accord with or express (as the case may be) something which is real only because the latter "exists" in the mind of God; the use of "exists", as contrasted with "subsists", is - in his system - merely a question of language. Rashdall chooses the former term because he believes that God exists, and that He thinks all valid universals whether or not these universals are, or ever could be, concretely realized in particulars.

This gives rise to the very important question as to what is the relation between God's thought and these universal laws. If the moral law "exists" independently of our knowing it, then the point which appeared earlier is again raised: Does not an argument from analogy indicate that the moral law "exists" independently of God's knowing it? Clearly Rashdall must either abandon the analogy between human and divine cognition as regards moral value, or he must admit that there is a sphere of being which is external to all minds, including God's. What he says about the moral law "existing in" some mind, and his personalistic system as a whole, constrain him to choose the former alternative, just a previously he was forced to relinquish the same analogy with regard to knowledge of physical objects. It does seem to be true that by the universality of a valid moral law we do not mean in this case "valid whether or not any mind thinks it"; for the law could not be valid where it is

inapplicable, and it is - on any theory - applicable only to the lives of persons. For Rashdall, who regards the "thinking" of anything impersonal as constituting its existence, to say that the moral law is thus dependent upon some mind, without being dependent upon our minds, necessarily implies that it exists "in" a (presumably) super-human mind.

It is instructive to notice the parallel which is thus established between our knowledge of value and our knowledge of the physical world; in both cases our own judgments can apprehend directly only what is essentially subjective; they apprehend what is objective and independent of our minds as the result of inference based on what we do know directly. In our knowledge of the physical world concepts as they exist "in our minds" are apprehended intuitively or immediately, not inferentially; and Rashdall can hardly mean anything more than this when he speaks of our knowledge of value as being intuitive or immediate. The "objective" world of value, as well as the archetypal world of physical nature, then, exists in the mind of God, independently of what we feel, will or think[1]. Such a view is compatible with his contention that value can reside only in some conscious personality, and yet it safeguards him against identifying value itself merely with the human states of consciousness which it qualifies. His failure to bring out the full significance

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1. If the right and the good are regarded as synthetically related, and "right" is made dependent upon motivation (cf. # 256 ff.), then the categorical obligatoriness of actions, and the value of the ends to which they are directed, are both dependent upon the subjective conditions which limit the individual's capacity to recognize and to perform his duty; but, granting these subjective conditions, propositions which assert categorically that an agent ought to perform a certain action, or that a certain end ought to be promoted by the agent, remain universally valid. They remain valid even when the agent does not recognize his duty, because a categorical obligation is one which he can recognize and fulfil. Hypothetical propositions likewise remain universally valid (as such), and they are of course only hypothetically contingent upon the subjective factors just mentioned.

of this implication of his theory has already received sufficient attention in the expository section[1].

This refusal on Rashdall's part to regard the sphere of value as a hierarchy which exists independently of God's mind, makes his view one which is often connected with the doctrine that the moral law depends upon what God wills arbitrarily. It is clear that he cannot accept the scheme of the Timaeus, in which the Forms and "Necessity" (as a negative or limiting cause) are external to God's Being; yet he certainly repudiates the teachings of Duns Scotus and Occam, despite the fact that they, with him, regard the Forms (or the order of value) as existing "within" instead of "externally to" the mind of God. How Rashdall can occupy a position which mediates between two such opposing views is easily explicable so long as one remembers that he conceives of God as a self-determined Being, neither indeterminate nor externally determined. Hence, he would contend, God's will can be determined or limited by an order of intrinsic goodness, without that order being external to His Mind. God's nature being what it is, He could not will what is not perfectly good, and

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1. Cf. # 42 ff. Indeed, there are passages in which Rashdall seems to fall into the fallacies connected with his first two arguments for idealism, and to argue that value and physical things have no existence apart from what the individual mind "creates". His remarks in GE. II, pp. 197 f., for example, seem to be entirely incompatible with the theistic view that value and physical things exist independently of our cognitive processes and are "presented" to our minds instead of "constructed" by them. In this passage he uses language which, if consistently applied, would condemn his own representative theory as phenomenalistic. He writes: 'the more fully it is recognized that in knowledge the mind is building up or contributing an essential factor to Reality, and not merely recognizing a Reality which is what it is quite independently of itself or of any other subject, so much the more intelligible does it become that there should be a truth which has no external "thing-in-itself" corresponding to it'. Here, in attempting to refute realism, he apparently forgets everything which he says elsewhere in support of the contention that his Berkeleian system can safeguard idealism and at the same time explain how value and the physical world can be independent of our minds.

yet remain Himself. What God "conceives" to be good is thus determined, to be sure, by the necessary nature of goodness, but this necessary nature is identical with what He, being God, wills. Thus the old puzzle as to whether a thing is good because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good, is swallowed up in the conviction that God and goodness are identical in essence. Absolute goodness is a sphere of being which "exists" independently of us; hence it can be attributed to us only adjectivally. But it does not exist independently of God; hence it cannot be attributed to Him adjectivally; He alone is not "good", but "Goodness"[1]. While it remains possible to distinguish logically between the notions "God wills X", and "X is perfectly good", it is impossible for the theist to attach a meaning to either notion which does not imply the other.

The entire preceding argument makes it difficult to understand how Rashdall can attempt to differentiate between his first postulate (the belief in a self which causes its own actions) and his second (belief in the existence of God) as regards their necessary connexion with an "objective" morality[2]. When he first draws the distinction[3], he admits that an atheist could find "some meaning" in morality: for example, an atheist could say (in Tennant's terminology) that it has an over-individual, but not an over-social, validity; but he could not say even this without believing in the reality of an active self. So much is clear. But a few pages later Rashdall writes:

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1. Cf. A.E. Taylor's remarks Proc. Arist. Soc. Supplementary Vol. XI, (1932) pp. 167 f. This essay, entitled "Is Goodness a Quality?", was later republished as the last chapter of his Philosophical Studies.
2. Cf. # 86 f.
3. Cf. GE. II, p. 212.

... 'A certain belief about the self and its relation to human action may be described as the primary postulate of Ethics, since the incompatibility between its negation and a real belief in an objective or absolute Ethic is obvious on the face of it, obvious at the level of common-sense thought'[1]. The words which I have underlined indicate how this statement differs from the preceding one. The only meaning which he ever gives to "an objective or absolute Ethic" connects it with the conformity (or lack of conformity) of our moral judgments with an independent moral law embodied in what God thinks and wills. Hence recognition of any relationship between the first postulate and the notion of "an objective or absolute Ethic" is obviously logically posterior to the apprehension of the latter notion itself; and this latter notion, unless Rashdall's whole argument concerning the objectivity of the moral law is invalid, is meaningless apart from theism. A plain contradiction exists between his first statement, in which atheistic morality adheres to the first postulate although its ethic is not objective or absolute, and his second statement, in which this first postulate is said to be necessarily connected with an objective and absolute ethic.

Nevertheless, we must not permit this contradiction to obscure a real distinction which Rashdall has in mind concerning the relation between theism and belief in an objective morality. It is this: while he must say that a true moral judgment accords with a moral law which "exists", independently of our cognition of it, in the mind of God, he can yet acknowledge that we may form a true moral judgment without knowing that this is the case. It is in this sense that moral judgment is autonomous; it is in this

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1. ~~cf.~~ GE. II, p. 218. Italics mine.

sense that it contains 'no explicit reference' to belief in God, although the latter belief is reached by inference 'as soon as the attempt is made to develop what is contained in the actual moral consciousness and to harmonize it with other parts of our experience'[1].

6. Revelation.

We have just seen that with regard to ethical ideals, as well as to physical things, Rashdall asserts that the transcendent object, to which a concept or judgment "in" the individual mind refers, can be known only inferentially. This assertion affords the key to a proper interpretation of his remarks concerning revelation.

He causes serious confusion by setting reason and intuition in sharp contrast when he speaks of religious knowledge, while stoutly maintaining, when writing about ethics, that judgments concerning value are the work of reason, notwithstanding the fact that they are intuitively formed. It is possible to show, I believe, that he really regards moral knowledge as a form of revelation, so that the distinction between "immediate" moral knowledge and "immediate" religious knowledge, which his aversion to mysticism constrains him to postulate, is misleading, and conceals the true import of his theory.

Let us succinctly restate what this theory implies. A moral judgment, so far as the individual mind is concerned, is "immediate" in the sense that it is not deducible from ulterior logical grounds; but the transcendent object to which it refers cannot be apprehended directly, if it lies outside the subjective experience of the individual. If this judgment is true, however, it affords knowledge which actually does accord with the moral law which exists objectively in the mind of God, whether or not the individual recognizes that this is the case. This latter recognition can arise only through inference, and this

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1. Op. cit., p. 218.

inference is based upon the immediate judgment[1]. Therefore it is impossible to acquire a direct knowledge of the objective moral law which enables one to say whether or not this particular immediate judgment is true or false.

The chief defect of this theory is not so much what is contains in itself (although presently I shall protest against that); from the point of view of understanding Rashdall's real meaning, the chief defect is that he has here confined himself to an account of the ordo cognoscendi. Now so long as he remains faithful to the principle that the data which enter into true conceptions and judgments are presented to our minds, not constructed by them, - so long, that is, as he adheres to the principle that all knowledge is made available as the result of divine activity, - an account of the ordo cognoscendi is inadequate. It is easy to understand why he regards the work of revelation and the work of reason as different aspects of the same process; the one is disclosure from the God-ward side; the other is apprehension from the manward side. Yet his discussion of revelation is almost entirely restricted to his views concerning the latter.

His theory implies that, although a true moral judgment may be prior to theistic belief in the ordo cognoscendi, nevertheless our "immediate" apprehension of moral truth is posterior to divine activity in the ordo essendi. It may be justifiable to claim that the process of inference involved in the ordo cognoscendi is as much due

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1. The inference takes the following form: "Because I believe (on the ground of immediate insight) that this moral judgment is true, I infer that it holds true for all rational creatures, and that it is in accord with the objective moral law as it exists in God's mind". Needless to say, a particular moral judgment can be universally true in this sense: if it truly asserts that E is good, then this holds universally, despite the fact that it may be the duty of A, but not of B, to promote E; that is, E may be the best feasible end for A, but not for B. Moreover, a proposition which asserted that it was A's duty to promote E in that situation would be universally true; while a similar proposition concerning B would be universally false.

to God's activity as is the immediate judgment on which this process is based (cf. # 161). But the fact remains that if this immediate judgment is true, its truth presupposes God's existence and activity, whether or not the judging individual consciously makes this presupposition, or whether or not he even believes in God. In the ordo cognoscendi belief in God is a logical consequence of belief in the objective truth of moral judgments only because in the ordo essendi the existence and activity of God are necessarily prior to this belief. The interpretation which we place upon our moral knowledge naturally moves from the human sphere to the divine; but this knowledge is itself possible only because God has first disclosed it. No subjective fusion between God's mind and that of the individual need be postulated at all. Rashdall fails to do himself justice because he habitually identifies revelation solely with the knowledge that a true moral judgment accords with the divine moral law, whereas he could have consistently affirmed the theory that what God wills is known to us immediately in true moral judgments. In the ordo essendi the primary data of revelation, and the primary act in man's apprehension of them, are to be found in this immediate moral judgment itself.

His objection to mysticism is based upon a refusal to believe (a) that one mind can know the content of another mind, as it presents itself subjectively to that other mind, or (b) that one mind can otherwise know non-inferentially that a given content is present to another mind. It is possible to defend the latter against his objections without affirming the former. In any case, however, both of these points could be granted to Rashdall, without making it necessary to deny that the content which is directly present to one mind may also be directly present to another; thus he might have put forward a theory of direct, non-inferential knowledge of what God discloses, no matter what theory he espoused concerning how man comes to recognize this knowledge for what it is.

If this had always been made clear, he could have spared himself the appearance of arguing, in practice, that God must conform to the moral judgments of men. He might also have avoided the appearance of testing Christian doctrine by ethical canons which are "independently true", if this latter phrase be taken to mean "independent of the sphere of revelation". Perhaps it is true, as he claims, that moral judgments provide the only data for knowing God's character; but, if so, this is only because moral truth falls within the sphere of revelation, and for that reason may be made a ground for distinguishing between what is revealed (i.e., what is in accordance with God's will) and what is not. Once this be acknowledged, much of what he says concerning moral judgment may be taken as a fair description of the manner in which recognition of duty brings home to the minds and hearts of men what it is that God wants them to do.

Some critics have objected that Rashdall's theory of revelation fails to provide certainty in any form. A conviction that an individual moral judgment is certainly either true or false, they protest, does nothing whatever to help determine which is the case in any given instance; and so long as our own immediate moral insights are uncertain, the theistic conclusion which follows as an inference from them is likewise uncertain. Rashdall could of course reply to the latter criticism that the very possibility of a judgment's being objectively true or false ultimately implies (in his Berkeleian system) a belief in God. But I cannot see how any theory of revelation can possibly escape the former dilemma; for to hold that any fact or teaching is revealed is to formulate an individual judgment about it, however humbly one may admit that the revelation transcends his own powers of comprehension; and this judgment is either true or false, but no criterion more ultimate than this judgment, and the immediate insight on the basis of which one believes its subject to be revealed (if the judgment is not its own

ground), can determine which it is in any given instance. Or if it be claimed that it is in a Person, not in propositions, that revelation resides, Rashdall would certainly agree, but he might add that individual appreciation of the significance of this Person is subject to precisely the same limitations, the same differing degrees of insight, as is our apprehension of moral truth.

So far as human apprehension of truth is concerned, then, Rashdall's theory merely acknowledges the inescapability of (what Professor Perry has called) "the ego-centric predicament". So far as the divine initiative in revelation is concerned, it acknowledges that the relationship between God and man is not one of coercion, and that God works within the limits of human receptivity in imparting knowledge of Himself to His creatures.

The problem of error, especially in moral judgment, is one which every theistic system must confront; for Rashdall the fact that God must be said in some sense to cause or permit error is an aspect of the problem of evil which certainly is no more pressing than the problem of sin; the two, indeed, are closely related, although he would contend that sin is a primary cause of moral blindness, and not merely a result of ignorance. Any theodicy must strive to solve both problems, those of sin and error, in similar ways. The attempt of absolute idealism to divert attention from temporal evil by regarding it as an illusion is self-defeating; for as a psychological fact, an illusion is as real as any other experience; and an illusion which conceals from us the perfect goodness of the universe (as absolutism would have it, sub specie aeternitatis) is itself an evil[1].

Nevertheless, even when it is restated in the preceding form, Rashdall's theory of revelation is inadequate. To admit that our

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1. Several writers have urged this point, though Rashdall makes it only obliquely. Cf. Tennant: Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, p. 181, and McTaggart: Some Dogmas of Religion, pp. 208-10.

knowledge of human selves must be inferential does not necessarily mean that our knowledge of God must be inferential likewise, unless one supposes that God's communication of His will and nature to our minds is subject to the limitations which circumscribe human intercourse. I have already attempted to show the weakness of Rashdall's view when he makes this latter supposition; I should be inclined to go further and to follow Professor Cook Wilson in renouncing the idea of "inferred friends" as well as that of an "inferred God". Rashdall's assertion that our "knowledge of God" is like our knowledge of a friend would connote to most minds a form of knowledge by direct acquaintenance. The single phrase "knowledge of God", however, conceals a fundamental distinction which must be drawn between (a) knowledge of what God is like, and (b) knowledge that God exists. If Rashdall's theory of revelation is valid it has exhibited the necessarily inferential nature of our knowledge <u>that</u> characteristics which we apprehend in true moral judgments must qualify God, as well as all other rational creatures; and it may or may not be true as a universal generalization that our knowledge of what another self is like - that is, our knowledge of his intellect, will, emotions, etc., as subjective functions, which on Berkeleian principles can never become direct "objects"[1] - must be inferential. But his argument on this score does not show that our knowledge that God exists must be arrived at as the result of an inferential argument.

If knowledge of what a self is like must be inferential, is it not apparent that any such inference must <u>presuppose</u> the existence of the other self, to which its attributes can be

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1. Cf. # 273.

referred?[1]. One could never become convinced of the existence of another self as the result of a discursive argument, if one did not believe in the existence of that self on the ground of direct acquaintance.

Similarly, our knowledge that God exists is based in the first instance upon religious experience as the genuine cognition of an object which is presented to the mind. Nothing more ultimate than such a presentation, and nothing less than it, can be sufficient evidence for believing in the existence of anything. All of the ultimate data of knowledge - moral and aesthetic values, an external world, other selves - transcend demonstration by a discursive argument because they are the starting points for discursive argument; but if belief in their reality is not irrational, then neither is belief in God. So far as rational verification of religious experience can go, consciousness of the reality of God exhibits the same characteristics which distinguish these other forms of cognition from mere illusion; He is known as an abiding presence without which not only this knowledge of Him, but many other aspects of experience would be inexplicable. Rashdall makes a fatal mistake when he bases his theistic "proofs" upon various aspects of experience in which prima facie God is not known, and then attempts to move by inference to a position where knowledge of His existence appears as a conclusion. If this were really necessary in the case of theistic belief, it

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1. Furthermore, because Rashdall bases inferential knowledge of another self on knowledge of one's own self-hood, it is necessary to point out that it is only through interaction with other selves that the individual becomes a self at all or that he can construct a notion of his own self-hood. Thus, for a second reason, the inference to which Rashdall refers presupposes the existence of other selves instead of yielding knowledge of that existence as a conclusion. Therefore Rashdall is quite right when he argues that intuitive "religious ideas" presuppose the existence of a God to be revealed (cf. # 171.), but wrong when he assumes that knowledge of this existence must be inferantial.

would also be necessary for the physicist to use principles which had not been derived from a study of his data in attempting to prove the existence of his data, and it would be necessary for Rashdall himself, as a moralist, to start with non-ethical data as the premiss of any argument by which he might seek to prove the validity of ethical knowledge.

Now he admits that such a procedure in the case of moral knowledge is not only unnecessary, but impossible. But if moral insight is knowledge, although it is not reached inferentially, surely the same may be claimed for the insight of religious worship or of the prophetic consciousness. I should contend that the test of an intuitive knowledge that God exists, like the test of an intuitive knowledge of moral value, cannot be more ultimate than the data which the intuition furnishes. Because his rejection of the theory that one mind can include another gives rise to the implication, on his Berkeleian principles, that what another self is like must be known inferentially, Rashdall erroneously concludes that for the same reason the existence of another self must be known inferentially[1]. But an argument concerning the character of God, even if it must be inferential, cannot proceed unless knowledge that God exists is included in the ground of that argument. If one does not know directly that God exists, no argument, so far as I can see, can move from a premiss in which God's existence does not appear to a conclusion in which it does appear. This generalization applies even to the moral argument for theism because it is really only the atheist who demands that this argument should start with the

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1. I should contend that both the existence and the characteristics of another self are known directly.

moral law as a mere regulative norm and then move inferentially to a conclusion in which that law becomes a manifestation of the nature of God. And I can see no more reason for permitting the atheist to dictate the mode of approach to an understanding of the religious experience, than for permitting the morally obtuse to dictate the mode of approach to an understanding of the moral experience[1].

The foregoing protest against Rashdall's views does not require a return to a radical distinction between revelation and reason; all it implies is that the knowledge of God's existence, which he assigns to reason operating discursively, should be assigned to reason operating intuitively. God's direct self-revelation transcends what man's ordinary rational powers, operating discursively, can disclose; but it does not transcend what man has the capacity intuitively to receive, although men differ in this capacity. Moreover, that direct self-disclosure can be related harmoniously to what natural theology takes as its province, once the evidence of religious experience be taken as the true starting point of any discursive argument in the sphere of theology. Any belief must suffer if it is incapable of rational justification; but it must be remembered that belief in the existence of God is held in the first instance independently of any rational justification, and rational justification takes that belief as its point of departure. Rashdall is right in contending that Christians have been able to give reasons for holding their belief in the existence of God[2]; but they have not believed because they could give reasons; rather, they have given reasons

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1. Or for permitting the tone-deaf and colour-blind to dictate in the case of aesthetic experience.
2. Cf. # 163.

because they already believed[1].

Because belief in the existence of God has its orgin, not in the assent to certain doctrines or propositions, but in fellowship with a Person, it is not a "religious idea" to be tentatively accepted, subject to some final assurance as to its truth or falsity which logical demonstration can provide. Natural theology serves the important function of satisfying the intellectual demand which impells us to trace such harmony as is discernible between a revelation which presents itself as ultimate and a rational interpretation of other aspects of experience. However, the difference between revealed and natural theology reflects the distinction between God's immediate self-revelation in fellowship and worship, and His mediate self-revelation in the physical world and ordinary human character. And it is not too much to say that the discursive reason, apart from the data supplied by religious experience, cannot give a content to ideas like God, freedom and immortality, which will satisfy religious needs.

For Christian theology (if the preceding argument is valid) the revelation of God in Christ is an ultimate fact which must be accepted as the starting point of its interpretation. I shall therefore conclude this thesis by attempting to indicate the respects in which Rashdall's views concerning the Incarnation[2] and the Atonement fail to do justice to certain aspects of the revelation in Christ, whose significance cannot be wholly grasped by a method which seeks to test their truth or falsity in terms of a preconceived ethical and metaphysical system. Specifically I shall criticize his position because it implies that Christ can be in no sense "personally" identical with God. I agree with Rashdall that "personality" is the most adequate category which we can use in our thought about God; but he has constructed his

1. I do not mean (to quote Bradley's famous phrase) that the Christian gives bad reasons for what he believes upon instinct. So long as it furnishes good reasons, natural theology is not mere "rationalization" of a blind prejudice; it is an earnest effort to interpret its data, and no science can claim to do more.
2. The Trinity is discussed only incidentally in what follows.

conception of that category apart from Christian doctrine, and then has sought to apply his conception of it to the Person of Christ. If my views concerning the function of natural theology are valid, his procedure is illegitimate. I have already sought to indicate the defects in his argument concerning divine personality from a speculative point of view; now I shall criticize it as it applies to Christian doctrine. In so doing, I am not attempting to minimize the respects in which the significance of Christ's Person and work can be related to "ordinary" human experience; what I wish to contend is that only when He is regarded as a member of the God-head can this relationship be properly established.

7. The Incarnation as Revelation.

Rashdall's interpretation of the Incarnation must be understood first of all in the light of the principles concerning his own general idea of revelation which I have already tried to make explicit. He approaches the doctrine in a way which seems to make acceptance of it contingent upon (and hence logically posterior to) two notions: (1) that the possibility of a unique and complete Incarnation of God in a human individual is dependent upon a community of nature between God and man such that all men reveal God to some extent; (2) that the evidence for the fact that this unique Incarnation actually took place must be sought in the appeal which Christ makes to the conscience of mankind, such that he is acknowledged to have fulfilled the highest moral ideal[1]. But here again, the distinction between the ordo essendi and the ordo cognoscendi must be kept in mind. For the grounds on which the doctrine is accepted as true may be "immediate" and "independent" only in the latter order.

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1. The only mention of the argument in Conscience and Christ in this critical section occurs in the succeeding remarks. The chapter on Christian Ethics was included in the expository section, not merely because without it our account of Rashdall's writings would have been incomplete, but because Conscience and Christ contains the clearest and most extensive statement of his views concerning the historical Jesus. His treatment of Christian doctrine is radically affected by the fact that he strives to reduce apocalyptic elements in the gospels to terms which are compatible with a moralizing purpose. It would be rewarding to discuss what he says concerning Christ as an ethical teacher; but in the main he presents a very familiar, semi-Ritchlian interpretation. Because Rashdall passes from a study of Christ's greatness in this regard, to an affirmation that He was the unique Revealer of God, I have thought it more profitable to presuppose the former point and confine our attention to this latter. One criticism of the book may be of especial interest as coming from the pen of T.S. Eliot: 'It follows almost inevitably, if one holds a theory of conscience similar to Dr. Rashdall's, that conscience will consist in the usual structure of prejudices of the enlightened middle classes. To this middle-class conscience the teaching of Jesus is gradually assimilated.' (Int. Jour. of Ethics, Vol. XXVII, p. 111). Eliot goes on to accuse him of "either denying or boiling away by the Principle of Development everything anarchic, unsafe or disconcerting in what Jesus said".

Indeed, if this distinction is forgotten (and Rashdall certainly fails to make it explicit), his argument seems to be reducible to the contention that the truth of the doctrine is contingent upon its acceptance by, or its acceptability to, human minds. His real intention appears to be quite different from this . He believes that Christ was "divine" in the sense that He perfectly revealed the nature and will of God; the doctrine which expresses this truth is valid, whether the moral ideals of any given individual, or of humanity collectively, ever are or have been such as to make it acceptable. But when, and in so far as, men do apprehend the truth of the doctrine, they do so primarily by means of true moral judgments. Hence he cannot say that the perfect revelation of God's will in Christ provides an independent criterion for testing the validity of particular moral judgments; for in the ordo cognoscendi this belief in Christ is a consequence of our apprehension of moral truth; therefore such a belief cannot be (in the first instance) a ground of this apprehension. Once the truth of the doctrine is accepted, of course, the moral goodness of any individual or of any society is seen to be dependent upon the extent to which the revelation of God's will in Christ is therein recognized and obeyed; yet the apprehension (not the truth) of this revelation still remains contingent upon the individual's own insight into moral truth. In the ordo essendi, as we have seen, the individual's "immediate" apprehension of moral truth arises from God's activity in self-revelation, - an activity which Christ perfectly mediated. Rashdall is really seeking to maintain merely that men must have the capacity to receive this revelation.

The same distinction affects the first "ground" mentioned

above - the "community of nature between God and man".[1] In the ordo cognoscendi it may be the idea of human moral goodness which gives rise to the notion of this community of nature; but in the ordo essendi it can only be because this community of nature exists in fact (whatever one supposes to be its extent) that man can apprehend moral truth in the first instance. At the same time, a somewhat different point emerges; even in the ordo cognoscendi the notion of a community of nature presupposes some knowledge of what God's nature is; and it presupposes this knowledge prior to belief in the Incarnation. Let us assume that human nature at its best (apart from Christ) affords the most adequate revelation (apart from that in Christ) of God's nature.[2] Now in direct proportion as one acknowledges the degree to which human nature at its best is infected with sin, one will be forced to admit, in a corresponding degree, the limitations placed upon any knowledge of God which human life can reveal apart from Christ. What Rashdall's argument amounts to, then, is that this partial knowledge of God is logically prior to knowledge of God as Christ-like. When he writes: 'We must believe in the existence of God on other grounds before we can

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1. This expression must not be misinterpreted; Dr. Gore and Dr. Headlam, it seems to me, both fail to understand it. Of course Rashdall does not intend it to blur the distinctions between God and man as respectively Creator and creature, "All-powerful" and finite, Holy and sinful, Redeemer and redeemed. All he means to convey (apart from the fact that God and men are alike spiritual beings) is that in whatever measure man is morally good, that goodness is identical in principle with God's goodness; what he wishes to combat is the doctrine of total depravity, which would set an absolute distinction between God's righteousness and the ethical knowledge and conduct of the "natural" man.
2. Most adequate because it alone can furnish grounds for believing in God's benevolence; teleological arguments based on physical nature alone cannot do this.

believe that Christ reveals Him',[1] he is in reality referring respectively to two distinguishable conceptions of God; belief in the existence of God "on other grounds" yields a partial conception; belief in the existence of God as revealed by Christ yields a complete conception.[2]

It seems to me that the logical order which Rashdall is here describing is one which it would be very difficult to establish as necessary, and I am not sure that he means anything of this sort. Otherwise the question at issue seems to relate solely to psychological processes which cannot be analyzed accurately. Certainly many people claim to have come to believe in the existence of God solely through contemplation of the life of Christ, even when they possessed no prior theistic belief whatever; and it seems arbitrary to conjecture that they must have gone through a possibly subconscious and naïve process of metaphysical reasoning which moved logically from a general belief in theism to a belief in the Incarnation.

However, psychological questions are irrelevant to the main point which I wish to make, namely, that there is no general metaphysical evidence which of itself can lead to a fully Christian conception of God, although such evidence may provide helpful prolegomena or subsequent corroboration for belief in His existence as revealed in the Incarnation.

One other question concerning the nature of Christ's task as Revealer turns upon the contrast between the ethical and the eschatalogical interpretations of the New Testament. What is the view of Christ and the early Church concerning the nature of moral

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1. Modern Churchman, Vol. I, p. 383.
2. All this presupposes that the doctrine of the Incarnation is true; this is not unfair because Rashdall accepts the truth of the doctrine in the sense here implied.

knowledge? For one thing it is clear that human moral knowledge is not regarded as a self-sufficient sphere, to which we may be sure that God conforms; instead, knowledge of and obedience to the moral law are represented as instrumental to a knowledge of God. But the fundamental dualism underlying the world-view of primitive Christianity sets a gulf between men's earthly moral judgments and the moral knowledge which refers to another world, a supernatural sphere, and which alone possess the character of revelation. Is there not a marked contrast here between Rashdall's contention that any true "earthly" moral judgment must be in accord with the will of God, - and the teaching of Jesus, which is startling and paradoxical because He is talking about another world, a Kingdom in which earthly judgments will be reversed? In Rashdall's system there is no room for a radical conflict between the moral judgments of the "natural" man, which conform to this world, and those of the regenerate man, which conform (though only partially, while he is living in this world) to a higher, a supernatural reality; for Rashdall the only question is the extent to which any human judgment is true, and this extent reflects the individual's own goodness of character, that is, the extent to which he has been regenerated. Every man is part sheep, part goat, in varying proportions; there seem to be no groups which are wholly one or the other, and which can therefore be separated as such at the Judgment.

The contrast which presents itself here arises from the fact that in the one world-view the dualism is purely ethical, while in the other it is (for want of a better word) cosmic. In Rashdall's system ethical tension arises merely from the stress of opposite forces within one spiritual world; it is a tension which works itself out in the temporal process through a progressive moralization of the race. This process is necessitated by evil as a real limiting condition,

but that condition falls within God's nature and control. On the other hand in the New Testament (although it is difficult to generalize) ethical tension arises from a conflict between two worlds; the forces of evil which God overcame in Christ, and which had held the temporal world and the human soul in bondage, are conceived as lying outside God's nature. Earth is the scene of this conflict, and men are saved by participation in the divine victory which Christ brought about on their behalf. By virtue of His work, those who have fellowship with God, though they dwell in the temporal world, are already not "of" it; they are already members of another Kingdom, into whose perfect fellowship they ultimately enter.

The question arises as to whether there is a contradiction between "earthly" moral judgments and those commands which constitute revelation from a supernatural sphere. Here I think we must agree with Rashdall that in so far as our "earthly" moral judgments are true, they constitute a form of revelation; it is possible to agree in this manner without overlooking the necessity for a radical change of heart, wrought within sinful human nature by Christ's saving work, before our moral judgments do become true.

Many writers hold that the Pauline conception of faith (as "trust", not merely as "intellectual assent"), and the Johannine conception of the Spirit both seem to postulate a supra-rational form of knowledge. It is true that the capacity in human nature which St. Paul and St. John regard as intrinsically allied to the divine nature seems to be one which is quite foreign to what is ordinarily meant by "reason". This is the case, however, because of the two-fold meaning of the term.[1] If it is taken as synonymous with man's cognitive capacities, all knowledge must be regarded as

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1. See distinctions (1) and (2), # 166 f.

"rational", however unique or supernatural its object may be. But "reason" may also be used with reference to the processes of discursive thought by which one type of knowledge is brought into coherent relationship with others. It is in this latter sense alone, I think, that our apprehension of revelation may be supra-rational, as incommensurable (in some respects) with all aspects of knowledge derived from our acquaintance with the temporal world.

I have protested against Rashdall's denial that knowledge of God is supra-rational in this latter sense. His theory of moral knowledge, when taken in connexion with his theistic belief, fulfils one aspect of the meaning which I have attached to the idea of revelation, because he regards moral knowledge as intuitive and at the same time as falling within the sphere of the operation of grace. He rejects the doctrine of total depravity not because he believes that men can attain moral knowledge and virtue without divine aid, but precisely because he believes that no man is wholly inaccessible to the divine influence. This leaves yet to be discussed the question as to whether Christianity does not cease to be a religion when the Incarnation and the Atonement are interpreted in purely ethical terms, - the question as to whether an adequate explanation of Christ's Person and work (and man's salvation) does not demand that His unity with God be regarded as one of personal identity instead of mere ethical similarity (however complete); hence we now turn to these latter topics.

8. The Incarnation and the Trinity.

A few points in Rashdall's historical sketch concerning the Incarnation and the Trinity must be mentioned, although our chief concern will be a consideration of the relations between these doctrines and Rashdall's own philosophical position. The essential

question concerning Christ's own conception of His Person has to do with whether He regarded Himself as more than human. Here differences of interpretation arise as a result of different presuppositions; critics who hold that Christ was "personally" identical with God find many synoptic passages in which He uses language about Himself which could be applicable only to such a personality; Rashdall construes the same passages as indicating that Jesus was aware of His unique relationship to God, but adds that 'never in any critically well-attested sayings is there anything which suggests that His conscious relation to God was other than that of a man towards God'.[1] Where the former find the distinction between Christ and other men to involve the distinction between Deity and humanity, Rashdall expresses the difference solely as being between a sinless man and sinful humanity.

An appeal to exegesis therefore cannot settle this dispute; nevertheless there are at least one or two synoptic passages which cast considerable doubt on Rashdall's view. If one holds (as Rashdall does) that in Mark 12:35-7 (Cf. Mt. 22:42) Jesus takes the 110th Psalm to be Messianic,[2] is not His reply best understood as meaning that the Jewish conception of the Messiah cannot solve the problem of how David can call his descendant "Lord"? The Pharisees would not have been silenced by a discussion merely of how a descendant can be greater than his ancestor. Christ is suggesting, it seems, that only if the Messiah is "divine" can He be at once David's son and David's Lord. Again, in Matthew 11:27 (Lk.10:21 f.)

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1. J.H.D., p. 12
2. I realize that according to some critics Christ propounded the enigma to show the incorrectness of the view that the Messiah was to be of Davidic stock.

Christ speaks of the knowledge of Father and Son as reciprocally perfect. The passage seems undeniably to set the Father's knowledge in contrast with all human knowledge; and then it classes the Son's knowledge with the Father's.[1]

Many similarily significant passages could be cited; Christ always draws a distinction between man's relationship to God, and His own; He teaches His disciples to say "Our Father"; He Himself says "My Father". There is no discoverable consciousness on Christ's part of having received unmerited gifts. He places loyalty to Himself above human relationships.[2] He is recorded to have regarded Himself as the future Judge of the Kingdom, although Rashdall questions the authenticity of these passages.[3] Yet none of this evidence can be entirely decisive, because Rashdall might construe it all as expressing a sinless man's consciousness of unique relationship to God. For this same reason the significance of Mark 2:3-12 cannot be stressed; as Dr. Mackintosh points out,[4] Christ does not say "I forgive thy sins"; nevertheless in this incident His own power to mediate divine forgiveness would appeal to most minds as partaking of a super-human character. Moreover, if Christ's consciousness was free from sin, then Rashdall's statement, which I have just quoted,[5] is misleading; for it fails to express that His relation to God was different from that of every other man. Lastly,

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1. This correlation of knowledge naturally suggests some sort of correlation of being; although Rashdall is right in contending that the passage does not specifically express the idea of Incarnation, it affords perhaps the strongest basis for it that can be found in the words of Jesus.
2. Mt. 10:37. Cf. Mt. 10:32 f. - the consequence of confessing or denying Him.
3. Cf. # 65 . Gore protests against this, cf. The Reconstruction of Belief, p. 226. Rashdall contends that, in any case, "Judge" does not imply membership in the God-head. He cites Acts 17:31:... 'He (God) will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he hath ordained'. (Cf. JHD., p. 13 n)
4. ~~Cf~~.
4. Cf. The Christian Experience of Forgiveness, p. 88 n.
5. Cf. # 335.

if the divinity of Christ properly means, as he would have it, complete harmony (but not personal identity) between God and Christ, then Christ's own conception of His Person (at the very least) fulfils the only sense in which Rashdall is willing to speak of Him as divine[1]. Yet Rashdall declares that the interpretation of the Incarnation which he himself advocates can be found only in later reflection within the Church, and not in the Synoptics.

If the orthodox conception of a personal identity between the Son and the human Jesus be taken as the norm, there is some reason for holding that from the outset the Church possessed, in a rudimentary form, the conception of a sinless divine personality incarnate, instead of two erroneous views (as Rashdall seems to suggest). Dr. Headlam has urged, for example, that it was not the Logos doctrine which first gave rise to the specific notion of Incarnation; rather, he argues, 'the term Logos became personal because it was associated with our Lord'[2]. Admittedly, Christ was reticent in disclosing to the disciples whatever insight He had into the significance of His own Person; and perhaps it is impossible to dogmatize concerning whether the incident at Caesarea Philippi and His reply before the Sanhedrin indicate that His own consciousness of Messiahship emerged late in His ministry, or that it was present with Him from the Baptism[3] but only disclosed by Him - and that indirectly[4] - toward the close. But Rashdall's suggestion that the current Jewish conception did not regard the Messiah as God, or equal with God, proves nothing, inasmuch as Jesus transcended

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1. Unless Mk. 10:18 be taken as implying that Jesus did not regard Himself as sinless. Critical opinions concerning this passage are so conflicting that I do not venture to express my own except to call attention to the contrast between goodness maintained under temporal conditions amidst human temptations, and the eternal, unchanging goodness of the Father.
2. Church Quart. Review, Vol. XCIII, p. 214.
3. Or even earlier, cf. Lk. 2:40-52.
4. Except for Mk. 14:61 f.; but compare with parallels Mt. 26:63 f. and Lk. 22:67 f.

Jewish ideas concerning the Kingdom and the Messiah in other respects[1].

One further point deserves brief notice. Rashdall's interpretation of the synoptic evidence affects the extent to which he conceives of Christ's knowledge as limited during the Incarnation. Except for the suggestion that our Lord's ethical teaching may be supplemented to include cultural values in the moral end, he restricts this limitation to non-spiritual and factual matters; but if he takes Christ's failure to announce His own divinity as indicating that He was in reality ignorant of a truth which Christians later grasped[2], then this constitutes a limitation of a very paradoxical sort. Especially if the Atonement be conceived as a work which involves the unmediated participation of God[3], Rashdall's position implies that Christ was ignorant of the central significance of His redemptive task. The synoptic evidence on this question will be considered later. In general it may be observed that Rashdall's argument does not affect the perfection of Christ's insight into the duty of men before God; but it does affect what insight we may believe Him to have had into His task as Mediator, from the God-ward side, to the minds and hearts of men.

We cannot afford to dwell long upon the development of the doctrine, which Rashdall touches so briefly. His description of the Pauline Christology does justice to the extent to which it anticipates the two-nature theory, but it needs supplementation. What has been

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1. A similar point is argued in more detail <u>infra</u>, # 353.
2. This seems to be Rashdall's intention; but the fragmentary nature of the synoptic evidence can be explained equally well, if not better, as due to the fact that Jesus was seeking gradually to dissociate the idea of Messiahship from Jewish political aspirations before making His own claims fully known to the disciples; in this latter case, His own sayings cannot be regarded as a complete statement either of what He believed concerning His own Person, or of what He intended that His followers should finally believe.
3. This is not, of course, Rashdall's view of the Atonement.

held to be the locus classicus for the Kenotic interpretation (Philippians, Ch. 2), for example, clearly seems to imply that the "form of God" was Christ's original state, in which He pre-existed, while the "form of a servant" was one which He assumed temporally. Though the reference to equality with God is somewhat cryptic, it indicates that St. Paul regarded such equality as involved in the original state of the pre-existing Lord - a state which He temporarily relinquished during the Incarnation. If so, then St. Paul espoused a conception of the pre-existent Messiah which was startling for a Jew[1]. It is true that, in this passage, St. Paul conceives of God as exalting Christ, because he is stressing the reality of our Lord's assumption of human limitations. On the other hand, the reference in the same verse[2] to 'the name which is above every name', could only mean one thing to a Jewish mind.

Rashdall claims that the Johannine Christology remedied certain defects in St. Paul's teaching: 'It made it possible to admit that the human Jesus had a beginning in time like other men, and to confine pre-existence to the Divine element in the historic Personality'[3]. This statement must be understood in the light of Rashdall's assumption that this "Divine element" is not "personally identical with" the human Jesus. In the Fourth Gospel, so far as I can see, Christ's personality is divine, and there is no distinction between it and the historic personality. It is the same personality (i.e. the Logos) which pre-exists, and then becomes incarnate[4]. The history which

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1. Rashdall follows Wrede and Brüchner in holding that St. Paul's conception of the pre-existent Messiah was derived from Jewish sources (cf. Atonement, pp. 127 ff.). Against this cf. Dalman, The Words of Jesus, pp. 128-32, 248, 252.
2. Phil. 2:9.
3. JHD., p. 22.
4. Cf., e.g., John 16:28; 17:5. This point is not affected by the theory that the Prologue is a later addition (because the Logos conception occurs only once, while the ideas of this author recur again and again), and that in the body of the Fourth Gospel Christ is substantially the Son of Man of the Apocalypses (not the Logos).

thus begins, as human, in time, is a phase in the life of the eternally existing Son. This conception is irreconcilable with Rashdall's metaphysics; for that reason it is inexcusable to fall into the anachronism of interpreting the Fourth Gospel in a manner which makes it conform to his metaphysics.

Only one other historical point need detain us. Concerning Athanasius the primary question is whether the Orations contain only a formal, instead of a whole-hearted, recognition of the fact that our Lord had a human intellect and consciousness. Rashdall originally asserts flatly in his Cambridge essay that Athanasius was "Apollinarian"; he qualifies this in a foot-note so as to apply it to the Nicene period; but he there suggests that Athanasius' later formal modification of his views did not greatly affect 'his general way of thinking'[1]. However, Athanasius' whole theory of Incarnation and Atonement turns upon the belief that Christ restored the Imago Dei by taking on human nature; and this theory is gravely weakened unless he regards the Incarnation as involving human nature in toto. Moreover, his condemnation of Apollinarianism in the latter part of his career indicates an attitude which was more than merely formal. In fact, one of the passages which Rashdall quotes from the third Oration[2], could equally well support the theory that although Athanasius uses σάρξ (as equivalent to "man") to express the idea of Incarnation, he means it to include ψυχή in a sense which involves the whole (human)

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1. JHD., p. 14 n.
2. Cf. # 188 n. 2.

consciousness[1].

Let us turn without further delay to a consideration of Rashdall's own Christological views. Personality, in his system, is inextricably bound up with functions which cannot be shared; every personality, so far as "the stream of consciousness" is concerned, is external to every other. Now it might be claimed that the Chalcedonian Christology is reconcilable with these presuppositions; but only because it holds that Christ's personality was a member of the God-head which took on impersonal manhood; manhood is in this case really adjectival[2]. According to the terms of Rashdall's system (since it rules out the idea of a duplex personality as heartily as does Catholic orthodoxy), there is only one possible alternative which may be set against this view; and that is to regard Christ's personality as human, his divinity as "impersonal" or adjectival. However one expresses these distinctions, the fact emerges (it might be claimed) that Rashdall affirms Christ's divinity in a sense similar to that in which the Chalcedonian view affirms His humanity[3]. If the one does justice to the idea of two natures harmoniously joined in one Person, then so does the other.

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1. Most scholars agree that this is the meaning of Athanasius' language in the Third Oration. Rashdall was misled by the fact that Athanasius' early position (cf. De Incarnatione; circa 320 A.D.) was "Apollinarian""; it is difficult to understand why he refused to believe that Athanasius changed his view fundamentally. Nevertheless, Dr. C.E. Raven (in his Apollinarianism, p. 202) goes so far as to suggest that the Biblical scholarship of Apollinarius did not 'allow him to follow Athanasius and expurgate from the Gospels the mark of the Lord's humanity'.
2. The Sabellian and Arian, the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies, all turn upon the interpretation of the words used to express what in modern speech is called "personality", - a concept which Chalcedon itself left undefined.
3. Except that "man" is a universal covering a class of particular entities, while of course with regard to Deity there arises no distinction between genus and species.

This might give Rashdall some ground for claiming that in renouncing as unintelligible the view that Christ was human without being a man, he is not doing violence to the remainder of the Chalcedonian Christology. Such an argument overlooks the fact, however, that in the Chalcedonian conception manhood and God-head were regarded as two quite different entities; it was this difference which set the problem for the orthodox and the heretical alike. In Rashdall's theory, on the other hand, the union of the divine and the human in one Person is possible because in the sphere of moral perfection they are not different.

Furthermore, as I have tried to show, the Pauline and Johannine views regard Christ's personality as that of Deity in a sense allied to the Chalcedonian statement rather than to Rashdall's; at the same time, these writers regard Christ definitely as a man. In St. Paul and St. John the Church passed beyond Adoptionism to the view that the same Personality who is from all eternity in the God-head, was a man on earth. Influences like that of St. Cyril introduced a rationalistic element into the decisions of the Chalcedonian Council which prevented it from recapturing the purity of the New Testament view; and to that extent the Council fell short of what is otherwise its chief virtue; the formulation of a statement which does full justice to the reality of our Lord's two natures, without attempting to supply a rational explanation[1]. A simple affirmation of the idea that the divine Son became a human soul with an earthly history, as it stands in the New Testament Christology, is more a description than an explanation; such theoretical notions as are there employed do not conceal what His contemporaries had actually found in Christ.

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1. "Rational" is here used to qualify an explanation which relates a given datum to other aspects of experience by bringing all under common categories.

Unfortunately later Christian speculation has seldom kept within these limits. Thus the Chalcedonian conception has sometimes resulted in an "incredible dualism" in which 'Christ executed this as God, it is said, and suffered that as man'[1]; while on the other hand, the doctrine of anhypostatic manhood has required the equally incredible notion of a Person who can have human experiences without being a human subject of those experiences. Besides being incredible in themselves, these rational explanations wander into a region remote from the fact which they are supposedly designed to interpret - the fact that God lived the life of a man in history.

In criticizing Gore[2], Rashdall has asked: "How did the Logos carry on His cosmic functions during the Incarnation?" The question is unfair because it overlooks the fact that the functions of the Son as Incarnate furnish the only data on which any theologian can base assertions in this connexion. In order to answer Rashdall's query, a theologian would have to possess some avenue of knowledge concerning the nature and mode of God's creative activity in the Logos more adequate than that which the Incarnation provides; but the fact that he does not possess such an avenue of knowledge furnishes no reason for relinquishing the data which he does possess or for renouncing the task of interpreting them within their limits. Everything which we do not completely understand challenges intellectual investigation, and it is right to carry such investigation as far as possible. But to deny a fact because we cannot completely "rationalize" it is madness. For example, the relationship between mind and body leads in all directions to theoretical absurdities; yet we do not doubt its reality. Is it unfair to claim that the Incarnation presents a case of this sort?

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1. H.R. Mackintosh: The Person of Jesus Christ, p. 294.
2. Cf. # 195 n. 1.

Dr. Mackintosh refuses to discuss the question which Rashdall raises[1]; while Rashdall himself avoids this theoretical difficulty only at the expense of regarding God and Christ as two distinct personalities. There is no doubt as to which attitude is nearer to the New Testament; where a fundamental Christian doctrine transcends complete rational explanation, as here seems to be the case, one must decide which alternative is worth what it costs. If the Incarnation (that is, God as "personally" dwelling in a human soul and body) was a fact, it was partially inexplicable to early Christians, and it remains partially inexplicable now, because there is nothing else in human experience comparable with it[2]. But to reject a doctrine solely on this ground would lead to disastrous consequences. In connexion with the notion that God is a Person, Rashdall acknowledges rational difficulties at every step; but he accepts the notion because, despite these difficulties, it accounts for what he takes to be the facts better than does any other theory. Dr. Gore might have said the same thing in reply to Rashdall's question concerning this aspect of his Christology.

When I say that the Incarnation remains partially inexplicable, I do not mean, of course, that the significance of Christ's life cannot be directly related to human goodness in general as revealing in history a "new beginning" in the relationship between God and the human race. But there remains an irreducible distinction between the conception of Christ as a man who acted in perfect harmony with the Logos, and the conception of Him as a member of the God-head incarnate. To my mind no difficulties in the latter doctrine are as great as those which arise in

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1. Cf. op cit., pp. 483 ff.
2. Dr. Sparrow Simpson's remarks (cf. Modernism and the Person of Christ, pp. 64 f.) are pertinent here. If the historical method confines itself in principle to what is explicable in terms of causes within the sphere of human experience, the critic who follows it must of course disregard passages which represent Christ literally as a member of the God-head incarnate; but in so doing, he becomes an exponent of his own beliefs, not those of the evangelists; in other words, his interpretation is not exegesis in the proper sense.

connexion with the former; for all of its emphasis upon Christ's kinship with humanity, Rashdall's Christology, especially because of his deterministic theory of grace and "freedom", must postulate an unaccountable break in the moral history of the race. Why did God endow a particular human person with sinlessness at a particular time? If one man could be sinless without it being necessary for God to become "personally" identical with a human soul, why does God work through a human Christ as Mediator? If God could make one man sinless directly, without being Himself "personally" incarnate, why could He not do the same for all men?

Rashdall raises another objection against the view that the Logos and the human Jesus were personally identical; for this view implies that the Logos, as a member of the Trinity, is a distinct personality. Rashdall's own treatment of the latter doctrine is a logical consequence of his Christology and of his theistic metaphysics, and his historical discussion concerning it constitutes a pertinent warning against tri-theism. Several critics (e.g., Headlam and Quick)[1], while admitting this, nevertheless have urged that Rashdall overlooks the fact that the distinctness, but not the separation, of the Persons of the Trinity must be affirmed in order to conceive of God as self-existent and at the same time as perfect Love. The argument on which these writers rely (though neither elaborates it) runs as follows: If the world and its creatures were the only objects of God's love, this love could not be perfect, for perfect love involves harmonious communion and reciprocity with an equal. A variation of the same argument can avoid the objectionable implication that God's love toward man is not perfect, by laying the stress on the eternity of God's love (the world being conceived

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1. Cf. their respective articles in The Church Quart. Review, Vol. XCIII, pp. 201 ff., and The Commonwealth, Vol. XXVI. pp. 287 ff.

as not co-eternal); but even this requires a conception of God which abstracts from His creative activity. In short, any interpretation of the Trinity in its traditional form (as amans, amatus, amor) either does not naturally connote three distinct (even though harmoniously united) centres, or it still bears the semblance of tri-theism.

On the other hand, Rashdall's own conception of the Trinity encounters a difficulty[1]. He points out that it is heterodox to regard the whole Trinity as incarnate in the human Jesus, but he says nothing further about the matter. However, it is obvious that when he construes the Trinity as symbolic of aspects or functions of God's consciousness, he must regard all of these functions as equally incarnate in Jesus - no matter what view he takes concerning the nature of this indwelling. An extremely literal-minded person might infer that his theory attributes only divine wisdom to the human Jesus; for he speaks of the Father as Power, the Son (Logos) as Wisdom, the Spirit as Love. And the same literal-minded person would have to conclude that, if Rashdall is unwilling to regard the whole Trinity as incarnate, then he must contend that Jesus was united to God's wisdom in some sense that He was not united to God's will and love. Needless to say, this is not Rashdall's intention; but because it is not, we must suppose that when he speaks of

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1. In a well-known passage in De Trinitate (xv. 12), St. Augustine works out the theory that each Person in the Trinity has a knowledge, memory and love of His own. (cf. Ibid., xv. 7, and Epistle clxix. 6). Rashdall admits the presence of passages which are inconsistent with St. Augustine's prevailing doctrine; but he does not sufficiently emphasize that St. Augustine repeatedly apologized for the inadequacy of his analogies based on the functioning of a single self. Although Rashdall's own view of the Trinity undeniably has authoritative support in St. Augustine and St. Thomas, it is also similar to that held by the Sabellians. But the latter were forced into a position which was really Docetic, in order to avoid Patripassianism. Rashdall, as we have seen (# 243), believes in a suffering God as revealed by Christ, or as suffering with Christ, not as suffering in Christ. So far as I can see, there is no middle ground between Docetism and some form of Patripassianism.

the union between Jesus and the Logos, the latter term is really meant to signify God's consciousness in all its aspects[1]; and the unity referred to is of course a perfect moral similarity rather than a subjective identity between Christ's intellect, will and love, and God's. He admits that his view of the Trinity is therefore one which any Unitarian could accept; but this is because, as he sees it, the choice really lies between monotheism and tri-theism[2].

The notion that the Son remained "unchanged" in the Incarnation, against which Rashdall protests, was intended to safeguard orthodoxy from just such theories as his. As J.K. Mozley has written:

'The four words of the Chalcedonian Definition which we translate "without change, without confusion, without division, without separation", do no more than say that in Christ what is divine remains divine and what is human remains human, while they are not isolated from one another as they would be if there were one Person who was divine and another Person who was human'(3).

These expressions were not intended to deny that the relations of the one personality changed. Because orthodoxy does not teach that the human soul of Jesus pre-existed, it holds that when the Son took on human flesh and a "reasonable" (i.e., as against Apollinarius, a "human") soul in time, this Incarnation indeed involved a new relation. Moreover, orthodoxy holds that this new relation is a permanent one; in the words of the twenty first question of the Shorter Catechism:

'The Lord Jesus Christ, being the eternal Son of God, became Man, and so was, and continueth to be, God and Man in two distinct

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1. Rashdall therefore retains the term "Logos", I believe, because of its historical associations in doctrine as the medium of God's self-revelation and creative activity.
2. Canon Quick (loc. cit.) rightly calls attention to the Unitarian implications underlying Rashdall's thought at this point; but he overlooks Rashdall's whole metaphysical system when he suggests that this view of Christ's relation to the God-head might tend to reduce Deity to mere ideal manhood - that is, to a notion which has no reality apart from human aspiration. Rashdall never leaves the slightest doubt as to the firmness of his own conviction that God exists as a reality distinct from humanity, even at its highest.
3. Essays Catholic and Critical, p. 189.

Natures, and One Person for ever'[1].

But a change in relations does not imply a change of personality. Human experience of course relates the self very closely to its embodiment; and the notion of the eternal God as entering a human body and undergoing the career of a human soul requires a conception of the relations between the temporal and the eternal which transcends the limits of imagination and understanding. All this must be admitted. Yet in our own experience personality enters into various changing relations with its own body and its environment, and it engages in various modes of conduct, while yet remaining self-identical. To conceive of God as remaining "self-identical" through the profound change in His relations represented by the thought of Him before, during, and after His earthly life may be impossible; but the impossibility arises from the limited character of human imagination and experience. Apart from this, there is nothing which implies - as Rashdall's objection assumes - that an incarnate personality must be distinct from God's; personality can endure through changes in its relations, and it is unsound in principle to attempt to bring the idea of Incarnation within the ordinary confines to which these changes are restricted in human experience[2].

One aspect of traditional Christological doctrine, however, definitely favours Rashdall's general position. That is the condemnation of Monothelitism. It is possible for the modern mind to comprehend, if not to accept, the notion of one Person and two

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1. Italics mine.
2. Cf. Paul Elmer More: Christ the Word, p. 299 n. 'The logos of man differs from the πρωτότυπον in being τρεπτός, subject to mutation. This is not to say that the divine Logos, as ἄτρεπτος is fixed in stark immutability, but that through all its changes its essential nature remains unaffected. In man change is of the radical sort designated by the Stoics as "passion", πάθος '.

natures, so long as "nature" is understood as a class name, instead of as a reference to specific subjective functions. But the conception of one Person and two wills causes great perplexity unless it be assumed that the Personality possessed[1] one will, and was merely in complete harmony with the other without in the same sense possessing it. Rashdall holds that Christ was a human will, acting in perfect conformity with God's will; the opposite alternative is unintelligible. And to hold that Christ was, or possessed, two wills in precisely the same sense, seems almost monstrous to our minds to-day. The only remaining possibility is to say that He possessed one will which was both human and divine; and, if the theory of anhypostatic union be rejected, the single centre of consciousness which possessed this will was both human and divine. A difficulty will always remain for strict orthodoxy on this point; it seems to have arisen from the fact that although the Fifth Council at least tended toward the view that Christ had but one will, and that divine, the Sixth Council's acceptance of Dyothelitism was really a reversion to Nestorian ideas which cannot be brought into harmony with Chalcedonian standards.

Having examined Rashdall's conception of Christ's relationship to the God-head, we now turn to his conception of the difference between our Lord and other men. Christ and men are alike in being personalities distinct from God; therefore the mode in which they reveal God is the same for all men; for however much they may be like God, they cannot be in any strict sense identical with His personality. Yet Rashdall does not express the difference

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1. The verb "to be" would express modern thought better than "to possess"; its volition is the self from a particular point of view.

between Christ and other men merely as one of degree; when he says that the Logos dwelt completely in Jesus, while He has dwelt only partially in all other men, he regards our Lord as the unique Son, "the only one of His kind". Even though he interprets this "indwelling" in a sense which still leaves Godhood logically external and merely adjectival to the personality of Jesus, the distinction remains; and it is a distinction which cannot be wholly expressed in terms which stress exclusively the continuity between the life of Christ and the life of the race. Fortunately, therefore, he avoids the fruitless question as to whether the end-term (sinlessness) of a series (degrees of moral goodness) falls within the series. Abstract, quantitative categories cannot express the finality of the revelation in Christ of human goodness, as well as of God's relation to man.

Nevertheless, Rashdall's conception of the Incarnation and orthodox doctrine do not represent two variant ways of expressing the same thing. The ideas of sacramental union which we find in the New Testament are directed toward something which He is Himself, and not toward a God-head external to Himself which He perfectly reveals. Rashdall's aversion to mysticism prevents him from pressing on to the conviction whereby St. Paul taught that in Christ men may become "perfect". Yet the notion of union with Christ does not at all imply that the believer ultimately loses his personal identity; it expresses, rather, the conviction that the believer's salvation from sin may ultimately be complete and unqualified. From the earthly perspective it is right to recoil from self-righteous assurance as to one's own superiority over others in the sight of God; but from the perspective of eternity, the hope for perfection is integral to the Christian

faith.

Rashdall's theory that a perfect man is ipso facto divinity incarnate (in the only permissible sense), cannot fulfil the orthodox conception as to how human perfection is brought about. He might recognize that a distinction remains eternally between Christ and the men who are ultimately made perfect in response to the love of God which He reveals; for a development through sin to repentance, amendment, forgiveness and salvation is different from the development in which the earthly life of our Lord matured without sin. But in orthodox teaching morally perfect manhood is not synonymous with "divinity"; for the former, in this teaching, is possible for men only because the latter belongs to Jesus Christ alone. A perfect man derives his perfection through the Logos; but Christ's perfection is not derived, because He is the Logos.

Therefore Rashdall's conception of the Incarnation has the closest possible connexion with his interpretation of the Atonement. In his thinking, the significance of Christ's work, as well as that of His Person, turns primarily upon the notion that He was the Revealer of God's nature and moral purpose. The question which confronts us is whether or not this conception does justice to the truth that in Christ God initiated and carried through a supreme act of redemption for mankind. Canon Quick has written, in criticism of Rashdall's views: 'If the Incarnation... is only the personification of a moral ideal, then indeed we are "yet in our sins".'[1] The justness of this criticism depends upon whether or not redemption implies that God (or a member of the God-head) was "personally" in Christ.

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1. The Commonwealth, Vol. XXVI, p. 289.

9. The Atonement.

Much of what Rashdall says in his "Bampton Lectures" concerning the inadequacy of traditional theories of the Atonement is indisputable. A thorough-going attempt to examine this historical evidence would demand an extended discussion; consequently the ensuing remarks do not constitute an adequate appraisal of his historical research; they are intended merely to point out a few basic defects which directly affect his own conceptions. I shall confine my criticisms to three points in his account which seem to be crucial in this regard: his treatment of the Synoptics, of St. Paul, and of Luther.

Although repentance can be described as the beginning of moral transformation, is it not clear that in Jesus' own teaching, notably in the parable of the Prodigal Son, such moral improvement as does take place in the penitent is represented as the outcome, and not as the cause or condition of repentance? If the essence of the Master's teaching was a promise of forgiveness, of restoration to fellowship with God, while we are yet sinners, then His teaching may only be made a foundation for theories in which forgiveness is a condition of being "made righteous"; the reverse theory, in which repentance is regarded as a form of becoming righteous (as a condition of forgiveness), and for which Rashdall attempts to find a basis in the Synoptics, is not very different in principle from the Jewish legalism which Jesus transcended.

The discrepancy between the apostolic doctrine of Christ's death as propitiation, and Jesus' own teaching of forgiveness as a consequence of repentance, was (to say the very least) not nearly so great as Rashdall supposes. The passages in which He explicitly connects forgiveness with His own death are admittedly few; in a

moment we shall consider whether Rashdall is justified in eliminating even these. In any case, certain considerations which he fails to emphasize, should be taken into account. Christ's own teaching about His Person and work was subject to definite limitations. It is not necessary to postulate the theory of a "Messianic secret" in order to realize that His self-disclosure was limited by the extent to which His disciples could comprehend (what to Jewish minds was well-nigh unthinkable) the notion of a suffering Messiah. Yet when the evidence in Mark that Jesus foresaw the necessity for His suffering is taken in conjunction with His consciousness of Messiahship[1], it indeed seems gratuitous to suppose that the Suffering Servant passages were associated with His work only after the Crucifixion, and did not help Him to understand His own destiny. While He was alive, the disciples were manifestly unable fully to comprehend the significance of His death; but is it not arbitrary to eliminate all the passages in which Jesus, whose whole interpretation of the Messianic office so transcended previous Jewish conceptions, seems to comprehend it? For Rashdall to suggest, as he does, that because current thought did not identify the Servant and the Messiah, therefore this identification probably arose from the reflection of the apostles after the Crucifixion instead of from the teaching of Christ Himself, indeed seems irreconcilable in principle with his eagerness in other respects to emphasize the originality of our Lord's teaching. If He did make this identification, but could disclose it only through anticipatory hints which the disciples did not fully understand at the time, would they not have remembered it, and at last understood it, after the Crucifixion?

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1. The question as to when Christ came to recognize His Messiahship and the necessity for His death is not here decisive. Rashdall seems inclined to date both from Caesarea Philippi; but there is some ground, at least, for claiming that Jesus must have understood both notions, and their connexion, at the time of His Baptism and Temptation.

In that case Jesus' own teaching stands in organic connexion with that of His followers.

The discrepancy which Rashdall seems to find is better explained as arising from the fact that Jesus was teaching before the event, - while by its very nature His atoning sacrifice could be understood by the disciples only after the event. His teaching largely took the form of questions whereby He elicited a partial understanding, as they were "able to bear it"; but the fact that His statements are therefore rarely explicit, affords no justification for ruling out those which are.

Now let us consider the two synoptic passages in which, if they are genuine, Jesus was planting the seeds which later matured in the apostolic teaching concerning the atoning efficacy of His death. Admittedly it is impossible to find in Christ's own teaching a theory concerning the connexion between atonement and His death; the question is whether the Synoptics furnish any evidence for holding that He connected them at all.[1]

In general I think it is fair to say that the Ransom Passage and the accounts of the Lord's Supper are an essential part of the valid evidence in the Synoptics that Jesus did interpret His own mission in the light of the Suffering Servant poems and their message of vicarious sacrifice.[2]

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1. This question must be distinguished from that of whether He connected forgiveness exclusively with His death.
2. Prof. Burney has suggested, in direct criticism of Rashdall's "Bampton Lectures", that Lk. 4:18, in which Jesus reads from Is. 61, and then declares it fulfilled "this day", is also very strong evidence indicating that He connected the Suffering Servant passages with His own Messianic task. (Cf. his The Old Testament Conception of Atonement, p.11. S.R. Driver agreed with this interpretation). He also suggests that Jesus was consciously fulfilling the one Old Testament passage which makes this same connexion (Zechariah, Ch.9) when He made His triumphal entry upon an ass. And another such instance of conscious fulfilment, Burney adds, was His silence before the High Priest and Pilate; cf. Is. 53:7, 'He was oppressed, yet when he was afflicted he opened not his mouth'. Furthermore, there are passages in which our Lord's references to His death as the fulfilment of scripture at least lend corroborative support to the above contention. Cf. Mk. 9:12; Mt. 26:24, 54, 56; Lk. 18:31-33; 22:37 (quotes Is.53: 12). Lk.24:25-7,46, contain similar allusions, but they are spoken after the Crucifixion-on the way to Emmaeus, and just before the Ascension.

The former passage is open to suspicion only if it is supposed that λύτρον is necessarily connected with later theories. If, however, the statement is taken as signifying simply that Christ's death will constitute a "covering", a "satisfaction", for sin, so that lives which had been forfeit because men were in bondage to sin will now be released, there is no reason for reading into it later theories, nor for supposing that Christ could not have said it. At the same time, the substitutionary or representative significance which cannot be eliminated from the saying need not be taken as associated with punishment at all.[1] The context in which the expression stands shows clearly that Jesus does not regard his sacrifice as one which will rescue His disciples from physical suffering and death (which the Jewish mind inevitably connected with punishment); the same way of suffering, He says, in incumbent upon His disciples.

Rashdall (unlike Johannes Weiss, for example) does not attempt to claim that there is no connexion between the Lord's Supper and His coming death; he merely attempts to show that the symbolism had nothing to do directly with the forgiveness of sins. However, the passage in Jeremiah which underlies Christ's reference to the New Covenant contains a reference to the forgiveness of sins.[2] The textual problem concerning these accounts is too complicated to be discusssd here. But anyone who wishes to arguethat mediation of forgiveness through Christ is a conceptionn inconsistent with His own teaching, and that therefore the words of institution must reflect the later ideas of the Church, has to consider other synoptic evidence.

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1. Rashdall associates the offering of a vicarious sacrifice to God with punishment for sin, partially because of his pre-occupation with later theories, but also because of a misinterpretation of the Old Testament conception, which did not imply that the sin was transferred to the sacrificial animal.
2. Jer. 31:34.

The idea of the New Covenant signifies that God takes the initiative in seeking out sinners and receiving them in penitence; but this same conception of the divine initiative underlies Christ's whole teaching of forgiveness, and His work as Mediator cannot be dissociated from it.[1] If, then, there is really an incompatibility between (a) assuring men that repentance will bring forgiveness, and (b) so living and dying as to mediate this forgiveness, it affects the whole synoptic account and not merely the narrative of the Last Supper. What one takes to have been Christ's own conception of His Person naturally determines, to a large extent, what one takes to have been His own conception of the nature of His task as Mediator.

The fundamental question, which again raises the issue concerning an alleged discrepancy between apostolic teaching and the words of Jesus, is whether (a) forgiveness of the penitent, and (b) propitiatory mediation,[2] are mutually exclusive or supplementary ideas. The essence of the idea of propitiation is that sin raises a barrier which has a two-fold aspect because the relation has two participants. If Christ realized that His death was necessary for forgiveness, as a revelation of God's love which would inspire repentance, that in itself would establish a connexion which Rashdall does not seem willing to admit as existing in Christ's mind. This, of course, has to do solely with the man-ward aspect of forgiveness. The idea of propitiation also implies that God must meet a necessity arising out of His relation to the sinner, - a necessity wherein the barrier raised by sin requires the oblation of a substitute as well as man's repentance. Now so long as God's love is regarded

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1. For example, the four parables of forgiveness in Mt. 18:23-35 and Lk. 15, cannot be dissociated from Jesus' own work as Messiah.
2. The attempt to claim that the words of institution are not associated with Jewish ideas of propitiation seems peculiarly unfounded.

as a cause, not a result, of propitiation, Christ's identification of Himself (e.g., at the Baptism) with sinners, and His obedient offering of Himself in a representative capacity for mankind, fulfil the conditions of this Jewish system in a manner purged of all crude and repellent associations. Whether the idea entered into Christ's own mind that a life of perfect obedience could alone make perfect reparation for sin, is a question which need not be raised here; for, irrespective of it, is there any fundamental incompatibility between the idea that the Messiah mediates forgiveness through vicarious suffering offered in reparation for sin, and the idea that men should themselves make such reparation as they can through repentance? Surely the two ideas are supplementary, not contradictory, and that is enough to suggest that Christ could have spoken the words which Rashdall is inclined to regard as a gloss (as irreconcilable with His teaching as a whole). That the "substitutionary" or "representative" interpretation alone takes account of the God-ward side of the relation broken by sin, is a further contention which will concern us later.

A word needs to be added about the earliest apostolic teaching. It is true, as Rashdall says, that there is no explicit reference in the speeches of Peter and Stephen in Acts to the death of Jesus as offered for the remission of sins;[1] nevertheless, if the Suffering Servant passages were used by Him to interpret the significance of His death as an offering for the sins of others in obedience to God's will, then there is definite evidence to the effect that Peter, at least, came to understand this interpretation and use it in his

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1. Cf. Atonement, p. 77.

preaching; for he refers four times to Christ as a "Servant".[1] While these references assuredly do not constitute a theory (and, in any case, the author of Acts was not here attempting to furnish an account of early Christian doctrine), they undermine what Rashdall seeks to prove by a questionable appeal to the argument from silence. The same sort of argument (i.e., one based solely upon the evidence in Acts) could prove that (except for 20:28) St. Paul had no theory of the Atonement at the time he made the speeches which this book records.

Moreover, if the preceding criticism of Rashdall's treatment of the synoptic evidence is at all valid, then the connexion between prophecy and Christ's death, which became the foundation for authoritative explanation, does not bear the appearance of being an apologetic tour de force, as it does in Rashdall's account. He does not deny that the beginnings of a theory were supported by the experience of the early Church; but he does make sweeping statements on the basis of what must be regarded as insufficient evidence. For example he writes:

'Apart from some authoritative assurance that God had forgiven, and forgiven in consequence of Christ's death, there was nothing to suggest any special connexion between what the Christian experienced and the death of the Messiah'.2.

If the doctrine which St. Paul received from the apostles were one which indeed had foundation in the words of Jesus toward the close of His ministry, then the apostle's theoretical

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1. Cf. Acts 3:13, 26; 4:27, 30. With regard to Peter's discourses, cf. also Acts 2:23. Moreover, it is important to note that Acts 5:30 and 10:39 refer to the passage in Deuteronomy (21:23) which St. Paul quotes in Gal. 3:13. Finally, Philip's quotation from Is. 53 in Acts 8:32f. is not without significance, although it contains no direct allusion to forgiveness.
2. Atonement, p.82. The "authoritative assurance" referred to is an acceptance of passages like Is. 53 as predictions of Christ's death; Rashdall is arguing that the early doctrine was grounded on prophecy, not on any teaching of Christ.

explanation of the Atonement was not merely a necessary attempt to vindicate the infallibility of the Old Testament and its "Messianic" predictions. While it is possible to distinguish as to form between doctrinal and experiential passages in his writings, there is no such hiatus between them, in content and meaning, as Rashdall supposes. A direct tie connects the cosmic significance of the Cross and the inward experience of regeneration in the apostle's mind.

In one respect at least, St. Paul's teaching of justification is a legitimate development of Christ's message of forgiveness; both hold to the promise that God offers forgiveness to men while they are yet sinners. Assurance of this brought to the apostle the inward experience of release from bondage to the law; and in his doctrinal teaching he sought to show that in the Cross alone was to be found the secret as to how a righteous God could thus deal with sinners.

Rashdall's exposition of Pauline teaching somehow fails to come to grips with these fundamental points. He rightly interprets St. Paul as holding that God provides atonement; the change wrought by the work of Christ is within man; God's attitude toward men is one of constant love. But it is still conceivable that St.Paul's theory does more than Rashdall's to explain how God's constant love operates in removing the power and guilt of sin against which man himself is impotent. Once again, Rashdall's own teaching is at one with the apostle's to the extent that for the latter salvation (potential in this earthly life, actual at the Judgment) is contingent upon a man's actual moral state; but salvation is not the same as reconciliation.[1] St. Paul holds that men may become perfect in Christ

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1. Rashdall lays the whole stress on the technical term "justification"; he mentions "reconciliation" only in a note (cf. Atonement, pp. 124 f.); there his comment upon how infrequently the word is used takes account of the substantive only, and not of the verb.

and thus saved, only because they may be cleansed from guilt and may enter into right relations with God before they are themselves righteous; they are then able to combat sin and work out their own salvation because they do so as children of God, not as slaves to a moral law which, unaided, they are unable to fulfil. For him reconciliation and the assurance of forgiveness are causes of moral regeneration, liberating conditions which make possible the beginnings of righteousness. Rashdall, on the other hand, seems to make justification and reconciliation follow as consequences of moral change; a man must first become righteous to a degree by repenting, and by determining to alter his mode of living, and to that extent he thereby becomes "justified" in the sight of a righteous and loving God. Only the former teaching, as Protestantism has always held, provides a gospel for sinners. Rashdall, of course, does not regard man's own desire to improve morally as "meritorious", since this improvement is obligatory upon him; moreover, he holds that this desire is called forth in response to a revelation of God's love in Christ. He does not, then, conceive of man as becoming righteous in any degree without God's aid. Yet he overlooks two cardinal facts: (1) moral improvement cannot cancel guilt, and (2) however great this moral improvement may be, it remains woefully inadequate. Therefore his theory fails to answer two questions: (1) How can we be cleansed from guilt? (2) If restoration to fellowship with God is dependent upon man's actual moral condition, who then can be saved? St. Paul answers both of these questions by showing how the needs they express were fulfilled in a finished work, a redemptive act; this was necessarily God's work because nothing man can do will deliver him from the sin which otherwise would exclude him eternally from the presence of a righteous God; yet this is a work in which man can participate by union with

Christ. The idea that God's love thus initiates a redemptive act which appeases His wrath, may be distorted into a caricature; St. Paul, however, found revealed in the Cross at what great cost God's love operates in a manner consistent with His righteousness.

Without minimizing the necessity for moral change, the apostle taught that we may be saved by corporate unity with the living and dying of One who was perfect and yet identified Himself with sinners. Rashdall's purely individualistic interpretation of the sinner's relationship with God overlooks the corporate character of guilt. Moreover it implies that this relationship cannot be affected by what God does through His Son, except as this gracious gift awakens regenerative forces within the sinner; this neglects the fact that these regenerative forces, apart from their basis in the sinner's participation in Christ's redemptive act, do not of themselves overcome sin and guilt within the soul. Rashdall's own temperament rendered him incapable of appreciating St. Paul's doctrine of union with Christ; yet this doctrine was central to the apostle's conception of the substitutionary significance of the Atonement.[1]

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1. Rashdall contends that the idea that Christ was punished for our sins cannot be entirely eliminated from St. Paul's thought. Agreement with Rashdall's view would not affect the criticisms just offered; nevertheless there is much to be said against it. The sufferings of Christ do not have, in St. Paul's teaching, the same character as punishment that they would have had if a sinful man had been enduring them. Here the distinction involved is closely analogous to Anselm's; Rashdall seeks to show, however, that Anselm himself did not treat the distinction between "punishment" and "satisfaction" as absolute. (Cf. Atonement, pp. 351 f).

It is only because he fails to comprehend this essentially religious (and as most writers agree) mystical element, that Rashdall falls into the error of regarding the Pauline conception of redemption as primarily legalistic in temper.

Other respects in which his exposition of St. Paul's teaching is inadequate can be indicated only in barest outline. His radical distinction between formal and experiential aspects leads Rashdall to say that the apostle regards faith as mere intellectual belief;[1] and his later qualification of this statement would seem to invalidate the distinction on which it is based. Throughout the epistles, St. Paul primarily means by faith "trust in God"; it is by this attitude that the believer appropriates God's offer of forgiveness, and though it of course contains an intellectual element because it implies belief in God and His work of reconciliation, it transforms life because it establishes that relation whereby His love works within us.

Again, St. Paul's teaching concerning the Atonement is indeed couched in legal language; but to overlook the fact that he used such language to express a wholly new, non-legalistic meaning, is to miss the point of his conviction that the gospel offers deliverance from the idea of law.[2] Rashdall seems to think that the legalism of Latin theology was a logically inevitable extension, instead of a distortion, of the apostle's teaching, and he fails to do justice

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1. Cf. Atonement, p.108.
2. For example, Romans, Chs. 3 and 4 on the one hand and Ch.6 on the other, if they had been written by different men, might be said to present contradictory conceptions - the former being "legalistic," the latter "mystical;" but, as flowing from the thought and experience of one man, each passage must be interpreted in the light of the other.

to the manner in which Luther recovered St. Paul's conviction that the gospel brings freedom, not to disobey the law, but to fulfil and transcend it. This, and many other defects of Rashdall's treatment, seem to be the result of attempting to confine Christian soteriology wholly within ethical categories.

We must pass over comments which might be made concerning the chapters in his "Bampton Lectures" which trace the doctrine from apostolic times to the Reformation, except to observe that most of the objections which he urges against Anselm's theory would be assented to by writers who yet maintain that the significance of the Atonement cannot be restricted to a "moral influence" theory.

Because of his rather impatient scorn for the doctrine of justification by faith, Rashdall misrepresents Luther as he does St.Paul. In the case of Luther there might be some excuse for distinguishing, not between his theory and the demands of his own religious experience (for the latter gave rise to the former), but between the bald statement of his theory as a reaction against Roman Catholic views of merit, penance and grace, and the more temperate statements in which Luther looks beyond justification to its fruits. Rashdall unduly concentrates attention upon the former of these, and thus finds an undeniably large body of evidence in support of his thesis that Luther over-emphasizes intellectual assent to a particular belief and under-emphasizes the necessity for moral regeneration. However, in the light of his own admission that Luther says much which is diametrically opposed to these interpretations, Rashdall might have been less hasty in deciding as to which strain of thought represents Luther's "main intention". Many of the extreme statements which he quotes are taken from an early commentary on Romans, which Luther never published; Rashdall unwisely

follows Denifle[1] in stressing this manuscript.

Luther was chiefly concerned to deny that good works or moral transformation could be in any sense a ground of justification and acquittal; at that point there is an irreducible difference between his views and Rashdall's, although the latter, of course, does not fall into Roman Catholic ideas of merit and grace. So far as the subjective preconditions of justification are concerned, then, the Lutheran idea of faith stands over against good works in a sharp antithesis. But there is pervasive evidence to show that Luther regarded moral regeneration as a necessary result of justification. Therefore the contradiction underlying his statements about faith - (a) as mere intellectual assent, or (b) as involving dedication of the will to God in trust - can be at least partially resolved if one asks whether Luther is thinking primarily of the ground or of the effects of justification.

Rashdall's failure to weigh these two aspects of Luther's thought fairly does not affect, however, what he says in protest against the idea of vicarious punishment. Undeniably Luther departs from Pauline thought in viewing justification, in the first instance, as a change in God's attitude which is brought about because His demand for punishment has been fulfilled in Christ, irrespective of any change within the sinner. Rashdall's refutation of this conception is one which will be accepted by most English-speaking

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1. Who surely was unfair to Luther. Possibly Rashdall was influenced by a justifiable admiration for Denifle's work on the University of Paris.

theologians today.[1] Advocates of "objective" theories now lay the stress not upon acquittal (or the remission of punishment), but upon forgiveness; and they do not identify the two notions as Rashdall sometimes tends to do.

He seems to believe that repentance and the desire to become righteous make the individual no longer worthy of punishment. Luther too, for very different reasons, held that justification and the remission of punishment accompany one another. I think it is a radical misinterpretation of Christ's work to hold that He saves us from such temporal punishment as we do deserve, or to hold that we ever become so transformed in this life as to deserve it no longer. Rather, faith in Him transforms the spirit in which we bear this punishment. More important still, it ushers us into that filial relationship with God which ultimately regenerates us, and thus saves us from the final punishment which would have been ours if we had been left in the power of sin. But complete salvation from punishment, complete righteousness, is a condition which is ours in this earthly life only in anticipation and hope.

What Rashdall fails to explain (as we have seen) is how sinful men, who are never able to be perfectly righteous and loving, and who are therefore never worthy of fellowship with God, nevertheless may be assured of reconciliation. If we abstract the question from penal considerations, who is right, Rashdall or Luther, when we ask whether fellowship with God is founded upon our present obedience,

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1. J.K. Mozley, in criticizing Rashdall's book (cf. Theology, Vol. I, pp. 222 ff.), suggests that the penal theory can be so spiritualized as to be compatible with belief in God's love. That divine punishment is compatible with love need not be denied; yet the fact remains that punishment of the sinless Christ for the sake of acquitting the guilty can be neither loving nor just.

feeble as it is in the best of men, or whether it is founded upon a gracious gift whereby God, in Christ, overcame the disaster of sin at the cost of suffering? Is there any question as to which conception really assures us of a never-loosening bond with God the Father, and thus releases us from moral impotence and despair? Our own attempts to be loving are faltering and intermittent; what Christ has done for the race is for ever available to the contrite as a free and gracious offer of redemption. To say that repentance is the sole subjective condition necessary for forgiveness need not mean that it is a ground, a reason why forgiveness is offered at all. It may well be the case, then, that only because the reparation made by Christ furnishes an adequate ground of forgiveness, is repentance seen to be the sole human condition necessary for the receiving of it.

The foregoing comments have made sufficiently clear the fundamental respects in which Rashdall's own theory seems to me to be inadequate - not merely because it departs from the teaching of the Synoptists, St. Paul and Luther, concerning an objective connexion between the Atonement and forgiveness, but because the latter conception seems to account for God's reaction against sin and to acknowledge man's moral impotence in a manner more in keeping with our actual experience of need for and assurance of redemption. We must now conclude this critique with a few general remarks.

Rashdall's stress upon the essential compatibility between God's part and Christ's part in the Atonement is entirely acceptable to modern theologians, whatever their particular theory may be. The same holds true, I believe, concerning his insistence that the significance of Christ's death must not be isolated from the character and teaching of His entire ministry.

Because Rashdall recognizes the distinction between vicarious suffering[1] and vicarious punishment, there is less excuse for his wholesale rejection of the substitutionary - or better, "representative"- conception of Christ's death. This conception need not imply at all that His sufferings make ours superfluous. The real difference between Rashdall's theory and "representative" interpretations lies elsewhere.[2]

He would assert that the Cross reveals God's love in a manner which makes it possible for men to follow this same way of sacrifice and thus to become righteous. As such the Cross epitomizes the truth that God cannot achieve His good ends without the cost of suffering. Thus Rashdall might have connected it more explicitly than he does with his philosophical solution to the problem of evil. If he had done so the Resurrection must inevitably have taken on a significance wider than any which he accords to it; our Lord's endurance of suffering and His victory over death possess a meaning which philosophical arguments about evil and immortality may confirm, but which they can never fully express. It may also be observed, in passing, that his view of the Atonement is at this point compatible with the idea (which "objective" theories stress) that the Cross issues from a necessity, arising within the nature of God, for overcoming the barrier which sin erects between Him and His children.

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1. Space forbids a discussion of Moberly's conception of vicarious penitence on the part of Christ; despite Bishop Gore's remarks (cf. The Reconstruction of Belief, p.593), I find certain aspects of the idea an illuminating interpretation of our Lord's self-identification with sinful men; surely His sinlessness put no constraint upon His sympathetic understanding of remorse on the part of the sinful.
2. In what follows I have not sharply differentiated between what Prof. Aulén calls the "classic" and the "Latin" theories (cf. Christus Victor), because recent interpreters of an "objective" theory take over some elements from both, and leave others aside.

What, then, is the essential difference between this and the best form of the "objective" theory? In both, God is conceived as initiating the work of redemption, and repentance is regarded as the subjective condition whereby man appropriates this gracious gift. But in the former this repentance is held to be sufficient ground for the restoration of fellowship between God and man; in the latter repentance is regarded as necessary, but insufficient. The former, holding that repentance itself constitutes a moral change and contains the promise of further improvement, makes forgiveness dependent upon and proportional to the degree of righteousness which the believer has actually attained; the latter holds that the repentant sinner does not become, merely in virtue of his repentance, a worthy person whose goodness is such that he deserves forgiveness; he cannot deserve it; he can only accept it humbly, as a reconciliation brought about by God not by first making him righteous, but despite his sinfulness. In the former God brings about moral improvement within the believer in order that He may receive him again in fellowship; in the latter,God receives the contrite sinner unconditionally, and his moral improvement, his "satisfaction" is the fruit of this restored relationship.

Several considerations underlie these various respects in which the two theories stand in contrast to each other. Rashdall's rejection of a corporate for a purely individualistic theory of the Atonement makes it necessary for him to regard the redemption of the race as a process, while the objective theory regards it as a finished work. Of course he holds that Christ's work is "finished" in the sense that it

has made available, for all time, the means of redemption;[1] and, on the other hand, "objectivists" may agree that sanctification is a process. The difference between the two arises at a point where the latter view operates under the speculative disadvantage of having to express a cosmic significance in the Cross which transcends temporal categories. My own conviction is that the latter view meets a necessity of experience which yet escapes complete theoretical explanation; but I shall express as best I can what this view seems to imply. Whereas Rashdall sees in the Cross the promise that individual men can be rescued from sin and guilt, this latter view implies that in the Cross a work was accomplished which makes redemption available for the race before we ask it. In the one case redemption comes into being with the sinner's change of heart; in the other case, it is "waiting" for him before that change. Both theories represent God's attitude as one of changeless love, one of constant readiness to receive the contrite; both ground the experience of redemption in what God does. The real distinction between them arises in answer to questions concerning how this constant love is possible, and what it implies with regard to the specific nature of what God was doing in Christ. The "objectivist" argues that if God, who is righteous, yet receives the sinner, then this fact must be based upon something other than the actual condition of the sinner; for if the latter were the only factor to be taken into consideration, a

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1. Dr. K.E. Kirk (in Essays Catholic and Critical, pp.254-9, 274-6) has criticized Rashdall's theory as to how redemption is made available to the believer. Dr. Kirk contends that the "exemplarist" theory, if it is regarded as all-sufficing, is 'not only ... inadequate to human needs, but also profoundly inequitable' (op. cit., p.257), because the benefits of Christ's example will be appropriated by the believer in direct proportion to his capacity for imaginative response; and this capacity for imaginative quickening, on which moral improvement thus depends, is not a gift for which the individual is responsible, but one which varies with the 'accidents of heredity'. For this reason he argues that theories like Rashdall's are 'more unethical and arbitrary than any but the most absolute Predestinarianism'. (Ibid., p.258).

righteous God would merely condemn the sinful and receive the obedient; in that case we should all fall under condemnation, we should all remain in bondage to the law. While if God's love prompted Him simply to receive the sinner unhampered, "letting by-gones be by-gones," then how could He be at the same time righteous - and, above all, why was it necessary for Him to permit His Son to be crucified? Rashdall has his own answer to the latter question, but his reply to the former contention is utterly inadequate. And this in turn reveals an important deficiency in his interpretation of the Cross; for he fails to emphasize that it is a revelation of God's reaction against sin, as well as a revelation of God's love.

I have suggested that the "objective" theory implies a view of redemption which transcends temporal categories. In other words, unless one is willing to support the difficult thesis that at a point in time God changed His attitude toward sinners, the Cross must be taken as the full revelation in time of what is eternally the harmonizing bond between love and righteousness within God's nature.[1] Rashdall's own treatment of the problem of the temporal and the eternal is so inadequate that he never reaches the conception of redemption as a working out, in the sphere of created being, of what is eternally actual - that is, "accomplished$_x$", "finished$_x$",- in the divine sphere.

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1. Thus it is possible, I believe, to transcend the antinomy which Aulén sets between the classic theory, which represents the Atonement as a continuous divine work, and the Anselmic or Latin theory which represents it as "finished$_x$". (Cf. Christus Victor, pp.21 f). In so far as the former involves a conception of God as "changing His own attitude" (cf. ibid., p.22), it seems to me to be unintelligible - unless this is merely a figurative expression. On the basis of an objective theory, only some such significance as is suggested above will explain how Christ could declare sins to be forgiven during His earthly ministry (cf. Mk. 2:3-12); the strict Anselmic interpretation cannot account for forgiveness prior to the Crucifixion.

Furthermore, his conception of the Incarnation does not make it possible for him to affirm that the personality of Christ is identical with the personality of God; the Atonement, for him, is what God does through Christ, not, strictly, in Christ. Doubtless he would not regard this fact as a decisive objection, because he claims that God takes the initiative in redemption, working through Christ as Mediator. But it is an indispensable part of the objective theory just described that both the cost of sin and the triumph of love, which are manifest in the Cross, shall be understood as falling literally within the sphere of God's own Being.

The corporate aspect of this theory, which is indispensable to any adequate account of how guilt is removed, does not necessarily involve a form of identification between personalities. The figure of the body and its members can be so employed as to do justice to the fact that salvation means being made perfect in Christ without losing personal identity; the figure is one of unity through communion, not through fusion.[1] Rashdall still might protest that this opposing theory entails an immoral conception of imputed righteousness. The difficulties of this conception are undeniable; yet in its best form it does not mean that God counts us as righteous whether or not we shall ever become so. Here again, the conception represents an effort to express a truth which transcends temporal categories: what man, in time, can only anticipate as future is, in the supernatural Kingdom, eternally actual; unless redemption be viewed as corporate, what Christ did cannot, of course, be regarded as actualizing for the race a perfect obedience which men do not fulfil in time, but which they may fulfil in eternity through union with Christ.

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1. This is doubly clear in the Pauline conception of a resurrected spiritual body.

Finally, this supra-temporal reference seems to me to have good foundation in the apocalyptic aspects of Christ's conception of the Kingdom. His call to repentance was one which set the urgent necessity for establishing right relations with God while we are yet sinners, above any conception of the progressive moralization of the race. How can the "moral influence" theory really account for His invitation to publicans and harlots?

Conclusion.

It would be superfluous for me to attempt a synthesis here of the "conclusions" which have been emerging throughout the preceding pages. My remarks on Christian doctrine have been coloured by the conviction that a "rationalistic" theology like Rashdall's, which attempts merely to move logically from the sphere of the human to the sphere of the divine, can never do justice to unique elements in the Christian revelation which must be received prior to speculation. On the other hand, I have written with the conviction that the true distinction between natural and revealed theology is merely one which marks the difference between God's direct and His mediated self-expression. A theology which makes this distinction absolute, assigning revelation and reason to different spheres, fails to show the revelance of direct revelation for human life in this world; by renouncing natural theology, it neglects such relationships as can be established between revealed knowledge and our demands for intellectual satisfaction. Knowledge of God is wider than ratiocination, but it is not irrational. There is no simple formula for showing how the uniqueness of the Eternal and its relevance for the temporal can be brought into fruitful harmony; but the task which man's

nature as a thinking being lays upon theologians to-day, as in the past, cannot be shirked. We may well learn afresh from Barthianism some of the dangers of extreme rationalism; but Rashdall's system is at least a salutary reminder that revelation (although our conception of it may differ from his) can and does satisfy the reason and conscience.

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"The Spiritual Independence of the Church". pp. 331-44.
"Divorce: The Question of Principle". pp. 566-75.

VIII. (1918-19). "The Validity of Religious Experiecne". pp. 302-15. (Cf. ID. Ch. I).

X. (1920-21). Review of Peter Green: The Problem of Evil. pp. 437-441.
"Reunion and the Lambeth Proposals". pp. 518-24.
"The Creed of the Re-united Church". pp. 570 f.

XI. (1921-22). Review of E.W. Hirst: Self and Neighbour. pp. 35-39.
"Christ as Logos and Son of God". pp. 278-86. (Cf. JHD. Ch. I and GM. Ch. II)

Modern Churchman (Continued).
Vol. XI. (1921-22) "Some Plain Words to Bishop Gore". I - pp. 469-80.
XII. (1922-23). "Some Plain Words to Bishop Gore". II - pp. 6-28 (Cf. G.M. Ch. III).
III - pp. 196-213 (Cf. GM Ch. IV).
"The Present Value of the Creeds". pp. 444-51.
XIII. (1923-24). "What is the Church?" pp. 21-29.
A letter, with others, on "The Grounds of Divorce". pp. 162 f.
"The Broad Church Party". (Cf. CE. XXIV). (A Sermon). pp. 648-60.

The Nation.
1909. Two letters on Curzon's Red Book (concerning Oxford).

Oxford Historical Society.
(1890). Introduction to "The Friar Preachers vs. the
Vol. XVI. University, 1311-13".

Oxford Magazine.
Oct. 29, 1884. A letter on the Broad Church Party.
Feb. 27, 1907. Review of Paulsen: German Universities.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
Vol. I. (1891). "The Principle of Authority in Its Relation to
(No. 4). Morals". pp. 96-110.
N.S. V. (1904-5). "Moral Objectivity and Its Postulates". pp. 1-28.
VI. (1905-6). "Causality and the Principles of Historical Evidence". pp. 1-34.
"Can Logic Abstract from the Psychological Conditions of Thinking?" (with Bosanquet and Schiller). pp. 247-55.
VII. (1906-7). "Nicholas de Ultricuria, A Medieval Hume". pp. 1-27.
Supplementary Vol. No. 2. (1919): Problems of Science and Philosophy
Symposium III: "Can Individual Minds Be Included in the Mind of God?" (with Muirhead, Schiller and C.F. D'Arcy). pp. 109-23.

Review of Theology and Philosophy.
Vol. I. (1905-6). Review of J.L. de Lanessan: La Morale des Religions. pp. 338-44.
III. (1907-8). Review of Harald Höffding: The Philosophy of Religion. pp. 316-31.
V. (1909-10) Review of G. Galloway: The Principles of Religious Development. pp. 713-20.

Theology - A Journal of Historic Christianity.
Vol. I. (1920). "The Relation Between Philosophy and Theology". pp. 196-210.

(iv) - Unpublished Papers. *

(In the Library of Pusey House, Oxford).
(The following list is a selection from several hundred manuscripts; it includes all papers referred to in this thesis).

Divorce.
Preaching and Teaching.
The Duties of Electors. (Preached in Carlisle Cathedral, Dec. 8, 1918).
Buddhism.
Conscience. (Carlisle, Sept. 2, 1917).
Conscience and God. (Carlisle, Sept. 9, 1917).
Conscience and Christ. (Carlisle, Sept. 16, 1917).
Ritschl and Harnack. (Read before the Wadham Clerical Society, Nov. 1902).
Miracles.
Three Great Devotional Books. (A Kempis: Imitatio Christi; Law: Serious Call; Seeley: Ecce Homo).
Address to the Durham Branch of the Churchmen's Union. (1922?).
Heaven or Earth. (Preached in Hereford Cathedral, Mar. 30, 1913).

The Philosophical Basis of Theism. (A Lecture. Occasion not Recorded).
The Existence of God. (Preached in Lincoln's Inn, 1901).
God a Person. (Preached in Westminster Abbey, Septuagesima, 1923).
The Essentials of Christianity.
God not Unknowable. (Westminster Abbey, 1904).
The Eternal Purpose. (Carlisle, Nov. 2, 1919).
Spiritualism and Immortality. (Carlisle, April 4, 1920).
The Body of the Lord. (Carlisle, June 23, 1918).
The Appendix to St. Mark. (Hereford, April 14, 1912).
The Bearing of Recent Psychological Investigation upon Religion. (Re Sabatier and James).

The Philosophy of Revelation.
The Study of Dogmatic Theology.
The Study of Dogmatics. (Read before a Cambridge (?) Clerical Society 1920).
The Place of Dogma in Education.
The Person of Christ. (Read before the Church Congress, Sept. (?) 1920).
Punishment. (Carlisle).
Punishment, Human and Divine. (Lincoln's Inn, 1899).
For Sermons on Faith. (Carlisle?, 1919?).
Faith and Love. (Carlisle, Mar. 2, 1919).
The Gospel of the Cross. (Carlisle, Mar, 24, 1918).
The Fall of Man. (Preached in New College Chapel, Mar. 14, 1898).
Original Sin. (Carlisle? Feb. 8, 1920).
The Service of Intercession. (Carlisle, May 5, 1918).
The Equipment of the Modern Clergyman. (Hereford, June 11, 1911).

* Unpublished so far as I know.

(v) - Letters to Newspapers and Periodicals.

(A Selection.)

Daily Telegraph.	Nov. 24, 1910.	Testimony before the Royal Commission on Divorce.
London Times.	Mar. 31, 1899.	On Theological Colleges.
	Nov. 15, 1902.	On Freedom of Thought. (Signed, "Another Presbyter").
	Sept. and Oct., 1903.	Concerning "Greats".
	June 3, 1903.	On Athleticism.
	April 20, 1906.	On Religious Education.
	July 8, 1909.	On Oxford Scholarships,
	March 1911.	Controversy with Prof. Goudy on Divorce.
	Mar. 22, 1913.	Open Theological Degrees at Oxford.
	Feb. 27, 1919.	Concerning the Enabling Bill.
	Nov. 15, 1923.	Joint Letter concerning Reparations.
The Guardian.	1902.	Review of Seebohm Rowntree: Poverty.
	Nov. 4 and 18 1921.	Letters to Canon Lacey concerning the Girton Controversy.
Yorkshire Post.	August 1920.	Concerning the Lambeth Conference.

For letters to friends concerning philosophical and theological topics, see Percy Matheson: The Life of Hastings Rashdall, especially pp. 103, 110, 167, and 182 (respectively, to Percy Gardner, C.C.J. Webb, Claude Montefiore, and A.E. Taylor).
See also Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends. (Edited by J.H. Muirhead). pp. 195 and 221 f. London 1935.

2. Direct Criticisms of Rashdall's Writings.

(An asterisk indicates that the entire volume has been read or re-read in connexion with the preparation of this thesis; other citations are to specific passages or to works which were used for reference purposes. In every case, however, the items in parenthesis indicate where direct references to Rashdall may be found; if there is a single continous discussion of his work, I cite the pages; if there are several scattered comments, I refer to the index).

(i) - Books.

* Percy E. Matheson: The Life of Hastings Rashdall. Oxford. 1928. (In toto; see especially Chapter XIII by C.C.J. Webb; "Rashdall as Philosopher and Theologian".)

Chapter I - Moral Theory.

F.H. Bradley: Collected Essays. Vol. I. Oxford. 1935. (p. 164 n.)

* E.F. Carritt: The Theory of Morals. London. 1928. (cf. "Analysis", pp. vi. ff.)

* M.E. Clarke: A Study in the Logic of Value Theory. London. 1929. (cf. index).

A.C. Ewing: The Morality of Punishment. London. 1929. (pp. 26 ff., etc. cf. index).

F.H. Hayward: The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick. London. 1901. (pp. 265 ff.)

E.W. Hirst: Self and Neighbour. London. 1919. (pp. 163 ff.)

* H.W.B. Joseph: Some Problems in Ethics. Oxford. 1931. (pp. 100 f., etc. cf. index).

Wm. McDougall: An Introduction to Social Psychology. 6th Edition. London. 1913. First published, 1908. (cf. index).

* J.H. Muirhead: Rule and End in Morals. London. 1932. (cf. index.)

* R.B. Perry: General Theory of Value. New York. 1926. (cf. index).

* E.A. Westermarck: Ethical Relativity. London. 1932. (cf. index).

Chapter II - Christian Ethics.

A.B.D. Alexander: Christianity and Ethics. London. 1914. (cf. index).

Peter Green: The Problem of Right Conduct. London. 1931. (cf. index).

K.E. Kirk: Conscience and Its Problems. London. 1927. (cf. index).

George Walker: The Idealism of Christian Ethics. Edinburgh. 1929. (cf. index).

Chapter III - Theism and Metaphysics.

* John Baillie: The Interpretation of Religion. New York. 1933. (cf. index).

E.W. Barnes: Scientific Theory and Religion. Cambridge. 1933. (cf. index).

* E.S. Brightman: The Problem of God. New York. 1930. (pp. 29 and 180 ff.)

C.F. D'Arcy: God and Freedom in Human Experience. London. 1915. (pp. 92 ff.)

* A.C. Ewing: Idealism. London. 1934. (cf. index).

L.R. Farnell: The Attributes of God. Oxford. 1925. (cf. index).

* G.D. Hicks: Berkeley. "Leaders of Philosophy Series". London. 1932. (pp. 309 ff).

R.F.A. Hoernlé: Matter, Life, Mind and God. Ch. V. London. 1923. (cf. index).

K.E. Kirk: Some Principles of Moral Theology. London. 1920. (cf. index).

* A.C. Knudson: The Philosophy of Personalism. New York. 1927. (cf. index).

* W.R. Inge: Vale. London. 1934. (p. 54 et seq.)

E.N. Merrington: The Problem of Personality. London. 1916. (pp. 122 ff.)

* A.S. Pringle-Pattison: The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy. London. 1917. (pp. 387 ff.)

S. Radhakrishnan: The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy. London. 1920. (pp. 392 ff).

H.M. Relton: Some Postulates of a Christian Philosophy. London. 1925. (pp. 107 ff., etc. cf. index).

F.C.S. Schiller: Studies in Humanism. London. 1907. (cf. index).

* W.R. Sorley: Moral Values and the Idea of God. 3rd Edition. Cambridge. 1924. (pp. 347 ff.)

A.E. Taylor: Elements of Metaphysics. London. 1903. (cf. index).

(Chapter III, continued).

* A.E. Taylor: Essay entitled "The Freedom of Man", in Contemporary British Philosophy (Edited by J.H. Muirhead), Vol. II, pp. 270-304. London. 1925. (cf. index).

* The Faith of a Moralist. Two Vols. London. 1930. (cf. index).

* F.R. Tennant: Philosophical Theology. Two Vols. Cambridge. 1928. (30). (cf. index).

Jean Wahl: The Pluralist Philosophies of England and America. London. 1925. (pp. 203 ff., etc. cf. index).

James Ward: The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism. 2nd Edition. Cambridge. 1912. (pp. 321 and 404).

Essays in Philosophy. Cambridge 1927. (pp. 179 f).

E.S. Waterhouse: Modern Theories of Religion. London. 1910. (pp. 289 ff.)

The Philosophical Approach to Religion. (cf. index).

John Watson: The Philosophical Basis of Religion. Glasgow. 1907. (pp. 108 ff.)

* C.C.J. Webb: God and Personality. London. 1918. (pp. 135 ff.)

* A Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850. Oxford. 1933. (cf. index).

A.C. Widgery: Contemporary Thought of Great Britain. London. 1927. (pp. 205 ff.)

Chapter IV - Christian Doctrine.

* Gustaf Aulén: Christus Victor. Translated by A.G. Hebert. London. 1931. (cf. index).

* John Baillie: The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity. Edinburgh. 1929. (cf. index).

* C.F. Burney: The Old Testament Conception of Atonement Fulfilled by Christ (A Sermon): with a Criticism of Dr. Rashdall's Bampton Lectures. London. (Oxford Press). 1920. (In toto.)

* Charles Gore: The Reconstruction of Belief, (being Belief in God; Belief in Christ; The Holy Spirit and the Church). One volume edition. London. 1926. (cf. index).

* The Philosophy of the Good Life. Everyman Edition. London. 1935. (cf. index).

* L.W. Grensted: (Editor): The Atonement in History and Life. London. 1929. (cf. index).

(Chapter IV, continued)

A.C. Headlam: Christian Theology: The Doctrine of God. Oxford. 1934. (cf. index).

* H.D.A. Major: English Modernism. Cambridge, Mass. U.S.A. 1927. (cf. index).

* A.E.J. Rawlinson: (Editor): Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation. London. 1928 (cf. index).

* Wm. Sanday: Christologies Ancient and Modern. Oxford. 1910. (pp. 75 ff).

* E.G. Selwyn: (Editor): Essays Catholic and Critical. London. 1926. (pp 254 ff. and 274 ff. in the essay, "The Atonement", by K.E. Kirk).

* W.J. Sparrow Simpson: Modernism and the Person of Christ. London. 1923. (In toto).

* C.C.J. Webb: Problems in the Relations of God and Man. London. 1915. (cf. index).

* Divine Personality and Human Life. London. 1920. (pp. 174 ff).

(ii) - Journals.

Blackfriars.
Vol. II. (1921-22) Vincent McNabb: "Our Lord Jesus Christ's Knowledge of His Divinity". pp. 389-400.
John B. Reeves: "Bishop Gore and the Anglican Modernists". pp. 467-70.
Vincent McNabb: "Review of the Modern Churchman for September 1921". pp. 509 f.
Vincent McNabb: "Did Jesus Christ Claim to Be God?". pp. 582-91.

Church Quarterly Review.
Vol. LV. (Oct. 1902-Jan 1903). "Religion in Oxford". pp. 1-23.

Vol. XC. (April-July 1920).
T. B. Strong: "The Christian Doctrine of Atonement". pp. 219-33.

Vol. XCIII. (Oct. 1921-Jan.1922).
H. L. Goudge: "The Interpretation of the New Testament". pp. 1-24.
W. J. Sparrow Simpson: "Forgiveness in the Teaching of Christ and His Apostles". pp. 34-51.
A. C. Headlam: "The Modernist Christology". pp. 201-32.

Vol. C. (April-July 1925).
W. R. Matthews: "Three Philosophers on Religion". pp. 112-38.
Hilda Oakeley: "The Idea of the Kingdom of Heaven in Human Experience". pp. 330-54.

Commonwealth:
Vol. XXVI. (Nov. 1921). O. C. Quick: "Orthodoxy and Dr. Rashdall". pp. 287 ff.

Critical Review.
Vol. VI. (1896). T. M. Lindsay: Review of Rashdall's Medieval Universities. pp 351-58.

Vol. XII. (1902). S.D.F. Salmond: Review of Contentio Veritatis. pp. 360 ff.
H. R. Mackintosh: Review of Personal Idealism. pp. 530-39.

Economic Review.
Vol. XVII. (1907). W.H. Moberly: Review of The Theory of Good and Evil. pp. 480-87.

Hibbert Journal.
Vol. I. (1902). Percy Gardner: Review of Contentio Veritatis. pp. 397 ff.

Hibbert Journal. (continued).

Vol. I. (1902). C.B. Upton: Review of Personal Idealism. pp. 403-7.

Vol. VI. (1907-8). G.E. Moore: Review of The Theory of Good and Evil. pp. 446 ff.

Vol. XIII. (1914-15). W.R. Matthews: Review of Is Conscience an Emotion? pp. 926 f.

Vol. XIV. (1915-16). Hilda Oakeley: Review of The Faith and the War. pp. 649 ff.

Vol. XVIII. (1919-20-..H.R. Mackintosh: Review of The Idea of Atonement. pp. 607-13.

Vol. XIX. (1920-21). Wm. McDougall: "Is Conscience an Emotion?" pp. 279-95

Vol. XX. (1921-22). F.J. Foakes-Jackson: "The Cambridge Conference". pp. 193-207.

Vol. XX. H.D.A. Major: "Modern Churchman or Unitarians?" pp. 208-219.

M.D. Petre: "The Impasse of Modern Christology". pp. 401-10.

E.J. Bidwell: "Modernist Christology and the Plain Man". pp. 411-18.

S.H. Mellone: "Modern Churchmen and Unitarians". pp. 419-34.

Vol. XXIX. (1930-31). J.C. Mantrip: Review of God and Man. pp. 375-8.

International Journal of Ethics.

Vol. IX. (1898-99). R. Latta: Review of Doctrine and Development. pp. 398-401.

Vol. XIII. (1902-3). J.M.E. McTaggart: Review of Personal Idealism. pp. 246-51.

Vol. XVIII. (1907-8). J.H. Muirhead: Review of The Theory of Good and Evil. pp. 382-6.

Vol. XXIV. (1913-14). Sydney Watertow: Review of Ethics. pp. 98 ff.

Vol. XXV. (1914-15). F.C. Sharp: Review of Is Conscience an Emotion? pp. 540 ff.

Vol. XXVII. (1916-17). T.S. Eliot: Review of Conscience and Christ. pp. 111 f.

Journal of Philosophy.

Vol. IV. (1907). A.R. Gifford: Review of The Theory of Good and Evil. pp. 549-53.

Vol. XIII. (1916). F.C. Lamont: Review of Is Conscience an Emotion? pp. 498 ff.

Journal of Theological Studies.

Vol. IV. (1902-3). W. Sanday: Review of Contentio Veritatis. pp. 1-16.

Vol. VI. (1904-5). J.H.F. Peile: Review of Christus in Ecclesia. pp. 472 f.

Vol. XV. (1914) V.H. Stanton: Review of Property, Its Duties and Rights pp. 622-28.

Vol. XXI. (1920). John Oman: Review of The Idea of Atonement. pp. 267-75.

Liberal Churchman.

Vol. I. (1904-5). W.D. Morrison: "Dr. Rashdall's Sermons". (A Review of Christus in Ecclesia). pp. 208-21.

Mind.

Vol. XII. (1903). Wm. James: Review of Personal Idealism. pp. 93-97.

G.H. Howison: "Concerning Personal Idealism". pp. 225 ff.

Vol XVI. (1907). James Seth; Review of The Theory of Good and Evil. pp. 588-98.

Vol. XVIII. (1909). John Watson: "Mr Rashdall's Defence of Personal Idealism". pp. 244-51.

Vol. XXI. (1912). R.F.A. Hoernlé: Review of "The Metaphysics of F.H. Bradley". pp. 589.

Vol. XXIV. (1915). L.J. Russell: Review of Is Conscience an Emotion? pp. 412-16.

Vol XXVI. (1917). E.W. Hirst: "Moral Sense, Moral Reason and Moral Sentiment". pp. 146-61.

G. Galloway: Review of Conscience and Christ. pp. 361-65.

Vol. XXVIII. (1919) A.S. Pringle-Pattison: "A Reply to Some Criticisms on The Idea of God". pp. 1-18.

Vol. XXXVIII. (1929). John Laird: Review of Ideas and Ideals. pp. 120 f.

Modern Churchman.

Vol. II. (1912-13). A.C. Jennings: A letter entitled "Does not Mention-Does not Know. pp. 60.

Modern Churchman, (Continued).

Vol. V. (1915-16). R.B. Tollinton: Review of The Faith and the War. pp. 528-37.

Vol. VI. (1916-17). Alfred Fawkes: Review of Conscience and Christ. pp. 225-29.

Vol. VII. (1917-18). H.D.A. Major: "The New Dean of Carlisle". pp. 97-102.

Vol. IX. (1919-20). M.G. Glazebrook: Review of The Idea of Atonement. pp. 541-48.

Vol. XI. (1921-22). Criticisms of the Cambridge Conference: cf. pp. 349, 365, 524, 559.

Vol. XII. (1922-23). H.D.A. Major: Review of Jesus, Human and Divine. p. 101.

Vol. XIII. (1923-24). H.D.A. Major: "Hastings Rashdall". pp. 634-42.

Vol. XIV. (1924-25). J.S. Bezzant: "Bishop Gore as a Christian Apologist".
I - pp. 518-28.
II - pp. 575-86.

Vol. XVII. (1927-28). J.S. Bezzant: Review of Principles and Precepts. pp. 217 ff.

P.J. Kirkby: "Hastings Rashdall". pp. 481-88.

Vol XVIII. (1928-29). G.L.H. Harvey: Review of Ideas and Ideals. pp. 213-16.

H.D.A. Major: Review of Matheson's Biography of Rashdall. pp. 274 f.

Oxford Magazine.

Vol. XLII. (Feb. 14, 1924). H.W.B. Joseph: "The Late Dean of Carlisle". pp. 275 ff.

Philosophical Review:

Vol. XII. (1903). A.K. Rogers: Review of Personal Idealism. pp. 577 ff.

Vol. XIV. (1905). H.N. Gardiner: Review of Christus in Ecclesia. pp. 735 ff.

Vol. XVII. (1908). W. Caldwell: Review of The Theory of Good and Evil. pp. 191-99.

Vol. XXI. (1912). H.W. Stuart: Review of Philosophy and Religion. pp. 82-87.

Vol. XXV. (1916). W.K. Wright. Review of Is Conscience an Emotion? pp. 81 ff.

W.K. Wright: "Conscience as Reason and as Emotion". pp. 676-91.

Philosophical Review (Continued.)
Vol. XXX. (1921). J.G. Riddell: "The New Intuitionism of Dr. Rashdall and Dr. Moore". pp. 545-65.

Vol. XXXV. (1925). W.C. Swabey: Review of The Theory of Good and Evil. (Second Edition). pp. 179 ff.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
Vol. VI. (1905-6). Symposium: "Can Logic Abstract from the Psychological Conditions of Thinking?"
Essays and Replies by F.C.S. Schiller and B. Bosanquet: pp. 224,46; 256-70.

Supplementary Volume No. 2. (1919).
Symposium: "Can Individual Minds Be Included in the Mind of God?"
J. H. Muirhead: pp. 124-34.
F.C.S. Schiller: pp. 135-47.
C.F. D'Arcy: pp. 148-58.

Review of Theology and Philosophy.
Vol. I. (1905-6). W.P. Paterson: Review of Christus in Ecclesia. pp. 424-28.

Vol. III. (1907-8). J.W. Scott: Review of The Theory of Good and Evil. pp. 522-27.

Vol. VII. (1911-12). S.H. Mellone: "A Survey of Recent Works on the Philosophy of Religion". pp. 387-96.

Vol. IX. (1913-14). R.F.A. Hoernlé: Review of "The Metaphysics of F.H. Bradley". pp. 54 ff. (Cf. Mind. Vol. XXI).

Theology. - A Journal of Historic Christianity.
Vol. I. (1920). J.K. Mozley: "Recent Work on the Atonement". pp. 222-32.

Vol. IV. (1922). P.L. Snowden: "Dr. Rashdall's Theory of the Atonement".
(I) - pp. 30-41.
(II) - pp. 99-101.

Vol. XVI. (1928). F.H. Brabant: Review of Principles and Precepts. pp. 116 f.

Vol. XVIII. (1929). W.J. Sparrow Simpson: Review of Ideas and Ideals. pp. 55 f.

(See also the files of The Church Times and The Guardian, especially for September - December,1921).

3. General Critical Material.

(An asterisk indicates that the entire volume has been read or re-read in connexion with the preparation of this thesis; other citations are for the most part to works to which Rashdall has referred in his writings. Some volumes in the following list contain incidental references to Rashdall).

(i) - Books.

Chapter I - Moral Theory.

* T.K. Abbott (Translator): Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. 3rd Edition. London. 1883.

* C.D. Broad: Five Types of Ethical Theory. London. 1930.

* F.H. Bradley: Ethical Studies. 2nd Edition. Oxford. 1927.

* T.H. Green: Prolegomena to Ethics. 2nd Edition. Oxford. 1884.

L.T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution. Two Vols. London. 1906.

* The Rational Good. London. 1921.

Wm. James: The Will to Believe. pp. 184-215. New York. 1897.

* John Laird: A Study in Moral Theory. London. 1926.

* The Idea of Value. Cambridge. 1929.

* G.E. Moore: Principia Ethica. Cambridge. 1903.

* Ethics. "Home University Library Series". Sixth Impression. London. 1930. First published, 1912.

Philosophical Studies. Chapters VIII-X. London. 1922.

* W.D. Ross: The Right and the Good. Oxford. 1930.

* Henry Sidgwick: The Methods of Ethics. Sixth Edition. London. 1901.

J.L. Stocks: The Limits of Purpose. London. 1932.

E.A. Westermarck: The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. Two Vols. London. 1906 (08).

Chapter II - Christian Ethics.

* G.F. Barbour: A Philosophical Study of Christian Ethics. Edinburgh and London. 1911.

* F.R. Barry: The Relevance of Christianity. London. 1931.

W.R. Inge: Christian Ethics and Modern Problems, Chapters I and II. London. 1930.

* Reinhold Niebuhr: An Interpretation of Christian Ethics. New York. 1935.

* E.F. Scott: The Ethical Teaching of Jesus. London. 1924.

Newman Smyth: Christian Ethics. 3rd Edition. Edinburgh. 1894.

Chapter III - Theism and Metaphysics.

George Berkeley: Works. Edited by A.C. Fraser. Oxford. 1901.
Vol. I. - Commonplace Book pp. 1 - 92.
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. pp. 211 - 348
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. pp. 349 - 486.
Vol. II. - Alciphron; or, The Minute Philosopher. pp. 1 - 368.
Vol. III. - Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflections, etc. pp. 115 - 300.

* A.J. Balfour: Theism and Humanism. London. 1915.
* G.F. Barbour: The Ethical Approach to Theism. Edinburgh and London. 1913.
* Bernard Bosanquet: The Principle of Individuality and Value. London. 1912.
The Value and Destiny of the Individual. London. 1913.
* F.H. Bradley: Appearance and Reality. London. 1893.
Essays on Truth and Reality, Chapter XV. Oxford. 1914.
* C.D. Broad: Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism. Cambridge. 1934.
* R.G. Collingwood: Religion and Philosophy. London. 1916.
Peter Green: The Problem of Evil. London. 1920.
* L.T. Hobhouse: Development and Purpose. London. 1913.
* W.E. Hocking: The Meaning of God in Human Experience. New Haven. 1912.
* The Self: Its Body and Freedom. New Haven. 1928.
* R.F.A. Hoernlé: Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics. London. 1920.
Idealism, Chapters II and III. London. 1924.
* David Hume: Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd Edition. Impression of 1927. Oxford.
* Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Edited by Norman Kemp Smith. Oxford. 1935.
* Harald Höffding: The Philosophy of Religion. Translated by B.E. Meyer. London. 1906.
J.R. Illingworth: Personality, Human and Divine. London. 1896.
W.R. Inge: Personal Idealism and Mysticism. 2nd Impression. London. 1907.
Outspoken Essays. First Series, Chapter XI. 13th Impression. London. 1925.
Second Series, Chapter III. 7th Impression. London. 1926.
John Laird: Problems of the Self. London. 1917.
* E.W. Lyman: The Meaning and Truth of Religion. New York. 1933.
* H.R. Mackintosh: Some Aspects of Christian Belief. London. 1923.

Chapter IV, (Continued).

R.S. Franks: The Atonement. London. 1934.
Charles Gore: The Incarnation of the Son of God. Bampton Lectures for 1891. London. 1891.
Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation. London. 1896.
(Editor): Lux Mundi. 15th Edition. London. 1904. First published, 1889.
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